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   Table of Contents
Title Page
Introduction
About This Book
Overview
PLACEBO
The Placebo Effect. Steven Novella 
The Rise of Placebo Medicine. Steven Novella
The Placebo Myth. Mark Crislip
Michael Specter on the Placebo Effect | S Novella
Placebo Again. | M Crislip
Placebo Myths Debunked | S Novella
The Placebo Narrative | S Novella
The myth of the magically powerful placebo returns | D Gorski
Do physicians really believe in placebos? Peter Lipson
The rebranding of CAM as “harnessing the power of placebo” | D Gorski
Placebo effects are not the “power of positive thinking” | D Gorski
Is “harnessing the power of placebo” worthwhile to treat anything? | D Gorski
Placebo Effect Revisited | S. Novella
Studying Placebo Effects. Steven Novella
Placebo Effects Revisited. Steven Novella.
Placebo, Are You There? | H Hall
Placebo by Conditioning | S Novella
Behold the spin! What a new survey of placebo prescribing really tells us | S Gavura
Adventures in defending science-based medicine in cancer journals: Energy chelation | D Gorski
Does thinking make it so? CAM placebo fantasy versus scientific reality | D Gorski
Can the mind really heal the body? The false narrative of placebo “healing” revisited | D Gorski
The Placebo Gene? | S Novella
Are placebo effects genetically determined? | D Gorski
Mr Hyde – The Dark Side of Placebo Effect | T Witkowski
Dummy Medicine, Dummy Doctors, and a Dummy Degree, Part 2.2: Harvard Medical School and the Curious Case of Ted Kaptchuk, OMD (cont. again). Kimball Atwood
Are Placebos Getting Stronger? | S Novella
Should placebos be used in randomized controlled trials of surgical interventions? | D Gorski
The use of placebo controls in clinical trials | D Weinberg
Placebos as Medicine: The Ethics of Homeopathy. Scott Gavura 
Cure Is About Caring, Not Curing: Placebos, Alternative Medicine, and Patient Comfort | H Hall
The Ethics of Deception in Medicine. Steven Novella 
Is the use of “Open-Label” Placebo Ethical in the Treatment of Children? | C Jones
Sterile Water Injections for Pain Relief. Harriet Hall
Spin City: Using placebos to evaluate objective and subjective responses in asthma. David Gorski
Placebos in the news again. David Gorski
On the dangers of using valid placebo controls in clinical trials of acupuncture. David Gorski
Placebo effects without deception? Well, not exactly… David Gorski.
Benedetti on Placebos. Harriet Hall
Followup: Benedetti on Placebo Ethics | H Hall
A world-renowned placebo researcher asks, “Does placebo research boost pseudoscience?” | D Gorski
Placebo Effect for Pain. Steven Novella.
Cries the acupuncturist, “Medicine is biased against us, and there’s a double standard!” | D Gorski
Can we finally just say that acupuncture is nothing more than an elaborate placebo? | D Gorski
Vertebroplasty for compression fractures due to osteoporosis: Placebo medicine. David Gorski.
The Prostrate Placebo
Incorporating Placebos into Mainstream Medicine. Harriet Hall.
It’s All in Your Head. Steven Novella 
Asthma, placebo, and how not to kill your patients. Peter Lipson 
Revisiting Daniel Moerman and “placebo effects” David Gorski 
A Different Perspective: Placebo, SCAM, and Advertising | M Crislip
CAM: The Beer Goggles of Medicine.Mark Crislip 
Placebo Speculations | M Crislip
Placebo Prescriptions. Scott Gavura.
Homeopathy and the Selling of Nonspecific Effects. Steven Novella.
A Credible Placebo Control for Chiropractic Research | H Hall
Is There a Placebo Effect for Animals? David Ramey
Adjectives | M Crislip
The Magic Feather Effect: Placebos and the Power of Belief in Alternative Medicine | H Hall
The “It Worked for Me” Gambit | S Novella
ORBITA: Another clinical trial demonstrating the need for sham controls in surgical trials | D Gorski
Psychological Placebos | S Novella
Science-Based Medicine Reviews: Placebo 
A Critical Guide for the Health Practitioner and Consumer 
2025 Edition

Executive Editor Steven Novella MD
Managing Editor David Gorski MD PhD
Series Editor Mark Crislip MD

   Introduction 
Steven Novella
The world of health care is becoming an increasingly complex and challenging place. The internet is changing the way we generate and access information, and health information is one of the most popular uses of the internet. It represents an unprecedented democratization of information and opinion. 
While there are many advantages and benefits to such information access, there are also many challenges to health professionals, regulators, academics, and consumers. There is a proliferation of health related products and services, with many provocative health claims. Regulations are generally not keeping up, and often have been watered down, in the face of this onslaught of claims and products. 
The consumer is left with an overwhelming array of health claims, many of which challenge and even directly oppose the traditional experts and institutions. 
The mission of Science-Based Medicine (SBM) is to be a source of reliable information and analysis to help navigate the wild west of health information on the internet and elsewhere. The authors who contribute to this series of e-books are all physicians and other health care professionals who have a great deal of experience educating the public about complex medical issues. We especially take on controversial issues and try to expose pseudoscience and fraud wherever possible.
The Philosophy of Science-Based Medicine
The philosophy of SBM, at its core, is simple: Safe and effective health care is critical to everyone’s quality of life; so much so that it is generally considered a basic human right. Therefore, health care products and services that work and are safe are better than those that do not work or are unsafe. 
The best method for determining which interventions and health products are safe and effective is, without question, good science. Therefore it is in everyone’s best interest for health care to be systematically evaluated by the best science available.
Too often the nature of science itself is misunderstood or misrepresented to the public. Science is not an arcane and privileged discipline. By its very nature it is meant to be transparent and public. Science is nothing more than a systematic and careful use of evidence and logic to evaluate factual claims. And good science possesses certain virtues that are not unique to science but generic to all intellectual endeavors: fairly accounting for all available evidence, using valid and internally consistent logic, using unambiguous concepts and language, proper use of statistics, being quantitatively precise and accurate, and above all being honest.
And yet there are numerous and powerful influences in society that strongly appose the scientific basis of medicine. Driven by some combination of ideology or the desire for profit they wish to eliminate standards of science in health care, or (often under the guise of “health care freedom”) create a double standard in which unscientific methods and products can thrive unchecked. Others simply lack the training or knowledge to achieve minimal standards of quality for scientific medicine. And even the best traditions of scientific medicine can benefit from more critical analysis.
Recognition of the need for careful scientific analysis in medicine partly stems from a recognition that it is very difficult (almost impossible) to reliably assess treatments anecdotally. Human perception, memory, and cognition are prone to a host of flaws, weaknesses, and biases that will tend to mislead us, especially towards conclusions that we wish to be true. Placebo effects, confirmation bias, and simple statistics can make any intervention seem effective, even when they are worthless or harmful. 
Science-Based Medicine vs Evidence-Based Medicine
Within the practice of medicine there is already a recognition of the need to raise the standards of evidence and the availability of the best evidence to the practitioner and the consumer – formalized in the movement known as evidence-based medicine (EBM). 
EBM is a vital and positive influence on the practice of medicine, but it has its limitations. EBM tends to focus on clinical trial results to the exclusion of scientific plausibility. The focus on trial results (which, in the EBM lexicon, is what is meant by “evidence”) has its utility, but fails to properly deal with medical modalities that are highly implausible, or seem to defy well-established findings in science.
All of science describes the same reality, and therefore it must (if it is functioning properly) all be mutually compatible. Collectively, science builds one cumulative model of the natural world. This means we can make rational judgments about what is likely to be true based upon what is already well established. This does not necessarily equate to rejecting new ideas out-of-hand, but rather to adjusting the threshold of evidence required to establish a new claim based upon the prior scientific plausibility of the new claim. Failure to do so leads to conclusions and recommendations that are not reliable, and therefore medical practices that are probably not safe and effective.
The SBM Series
This is why the authors of this series strongly advocate for science based medicine – the use of the best scientific evidence available, in the light of our cumulative scientific knowledge from all relevant disciplines, in evaluating health claims, practices, and products. 
Some of the articles here will analyze individual studies, and explore the strengths and weaknesses of their methods, separating what the study really tells us from how it may be represented in the media. Other articles will summarize what many studies tell us about a specific medical question. 
We will also explore health information on the internet, separating out which information is reliable from that which is misleading, erroneous, or possibly even fraudulent. Likewise we will critique mainstream media coverage of health topics, giving the reader specific tools for to critically analyze health information for themselves.
Other articles will explore topics related to health regulation and academia. Regulations have struggled to keep up with the rapidly changing health care market place, with critical gaps that leave the health care consumer responsible for their own protection. Academic institutions themselves, long the defenders of high standards of scholarship in all fields, including medicine, have been infiltrated by promoters of pseudoscientific belief systems. The result is that there is no longer any single reliable guarantee of scientific integrity. 
The SBM series of e-books is organized by topic, such as acupuncture, chiropractic, homeopathy, and many others. The books are collections of essays, not intended to be a systematic reference, but rather to explore the various scientific issues related to each topic. The goal is to give the reader critical thinking skills and a deeper understanding of, not just the current findings of science, but the process of science, specifically how it relates to health care and the topic of each book. 
Science-based medicine can serve as your pocket guide through the wilderness of health information.

As of 2025, there are over 5000 essays on the Science Based Medicine website. I do no know about you, but I find it difficult to find any post I wrote, much less one written by another contributor. 

So I have updated the books and include almost all the articles through 2s025. The volumes are

CAM Concepts
Chiropractic
COVID 
Critical Thinking
Diet and Nutrition
Ethics and CAM
Herbs, Supplements, and Diet
Homeopathy
Infections and Immunity
Law and CAM
Media and Internet
Medicine, Public Health, Dentistry and Pediatrics
Miscellaneous CAM
Naturopathy
Neurology and Psychiatry
Placebo
Quackademic Medicine
Regulation. FDA and FTC
SBM or EBM
Stem Cells, Genetics, AI and Gender
Supplements, Vitamins and Herbs
Vaccine & Anivax
Vaccines and Autism
Vaccines and Preventable Infections

The articles are roughly organized by publication date and topic. Many articles will be in multiple volumes as an essay of, for example, chiropractic and law will be found in both the chiropractic volume and the law volume.

You may find the organization a bit odd. I do. But 4700 plus articles are difficult to organize and I have more to do in my retirement than work of these volumes.

Still, if you find I have missed a nentry or some glaring error, drop me a note and I will fix it for the next edition.

About the authors
Steven P. Novella, MD – Founder and Executive Editor Science Based Medicine.
Founder and currently Executive Editor of Science-Based Medicine Steven Novella, MD.
David H. Gorski, MD, PhD – Managing Editor. Science Based Medicine.
Mark A. Crislip, MD. Editor, Science Based Medicine Guides. 
He did he editing of all the volumes so is to blame for any mistakes.
As to all the other contributors, if you are interested click on the ‘Link’ at top of each essay to go the SBM site, where further information about each author can be found.
A Note On References

The chapters in this book were originally blog entries at ScienceBasedMedicine.org.
Blog and web pages lend themselves to hyperlinks to sources and references that are tedious to translate into footnotes for this ebook.
Under the title of each essay is a hyperlink, cleverly titled ‘Link’, to the original blog entry with all the hyperlinks and references, as well as the comments to the blogs, which often have interesting and thoughtful insights by our readers, as well as some curious comments by the not so thoughtful.
Graphs, tables and links to videos are not in included these essays due to issues of copyright and permission. However, thanks to the ‘Link’, the graphics are a click away.
Thanks for reading the site.
Mark Crislip 


   Overview
There is what to think and there is how to think.
Science and medicine are constantly changing, being refined and evolving as knowedge advances. 
The essays in this collection concerns the placebo effect.

   Critical Thinking: Placebo

   The Placebo Effect
Steven Novella 
Link
Recently the Federal Trade Commission went after the makers of the Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet for their claims that their device was a cure for chronic pain. Last week Seventh Circuit judge Frank Easterbrook handed down his opinion on the company’s appeal, writing that the company was guilty of fraud and ordering them to pay 16 million dollars in fines. One of the key points for the company’s defense was that the Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet is legit because it exhibits the placebo effect. Judge Easterbrook was not impressed with this argument, writing:
“Like a sugar pill it alleviates symptoms even though there is no apparent medical reason. Since the placebo effect can be obtained from sugar pills, charging $200 for a device that is represented as a miracle cure but works no better than a dummy pill is a form of fraud.”
This decision creates an interesting precedent, since there are a large number of fanciful treatments that do not have any “apparent medical” mechanism and that are claimed by its proponents to work through a placebo effect. In my experience the placebo effect, briefly defined as a measurable response to an inert treatment, is almost completely misunderstood by the public – a fact that is exploited by purveyors of dubious treatments such as the Q-ray. Already in the comments of this blog there has been discussion over the nature of the placebo effect.
In order to demystify the placebo effect, I will try to first describe exactly what it is. The operational definition of a placebo effect is any health effect measured after an intervention that is something other than a physiological response to a biologically active treatment. In clinical trials the placebo effect is any measured response in the group of study subjects that received an inert treatment, such as a sugar pill. However, “the placebo effect” is a misnomer and contributes to confusion, because it is not a single effect but the net result of many possible factors.
The various factors that contribute to a measured or perceived placebo effect vary depending upon the situation – what symptoms or outcomes are being observed. Subjective outcomes like pain, fatigue, and an overall sense of wellbeing, are subject to a host of psychological factors. For example, subjects in clinical studies want to get better, they want to believe they are on the active experimental treatment and that it works, they want to feel that the time and effort they have invested is worthwhile, and they want to make the researchers happy. In turn, the researchers want their treatment to work and want to see their patients get better. So there is often a large reporting bias. In other words, subjects are likely to convince themselves they feel better, and to report that they feel better, even if they don’t. Also, those conducting a trial will tend to make biased observations in favor of a positive effect.
It has also been clearly demonstrated that subjects who are being studied in a clinical trial objectively do better. This is because they are in a clinical trial – they are paying closer attention to their overall health, they are likely taking better care of themselves due to the constant reminder of their health and habits provided by the study visits and attention they are getting, they are being examined on a regular basis by a physician, and their overall compliance with treatment is likely to be higher. So basically, subjects in a trial take better care of themselves and get more medical attention than people not in trials. If for those not in a clinical trial, if they decide to do something about their health by starting a new treatment, they are likely to engage in more healthful behavior in other ways.
A common belief is that the placebo effect is largely a “mind-over-matter effect,” but this is a misconception. There is no compelling evidence that the mind can create healing simply through will or belief. However, mood and belief can have a significant effect on the subjective perception of pain. There is no method to directly measure pain as a phenomenon, and studies of pain are dependent upon the subjective report of subjects. There is therefore a large potential for perception and reporting bias in pain trials. But there are biological mechanisms by which mental processes can affect pain. There are many non-specific factors that can biochemically suppress pain. For example, increased physical activity can release endorphins that naturally inhibit pain. For these reasons the placebo effect for pain is typically high, around 30%.
But the more concrete and physiological the outcome, the smaller the placebo effect. Survival from serious forms of cancer, for example, has no demonstrable placebo effect. There is a “clinical trial effect,” as described above – being a subject in a trial tends to improve care and compliance, but no placebo effect beyond that. There is no compelling evidence that mood or thought alone can help fight off cancer or any similar disease.
Other conditions are more objective than pain, but are special because they have a strong influence from the neuro-endocrine system. This system translates psychological stress into physical stress, by releasing stress hormones and increasing activity in the sympathetic nervous system. So, for example, for heart disease mood matters quite a bit. Someone who has an A-type personality and is always angry and upset is at higher risk of a heart attack than someone who is mellow and unstressed. But here there is a known physiological connection between mood and a specific organ – the heart. This cannot be extrapolated to other diseases; it doesn’t mean you can smile your cancer away.
Many people talk about the neuroendocrine system’s effect on the immune system. Again, here there is a physiological connection. Stress hormones do suppress the immune system, and it is probably true that extreme stress leaves us physically susceptible to disease for this reason. But the effects of moderate levels of stress are not established. Also, we cannot extrapolate from the risk of getting a cold to the ability to fight off cancer. You have to look at the evidence for each disease unto itself. So while this is a potential contributor, it is overall probably a small effect except in extreme situations.
The lack of any real biological placebo effect has led some to question the necessity of having a placebo control in clinical trials. However, I feel there is still a need for a double-blind placebo-controlled design for most clinical trials because that is the only way to minimize the effects of bias on trial outcomes. The factors I listed above will still create the illusion of an effect and the only way to control for this is with a placebo group.
Therefore the placebo effect is fairly complex and is largely an artifact of observation and confounding factors. Any real benefits that contribute to the placebo effect can be gained by more straightforward methods – like healthy habits, compliance with treatment, and good health care. The placebo effect is not evidence for any mysterious mind-over-matter effect, but since the mind is matter (the brain) and is connected to the rest of the body, there are some known physiological effects that do play a role (although often greatly exaggerated).
In light of all this, I do not feel that knowingly prescribing a placebo treatment is effective or ethical medicine. Modern scientific medicine should strive for interventions that physiologically are scientifically plausible and have sufficient evidence for safety and effectiveness. But I do think there are lessons to be learned from the placebo effect – there are aspects of therapy that do go beyond the physiological intervention. Medicine is not only an applied science; it is the art of humans treating other humans. As part of effective treatment it is helpful to try to maximize all those human intangibles that contribute to a good outcome. But we can do this in the context of scientifically valid treatment, and without crossing the ethically dubious line of deception.
I therefore heartily agree with Judge Easterbrook that invoking the placebo effect is not a defense for making fraudulent health claims, for the Q-ray or any other implausible treatment.

   The Rise of Placebo Medicine
Steven Novella
Link
It is my contention that terms such as “complementary and alternative medicine” and “integrative medicine” exist for two primary purposes. The first is marketing – they are an attempt at rebranding methods that do not meet the usual standards of unqualified “medicine”. The second is a very deliberate and often calculating attempt at creating a double standard.
We already have a standard of care within medicine, and although its application is imperfect its principles are clear – the best available scientific evidence should be used to determine that medical interventions meet a minimum standard of safety and effectiveness. Regulations have largely (although also imperfectly) reflected that principle, as have academia, publishing standards, professional organizations, licensing boards, and product regulation.
With the creation of the new brand of medicine (CAM and integrative) came the opportunity to change the rules of science and medicine to create an alternative standard, one tailor made for those modalities that do not meet existing scientific and even ethical standards for medicine. This manifests in many ways – the NCCAM was created so that these modalities would have an alternate standard for garnering federal dollars for research. Many states now have “health care freedom laws” which create a separate standard of care (actually an elimination of the standard of care) for self-proclaimed “alternative” practices.
But perhaps the most insidious and damaging double-standard that is being advocated under the banner of CAM is a separate standard of scientific research itself. The normal rules of research that have evolved over the last few centuries are being subtly altered or discarded, with clever newspeak. It is a way for proponents to choose their evidence, rather than having the evidence decide what works and what does not work. We saw this strategy at play with the recent acupuncture study for back pain that clearly showed acupuncture was no more effective than placebo acupuncture. Proponents (propagated by an uncritical media) turned scientific logic on its head by interpreting this result as indicating that placebo acupuncture must work also (if only we could figure out how, they unconvincingly mused).
We see this strategy at work also with the use of so-called “pragmatic” studies – a rebranding of “unblinded” studies. This is a way to choose their evidence – in this case, poorly controlled unblinded studies that are more likely to reflect the bias of the researchers and therefore give them a result that they like. This is their reaction to well-designed placebo controlled trials that show their preferred modality does not work.
Another strategy is to change the meaning of the concept of placebo effects. This one was ready-made, and most people grossly misunderstand the nature of “the” placebo effect. One of my first articles for SBM was about the placebo effect because this concept is so criticial to science-based medicine. To summarize – the placebo effect is really many effects. It is everything other than a physiological response to the treatment. It is not all a real effect of mind-over-matter – it includes every bias and artifact of observation as well. It includes things like subjects reporting they feel better to the researcher because they want the treatment to work and they want to please the authority figure, who also wants the treatment to work and may be encouraging the perception of benefit.
It is most important to understand how the term “placebo effect” is used in the context of a controlled clinical trial. Scientific methodology is about controlling variables – because we want to know which variables work and which ones do not. In any clinical scenario there are a multitude of variables that may affect the outcome or the perception of the outcome. Therefore a well-designed study maximally controls all the variables – ideally so that the one variable of interest (the treatment) is completely isolated. This is accomplished in a number of ways. One method is randomization – randomly assigning subjects to the various treatment and placebo arms of a clinical trial. Randomization combined with sufficiently large trial size (number of subjects) results in all variables not specifically controlled for averaging out among the various arms. Another way to look at is that randomization prevents systematic biases in who gets treated and who gets a placebo from affecting the results.
Another method of controlling variables is the double-blind placebo control. Ideally one group of subjects will receive the treatment being studied while another group will receive a treatment that is identical in every way except that it is inert (i.e. it controls for all possible variables and isolated the one variable of interest – the treatment). Both the subject and the examiner are blinded to which is which to control for psychological effects. In order to conclude that the treatment “works” those subject receiving the active treatment must do statistically significantly better than those receiving the placebo. If the activity of the treatment was the only variable, then we can confidently conclude it was responsible for the improvement.
I know this is all very basic, but it is these very basic concepts that are being challenged by proponents of so-called CAM. They are trying to say the the effect measured in the placebo arm of such studies is a real effect, something valuable and alone is sufficient to justify the treatment. This philosophy has been termed by critics “placebo medicine” and is just the latest attempt at creating a double standard. But the claim is utterly ignorant of the scientific nature of the placebo effect. It is a method of controlling for biases, artifacts, and variables (known and unknown) – it is not a real effect.
There may be some non-specific therapeutic effects mixed into placebo effects. For example, people who are being studied tend to take better care of themselves and are more compliant with treatments (because they are being watched). They may also feel better as a result of the positive attention from a health care provider – old-fashioned good bedside manner. These are some of the variables being controlled for. But it is scientifically absurd to argue that they justify an ineffective treatment. But that is exactly what CAM proponents are doing.
The latest manifestation of this strategy is a report put out in the UK by The Kings Fund – a health policy charity. They put together a committee to examine how the UK can find evidence to support CAM therapies. They are not interested in figuring out “if” such treatments work, but rather how they can show “that” they work. They report:
Explaining the need for different types of research when assessing complementary practice, Professor Dame Carol Black said: ‘It has become widely accepted that a stronger evidence base is needed if we are to reach a better understanding of complementary practices and ensure greater confidence in their clinical and cost effectiveness. The challenge is to develop methods of research that allow us to assess the value of an approach that seeks to integrate the physical intervention, the personal context in which it is given, and non-specific effects that together comprise a particular therapy.’
Got that? We need new kinds of research (read “double standard”) in order to demonstrate the value of these special CAM practices. The reason that we need to find new ways to demonstrate their value is because they fail under the accepted scientific methods. The last sentence is just a fancy way of saying that placebo effects should count as real effects.
It further says:
‘As long as findings from research can provide confidence in the positive effect of the physical intervention at the heart of the treatment, then any added benefit brought by the therapeutic relationship and the context for treatment should count as part of the treatment effect,’ the report says.
‘For complementary therapies such a holistic approach to effectiveness should be adopted by bodies such as NICE, when comparing cost-effectiveness across a range of treatments.’
The “physical intervention at the heart of the treatment” is functionally the same thing as – non-specific placebo effects. They want to take a “holistic” approach to evidence (another useful marketing brand), meaning they get to decide what the evidence means. George Orwell would be proud.
As usual, Edzard Ernst (the go to expert for the media) gets it exactly right. He is quoted as saying:
‘This is the introduction of double standards through the back door.’
‘In this case we might as well allow an ineffective medication on the market, because it too will have a placebo effect.’
That latter point is a favorite of mine as well. Whenever CAM proponents try to change the rules of science to suit their needs, I invite my readers to imagine a pharmaceutical company getting away with the same thing (not that they wouldn’t want to if they could). Imagine a drug that works no better than placebo in well-designed clinical trials and the company trying to get FDA approval on the grounds that their drug has a valuable placebo effect, even if it is physiologically worthless.
Conclusion
The integrity of science-based medicine is critical to the health of the public, the legitimacy of modern medicine, and also the economic health of modern society (as is being forcefully argued recently). We need to have one scientific standard that is fair, rational, and scientifically sound. The creation of a double standard for proponents of modalities that do not meet the very reasonable standards of scientific medicine is eroding the standard of care and the integrity of modern medicine.
The public, the media, politicians, and regulators should not fall for the deceptive language that is being used to disguise the truth of these efforts to undermine science-based medicine. This is a brass attempt at changing the rules of science to meet their perceived needs. When you change the rules of science you no longer have science – you have pseudoscience or something even more nefarious.

   The Placebo Myth
Mark Crislip
Link
King Arthur: Now stand aside, worthy adversary.
Black Knight: ‘Tis but a scratch.
King Arthur: A scratch? Your arm’s off.
Black Knight: No it isn’t.
King Arthur: What’s that, then?
Black Knight: [after a pause] I’ve had worse.
King Arthur: You liar.
Black Knight: Come on ya pansy.King Arthur: [after Arthur's cut off both of the Black Knight's arms] Look, you stupid Bastard. You’ve got no arms left.
Black Knight: Yes I have.
King Arthur: Look!
Black Knight: It’s just a flesh wound.
Monty Python and the Holy Grail
—————
I am, I think, in a minority on this blog, in that I do not think there is a placebo effect. Period. None. Zip. Zero. Nada. Zilch.
For analysis purposes, I divide the lack of placebo effect into outcomes that do not occur with objective measurement and those that do not occur with subjective measurement.
Why the dichotomy? Those studies where there have been an active treatment, a placebo treatment and an observation group, have demonstrated no difference between observation and placebo (1). To summarize from the conclusion of the compelling NEJM review:
“We found little evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects. Although placebos had no significant effects on objective or binary outcomes, they had possible small benefits in studies with continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain. Outside the setting of clinical trials, there is no justification for the use of placebos.”
Which makes sense to my reductionist materialistic way of thinking: why would actively doing nothing have any measurable physiologic effect? It shouldn’t and it doesn’t. Mind over matter? Bah, humbug.
How about subjective endpoints like pain? Isn’t there good data to support a placebo effect for pain? I saw the MASH episode where they ran out of morphine and relieved the post operative pain with placebo and the healing powers of caring and compassionate nurses and doctors (9).
Stick a knife in your finger. Pain receptors fire. Nerve impulses travel to the spinal cord for a quick withdrawal of your hand before you know you are hurt. The pain impulse travels up the spinal cord to the brain where you go ouch. Then you decide whether it hurts and if so how much (15). Ever watch a child injure themselves and look around to see if a parent is watching before deciding, at some level, that since Mom is watching, the injury is worth a good cry, some sympathy and a kiss?
There are several levels where pain can be blocked. Having had a crown this week, I am always grateful that a peripheral nerve can be blocked with some novocaine. Pain can be blocked with various medications that work at various levels in the CNS.
And then there is the appreciation of pain. How you react to the pain is different from the pain itself. Attitude can make the same amount of pain better or worse (6)
I had a herniated disc for about 9 months with chronic nerve root pain that was surgically repaired when all conservative therapies had failed (10). When I woke from the surgery my nerve pain was completely gone, and it was such a relief that in comparison the incision pain was nothing. I never bothered to take pain medications for the incision pain; I was so giddy to be pain free that the incision was nothing. Someone may argue that I was flooded with endorphins and that is why I had so little pain, but I have had enough other surgeries to wonder, if so, where were the endorphins during those other incisions where I was glad for the invention of the PCA pump.
I think that the placebo effect with pain is a mild example of cognitive behavioral therapy; the pain stays the same, it is the emotional response that is altered.
There was a recent study that sheds some light into the placebo myth.
“Sham device v inert pill: randomised controlled trial of two placebo treatments ” from the BMJ (11)
This was part of a larger study that demonstrated that sham acupuncture is better than real acupuncture (12). They took 270 patients with arm pain due to repetitive use injury of at least 3 months duration and pain rated as >= 3 on a 10 point scale.
“Participants could have any of a range of clinical diagnoses involving the tendons, soft tissues, and nerves of the arm or non-specific symptoms related to repetitive movement or overuse. We excluded people with systemic connective tissue or muscular diseases, neurological disorders, or acute trauma to the arm…This condition is the modern equivalent of “weaver’s hand,” “sprout picker’s thumb,” and “scrivener’s palsy.” Most patients had pain due to computer keyboard and mouse use.”
The patients were randomized to sham acupuncture 2x per week with a blunt device that felt like acupuncture but did not penetrate the skin. They had 5 to 10 sham needles in the arm and one in the foot. The other group received a placebo pill one time a day, which they were told to take at night as they were warned it may cause drowsiness and dry mouth.
At first they were randomized to sham acupuncture or placebo as part of a run up to the study where they were then further randomized to real or sham acupuncture and amitriptyline or placebo, and they were followed after the second randomization.
Result? The pain scores (subjective findings) decreased more in the sham acupuncture than the placebo group. The magnitude of the pain relief was not impressive as admitted in the discussion: “In this trial, the magnitude of this effect was small.” Objective findings, no surprise, did not change in either group (grip strength or arm function).
More patients in the sham acupuncture (75%) thought they were receiving active therapy than placebo (48%) and the believers had the better subjective, but not objective scores.
Two different placebos decreased pain, one placebo was better than the other. Why?
The answer may be in another interesting result of the study: side effects. Patients were told in the informed consent what the side effects of the active therapies were, even though initially they all were getting placebo. And the informed consent worked to ‘cause’ side effects: three of the placebo subjects dropped out from dry mouth and fatigue and 10% of the sham had increased pain after the needle was ‘removed’.
Also, the sham acupuncture group had more interaction with their providers. So more chance of developing expectations, important in placebo effects
My take: Aint no such thing as a placebo effect, only a change in perception.
Take a different example of how expectation can alter the perception of a complex sensory experience. The example is taste.
I know that the same bottle of Bordeaux tastes far better in a 2 star restaurant on a summers day in the south of France with friends than it does on a January day alone with a bowl of top raman.
The wine will taste better if the bottle has a higher price tag. There was a recent study where people were given the same wine, but were told it cost 10 dollars or 90 dollars. They thought the 90 dollar wine tasted better (2). They did functional MRI’s on the participants as well and when they had the 90 dollar wine the part of the brain that deals with pleasure lit up but the same area did not light up with the 10 dollar bottle of wine.
I would argue the molecules in the wine did not change, the same receptors were activated in the mouth and nose, and information conveyed to the brain did not change, but the perception of the wine did. The wine became better, even as it stayed the same.
Same thing happens, I wager, with the so called placebo effect. No physical change. Pain is unchanged but the perception of the pain is changed. People have the result they expect to have and the side effects they are told they will have.
Outside of alt med, perception does not alter reality (13). People can talk themselves into believing anything. You may think that is nonsense, but in medicine you get to see the extremes of human experience. People will see things that are not there and not see things that are (16).
I remember the first time I saw a patient with this issue. I was a 3rd year medical student in the ER and a patient came in feeling lightheaded. I went through the extensive review of systems med students do, and found nothing, so I moved on to the exam. He had a blood saturated bandage under his gown, and beneath the bandage was a bleeding melanoma the size and shape of large mushroom that had oozed blood to the point where his red cell counts were 25% of normal. When asked about the tumor, he said it was nothing. He denied the huge bleeding tumor was a problem.
That is not all that an unusual experience: patients with horrible pathology that they deny exists. Patients present with huge tumors or endstage AIDS and completley deny they have anything wrong. At the other end of the spectrum are the patients who have nothing wrong with them but are convinced that every bump or twinge is a manifestation of some horrible, soon to be fatal, illness. After seeing these extreme examples, someone thinking their pain is decreased, when in fact it isn’t, requires no stretch of the imagination.
In humans there is no ‘real’ effect from placebo.
It was also mentioned in this blog that animals experience a placebo effect. As is so often the case, opinions go unreferenced, but my first response was disbelief. How could a dog have a non existent experience?
So I went looking.
It would be critical in determining if there is a true placebo response in animals that there was an observation group, a placebo group and a treatment group. Even more important would be that those collecting the data have to be blinded to the intervention. It keeps coming back to N Rays. People see what they want to see, what they expect to see, not necessarily what is there (3).
I admit up front that I do not read the veterinary literature and am limited in my access to this information compared to human medicine. So I may have missed some important literature.
That said, my start was a 1999 review of placebo in animals (4). It is a good discussion as to why it is difficult to assess the placebo effect in animals and its potential mechanisms. Then it moves on to clinical studies.
“Identifying placebo effects in veterinary medical studies is problematic. To the authors knowledge, studies specificly examining the placebo effect in therapeutic trials have not been reported. Placebo data for treatment trials is available only for control group results in studies investigating specific treatments. Most importantly, in trials in which placebo is selected as the control method, untreated groups serve as second controls to distinguish placebo effects other causes of disease resolution are not used. Even if a beneficial response is detected in the placebo group, such improvement cannot be conclusively attributed to the placebo, because non treated individuals are not included in the study. Accordingly, specific placebo data in studies of therapeutic effects is sparse.”
He then discusses a double blind study of carprofen in dogs (5). While the drug was better than the placebo, 56% of the dogs objectively improved on placebo (as judged by force plate measurement), better than the subjective improvement as judged by the owner or the vet. I do not know, as I cannot yet access the article, what the activity of the animals was during the study. If I had a dog that was diagnosed with hip problems, I would exercise it less, which would also lead to improvement that could be attributed to placebo.
A Pubmed search using “animals and pain” yielded 277 references that were clinical trials and had abstracts. I found few studies with objective end points that demonstrated an improvement attributed to placebo (7).
One study, which had a 60% placebo effect for gold wires injected for hip dysplasia, makes no mention of animal activity, so making judgements as to response to placebo is problematic (8).
I tried other combinations of search terms using placebo and animals and could not find well done blinded studies that demonstrate any placebo effect in animals. If there is compelling data that demonstrates placebo effects in animals where confounding issues are controlled (14), I cannot find it. I am sure the readers will send me the references to let me know I am wrong.
I conclude placebo effect is a myth: for humans and for animals.
References and Snotty Comments
(1) IS THE PLACEBO POWERLESS? An randomized of Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment N Engl J Med, Vol. 344, No. 21 • May 24, 2001
(2) (http://news.cnet.com/8301-13580_3-9849949-39.html).
(3) This is a huge issue in clinical medicine. If you think you have the right diagnosis, you may not see the information that contradicts your diagnosis or suggests an alternative. Good docs are aware of this.
(4) J Am Vet Med Assoc. 1999 Oct 1;215(7):992-9.
The placebo effect in animals. McMillan FD. PMID: 10511866
(5) Randomized, controlled trial of the efficacy of carprofen, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug, in the treatment of osteoarthritis in dogs.
J Am Vet Med Assoc. 1995 Mar 15;206(6):807-11.
PMID: 7759332
(6) Curr Opin Anaesthesiol. 2007 Oct;20(5):435-9.
Nocebo hyperalgesia: how anxiety is turned into pain.
(7) J Vet Intern Med. 2007 May-Jun;21(3):410-6.
Evaluation of client-specific outcome measures and activity monitoring to measure pain relief in cats with osteoarthritis.
(8) Acta Vet Scand. 2005; 46(2): 57–68. Stratification, Blinding and Placebo Effect in a Randomized, Double Blind Placebo-controlled Clinical Trial of Gold Bead Implantation in Dogs with Hip Dysplasia
(9) Season 6, episode 24. It’s on TV, it must be so.
(10) No, I did not use acupuncture.
(11) Sham device v inert pill: randomised controlled trial of two placebo
treatments. 2006;332;391-397. BMJ
(12) Not their intent, I am sure. As if there is a difference between real and sham acupuncture. Like the difference between real and sham ghosts.
(13) And the reality of WMD’s. And don’t give me the “What the Bleep Do We Know?” bs.
(14) Thanks to Dr Hall:
“animals ought not to have a placebo effect”
Maybe they “ought not” but they clearly DO. The veterinary literature recognizes that.
“I wonder how this can be explained.” Here’s how:
(1) They can develop a learned physiologic response to a drug and then respond similarly when a placebo is substituted.
(2) They respond to attention and care from humans.
(3) Human owners can experience the placebo effect for their pets by perceiving a response where there really is none.
(4) Since animals can’t talk, we have to interpret an animal’s behavior as indicating relief of pain; this may not always be accurate.
(15) Yes, I know, simplistic. Dr. Novella is probably squirming.
(16) Sometimes like essays in blogs, which are like Rorschach tests. Or maybe Horshack tests. Welcome back.

Michael Specter on the Placebo Effect
Steven Novella on December 7, 2011
Link

Michael Specter is a good science journalist. I particularly enjoyed his book, Denialism. In a recent New Yorker article he tackles the difficult question of the placebo effect in modern medicine. While he does a fair job of hitting upon the key points of this question, I think he missed some important aspects of this question and allowed the views of Ted Kaptchuk to overly influence the framing of the article. Specter fell for the typical journalist trap — frame the article around a charismatic “maverick”, complete with compelling anecdotes, bury the meat of legitimate skepticism deep in the article, but then bring it all back to the maverick in the end. Be sure to tell us how this is going to change everything. This is good story telling, but very problematic as science journalism.
Kaptchuk himself is an interesting character. He is heading Harvard’s Program in Placebo Studies and the Therapeutic Encounter. He has produced some good science on the placebo effect, but does not seem to want to draw the appropriate lessons from that research, and passes his bias on to Specter. From the article the quotes from Kaptchuk that most strike me are those about his personal experience with placebo medicine. Specter reports:
“There was no fucking way needles or herbs did anything for that woman’s ovaries,” he told me, still looking mystiﬁed, thirty-ﬁve years later. “It had to be some kind of placebo, but I had never given the idea of a placebo effect much attention. I had great respect for shamans—and I still do. I have always believed there is an important component of medicine that involves suggestion, ritual, and belief—all ideas that make scientists scream. Still, I asked myself, Could I have cured her? How? I mean, what could possibly have been the mechanism?”
To me this is no different than Ray Hyman being flabbergasted when his cook-book palm readings were found to be highly accurate by his clients. Hyman, however, took a step back and did what a scientist should do. He gave the opposite readings as was dictated by the reference book and found that his clients were just as pleased with the results. He concluded that the accuracy of palm reading (any cold reading, really) is just an illusion, one happily constructed by the client.
It is difficult to shake the sense, however, that something real is going on in such situations. We are struck by coincidences and apparent patterns and effect. The patterns may seem so real to us that, emotionally, we just can’t accept that they are illusory.
That is what I see in Kaptchuk’s memory of that one case, which is just representative of the many cases that apparently convinced him of the power of the placebo. All practitioners, like all psychics (regardless of how sincere they are), are subject to this illusion. We are all subject to confirmation bias, statistical effects like regression to the mean, expectation bias, and reporting bias. These psychological effects create the illusion of a real effect where none exists.
In fact, the analogy to psychics is very illuminating, because it demonstrates that people can be led to believe that there is a real effect when we know (as much as we can know anything in science) that none exists. Why should the placebo effect get any different treatment?
The real question is: how much of the placebo effect is due to illusions, like confirmation bias and regression to the mean, and how much is due to a real physiological response to the therapeutic interaction? This is an important question, and Kaptchuk is right to research it, as long as he is willing to listen to the answer.
We already have much research that addresses this question, and Specter references some of it in his article. In fact, Specter would have been better served to frame his article around Asbjörn Hróbjartsson and his research, rather than Kaptchuk (the same facts would then have been framed very differently, it seems). Hróbjartsson has been reviewing studies in which a placebo arm is compared to a no-treatment group. He first published his findings in 2001, but has updated his research. His most recent study concludes:
We did not find that placebo interventions have important clinical effects in general. However, in certain settings placebo interventions can influence patient-reported outcomes, especially pain and nausea, though it is difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting. The effect on pain varied, even among trials with low risk of bias, from negligible to clinically important. Variations in the effect of placebo were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted and how patients were informed.
In other words, the best research we have strongly suggests that placebo effects are illusions, not real physiological effects. The possible exception to this are the subjective symptoms of pain and nausea, where the placebo effects are highly variable and may be due to subjective reporting. In a separate publication Hróbjartsson explores this question further and concludes that the existing research is consistent with reporting bias (i.e. illusion), but we need to creatively design studies to better answer this question.
Placebo effects are mostly just as much an illusion as precognition or talking with the dead. Pain is the notable exception, which makes physiological sense. Pain is a subjective experience, evolved to have adaptive features that are highly situational. There are times when pain should be very bothersome, and other times when it’s more adaptive to be able to ignore pain. So it is no surprise that mood and expectation can highly influence the reporting of pain.
There is another way to get at the question of how much of placebo effects is real and how much is illusion, and ironically Kaptchuk himself has authored one of the best studies of this kind — comparing subjective and objective outcomes. Kaptchuk performed the now famous (at least among medical skeptics) study of medical treatment vs placebo vs no treatment of asthma patients. David Gorski reviews the study here, pointing out that for subjective outcomes there was a measurable placebo effect. For objective outcomes, there was none. That is the key finding. In my opinion it is difficult to miss the implications of this — that at least when it comes to asthma the placebo effect is illusion, not real.
Kaptchuk, however, missed that. He concluded, rather (to quote Specter):
Kaptchuk concluded that objective data should not be the only criterion for doctors to consider. “Even though objective physiological measures are important,” he wrote in the study, published earlier this year in The New England Journal of Medicine, “other outcomes such as emergency room visits and quality-of-life metrics may be more clinically relevant to patients and physicians.”
I wonder what he would have concluded if the study showed there was an objective improvement with placebo? Anyway — Kaptchuk just wants to change the rules to suit the outcome, rather than listen to the outcome. Asthma is perhaps the perfect disease to demonstrate the folly of his approach. Asthma attacks can kill. If someone is made to feel that they are better because of expectation, investment justification, and other psychological effects — essentially biasing their reporting of their symptoms — while the physiological asthma attacks continues, they are theoretically at higher risk of complications, including death. Kaptchuk, however, pulls the standard — what are you going to listen to, numbers or people. He misses the point. The subjects of his study who received the placebo were not better. They just reported that they were because they felt they were expected to.
If the study were just a pain study, Kaptchuk might have a point. As I teach my students every day — you have to ask what the goal of treatment is. If it is solely to make the patient feel better, then it’s OK to assess a treatment (in clinical practice, not as a scientific study of efficacy) on whether or not the patient feels better. But when your goal is to change the course of a disease, or prevent a complication, then you have to use objective measures, not subjective report.
Conclusion
There is no question that if you give someone a treatment and ask them how they feel, they are likely to report that they feel better. There are numerous psychological ways to manipulate and maximize this response (type of treatment, cost of treatment, and the interaction of the practitioner). No one doubts this. The real question we have to ask, however, is — is the reported improvement the same type of illusion that makes people feel psychics have magical power, or is it a real physiological effect that can be exploited?
The best evidence we have strongly suggests that the answer (for everything but pain and nausea) is that the placebo effect is largely or entirely an illusion. It is something to be controlled for so that we do not fool ourselves into thinking that a worthless treatment has a real effect. For pain and nausea the question is a bit more complex, but still the best evidence suggests that any placebo effect is small and variable, and may also be largely biased reporting. To the extent that placebo effects for pain are real, we can get them by having a pleasant therapeutic interaction.
It is unlikely that spending billions of dollars on further research is going to give us the ability to exploit the placebo effect for pain any better than we can now, simply by being hopeful and supportive of the patient. That will not stop billions of dollars from being spent on asking and answering the same questions over and over again.
Specter missed, in my opinion, a major context to this question. Proponents of so-called CAM (complementary or alternative medicine) have been telling the world for decades that their treatments are real, and they can prove it once they are studied properly. Now that they have been (at least all the major CAM modalities) and found not to work any better than placebo, CAM advocates have come out with a range of special pleading, such as the bogus claim that “Western” science cannot study such mystical methods.
Recently the main special pleading we have been hearing is that CAM modalities work through the placebo effect. That is why they are so desperate to represent the placebo effect as something more than it is — as a real effect worthy of exploitation. If the placebo effect is all illusion, however, then CAM is all illusion.

Placebo Again.
Mark Crislip on January 27, 2012
Link

Medicine is simultaneously both easy and hard. As an Infectious Disease doctor, my day can be summed up with the phrase “me find bug, me kill bug, me go home.” Sometimes it is just that simple. A lot of the time it isn’t. I may not be certain what the infection is, or even if the patient has an infection, or allergies and/or antibiotic resistance limit therapeutic options, the host has co-morbidities that limit effectiveness, and the patient has no financial resources for the needed treatment.
I am lucky, since most infections are acute, make people feel terrible, and require a relatively short course of therapy during which the patient feels better. I rarely have to worry about compliance with the treatment plan; it is the rare patient, usually a heroin user or a particularly irascible old man, who will not follow through with their antibiotic course. I do not have to worry about chronic or symptomless diseases like diabetes or hypertension or the complications of obesity where long term compliance often limit therapeutic success. Long term it is difficult for many people to stick with their therapeutic plan, much less their diet and exercise resolutions.
Infectious diseases is a job where I do not have to concern myself about placebo effects. As readers of the blog are well aware, I do not think there is any such thing as a placebo effect that has any clinically meaningful application, especially in the world of infectious diseases. Infections are usually a binary proposition: either you are infected or you are not and either I am curing you or I am not.
Still, there is more to medicine than me find bug, me kill bug, me go home. Often most of the time on a consult is spent talking with the patient: explaining what they have, why they have it, what we are going to do about it and what they can expect.
As an aside, while I ‘take a history’, as we say in the parlance of the field, patients provide a story, a narrative. Much of what the patient has to say is frequently of little importance to the medical matter at hand, and there is something about illness that lends people to philosophizing. At length. Especially at 4 o’clock in the afternoon on Friday. I hate to tell you this, but the details of your life and the philosophy of your existence are neither that interesting nor that original. You, like me, are really not that compelling. I have heard the content and what you are saying before, more times than I can count.
At one of the hospitals I go to they report metrics on patient satisfaction, and one is “My Doctor listens carefully to what I said.” We are usually around 80%, but I point out that at least 20% of the time the patient is not saying anything worth listening to. The elderly male I saw last Friday at the end of the day felt obligated to go on about his grade and high school GPA, I guess to let me know how smart he was. Such irrelevant soliloquies, at least irrelevant to making a diagnosis although they do add insight into the patient, are common. I pretended to listen with interest, looking for the right moment to interrupt, glad we are not telepathic. I am often glad we are not a telepathic species.
I suspect part of the allure of alternative medicine providers is that the dull details of my life, which are of no interest to anyone but me and (maybe) my family, are of endless interest to the fake diagnosis and treatment by the homeopath or naturopath. The patient gives us a story, we extract the small amounts of information that are relevant to the diagnosis, but do not give a narrative back in return. We give data and odds and studies. Alt med providers return a narrative and a story, incorporating the faux uniqueness of their patient. The problem with medicine, and the source of its diagnostic and therapeutic power, is that there is usually nothing whatsoever special about you, or me. Humans operate under very tight and predictable operational parameters: physiologically, emotionally, and psychologically. Human variations are usually trivial, since extreme variations are fatal. People prefer to operate under the delusion they are interesting and unique and SCAM practitioners feed into that.
I recognize that conversations with the patients are important for a variety of reasons, since the more they understand about their infection and its treatment, the better they will be able to adhere with their compliance. Or comply with their adherence. Whatever the current buzz word is for getting the patient to do what you want them to. While I think the patients attitude has nothing to do with whether I will successfully kill the MRSA on their aortic valve, being ill is difficult, and the better they cope and comply, the better will be the quality of their life during the illness.
We have four possibilities when treating an illness:
    • We can improve the pathophysiology and the patient feel better. That’s the best case scenario. It is what I strive to accomplish with my patients.
    • We can improve the pathophysiology , but the patient feels no better or feels worse. My fathers chemo for his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma cured the tumor, but he never quite felt well after.
    • We can not improve the pathophysiology, but the patient feels better. In my world, that is mostly when patients are on hospice, but it applies to chronic pain.
    • We can fail to improve the pathophysiology and the patient feels worse. That is the worst case scenario.
I have long realized the importance of what we referred to as a resident as the supratentorial component of illness. It is a large part of being a doctor, but one of the more difficult parts since the approach differs with each patient. I do not need to individualize the antibiotics for your MRSA osteomyelitis, but I do for how I communicate about your illness. Is the patient smart? Stupid? Uneducated? Overeducated? Confused? Drugged? Depressed? Demented? Fatalistic? Unrealistic? The message needs to fit the recipient.
At the heart of the communication with patients is honesty and truthiness. I have to get a sense of who you are and then tell you what is occurring. The patient-physician relationship is based on honesty, and without honesty there can be no autonomy, the first of the on the principles of medical ethics:
Autonomy. The principle of autonomy recognizes the rights of individuals to self-determination. This is rooted in society’s respect for individuals’ ability to make informed decisions about personal matters.
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence, the other key principles, are always two and three on the list, perhaps it is always alphabetical. A patient cannot make informed decisions if they are not told the truth.
As a rule, autonomy trumps beneficence and non-maleficence. I can’t lie to you, even if it is to your benefit. No weasel words or Romneyesque evasions, but of course there are many ways to tell the truth: do I say an 80% cure rate or a 20% failure rate? Emphasize the good? Dwell on the bad? It is not what you say, but how you tell the truth that can be important, but you always have to be aware of the line and not cross it. I wonder how well other docs do, as I not infrequently get a comment from a patient that they appreciated how clear I was in my explanation of the medical situation, good, bad and indifferent. That I told it like it is.
We all can manipulate our patients in subtle ways. A classic example is sitting down when you go into a patients room. Patients will rate the time spent as longer if the doctor sits down instead of stands, even if the actual time is no different. There are other tricks (I am not certain I like that word) that can be used to enhance the therapeutic interaction. I don’t think of it as lying, but is part of being a good doctor, especially in an era when patients can be referred to (never, ever by me) as clients and consumers and it is our job to have happy customers.
Even if I thought the placebo effect existed in any meaningful way, I could never use it since at its heart it violates the prime directive of medical ethics. It is why editorials in JAMA, like Lessons From Recent Research About the Placebo Effect—From Art to Science by Howard Brody MD, PhD and Franklin G. Miller PhD , besides only presenting half the information, give me the willies.
Dr Brody is the author of The Placebo Response: How You Can Release the Body’s Inner Pharmacy for Better Health, which I have not read, but the Amazon summary says
According to Brody, the placebo phenomenon–which he pronounces mysterious and unknowable at its very heart–is when the convergence of healing signals, assigned meaning, and human expectations stimulates the body’s inner healing power. The patient’s positive mental and emotional reaction to a medical intervention releases what Brody terms the “inner pharmacy.” In other words, even though the treatment is benign, the body’s biochemical pathways are stimulated to induce healing in the same manner actual medicines do. “Could harboring hope, faith, or expectation be genuinely potent factors in the healing process?” Brody asks, “I believe they are. In fact, I see them as the heart and soul of the placebo response.
Doesn’t look like a promising start. But what is placebo?
In popular understanding, placeb is giving a sugar pill instead of a real medicine, like Doc Martin did in the episode I saw yesterday. The teenage girl wanted a larger chest and he gave her some peppermint breath mints to take once a month for a year and he pointedly never contradicted her misunderstanding as to what she was receiving. Of course the young lady instantly went from poor self esteem who was easily bullied by the other girls to aggressive young lady who verbally slapped down her bullies with new found self confidence. Of course, in keeping with the true placebo effect, no anatomy was changed. I have only seen a few Doc Martin episodes to date, but so far I have been impressed with accuracy of the medicine.
Placebo is also used in clinical trials, an inert treatment that is the surrogate for all the other confounding factors in patient treatments that can determine results: natural history of disease, physician and patient bias, regression to the mean, etc. Interactions with health care providers can have effects on patients, especially for subjective symptoms. As studies and their meta-analysis have consistently demonstrated, placebo in clinical medicine does not alter the underlying pathophysiology, the objective endpoints, only the subjective endpoints. Placebos do not treat the underlying disease, they only alter the symptoms, and not by much. Symptom relief is not a bad thing, as long is it does not violate autonomy, beneficence non-maleficence. Kind of hard to do when the placebo effect is based on lying to the patient.
The JAMA editorial completely ignores the first use of placebo, and ignores the data that placebo has no effect to alter pathophysiology. I suppose it is how you read the literature. Referring to Placebos without deception: a randomized controlled trial in irritable bowel syndrome (blogged about by Dr. Gorski when it came out) that they interpret as
Recent research now challenges the prior beliefs that placebo treatments must be prescribed deceptively in order to work.
Patients were told in the study that
…placebo pills made of an inert substance, like sugar pills, that have been shown in clinical studies to produce significant improvement in IBS symptoms through mind-body self-healing processes (bold mine).
The study included four talking points:
“…1) the placebo effect is powerful, 2) the body can automatically respond to taking placebo pills like Pavlov’s dogs who salivated when they heard a bell, 3) a positive attitude helps but is not necessary, and 4) taking the pills faithfully is critical. ”
That, to my mind, is deceptive, and while I am not surprised that patients reported feeling better, as they often do after a visit with the doctor, it was based on several lies, and the study would violate patient autonomy if applied outside of a clinical study. You tell a patient up front that a positive attitude helps, and you are not surprised when they report doing better. Being in a medical trial will lead to the patient trying to please the researcher, a clinical trial Stockholm syndrome.
I’ll grant you that there are “Two intertwined psychological mechanisms are thought to underlie placebo effects—expectancy and conditioning” and that patients can be manipulated in clinical trials to report feeling better. Placebo effects are neither clinically impressive in their effect nor an ethical for a practicing clinician, but ones man’s ethics is another man belly laugh. Note, the authors start out saying the effects are psychological, and changing psychology will not make your breast cancer remit.
But then, something changes. One moment I see a Victorian woman looking in a mirror, then suddenly I see a skull. Because placebo becomes more than a sugar pill, more than the placeholder for the numerous confounding variables and biases that muddy the waters of a clinical trials. The placebo effect are pleural and are as many as sands in the hour glass.
Neurophysiology and neurochemistry suggest that there are multiple placebo effects, with different neurobiological mechanisms, depending on the organ system and the target illness.
Good. It there are as many placebo effects as there are illness, perhaps I can use it. Failure rates with vancomycin for MRSA hover around 30%. Maybe I can use placebo effects to help, but it never seems to be the case. Infections are recalcitrant to placebo effects. Instead they mention the usual suspects of subjective experience: pain and irritable bowel syndrome. But it turns out that I have been practicing placebo medicine all this time after all. You can elicit the placebo effect by being, well, a good doctor.
Good ways to enhance everyday encounters include inviting and listening carefully to the patient’s story of illness experience, offering a satisfying explanation for the patient’s distress, expressing care and concern, communicating positive expectations for therapeutic benefit, and helping the patient to feel more in control of life in the face of the illness.
Everything you do as a clinician evidently can elicit the placebo effect. Even “rather than advising the patient to get more exercise, a physician can write a prescription for exercise on a prescription pad, thus using ritual in a way designed to elicit a placebo response along with increased adherence.” is a placebo effect. Every interaction becomes the opportunity to elicit a placebo response and I suppose, failing in these characteristics will enhance the nocebo effect.
It is a definition of placebo so broad as to be useless. What isn’t an opportunity to elicit a placebo or nocebo effect? When a definition apparently encompasses everything, it becomes nothing.
Although patient beliefs vary depending on geography, culture, and education, at least some of today’s patients are eager to become active collaborators in mind-body healing practices. Many patients will be relieved to learn that the physician wishes to avoid unnecessary and potentially harmful drugs and wants to maximize the powers of the mind alongside those drugs and other modalities that are well supported by scientific evidence.
Show of hands; how many out there like to prescribe to “unnecessary and potentially harmful drugs”? And the sentence suggests the authors knows that maximizing the powers of the mind is not well supported by scientific evidence.
The patient-physician interaction can be complex and multifaceted. All human interactions can be complex and multifaceted. As health care providers we are trying to influence the patients behavior and attitude in an attempt to heal the patient. In the old days it was called a good bed side manner; as I have said before no different, but more complex, than the salubrious effect one ape has on another when they are groomed. A good bedside manner helps the patient feel better but doesn’t make their brain tumor or liver abscess shrink.
Having a good bedside manner and helping the patient feel better about the psychological/subjective components of their illness has always been part of medicine, although obviously some are better at it than others, and some are more interested than others. You don’t become a pathologist because you like to work with people. A good bedside manner has always helped the patient feel better, there is no mystical underpinnings to the process. It is not “the practitioner has many means to help each person activate the potentially powerful inner pathways that assist healing.”
There’s the leap that drives me nuts: placebo is good for symptom relief, nothing more. Nothing is healed, although I have an old school idea of healing: the process is cured. A healed wound is closed and has a scar, not having less pain. Placebo heals nothing, There are no potentially powerful inner pathways by which placebo heals. At best, when lied to, you will feel better.
But what about low-risk interventions such as acupuncture to treat low back pain? Today, if rigorous clinical trial evidence shows such modalities to be better than no treatment or usual care but no better than placebo, the treatment is often summarily dismissed.
As it should be. If trials show an intervention does nothing, it should not be used. Substitute ‘pharmaceutical medication’ for ‘acupuncture’. Would you still recommend it?
An open question for future research and ethical reflection is whether such modalities can be recommended consistent with informed consent.
Informed consent: Acupuncture does nothing. There are no meridians, there is no chi, and studies are clear acupuncture does nothing to alter your underlying disease. At best you may think your pain is decreased, but the effect is not sustained. Besides having no efficacy, there are the occasional severe and even fatal complications from the procedure and many practitioners are not particularly fastidious with the techniques of infection prevention. It will cost you $100.
Doesn’t take much ethical reflection for me.
Of course virtually all of SCAM, from acupuncture on down the alphabet, does nothing to alter underlying anatomy or physiology. No healing is accomplished. And all SCAM results is placebo: the psychological effect of a lie believed to be beneficial. A good therapeutic relationship with a SCAM provider that is based on a lie is not, in my narrow world, ethical. I am not a means justifies the ends kind of guy.
They go from the well defined effect of placebos for modifying symptoms in clinical trials to every interaction being able to cause placebo effect to placebos can heal. I tend to like clear thought, and these essays are written in no small part to help me clarify my own thoughts on the topics about which I write. When everything is placebo, and somehow the mild decrease in IBS symptoms is translated into a powerful mind-body medicine beyond mild symptom relief, I look in vain for clear thinking. And how understanding how a mild decrease in symptoms heralds a “bridging the long-standing gap between the scientific and humanistic orientations of modern medicine,” I can’t see. I also don’t see the gap in my practice. The gap is not in medicine, but in the variation in providers, not all of whom are proficient or interested in maximizing the doctor-patient relationship.
Give half the data and wildly extrapolate. That is not from Art to Science. That is from molehill to mountain.
Addendum. As I finish this essay, eradicating all the typos and grammatical mistakes for Dr. Gorski’s sake, an interesting study crossed my desk: Adherence to placebo and mortality in the Beta Blocker Evaluation of Survival Trial (BEST), which concluded
Analyses of the BEST trial data support a strong association between adherence to placebo study medication and total mortality. While probably not due to publication bias or simple confounding by healthy lifestyle factors, the underlying explanation for the association remains a mystery.
It takes a while for me to read and digest an new article, my initial take is that being adherent in one sphere of your care probably means you are adherent on other spheres of your care. Being adherent in general leads to to better outcomes, and there are a multiplicity of factors that decrease adherence and worsen outcomes. It is never one intervention that leads to good, or bad, outcomes, but the summation of many small interventions. Adherence to placebo is probably such a marker. I saw no reason to invoke powerful mind-body effects at work.

Placebo Myths Debunked
Placebo treatments are often sold as magical mind-over-matter healing effects, but they are mostly just illusions and non-specific effects.
Steven Novella on November 15, 2017
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Placebo effects are largely misunderstood, even by professionals, and this leads to a lot of sloppy thinking about potential treatments. This problem has been exacerbated by the alternative medicine phenomenon.
Several decades ago, the proponents of so-called CAM promised that if only their preferred if unconventional treatments were properly tested medical science would discover how effective they are. “Effective” (or more precisely, “efficacy”) has a specific definition in medical science – it means that a treatment has been found to perform statistically significantly better than placebo in a blinded controlled trial. Several decades and thousands of studies later, the most popular CAM modalities (homeopathy, acupuncture, reiki, manipulation for medical indications, and more) have been shown to be no more effective than placebo. This means they don’t work.
Not to be deterred by reality, CAM proponents simply shifted the goal posts. Now many of them are saying that placebo effects are real, and therefore being as effective as placebo means that their treatments “work.” As part of this strategy they have promoted and amplified common myths about placebo effects. Let’s take a closer look at these myths and show why they are wrong.
Myth #1 – “The” placebo effect
The first and overriding myth about placebos is that there is one placebo effect (singular). This confusion is understandable, because scientists often refer to “the” placebo effect. However, they are referring to what is measured in the placebo arm of a clinical trial – that net effect (the difference between baseline or no treatment at all and a placebo treatment) is the placebo effect for that study.
There are multiple placebo effects contributing to that difference, however. Anything that might give the appearance of an improvement will contribute to the measured placebo effect. These placebo effects include: Regression to the mean – when symptoms flare, they are likely to return to baseline on their own. If you take any illness that fluctuates in severity, any treatment you take when your symptoms are at their peak is likely by chance alone to be followed by a period of less intense symptoms.
Similar to this but distinct is the reality that many illnesses are self-limiting. If you have a cold, you will likely get better even if you do nothing – so anything you do will be followed by improvement. There is also bias in perceiving and reporting subjective symptoms. People want to feel better, they want to think that the treatment is working, and they may want to please the researcher or their physician. Further, researchers and doctors want their treatments to work.
There are also many possible non-specific effects just from the act of being treated. Hope can be a very positive emotion, and that alone may make people subjectively feel better. Subjects in a trial are also getting medical attention, and are likely paying more attention to their own health. They are likely to be more compliant with other treatments.
The treatment under study itself may have several components, some specific and some non-specific. Do people sometimes feel better after a session of reiki or acupuncture because they were laying down listening to music and smelling incense during the treatment? How much of a relaxation effect is at play? Does it matter if you actually stick the needles in alleged acupuncture points (the answer is no)?
Myth #2 – Placebo effects can cause healing
Because it is often believed that “the” placebo effect is one thing, that one thing is often believed to be a real mind-over-matter physical healing. There is no evidence to support this interpretation, however. In fact researchers looking for that real healing effect of placebos have only demonstrated that it doesn’t exist.
Part of the problem here is that the term “healing” is vague. It does not have a specific definition, but the implication is that biological repair is taking place. In practice researchers distinguish objective vs subjective markers of improvement. Subjective just means that the patient feels better in some way, per their own report. They rate their own pain, for example. An objective outcome is something measurable, like blood pressure, survival, or tumor burden.
A systematic review of cancer research, for example, found that placebo interventions resulted in minor improvements in subjective symptoms, but no improvement in the cancer itself.
Placebo effects break down into several categories. One category is illusory – the misperception of improvement through regression to the mean or biased reporting. The second category is non-specific effects, such as emotional comfort from a practitioner, relaxation, or improved self-care or compliance. This third category is comprised of effects which can plausibly result from psychological interventions only. These relate mainly to stress, depression, anxiety, and the perception of pain and similar subjective symptoms. There is a mind-body connection – it’s called the brain.
There is, however, no magical control of your brain over biological or physiological processes that are not networked with the brain through nerves or hormones.
Myth #3 – Animals and babies cannot have a placebo effect
This myth results from the false assumption that in order to have a placebo effect you need to believe that you are taking an active treatment. It is the belief that is causing the effect, and therefore it is a prerequisite. The logic then follows that animals and babies, who cannot know they are receiving a treatment, can therefore not have a placebo effect. Any improvement in this context, therefore, must be a physiological response to the treatment itself.
It should already be obvious, however, that these assumptions are incorrect. There are many sources of placebo effects that do not depend upon the subject knowing they are being treated, such as regression to the mean, the self-limiting nature of many ailments, and non-specific effects or benefits from simultaneous interventions.
Further, however, someone has to determine that the animal or baby has improved. That person is vulnerable to biased perception and reporting, and will also contribute to any measured effect.
This means that studies of treatments in animals or babies still need to be properly controlled, and whoever is assessing the outcome needs to be properly blinded to treatment allocation.
Myth #4 – Fanciful or alternative treatments yield better placebo effects
Desperate to salvage a role for their preferred but ineffective treatments, many alternative practitioners will argue that their real expertise is in maximizing placebo effects. OK, sure, the scientific evidence shows that my treatment is no better than placebo, but placebo effects are real, and I am very good at eliciting them. This is the “placebo medicine” gambit.
I have already debunked the first part of that claim. There is also no evidence for the second part, that alternative practitioners elicit more of a placebo effect. What the scientific evidence shows is that all interventions will produce some placebo effect, depending mainly on the outcome to be followed. The more subjective and amenable to variables such as mood, the larger the measured effect will be.
The existence of a placebo effect does not justify using inactive or pseudoscientific treatments. You can elicit the same effects from science-based interventions. Related to this is the notion of placebo effects without deception. This is certainly possible, if you include all the non-specific and statistical effects, but most patients would likely not be happy to be receiving a treatment that they were told was completely inert, just so it may bias their perception of their symptoms. All pseudoscientific treatments, even if they are justified through placebo effects, are given with a generous helping of deception, which violates patient autonomy.
The other variable that seems to be important, but requires further study, is the therapeutic relationship between practitioner and patient. Having a positive relationship may enhance the measured placebo effect, but that may be just another measure of bias.
In any case, anything useful about placebo effects can be had with a positive therapeutic relationship, using science-based interventions, and following the ethical requirements of informed consent and patient autonomy.

The Placebo Narrative
Steven Novella on January 16, 2013
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Science journalist Sharon Begley wrote a recent piece in The Saturday Evening Post about Placebo Power. The piece, while generally better than the typical popular writing on placebos, still falls into the standard placebo narrative that is ubiquitous in the mainstream media. The article is virtually identical to a dozen other articles I have read on placebo effects in the popular press, and most significantly fails to even question that narrative.
Begley is generally one of the better science journalists, although I have had my disagreements with her – specifically over her attitude toward the relationship between skeptics and the media. She seems to have a distorted and negative view of skeptics and does not think that the media can or should help us in our “debunking crusade.” (The term itself speaks of a fundamental misunderstanding of the modern skeptical movement.)
I have also parted ways with Begley over her view of the relationship between science and medicine. She seems to have a fairly negative view of doctors, fueled in part by her imperfect grasp of medical science. This is the risk with even the best lay science journalists – science is often complex and it is difficult to master the nuances if you are not an expert and steeped in the evidence and the community. Further there is a tendency for people in general (including journalists) to go along with an appealing and available narrative. (For journalists those narratives that are appealing are the ones that make good headlines.) These shortcomings are present throughout her recent article on placebos.
I will start with what the article does well – break down several reasonably established mechanisms for certain placebo effects. These include endorphin release for pain, dopamine release which serves as both a reward signal and also may temporarily reduce certain symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, those caused by a lack of dopamine (although I consider this evidence preliminary), conditioning, and ritual. That is where she does better than most. Still, she follows the standard narrative of proclaiming in breathless terms the surprising power of “the placebo effect” without putting it into a reasonable perspective, or mentioning very high profile data that tells us what placebo effects are not. She writes:
“It is tempting to say that “mere thought” or “mere belief” caused these patients to feel and function better, just as the child’s trust in her mother made her knee feel better and our belief that little white pills will relieve a headache made the calcium tablet do so, even though it contained not a speck of headache-fighting medication. But if doctors and scientists have learned one thing about the placebo response or placebo effect, it is this: There is nothing “mere” about how thoughts, beliefs, and the power of the mind affect the body.”
And there is the standard narrative. I don’t think it is nitpicking to complain about the term “the placebo response or placebo effect” in the singular, which Begley uses throughout her piece. There are many placebo effects, which are different for different conditions. I know it’s probably hopeless at this point to expect general use to change – “the placebo effect” is likely to remain a common vernacular short hand. However, in an article entirely on placebos such distinctions should be made explicitly clear.
The only proper reference of “the placebo response” is the outcome measured in the placebo arm of a clinical trial, where use of the singular is proper because the study is measuring a net combined placebo effect. When we start talking about the placebo phenomenon, however, we have to start talking about placebo effects in the plural. One of the major conceptual problems with the placebo narrative is conflating the placebo effect that is measured in a clinical trial with all the various placebo effects that may make up that measured response.
This is where the placebo narrative almost always breaks down – popular writers like Begley talk about physiological mechanisms like endorphins and dopamine without mentioning all the other effects that are being measured in those clinical trials they are citing as evidence for how powerful those mechanisms are. What is measured in the placebo response includes things like reporting bias, or the desire of subjects to feel better, to please their doctor or the researcher, and to justify their prior decisions (to trust the doctor, take the treatment, enter the study, etc.). Begley fails to distinguish, in other words, between the pain that patients feel and the pain that they report. In studies we never know and cannot measure how much pain patients feel, only how much pain they report. Anything that would affect that reporting will also be lumped into “the placebo response” that is measured in the placebo arm of the study.
This is not quibbling. There is good reason to believe that reporting bias may be the major component of measured placebo effects.
Begley also fails to mention non-specific responses. Anxiety reduction from the belief that one is getting treated can certainly improve one’s mood and outlook on their symptoms (and their reporting of symptoms). Being in a study also involves getting medical attention and is associated with better self-care as well. This is partly the Hawthorne effect – looking to see how patients do is likely to have an effect all by itself, improving compliance and self-care, for example.
I do have to give Begley credit for referring to “the placebo effect on pain” in one instance in her article. This is at least better than most. When discussing specific physiological mechanisms for certain placebo effects, it must be qualified what outcome is being considered. Placebo effects for pain may not be relevant at all to placebo effects for any other condition. Such articles also frequently fail to mention that placebo effects for pain tend to be much higher in magnitude than for other outcomes. In fact – placebo effects are generally restricted to subjective outcomes (ones, probably not by coincidence, that are dependent on reporting and cannot be objectively measured).
In fact Begley did not mention the now famous (or infamous, I guess, depending on your perspective) study by Kaptchuk in which he studied both objective and subjective outcomes in asthma in response to active and placebo interventions. The results – there was a measured placebo response to subjective outcomes, but none for objective outcomes. Asthma is a condition susceptible to things like anxiety and expectation – so it provided a good opportunity to demonstrate objective improvement from placebo interventions, but showed none. This study, while very telling, does not fit the placebo narrative that journalists like to tell, and so is often absent from such articles or misinterpreted when present.
Begley does mention the “placebo effect without deception” study. There are two main problems with citing this study the way Begley (and almost every media report about it) does, as pointed out previously here by David Gorski. The first is that the effect size is small (slight improvement), and may not even be clinically relevant. They were also barely statistically significant, and one outcome (quality of life) was not significant. These are unimpressive outcomes. Second – the placebo without deception wasn’t quite deception free as claimed. Subjects getting open-label placebo were told:
“Additionally, patients were told that “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.””
The bit about “rigorous clinical testing” and “significant mild-body self-healing processes” profoundly overstates and misrepresents the evidence. In other words – it’s deception. It’s just deception with plausible deniability. This hardly settles the issue about the effects of “open label placebos” without deception. But it does fit nicely into the placebo narrative, and Begley dutifully reports the standard presentation of this study without a hint of journalistic skepticism.
Conclusion
I had the pleasure of interviewing Christopher Hitchens a few years ago. He had a dim view of journalists in general, and for me one of his most memorable observations was that journalists generally accept the narratives of the day that are handed to them. Precious few do the hard work of investigative journalism to find something closer to the true story. Based on my experience I have to agree.
Unfortunately the placebo narrative that Begley regurgitates is now well-established in the media and we are likely to read some version of it over and over again. I have become a bit harsher over time on journalists for doing this because there are many articles, by experts, just a Google search away, that point out the various flaws in this narrative. Those skeptics that Begley seems to dismiss have done the hard work for her and other journalists of actually reading the original research, digging down to the salient details, and teasing out the nuances that make all the difference to a proper interpretation of a complex clinical issue.
NOTE: Orac has also weighed in on Begley’s article.

The myth of the magically powerful placebo returns
It’s been a long time since I’ve written about the deceptive narratives around placebos promoted by supporters of alternative medicine. Unfortunately, a new article claiming placebos can work as well as “real medicine” is making the rounds on social media. Here we go again.
David Gorski on April 27, 2026
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Certain topics covered by Science-Based Medicine are perennial. They keep coming up again and again, sometimes unchanged from past instance when we’ve written about them, sometimes changed subtly—or not-so-subtly—to match the times, although with the core narrative intact. If there’s one topic covered on SBM over and over and over again since the beginnings, it’s the placebo effect, or, more properly, placebo effects, given that there is not just one placebo effect. In general, going back to the very beginning of this blog in 2008, we have discussed how those promoting medical interventions that have no effect but placebo effects, such as reiki, homeopathy, acupuncture, and any number of alternative medicine staples, use, misuse, and abuse the science of placebo effects in order to promote a narrative that their quackery can be just as effective as real science-based medical interventions. Recently, I’ve seen an article popping up on social media and emailed to me on The Conversation entitled Placebo effect can work as well as real medicine – but your body may need permission to use it. It’s by an associate professor of biology at Tufts University named Phil Starks, and regular readers will no doubt recognize from the title alone what sort of distorted narrative about placebos that the article will promote. However, given my desire to take a mental health break from examining in depth yet more of the depredations and destruction committed against science and public health programs of the federal government on a near-daily basis by the current administration, I thought that discussing this article and placebo effects would be the perfect temporary antidote to the near constant flood of anxiety-producing news coming from the Department of Health and Human Services under Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.
In other words, this week I’m going to party like it’s 2009. (Unfortunately, SBM didn’t exist in 1999, thus necessitating a slight change the allusion.)
The magical, mystical super-powerful, just-as-good as medicine placebo
Before I proceed, I think I’ll simply very briefly summarize my general take on these placebo narratives. It’s probably not surprising that many physicians and scientists find the idea that the mind has the power to heal the body, often referred to as “self-healing” or “mind-body healing,” and an explanation invoking placebo effects to “explain” this “power” so seductive. After all, who wouldn’t want to be able to cure themselves simply by willing it to be so? It’s a concept that, like so many concepts in “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), goes far back into ancient times and stretches forward to today in ideas like The Secret, which goes quite a bit beyond the whole idea of “mind-body healing” or healing yourself because you wish it to be so, and declares that you can have virtually anything you want simply by thinking the right thoughts. In fact, to me it appears that the “powerful placebo” is being drafted in the service of supporting what are, at their core, mystical beliefs far more than science, dressing them up in what I like to call “biobabble,” which I define as the medical or biological equivalent of Star Trek technobabble.
In that vein, I note that Prof. Stark’s article doesn’t start very promisingly (as you might imagine). Right off the bat, Prof. Starks wants to convince you that placebo effects are totally biologically real and able to heal with no side effects:
The first time the placebo effect really got under my skin was when I read that roughly one-third of people with irritable bowel syndrome improve on placebo treatments alone. Usually this statistic is presented as a fascinating quirk of medicine. My reaction was anger.
Humanity possesses an extremely effective treatment, with essentially zero side effects – and patients need someone else’s permission to use it.
The placebo effect refers to the improvements in symptoms that patients experience after they’re given an inert treatment like a sugar pill. Driven by expectation, context and social cues rather than pharmacology, the placebo effect is often dismissed as all in the mind. But decades of research have shown it is anything but imaginary.
“No side effects”? Has Prof. Stark never heard of nocebo effects?
I note that the first article linked to is another article in The Conversation entitled In research studies and in real life, placebos have a powerful healing effect on the body and mind. Tellingly, one key passage in this article reads:
But studies have shown that the placebo effect is so strong that many drugs don’t provide more relief than placebo treatments. In those instances, drug developers and researchers sometimes see placebo effects as a nuisance that masks the treatment benefits of the manufactured drug. That sets up an incentive for drug manufacturers to try to do away with placebos so that drugs pass the FDA tests.
Even though Prof. Starks doesn’t (quite) invoke this narrative, which borders on conspiracy theory, he clearly at least tacitly approves of it, given that he linked to an article expressly promoting this idea. Be that as it may, this is as good a point as any to reiterate that placebo effects are most prominent for medical diseases and conditions that have a high degree of subjectivity in symptomatology, such as pain. For objective symptoms, placebos tend not to do so well. I like to point out that the most objective of all is being dead rather than alive and that you will never find a study showing that one-third of patients receiving a placebo live longer. If there is a study that has convincingly demonstrated that a placebo can detectably increase overall survival (OS) in patients with cancer compared to a no treatment group that can’t be attributed to flaws in the clinical trial design, the Hawthorne effect among the healthcare providers taking care of the patients, or observer bias among the researchers, I have yet to find it, and I have looked.
Because I’m a cancer surgeon, another example that I like to use is tumor shrinkage. Chemotherapy, targeted therapies, and radiation, for example, cause reproducible, measurable tumor shrinkage in many, many studies; placebos do not. The main reason for blinding in a clinical trial of a cancer chemotherapy, for instance, would be to prevent observer bias. If, for instance, radiologists knew which group a given patient was in, they might be subtly and unconsciously measure tumor response to be better in the group receiving the experimental drug. The same is true for many other pathological and biological measures of disease.
Again, regular readers will recognize some very common maximalist (and exaggerated) tropes about the “power of placebo.” Trope #1: Placebo effects result in powerful “healing” as effective as actual science-based medicine.
Longtime readers will remember that a favorite narrative of people promoting unscientific placebo medicine is that placebo effects are as powerful as “real” medicine. Prof. Starks even leads with his first section after the introduction entitled Medicine works, even when it isn’t medicine. Let’s see how many tropes we recognize:
The placebo effect is so reliable that researchers must account for it in nearly every clinical trial.
Yes, and no. Again, in clinical trials looking at “harder” endpoints, such as death, accounting for placebo effects is much less critical than in clinical trials that look at endpoints that are strongly affected by emotions, perception, and the like. I note that the link included goes to a page on the website of the National Center for Complementary and Integrative Health (NCCIH), formerly the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM), dedicated to placebos. NCCIH, as longtime readers will know, has been the primary federal source funding the rise of quackademic medicine and the promotion of quackery in medicine, primarily academic but also in non-academic settings. What, you might ask, does that webpage feature? Why, it’s a link to a video interview with Harvard placebo researcher Ted Kaptchuk, a name so ubiquitous in the promotion of placebo medicine and one that’s such a blast from the past as a topic on this blog that he has his own tag. Kaptchuk is, as some might remember, arguably the foremost promoter of the idea of “placebos without deception.” Does Prof. Stark buy into the concept of placebos without deception? Of course he does! We’ll get into that later, but I can’t resist a quick spoiler: Every “open label placebo” study suggesting the possibility of placebo effects without deception, without in effect hiding from patients in a clinical trial which group they are being randomized to, has involved deception elsewhere in the study design.
Next up from Prof. Starks:
When testing a new drug, scientists compare its effects to what patients experience on a placebo treatment like sugar pills, saline injections or sham surgery. If the drug doesn’t outperform the placebo, it rarely reaches the public. Placebo responses are common and powerful enough to rival active treatments.
Even surgery isn’t immune to the placebo effect. In several well-documented studies of knee procedures, patients who received sham operations – incisions without the full surgical repair – improved almost as much as those who received the real procedure.
Clearly something real is happening inside the body. But the strangest part of the placebo effect is not that it works. It’s what makes it work.
No one argues that something “real” isn’t happening in the body due to placebo effects. After all, the brain is part of the body, and even the conclusion that placebo effects are more due to perception rather than any real biological change would be a “real” effect in the brain. The problem is that the word “real” is doing some serious heavy lifting. When Prof. Starks uses the word “real,” he clearly wants you to think that placebos are causing “real” therapeutic effects, just like real science-based medical interventions. It’s a very convenient redefinition that all promoters of placebo medicine use at one point or another.
It is, of course, true that placebo responses can be common enough that they appear to rival active treatments in placebo-controlled randomized controlled clinical trials (RCTs). That doesn’t mean that they actually are “powerful enough” to rival active treatments. What it means is that, under the conditions of the given placebo-controlled RCT, the experimental treatment being tested doesn’t work, because it doesn’t produce improvements in disease symptomatology or progression beyond what the untreated patients who are part of the clinical trial experience. Indeed, acupuncturists love to take advantage of this to try to claim that acupuncture “works” when they design trials with a no treatment/normal treatment group in addition to the sham acupuncture and “true” acupuncture groups. (Usually, the sham acupuncture group involves either inserting needles in the “incorrect” locations not on acupuncture meridians and/or using special retractable needles that appear to be inserted but actually do not break the skin.) When the “true” acupuncture group doesn’t experience any greater relief of symptoms than the sham acupuncture group, often the researchers will try to argue that the proper comparator should be the no-treatment group, just the same way that the article cited by Prof. Starks claims that drug companies whose drugs fail placebo-controlled RCTs want to do.
In any event, as much as evidence-based medicine (EBM) guru Peter Gøtzsche has taken a heel turn in recent years, he is the researcher who produced two of the most compelling reviews failing to find a clinically relevant therapeutic effect attributable to placebo in any RCT, the 2001 New England Journal of Medicine article Is the Placebo Powerless? — An Analysis of Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment and the 2010 Cochrane systematic review and meta-analysis, Placebo interventions for all clinical conditions.
The former article concluded:
We found little evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects. Although placebos had no significant effects on objective or binary outcomes, they had possible small benefits in studies with continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain. Outside the setting of clinical trials, there is no justification for the use of placebos.
And the latter concluded:
We did not find that placebo interventions have important clinical effects in general. However, in certain settings placebo interventions can influence patient-reported outcomes, especially pain and nausea, though it is difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting. The effect on pain varied, even among trials with low risk of bias, from negligible to clinically important. Variations in the effect of placebo were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted and how patients were informed.
Which is what we at SBM have been saying all along, and we have seen no compelling studies or evidence to persuade us otherwise or that we need to change our minds. We keep looking though, and remain open to the possibility. I wonder if Prof. Starks is open to the possibility that the two reviews above come to accurate conclusions.
Meanwhile, another classic paper from 1997 by Kienle and Kiene, The Powerful Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?, reported a reanalysis of classic placebo literature, noting that reanalysis of one of the seminal papers on placebo effects, one that has been highly influential, Henry K. Beecher’s 1955 paper The Powerful Placebo, had called into question the rather—shall we say?—expansive interpretation interpretations of the data analyzed in the that paper, which is still widely cited. For their part, Kienle and Kiene reanalyzed other papers cited as being evidence for therapeutic placebo effects and found that misattribution of improvement in many of these papers could be explained by issues unrelated to placebo administration, such as:
    • Spontaneous recovery. “Spontaneous improvement was a major factor in Beecher’s misinterpretation of 10 of the 15 trials. This error is wide-spread in the placebo literature.“
    • Fluctuation of symptoms/regression to the mean. “Spontaneous improvement of diseases and the spontaneous fluctuation of symptoms are special forms of regression to the mean, i.e., the tendency of extreme values to move closer to the average on repeated measurement. In their interesting article, “How much of the placebo `effect’ is really statistical regression?” McDonald et al. [30] have argued, that “most improvements attributed to the placebo effect are actually instances of statistical regression.” My addition: Recall how, if a treatment is given when symptoms are at their worst, when those symptoms inevitably regress to the mean, it is often attributed to whatever intervention was given before the regression, whether that intervention had anything to do with the improvement or not.
    • Additional treatment.
    • Conditional switching of treatments. “When the patients felt well, they received a placebo; when they felt worse, they were switched to active treatment, or they were excluded from evaluation until they felt better again.“
    • Scaling bias. In three of Beecher’s trials [2, 3, 7] there were false augmentations of placebo effects due to asymmetrical measurement scales [21]. The scales included two or more categories for improvement, and only one or even none for deterioration. Thus the scales tempted patients to falsely give too many positive reports.
There were several other contributors, but I’ll stop there for the moment, as these were the most common issues. Although research methodology has improved since 2010, many of these problems still plague placebo research, which is dominated by researchers who believe in the narrative promoted by Prof. Starks, such as Ted Kaptchuk.
“Placebos without deception”? Not again!
Prof. Starks then proceeds to put a somewhat different twist on very old placebo narratives, specifically that we must somehow give “permission” for placebo effects to work, starting by citing longstanding, well-accepted findings regarding specific factors that modulate placebo effects:
Placebo treatments tend to be more effective when delivered by credible authorities. Pills work better when prescribed by doctors wearing white coats. Expensive pills outperform cheap ones. Injections produce stronger responses than tablets.
All of this is true, but doesn’t imply what Prof. Starks thinks that these findings imply, for example:
Some researchers have even removed the deception from placebo experiments entirely. In open-label placebo studies, patients are directly told they are receiving a placebo; and yet many still report significant improvement.
No, no, no, no, no, no! We have periodically written about these so-called “open-label” placebo trials used to fuel the myth of “placebos without deception” going back to 2010, when I deconstructed the first such study that I had noticed. In my 2010 post, I noted that, although the study did tell subjects whether they were in the placebo group or not, the subjects were told that placebo sugar pills “had been shown to have self-healing properties.” The study protocol itself stated:
The provider clearly explained that the placebo pill was an inactive (i.e., “inert”) substance like a sugar pill that contained no medication and then explained in an approximately fifteen minute a priori script the following “four discussion points:” 1) the placebo effect is powerful, 2) the body can automatically respond to taking placebo pills like Pavlov’s dogs who salivated when they heard a bell, 3) a positive attitude helps but is not necessary, and 4) taking the pills faithfully is critical. Patients were told that half would be assigned to an open-label placebo group and the other half to a no-treatment control group. Our rationale had a positive framing with the aim of optimizing placebo response.
Placebo without deception? Nonsense! The deception was in the script that each subject heard. The same is true of other studies that purport to show “placebo effects without deception.” Another of Kaptchuk’s studies, which tested the drug Maxalt versus placebo pills for their effect on migraine headache symptoms, included in its language about the placebo: “Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free.” Not to understand why placebo pills might be able to make you pain-free or could possibly make you pain-free. “Can make you pain-free.” The other study, billed an open-label placebo trial for chronic low back pain, included this language:
After informed consent, all participants were asked if they had heard of the “placebo effect” and explained in an approximately 15-minute a priori script, adopted from an earlier OLP study, the following “4 discussion points”: (1) the placebo effect can be powerful, (2) the body automatically can respond to taking placebo pills like Pavlov dogs who salivated when they heard a bell, (3) a positive attitude can be helpful but is not necessary, and (4) taking the pills faithfully for the 21 days is critical. All participants were also shown a video clip (1 minute 25 seconds) of a television news report, in which participants in an OLP trial of irritable bowel syndrome were interviewed (excerpted from: http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/40787382#40787382).
Basically, studies claiming to find “placebo without deception” tend to use variations of the same talking points from the 2010 study that I discussed, often with clips from news reports about happy study participants to prime the patients that placebo effects can be “powerful.”
So blinded by his belief in placebo effects as “powerful,” that Prof. Starks correctly interprets the example of placebo effects in animals and doesn’t seem to realize that what he is saying also applies to humans:
Consider what happens in veterinary medicine. Dogs and cats cannot believe a treatment they’re given will work; they have no concept of receiving medication. Yet when owners and vets believe an animal is being treated, they consistently report improvements in pain and mobility that medical tests do not confirm.
In one study of dogs with osteoarthritis, owners reported improvement roughly 57% of the time for animals receiving only a placebo.
The animals themselves may not have improved. But the humans caring for them perceived they had. The healing signal, it turns out, travels through the humans in the room.
No, it’s not a “healing signal.” In this case, placebo effects in animals are in reality a change in perception in the humans caring for their pets based on expectation bias. Here, Prof. Starks is so close to the correct interpretation of placebo effects. He just can’t generalize how placebo effects in animals are correctly interpreted to what happens in humans. He even correctly points out that observations by homeopaths that cholera patients treated with homeopathy in the 1800s had higher survival rates than those treated with the medicine of the times neglected to note that, when medicine is toxic and ineffective, the way that so much 19th-century medicine was, doing nothing could result in better outcomes, but he couldn’t resist adding:
Death rates were lower not because homeopathy worked but because the placebo effect – combined with not poisoning patients – was more effective than the medicine of the day.
No, placebo effects had nothing to do with it. These observations only indicate that doing nothing (homeopathy, which is water) produced better outcomes in very sick patients than poisoning them with toxic metals (which many 19th century treatments involved) did, no invocation of placebo effects from homeopathy necessary. That didn’t stop him from trying to shoehorn placebo effects into the narrative explaining this discrepancy. Indeed, when you think about it, it should be obvious that this concept of a “health governor” is basically another word for the “wisdom of the body,” a term often invoked by New Age “healers” as what their treatments somehow awaken or activate.
Placebo effects are due to “permission” to activate “self-healing”? Again, nope
As you see, Prof. Starks is very much about common longstanding incorrect narratives about what placebo effects are and what they can do. He does, however, throw in a twist in describing what he believes placebo effects to be in this framework:
The placebo effect is not a trick of the mind. It is a feature of human biology that people have largely surrendered to whoever performs authority most convincingly.
He even portrays himself as the skeptic, critical of “wellness culture”:
If belief can activate biological healing pathways, belief can also be manipulated. Charismatic figures, elaborate medical rituals and expensive treatments may produce real improvement in symptoms even when the underlying treatment is physiologically inert. That is how wellness culture works. It leverages the same social scaffolding of care to trigger the body’s internal pharmacy, regardless of whether the treatment itself does anything.
Amazingly, that first link goes to an article by critic and skeptic of alternative medicine, Jonathan Stea, entitled The multi-trillion-dollar wellness industry is making us sick, and the second link goes to another article in The Conversation, Why do we fall for wellness scams? Our cultural biases and myths are often to blame by Jesse Ruse. Both are strong articles. Neither supports the existence of powerful healing effects from placebo medicine or argue for the use of placebo. Moreover, strictly speaking, Prof. Starks is not entirely wrong when he argues that wellness culture leverages the “same social scaffolding” upon which placebo effects depend. He just leaps to the wrong conclusion:
The placebo effect is often celebrated as proof that the mind can heal the body. But I believe that may not be its most interesting lesson. It also reveals that human physiology evolved to take its cues from other people. Your brain, immune system, and pain response are not isolated machines. They are deeply intertwined with social signals, expectations and trust.
In a world filled with doctors, advertisements, wellness influencers and elaborate medical rituals, that insight is both fascinating and profoundly maddening. People are walking around with one of the most powerful healing systems ever documented locked inside them, and they can reliably access it only when someone in a position of authority gives them permission.
Wait, what? As I said, this is a bit of a new twist on an old argument. The way that this claim has traditionally been framed is that authority figures, such as shamans and priests in the distant past and doctors in white coats right now, are taken more seriously because of their perceived authority, so that their pronouncements that a given treatment can work are more effective in changing the perception of symptoms in a way consistent with placebo effects. Here, Prof. Starks is portraying placebo effects as “one of the most powerful healing systems ever documented” that somehow needs “permission” from authority figures and medical rituals, claiming that it’s all due to our inability to control our stress responses:
You can talk back to the stress response, consciously reappraising the threat – in other words, reframing a looming deadline not as a catastrophe but as a manageable challenge – to help quiet it. But notice what you cannot do: You cannot simply decide to activate your placebo response. You cannot will yourself to release pain-relieving endorphins by believing hard enough in a sugar pill. For that, you still need the ritual, the white coat, the authority figure. You need someone else.
The stress response, misfiring as it is, remains yours. The placebo response has been outsourced: not because it wasn’t always social, but because even now, people still can’t seem to access it on their own.
Did Prof. Starks cite any evidence for this assertion? Of course he didn’t. There isn’t any, not really. It’s his interpretation of the change in perceptual filter that leads patients to perceive improvement in their symptoms, whether or not there really was any improvement, or whether the placebo intervention caused any improvement in the pathophysiology of the disease or condition causing their symptoms. He does cite a paper while claiming:
Some researchers have proposed that placebo responses reflect a kind of biological health governor: a system that regulates when the body invests heavily in recovery. Cues from trusted individuals may be exactly the signal the body waits for before committing resources to recovery. A caregiver’s reassurance, a physician’s authority and the rituals of medicine may tell the body that conditions are finally stable enough to devote energy to healing.
If that interpretation is correct, the placebo effect is not a trick of the mind. It is an ancient biological system responding to social information.
The paper cited in the link in the passage above is remarkable to me, mainly because a highly reputable journal, Current Biology, published such an evidence-light commentary that makes some really amazing conclusions based on little data. (Seriously, this article almost demands a post of its own.) The authors propose that there is a “health governor” in our biology that weighs the costs versus the benefits of activating healing systems:
Given the real benefits, it will usually be adaptive to deploy a particular defense despite the costs. Better be in pain that reduces mobility than risk opening a wound. Better to put up with a fever that helps kill bacterial parasites than risk the infection flaring up out of control. But, equally, given the real costs, there will also be times when deploying the defense would actually be inadvisable. Better not to mount a full-blown immune response when there’s a risk of famine. Better not feel the pain from a sprained ankle when escaping from a predator.
In general, a particular healing measure can be expected to be adaptive only when the anticipated benefits are likely to exceed the anticipated costs. In short, self-healing involves — or ought to involve — a judgment call. It follows that, from early on in the evolution of the vis mediatrix, there must have been selective pressure to develop a secondary control system that can forecast the costs and benefits, and steer the vis accordingly.
Who makes this “judgment”? According to the authors, it’s a system that they postulate and dub the “health governor”:
What this health governor has evolved to do is to perform a kind of economic analysis of what the costs and benefits of self-cure will be, taking account of how dangerous the situation seems to be right now, what can be expected to happen next, what reserves there are in store, and so on. In effect, the health governor acts like a good hospital manager who, with finite resources, has to try to provide a service that maximizes patient satisfaction in the short-term while minimizing long-term risks. Crucially, he needs to be able to make an informed guess about future needs and opportunities, so that he can budget accordingly
The evidence that this “health governor” functions this way—or even exists at all? I didn’t see anything in the commentary that I considered compelling evidence. The paper is largely speculative and concludes that the reason “permission” is needed from societal influences and authority figures for placebo medicine to heal is because we are stuck in the past, evolutionarily speaking, with a health manager that is too conservative in terms of devoting energy and resources to “self-healing”:
The paradox is this. When people recover from illness under the influence of fake treatments, they must of course in reality be healing themselves. But if and when people have the capacity to heal themselves by their own efforts, why do they not simply get on with it? Why ever should they wait for third-party permission — from the shaman or the sugar pill — to heal themselves? How strange that people should be condemned to remain dysfunctionally sick just because — as must still often happen — they have not received permission.
It does indeed seem a puzzle for evolutionary biology. And we contend that the only explanation can be that the health governor remains stuck in the past, with rules for health expenditure that are overcautious for the modern environment.
Again, no solid evidence is presented for this hypothesis. It’s all speculative, such as when the authors suggest an explanation for why we are still “stuck in the past” with respect to self-healing: “A more intriguing one would be that modern humans are descended from a sub-population of Homo sapiens whose conservative approach to health allowed them to survive catastrophes that left their more liberal cousins too exposed [20].” The article referenced says nothing about this. It is a paper on human evolution that examined whole-genome sequences to infer when various human populations started to diverge genetically.
The times might change, but the narrative remains the same
With the rise of the “make America healthy again” (MAHA) movement, there has been a lot more discussion of and tolerance for the sorts of alternative medicine interventions that we used to discuss as being nothing more than placebo medicine. It should therefore not be unexpected that old narratives about placebo effects as being the activation of “powerful self-healing systems” in the human body should resurface with new wrinkles. I’m not saying that Prof. Starks is MAHA. I have no idea, never having heard of him before. What I am saying is that his is a very old narrative about placebos that can be traced back at least to the 1970s, when stories of “acupuncture anesthesia” started reaching the West from Communist China, to great buzz in the media. A more science-based perspective is not that placebo effects represent some sort of activation of an innate and powerful “self-healing” system in the body (whether “permission” needs to be given through authority figures, rituals, and other external influences or not), but rather derive from artifacts from the clinical trial process and changes in perception of their condition by those receiving the placebo.
Eighteen-plus years on since SBM first came into existence, neither I nor any of the others who have contributed to SBM have found compelling evidence to view placebo effects in any other way.

   Do physicians really believe in placebos?
Peter Lipson
Link
In a previous post, I argued that placebo is an artifact of certain clinical interactions, rather than a treatment that we can exploit. Apparently, there are a whole lot of doctors out there who don’t agree with me. Or are there?
A recent study published in the British Medical Journal is getting
a lot of enk (e-ink) in the blogosphere. As a practicing internist, I have some pretty strong opinions (based in fact, of course) about both this study and placebos in general.
The Study
The current BMJ study defines placebo as “positive clinical outcomes caused by a treatment that is not attributable to its known physical properties or mechanism of action.” I’ve got a lot of problems with this definition, but we’ll get to that later. It also allowed physiologically active medications to “count” as placebos. Oops.
The study surveyed internists and rheumatologists practicing in the U.S. They tried to control negative responses to the term “placebo” thusly (from the Methods section):
Because the term “placebo” and behaviours surrounding its use can be contentious, we devised a series of non-judgmental questions beginning with broad questions that avoided the term “placebo” and then gradually gained more specificity, culminating in items whose responses used a clear definition of a “placebo treatment.” By constructing a series of items in this manner we allowed respondents to describe their attitudes and experiences as accurately as possible.
The first set of three items began with a hypothetical scenario in which a dextrose tablet was shown in clinical trials to be superior to a no treatment control group (thus establishing its efficacy as a placebo treatment). To avoid biasing responses these three questions did not use the term “placebo,” “placebo treatment,” or “placebo effect.”
I know a lot of doctors. They tend to be fairly bright. I don’t think any of them would be deceived by this scenario. When you read “dextrose pill”, you think “placebo”. It might as well be the same word.
Respondents were then asked to indicate which of several treatments they had used within the past year primarily as a placebo treatment, defined as a treatment whose benefits derive from positive patient expectations and not from the physiological mechanism of the treatment itself; and how they typically described placebo treatments to patients. By asking these five questions both without the term “placebo” and then using the term, we aimed to assess physicians’ practices as accurately as possible.
All docs would recognize this as a placebo scenario. However, the definition above is rather problematic. Is a placebo “a treatment whose benefits derive from positive patient expectations and not from the physiologic mechanism of the treatment itself”?
The validity of this study hinges on the answer to this question.
Placebo—I do not think it means what you think it means
The concept of placebo, and the way it is used in this study are both problematic. First, we have an elephant in the exam room. When we observe a so-called placebo effect, we are very susceptible to the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. Just because the patient’s condition changes doesn’t mean we have done anything to cause that change. In fact, due to the remarkably inexact human pattern-recognition software, we are likely to attribute a change in a patient’s condition to something, and if we don’t know what that something is, we may label it “placebo”. So the very concept of placebo may be an artifact of our way of thinking, a label to place on a co-incidence, rather than a “thing”. We may have wrongly reified a rather fuzzy concept.
So, I’m not quite sure what a placebo is. In the current study, a placebo is defined as “positive clinical outcomes caused by a treatment that is not attributable to its known physical properties or mechanism of action.” This implies that the physician either knows the treatment shouldn’t work, or doesn’t understand how it works. This isn’t just semantics; we have many treatments available whose exact mechanism of action isn’t known, but whose effectiveness has been proved. If you interpret the definition less strictly, it oxymoronically defines a placebo as something that works despite it’s lack of efficacy. If I prescribe something expecting a predictable effect, and it produces that effect, by definition it isn’t a placebo. If I prescribe something I expect to work, and it doesn’t, then it isn’t a placebo. If I prescribe something expecting failure, but it works, I’m a lucky idiot. This would seem to imply that there is no such thing as a placebo (and I might agree).
Earlier work lays down some less problematic definitions by dividing out the “components” of the placebo effect. One scheme divides placebo effects into effects due to assessment and observation, due to therapeutic ritual (placebo treatment), and due to supportive patient-practitioner relationship. (It leaves out coincidence.) Each of these effects is easy to remove from the shadow of placebo. Effects due to assessment and observation occur with all patients. Therapeutic rituals exist independent of traditional placebos—for example, simply doing a thorough exam is a useful ritual, and is often therapeutic. And a supportive doctor-patient relationship is (should be) standard. When you try to divide placebo into its components, you’re left with standard components of medical care.
Modern medicine has a bit of a Clarkian quality to it. Most patients don’t know how medicine works, and that’s OK. It’s not necessary that every patient be a trained physician. Given the power of modern, science-based medicine, it can seem like magic to the uninitiated. To someone who doesn’t apply too much thought to the problem, a placebo can seem to be another tool on the shelf along with acetaminophen, appendectomies, and atenolol. Each of these tools can have a positive clinical effect. And positive effects can occur with no treatment at all. Is it right to label that which we do not understand “placebo”?
The best definition of placebo that I’ve seen, snatched right from Wikipedia, is ” a substance or procedure a patient accepts as medicine or therapy, but which has no specific therapeutic activity.” This seems more accurate. It takes out the necessity for a placebo to actually work. Some might say that this eviscerates the concept entirely, and that’s really the point—a placebo treatment is not a treatment at all, only the perception of one.
In sum…
A placebo is a tool used in clinical studies to separate out effects of the treatment in question from doing nothing. If there are improvements in subjects in the placebo arm, it is usually called a “placebo effect”, but may just be either random changes in the patient’s condition, or the effect of standard medical care such as being observed and cared for. A placebo cannot be used as a treatment, and cannot be observed outside of this setting. After all, how would you test a placebo? Against a different placebo? And trials that do exist measure only subjective outcomes, such as pain, rather than something objective, such as tumor size. Would you be willing to be a subject in a trial of placebo vs. nothing at all for your colon cancer? The ethical problem of deceiving a patient in order to achieve a placebo effect is dealt with in detail in Dr. Gorski’s post from earlier today. I would add to his argument that since placebo effects don’t really exist outside of clinical studies, there is never a good reason to use one.
Finally, placebo is a refuge for cult medicine enthusiasts. When homeopaths, naturopaths, chiropractors, and other modern shamans are confronted with the utter implausibility of their offerings, they may retort, “well, it at least has a powerful placebo effect, and the patient feels better.”
A careful examination of the nature of placebo shows this argument to be bankrupt. Placebo is not a treatment. It is unethical. And, as it is commonly understood, placebo treatments may in fact be non-existent, an ephemeral change in a patient’s condition. To claim credit for it is disingenuous at best.
References
J. C Tilburt, E. J Emanuel, T. J Kaptchuk, F. A Curlin, F. G Miller (2008). Prescribing “placebo treatments”: results of national survey of US internists and rheumatologists BMJ, 337 (oct23 2) DOI: 10.1136/bmj.a1938
T. J Kaptchuk, J. M Kelley, L. A Conboy, R. B Davis, C. E Kerr, E. E Jacobson, I. Kirsch, R. N Schyner, B. H. Nam, L. T Nguyen, M. Park, A. L Rivers, C. McManus, E. Kokkotou, D. A Drossman, P. Goldman, A. J Lembo (2008). Components of placebo effect: randomised controlled trial in patients with irritable bowel syndrome BMJ, 336 (7651), 999-1003 DOI: 10.1136/bmj.39524.439618.25
A Hróbjartsson (2002). What are the main methodological problems in the estimation of placebo effects? Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 55 (5), 430-435 DOI: 10.1016/S0895-4356(01)00496-6

The rebranding of CAM as “harnessing the power of placebo”
David Gorski on January 9, 2012
Link

If there’s one thing I’ve learned over the past seven years or so that I’ve been blogging, first at my other “super secret” (or, more accurately, super “not-so-secret”) blogging location, and then the four years I’ve been blogging here at Science-Based Medicine (SBM), it’s that the vast majority of “alternative medicine,” “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), and “integrative medicine” (IM) treatments (or whatever you want to call them) are nothing more than placebo medicine. True, there are exceptions, such as herbal treatments, mainly because they can contain chemicals in them that are active drugs, but any critical look at things like homeopathy (which is water), reiki (which is faith healing substituting Eastern mystical beliefs for Christianity), acupuncture (whose effects, when tested rigorously, are found to be nonspecific), or “energy healing” must conclude that any effects these modalities have are placebo effects or responses. Given writings on this topic by Steve Novella, Mark Crislip, Harriet Hall, Peter Lipson, myself, and others, this should be abundantly clear to readers of this blog, but, even so, it bears repeating. In fact, it probably can’t be repeated enough.
There was a time not so long ago when proponents of unscientific medicine tried very, very hard to argue that their nostrums have real effects on symptoms and disease above and beyond placebo effects. They would usually base such arguments on small, less rigorously designed clinical trials, mainly because, if there’s another thing I knew before from my medical education but that has been particularly reinforced in me since I started blogging, it’s that small clinical trials are very prone to false positives. Often they’d come up with some handwaving physiological or biological explanation, which, in the case of something like homeopathy, often violated the laws of chemistry and physics. Be that as it may, the larger and more rigorously designed the clinical trial, the less apparent effects become until, in the case of CAM therapies that do nothing (like homeopathy), they collapse into no effect detectable above that of placebo. Even so, there are often enough apparently “positive” clinical trials of water (homeopathy) that homeopaths can still cling to them as evidence that homeopathy works. Personally, I think that Kimball Atwood put it better when he cited a homeopath who said bluntly, “Either homeopathy works, or clinical trials don’t!” and concluded that, for highly implausible treatments like homeopathy, clinical trials as currently constituted under the paradigm of evidence-based, as opposed to science-based, medicine don’t work very well. Indeed, contrasting SBM with EBM has been a major theme of this blog over the last four years. In any case, for a long time, CAM enthusiasts argued that CAM really, really works, that it does better than placebo, just like real medicine.
Over the last few years, however, some CAM practitioners and quackademics have started to recognize that, no, when tested in rigorous clinical trials their nostrums really don’t have any detectable effects above and beyond that of placebo. A real scientist, when faced with such resoundingly negative results, would abandon such therapies as, by definition, a placebo therapy is a therapy that doesn’t do anything for the disease or condition being treated. CAM “scientists,” on the other hand, do not abandon therapies that have been demonstrated not to work. Instead, some of them have found a way to keep using such therapies. The way they justify that is to argue that placebo medicine is not just useful medicine but “powerful” medicine. Indeed, an article by Henry K. Beecher from 1955 referred to the “powerful placebo.” This construct allows them then to “rebrand” CAM unashamedly as “harnessing the power of placebo” as a way of defending its usefulness and relevance. In doing so, they like to ascribe magical powers to placebos, implying that placebos can do more than just decrease the perception of pain or other subjective symptoms but in fact can lead to objective improvements in a whole host of diseases and conditions. Some even go so far as to claim that there can be placebo effects without deception, citing a paper in which the investigators — you guessed it! — used deception to convince their patients that their placebos would relieve their symptoms. Increasingly, placebos are invoked as a means of “harnessing the power of the mind” over the body in order to relieve symptoms and cure disease in what at times seems like a magical mystery tour of the brain.
Part of what allows CAM practitioners to get away with this is that placebo effects are poorly understood even by most physicians and, not surprisingly, even more poorly understood by the public. Moreover, we all like to think that we have more control than we do over our bodies and, in particular, illnesses and symptoms, which is why the selling of placebo effects as a means of harnessing some innate hidden power we have to control our own bodies through the power of mind is so attractive to so many, including some scientists and physicians. Exhibit A is Ted Kaptchuk, the researcher from Harvard University responsible for spinning an interesting study of placebo effects in asthma into the invocation of the power of placebo. Kimball Atwood has written extensively about Kaptchuk recently, revealing his rather dubious background and arguments. More recently, however, Kaptchuk seems to be everywhere, appearing in articles and interviews, promoting just the argument I’m talking about, that CAM is a way of harnessing placebo effects, so much so that I felt it was time to take a look at this argument.
He’s here, he’s there, he’s everywhere
Over the last month or so, Ted Kaptchuk has been seemingly all over the place in some very prominent media outlets, including:
     1.  An article in the Wall Street Journal by Shirley S. Wang, Why Placebos Work Wonders: From Weight Loss To Fertility, New Legitimacy For ‘Fake’ Treatments.
     2.  An article in the New Yorker by Michael Specter, The Power of Nothing: Could Studying the Placebo Effect Change the Way We Think About Medicine?
     3.  An article in The Atlantic by Elaine Schattner, The Placebo Debate: Is It Unethical to Prescribe Them to Patients?
     4.  An interview on Boston’s WBUR with Jessica Alpert, Demystifying The Power Of “The Placebo Effect”
     5.  An interview on Science Friday with Ira Flatow, One Scholar’s Take On The Power of The Placebo
Much of what was published in these stories reminds me just how badly placebos are misunderstood. Perhaps the best (or, more appropriately, the “worst”) example is the article by Shirley S. Wang. If you want a primer on how not to write about placebos as a journalist, I’d be hard pressed to find a better example for you to study than this article. Wang falls for all the CAM/IM tropes that they like to use to demonstrate that their methods are anything more than ineffective methods that can provoke a placebo response. In fact, jumping ahead in her article a bit, I know she has no understanding of the issues involved — or even an active misunderstanding — when she writes a passage like this:
Ted Kaptchuk, director of Harvard’s Program in Placebo Studies and the Therapeutic Encounter, and colleagues demonstrated that deception isn’t necessary for the placebo effect to work. Eighty patients with irritable bowel syndrome, a chronic gastrointestinal disorder, were assigned either a placebo or no treatment. Patients in the placebo group got pills described to them as being made with an inert substance and showing in studies to improve symptoms via “mind-body self-healing processes.” Participants were told they didn’t have to believe in the placebo effect but should take the pills anyway, Dr. Kaptchuk says. After three weeks, placebo-group patients reported feelings of relief, significant reduction in some symptoms and some improvement in quality of life.
Wang so completely fell for the spin that Kaptchuk put on this study and so obviously doesn’t understand what she’s writing about that it makes me instantly question the rest of her article, particularly the parts where she cites studies. Fortunately, in this case, several of us have already blogged about the actual primary article cites and explained exactly why Kaptchuk’s spin that the study indicated that it was possible to induce placebo responses without deception. The long version is in this is in this post I wrote about a year ago. The short version is the observation that subjects were recruited for this study by ads touting a “novel mind-body management study of IBS [irritable bowel syndrome],” which introduced selection bias for people prone to be interested in “mind-body” interactions. Moreover, while it is true that Kaptchuk and his team told subjects that they would be receiving placebos, but they also told subjects that the sugar pills used “have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes,” which is, to put it kindly, an exaggeration. Add to all this the way outcomes were measured were custom-designed to exaggerate. The no-treatment arm demonstrated an IBS Global Improvement Score of 4 (no change) compared to the Open Placebo arm, which averaged 5 (slightly improved). This is highly unlikely to be clinically significant. Despite all these problems, this study was widely touted as somehow being slam-dunk evidence that placebo effects can be invoked without deception when it is anything but. The best possible spin that could be put on this study is that it is consistent with previous work that expectation effects are important in placebo effects. In other words, if you expect an effect, even if you know you’re taking a placebo, you’re more likely to feel better.
Of course, I shouldn’t be too hard on Wang, I suppose, at least not for this. After all, it apparently fooled Edzard Ernst himself into calling it “elegant.” I’ll also mention that she also discusses (and gets mostly right) another study that I’ve blogged about just last summer. In fact, it was a study that was prominently featured in the discussion panel that I participated in at TAM last summer, along with Steve Novella, Kimball Atwood, Mark Crislip, Harriet Hall, Rachael Dunlop, and Ginger Campbell. Steve even mischievously switched back and forth between two of the graphs in the paper to make a point. Yes, I’m referring to the “placebo in asthma” study, or, as I called it, Spin City, or as Peter Lipson referred to it Asthma, placebo, and how not to kill your patients. Wang correctly points out that only the active treatment (albuterol) improved the underlying biology but that both groups felt better. This is more or less the very definition of placebo effects: feeling better without any actual physiological improvement or correction of the underlying pathophysiology. Yet that’s not the overall impression that her article gives, as she cites a number of studies that suggest that placebo effects are more than just an effect on “how a person experiences or reacts to an illness.” She even uses an argument from popularity, pointing out how many physicians knowingly prescribe placebos based on a study from 2008 which, I can’t help but mention, I also blogged about when it came out, as did Abel Pharmboy, Janet Stemwedel, Jake Young, revere, and Peter Lipson, who quite aptly said about this study, “Placebo — I do not think it means what you think it means.” The reason is that the authors counted many things as placebo, including pills known to have actual pharmacologic activity and how the authors defined placebo, as Peter pointed out:
In the current study, a placebo is defined as “positive clinical outcomes caused by a treatment that is not attributable to its known physical properties or mechanism of action.” This implies that the physician either knows the treatment shouldn’t work, or doesn’t understand how it works. This isn’t just semantics; we have many treatments available whose exact mechanism of action isn’t known, but whose effectiveness has been proved. If you interpret the definition less strictly, it oxymoronically defines a placebo as something that works despite it’s lack of efficacy. If I prescribe something expecting a predictable effect, and it produces that effect, by definition it isn’t a placebo. If I prescribe something I expect to work, and it doesn’t, then it isn’t a placebo. If I prescribe something expecting failure, but it works, I’m a lucky idiot. This would seem to imply that there is no such thing as a placebo (and I might agree).
Certainly, our colleague Mark Crislip agrees, going so far as to refer to the placebo myth and the prostrate placebo (although my favorite Crislip-ism about CAM and placebos was when Crislip referred to CAM as the beer goggles of medicine).
Unfortunately, even Michael Specter, whom I’ve generally considered to be a good science journalist, wasn’t up to his usual standards in his New Yorker article. As Steve Novella pointed out, he hit most of the high points but clearly seemed too influenced by Kaptchuk, who, complete with various anecdotes about placebo effects, was portrayed as a “brave maverick doctor” who is “reviled” by the rest of the medical profession for challenging its paradigms.
Elaine Schattner did better, although even she seemed enamored of the spin that Kaptchuk puts on placebo. Indeed, she even accepted his description of his studies:
You might wonder, lately, if placebos can confer genuine health benefits to some people with illness. If you’re reviewing a serious publication like the New England Journal of Medicine, you could be persuaded by results of a recent article on giving placebos to asthma patients in a randomized clinical trial. The topic has blossomed since 2008, when PLoS One reported on the use of mock treatments, without concealment, in people with irritable bowel syndrome. In that small study, participants experienced symptomatic relief even though they knew they were getting bogus remedies.
No, no, no, no. The NEJM article showed nothing of the sort; there was no benefit to patients receiving placebo. That was the point, albeit danced around by Kaptchuk and Dan Moerman. And, again, it bears repeating that the IBS study did not show that the use of mock treatment “without concealment” results in symptomatic improvement. As I wrote before, there wasn’t the traditional type of concealment in that the patients were aware they were receiving placebo, but there was deception in that placebos were represented to the patient as producing “powerful mind-body healing effects” (at the very least there was exaggeration). The strength of Schattner’s article is that it emphasized that it’s unethical to deceive patients. Harriet Hall says it; bioethicist Frank Miller says it; even Ted Kaptchuk says it. Its weakness seems to be in taking Kaptchuk’s spin on his work at face value. Unfortunately, Ira Flatow, from whom I would expect better, falls even harder for the same spin. He interviewed Kaptchuk for a Science Friday segment just last Friday, where, at the very beginning he accepts Kaptchuk’s spin on the IBS study, declaring at the beginning of the interview that it is evidence that “placebos work even when patients are in on the secret.”
Meanwhile, Jessica Alpert declares:
Right here in Boston, in the heart of the city’s respected and centuries-old medical establishment, there’s a research center that is challenging long held views about how we treat illness, how we measure the effectiveness of treatment, and how the power of the mind — rather than drugs — can actually cure illness.
We’re talking about new and controversial research into the so-called placebo effect. There’s growing evidence that placebos can actually help cure people, or at least make them feel better. If true, this could spark a major revolution in medicine, because traditionally placebos have had a bad name. After all, they’re usually a fake pill, nothing more than a bit of sugar, for example, designed to deceive people in clinical drug trials.
But now there’s evidence that in some cases placebos — even when people knowingly take them — work just as well as real drugs and actually make people better. This has potentially enormous implications in the way we think about medicine, and how we understand the power of suggestion and belief in healing.
With such credulous and uncritical reporting about placebo effects running rampant, with even good science journalists like Michael Specter tainting his reporting on placebos with a bit too much credulity towards the claims of someone like Ted Kaptchuk, is it any wonder that so many people think that there’s something mystical about how placebos work (or don’t work) or that so many think that placebos represent “mind-body healing” or the power of Mind (capitalization intentional) over matter?
Some recent science on placebo effects
All too often, “placebo” seems to mean exactly what people choose it to mean, no more, no less (apologies to Lewis Carroll). In reality, a placebo is nothing more than “a substance or procedure a patient accepts as medicine or therapy, but which has no specific therapeutic activity” or, as Wikipedia now defines it, “simulated or otherwise medically ineffectual treatment for a disease or other medical condition intended to deceive the recipient.” This strikes me as a better definition than the old definition because it emphasizes that placebos are medically ineffectual and that they involve deceiving the patient. Indeed, the necessity of deception is, Kaptchuk’s claims otherwise, part and parcel of placebo use, which is one key reason why using placebos has fallen out of favor. Using placebos outside of a clinical trial is now generally considered at best paternalistic and at worst downright unethical, because it violates informed consent and patient autonomy. Sixty or seventy years ago, it was considered acceptable for physicians to deceive patients that way. In 2012, not so much.
In any case, what we call the “placebo effect” is not a single effect, and it has many components. Placebos are actually best viewed as a rather artificial tool used in clinical trials to control for nonspecific effects. There are expectation effects, in which patients experience what they are led to expect to experience. There are effects due to observation. Patients in clinical trials almost always do better than those not in clinical trials, thanks to the closer attention and more rigorous treatment protocols. This has sometimes been referred to as the “clinical trial effect,” and both patients and doctors often unconsciously modify their behavior based on their knowledge that they are being observed, an effect known as the Hawthorne effect. Then there are effects due to reporting, which can introduce bias. There are effects due to regression to the mean, which describes how patients interact with the natural waxing and waning of their symptoms. When their symptoms are at their worst is when patients will tend to try a treatment. Because most symptoms will wax and wane, even if nothing is done there’s a good chance that a patient’s symptoms will “regress to the mean” on their own even if the patient does nothing. However, if a patient has taken a remedy, even a placebo like homeopathy, at a time when their symptoms are at their worst, it’s very common for them to attribute their improvement to the medication. Correlation, of course, does not equal causation. In any case, depending on the timing of the clinical trial’s measurement, regression to the mean can play a role in placebo effects.
Given how complex placebo effects are and how many different variables determine the magnitude of placebo effects, it should not be surprising are a whole host of other factors that determine how strong a placebo effect will occur in any situation. Surgery and invasive procedures are more powerful placebos than pills, for instance. More expensive placebos tend to produce stronger apparent effects. Indeed, there’s a whole hierarchy of placebos, and placebo effects can be enhanced by things like empathy and the doctor-patient relationship. Traditionally, it’s been believed, based on a number of lines of evidence, that practitioner empathy has a major effect on placebo effects.
Just last month a group out of the University of Southhampton published a rather intriguing study that somewhat challenges that paradigm. The study, which was published online ahead of print last month is entitled Practice, practitioner, or placebo? A multifactorial, mixed-methods randomized controlled trial of acupuncture. Its conclusions are a mixture of the provocative and the mundane (i.e., in line with what we already know). It’s a rather complicated study design to explain, which opens it up to concerns on my part that it’s a bit too complicated to draw firm conclusions from. Let’s start with the abstract:
The nonspecific effects of acupuncture are well documented; we wished to quantify these factors in osteoarthritic (OA) pain, examining needling, the consultation, and the practitioner. In a prospective randomised, single-blind, placebo-controlled, multifactorial, mixed-methods trial, 221 patients with OA awaiting joint replacement surgery were recruited. Interventions were acupuncture, Streitberger placebo acupuncture, and mock electrical stimulation, each with empathic or nonempathic consultations. Interventions involved eight 30-minute treatments over 4 weeks. The primary outcome was pain (VAS) at 1 week posttreatment. Face-to-face qualitative interviews were conducted (purposive sample, 27 participants). Improvements occurred from baseline for all interventions with no significant differences between real and placebo acupuncture (mean difference −2.7 mm, 95% confidence intervals −9.0 to 3.6; P = .40) or mock stimulation (−3.9, −10.4 to 2.7; P = .25). Empathic consultations did not affect pain (3.0 mm, −2.2 to 8.2; P = .26) but practitioner 3 achieved greater analgesia than practitioner 2 (10.9, 3.9 to 18.0; P = .002). Qualitative analysis indicated that patients’ beliefs about treatment veracity and confidence in outcomes were reciprocally linked. The supportive nature of the trial attenuated differences between the different consultation styles. Improvements occurred from baseline, but acupuncture has no specific efficacy over either placebo. The individual practitioner and the patient’s belief had a significant effect on outcome. The 2 placebos were equally as effective and credible as acupuncture. Needle and nonneedle placebos are equivalent. An unknown characteristic of the treating practitioner predicts outcome, as does the patient’s belief (independently). Beliefs about treatment veracity shape how patients self-report outcome, complicating and confounding study interpretation.
It’s probably easier to borrow the figure in the paper that explains how this study was laid out (click on the image to enlarge):
Note how this design results in eighteen different experimental groups, based on three practitioners treating patients either with the “empathic protocol” or the “non-empathic” protocol, each of which is further divided into groups of real acupuncture, sham acupuncture (Streitberger placebo acupuncture technique), or mock electrical stimulation. It is these groups that were analyzed in different combinations (for example, empathic versus non-empathic, sham versus real acupuncture, practitioner 1 versus practitioner 2 versus practitioner 3). In the end, there were 221 patients randomized, and each small experimental group ended up with between 5 and 20 subjects, for a total of 221 patients. To assess for possible confounding factors, investigators also recorded “attitudes towards complementary medicine holistic complementary and alternative medicine questionnaire (HCAMQ),” empathy consultation and relational empathy (CARE) questionnaire, analgesic intake (tablet count), and needling sensation. Patients were also given a daily pain diary (100 mm visual analogue scale VAS) to complete for 7 (pretreatment) days and during treatment. Finally, patients were asked at treatment completion, “Do you think the treatment you had was real” and required to give a simple yes or no answer. One strength of the study is that high percentages of subjects believed (75% to 96%, depending on group) that they were receiving “real” treatments.
Let’s start with the unsurprising result of the study. Basically, it was found that all three main groups, real acupuncture, sham acupuncture, and mock electrical current, all experienced a decrease in pain and that there was no difference between them. This result is, of course, completely consistent with what studies have found time and time again about acupuncture, namely that it performs no better than placebo. Similarly, the observation that belief in the therapy (i.e., belief that the subject was receiving “real” therapy and that the therapy would be effective) was correlated with improved outcomes in pain was expected and consistent with previous literature about placebo responses. The result that was surprising was that there was no reported difference between patients receiving empathic and non-empathic treatment. This finding the authors reported, was unexpected. But what does it mean?
In this study, empathic treatments were described thusly:
Empathic (EMP) consultations were deemed to be normal pragmatic treatment sessions. Patients were greeted in a friendly, warm manner and were free to enter into conversation with their practitioner, who in turn would willingly do so. Practitioners did their utmost to comply with participants’ wishes, providing detailed answers to questions and emphasising patient comfort and well-being.
Non-empathic interactions consisted of this:
This encounter was more “clinical” in nature. Patients were greeted in an efficient manner and quietly shown to the treatment cubicle. Practitioners would only discuss matters directly relating to the treatment to enable them to effectively carry out that treatment, e.g., pattern of pain and side effects. Necessary explanations were kept as short as possible, and if patients attempted to enter into any discussion, the practitioner would respond using the words “I’m sorry but because this is a trial I am not allowed to discuss this with you.” Between needle stimulations, patients were left on their own in a curtained cubicle.
Based on previous results, we would expect that patients receiving the empathic consultations would report more pain relief, but such was not the case in this study. The authors speculated quite a bit about why this was, from their questionnaire not reflecting empathy adequately to a rather interesting potential confounder in which patients made excuses for the non-empathic interactions:
Participants in empathic consultations described practitioners as caring, friendly, and communicative. Those in nonempathic consultations undertook a little more work to explain their similarly positive views of their practitioners. Thus interviewees who had received nonempathic consultations talked about how they colluded with the practitioner to obey the study rules and have limited personal interactions. They suggested that the practitioners were not really nonempathic, they were just acting that way for the sake of the trial. For example, “I had the feeling that she sort of felt that you know, not being able to converse properly, that she felt a bit awkward about it” (Betty, nonempathic).
To me this suggests that patients really, really want to believe that their practitioners care about them and will go to great lengths to align their interpretations of observed behavior with that belief so that perhaps empathy isn’t as powerful an inducer of the placebo effect as we might expect.
Another intriguing result of this study was the observation of a definite practitioner effect independent of consultation type. Specifically, one practitioner (Practitioner 3) produced consistently better outcomes across all treatment and consultation types. The investigators report that this was observed “in spite of all the meticulous care and planning taken to ensure consistency of treatment delivery among the three practitioners.” Why was this? It wasn’t empathy, but rather it was something that wasn’t being measured in the study design, something unknown. The authors couldn’t identify it, but they did speculate that it has to do with patients viewing Pracitioner 3 as being more authoritative, expert, and confident:
The qualitative data suggested that the interviewees perceived practitioner 3 as a paternalistic male authority figure. Practitioner 3, as the primary investigator, might have been seen by patients as the expert, consequently establishing higher expectations of success, which in turn influenced outcome. Although this is consistent with previous research [10] and [29] a larger explanatory study involving many practitioners is needed.
This was in contrast to Practitioner 1:
Interviewees referred to Practitioner 1 by her first name and as a “girl” and a “young lady,” and some described her using affectionate terms such as “sweet.” Practitioner 3 was referred to as “Doctor,” was never referred to by his first name, and was typically described in more respectful than affectionate terms, including “courteous” and “formal but friendly.” Participants seem to have seen practitioner 3 as more authoritative than practitioner 1.
This is, of course, an observation that opens a can of worms that will be very difficult to deal with. Kimball Atwood once referred to integrative medicine and patient-centered care as the “new paternalism.” I chuckled when I read Atwood’s take on the issue, but I have to admit that he is probably more correct than I had wanted to admit. It might well be that more modern constructs in medicine that involved truly informed consent and respect for patient autonomy might be directly in conflict with Kaptchuk’s apparent vision of physicians as healing shamans whose interactions with patients are as powerful at healing as the medications and procedures they have at their disposal.
Placebo: Real versus fantasy?
In the end, I’m coming to agree more with Mark Crislip than I used to in that I’m starting to question whether placebos are nearly as powerful as they are commonly advertised, although I don’t think I go so far as to call them a myth. Placebo effects, more than anything else, appear to involve changes in how pain or subjective symptoms are perceived, not any physiological change that concretely affects the course of a disease. Consistent with this concept, I have yet to come across a study that provides serious objective evidence that placebos change “hard” objective outcomes, such as survival in cancer. What placebo is frequently claimed to be by advocates like Kaptchuk but is almost certainly not is “mind over matter” or thoughts and mind controlling health. Unfortunately, Kaptchuk and his ilk frequently find willing mouthpieces like Wang to spread this message because it’s such a seductively appealing message. After all, who doesn’t want to believe that we can control our health with our minds? Who doesn’t want to feel that powerful, particularly when disease strips us of control? Unfortunately, the overselling of nonspecific placebo effects leads to the impression that somehow placebos can cure disease, even though it’s been shown time and time again that placebo effects do not shrink tumors or change the underlying pathophysiology of disease. As has been reaffirmed in a recent Cochrane review (ironically, coauthored by Ted Kaptchuk), there is no good evidence for objective responses due to placebo; placebos serve, more than anything else, to change a patient’s perception of his or her symptoms. Beer goggles of medicine, indeed.
Unfortunately, people like Kaptchuk who believe in CAM draw the wrong conclusions from their work on placebo effects, even when that work is actually pretty good in and of itself. To Kaptchuk and scores of other quackademics, placebo effects provide a new rationale to use CAM even though the vast majority of it is placebo medicine. By that I mean physiologically inert but represented by practitioners to patients as real medicine. Clinical trials, as ill-advised as many of them are, continue to reinforce that conclusion. In medicine, when a treatment performs no better than placebo, it is interpreted, and correctly so, as meaning that treatment doesn’t work. Thanks to the magic of “mind-body” placebos, propagandists like Kaptchuk have found a new rationale to use the ineffective treatments that make up so much of CAM.
Michael Specter quotes Ted Kaptchuk as asking, “Do you think this entire field is based on a foundation of magical thinking, or do you not?” That is the wrong question, a massive strawman in fact. No one, least of all myself, that I’m aware of is arguing that the entire field of placebo medicine is based on magical thinking. In fact, I find studies of placebo effects intriguing and often worthwhile. I am, however, arguing that the way that people like Ted Kaptchuk co-opt placebo effects as evidence for “powerful mind-body healing” or as a rationale for using placebos like acupuncture, homeopathy, or “energy healing” is based on magical thinking. After all, we already know that empathy and paying attention to patients improves their perception of their symptoms and treatment with SBM also has a placebo component. We don’t have to invoke magic or pseudoscience or deceive patients paternalistically in order to maximize these effects; yet that is what Kaptchuk and his fellow travelers are implicitly advocating through their rebranding of CAM as “placebo medicine” and their rebranding of the placebo as “powerful mind-body healing.” In the end, all too much of the rebranding of CAM as placebo and the selling of placebos as some sort of powerful “mind-body healing” strikes me as being much like The Secret, in which wishing makes it so.

Placebo effects are not the “power of positive thinking”
David Gorski on January 13, 2014
Link

Here we go again. I once said that, in the wake of study after study that fails to find activity of various “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) beyond that of placebo, CAM advocates are now in the midst of a “rebranding” campaign in which CAM is said to work through the “power of placebo.” Personally, I’ve argued that in reality this new focus on placebo effects as the “mechanism” through which CAM “works” is in reality more a manifestation of the common fantasy that wishing makes it so.
None of this, of course, can stop everybody’s favorite apologist for “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) and, in particular, using placebo effects therapeutically, from continuing to do what he does with a study that’s been widely reported in the news and even featured on Science Friday last week. Basically, it’s a study in Science Translational Medicine, in which our old friend Ted Kaptchuk teamed up with an investigator interested in migraines, Rami Burstein, to do a study that finds that believing a medicine will work can have a strong effect on its actual activity on migraine. As is the case with most studies in which Kaptchuk is involved, it’s mildly interesting from a scientific standpoint. Unlike most studies in which he is involved, Kaptchuk seems a bit more able to tone down the hyperbole, which is a good thing. Unfortunately, this study, as much as it’s being touted by the press as providing new information on placebo effects, really doesn’t tell us much that is new.
But first, in case you don’t remember who Ted Kaptchuk is, let’s take a moment to remind you, given that it’s been a while since he’s appeared as a topic on this blog. He’s the Director of the Program in Placebo Studies, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, and a professor of medicine at the Harvard Medical School. His work on placebo effects has been a frequent topic right here on this very blog and has been a mixed bag. On the one hand, Kaptchuk sometimes does interesting work, but on the other hand he can’t seem to help himself when it comes to overselling it. For example, two years ago, Kaptchuk’s group published a study in which they evaluated subjective placebo effects and objective physiologic effects of “sham acupuncture” in asthma patients. The observations were actually intriguing, as I pointed out. Basically, Kaptchuk compared asthma patients receiving “placebo acupuncture” with patients receiving a real albuterol inhaler. What he found was that placebo effects from the sham acupuncture could make patients feel as though they were less short of breath, even though pulmonary function tests revealed that their lung function had not improved, a result that was not unexpected. It was also, as Peter Lipson described, a finding that indicated how dangerous it could be to rely on placebo effects to treat asthma in that it could easily result in the death of your patients by lulling them into a false sense of security of not feeling short of breath when, from a physiologic standpoint, they are on the knife’s edge of respiratory failure. Meanwhile, advocates of using placebo effects intentionally in medicine spun this study as some great evidence that placeboes could be useful in medicine when in fact it suggested that relying on placebo effects to alter physiology could be very dangerous.
The other message that Kaptchuk has been promoting is that it is possible to have “placeboes without deception.” One of the greatest difficulties as a physician with intentionally utilizing placebo effects, if they are useful, is that under our current understanding of how placeboes work deception is necessary. The patient has to be convinced that the placebo they are getting will help them, which requires the physician or health care provider, in essence, to lie. Indeed, Kaptchuk did a study a few years back testing placeboes in irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) in which he concluded that one could have placebo effects without deception. As I and others pointed out, his study showed nothing of the sort, as the power of suggestion, in which placebo pills were described as being capable of producing “powerful mind-body effects”, was used. Yet Kaptchuk’s old spin continues to persist, even in an NPR story about Kaptchuk and Burstein’s “hot off the presses” migraine study:
The group has shown: that placebos rival the effect of active medication in patients with asthma; that even when patients know they’re taking a placebo, they can get relief from the cramps, bloating and diarrhea of irritable bowel syndrome; and that those subliminal suggestions can activate patients’ placebo response.
Placeboes had no physiologic effect in the asthma study, and, I forgot to mention, in the IBS study the effects observed were actually very small and were not evidence of “placeboes without deception.”
So what about the study itself? Actually, like the asthma study, it’s a pretty well-designed study. Unlike the asthma study, whose results were often exaggerated and misrepresented to mean that placebo effects were as effective as real asthma medicine, Kaptchuk appears not to be willfully misinterpreting it, although he can’t always resist letting some of his old exaggerations slip into his discussion and interviews, as you will see. First, however, let’s look at the study.
Basically, it examined the effect of placebo or an active drug against migraine, Maxalt (rizatriptan), on the migraine headaches of 66 subjects. Each participant was asked to document seven migraine attacks, starting with one untreated attack at the beginning of the study and six subsequent attacks. These six attacks were randomly assigned to be treated with 10 mg of Maxalt or placebo, each labeled either as “placebo,” “Maxalt,” or “Maxalt or placebo.” Patients were asked to record one pain score 30 minutes after onset of the headache as a baseline and then to take the study pill, after which they were to record a second pain score 2.5 hours after the onset of the headache. They were provided with “rescue medications,” which the participants could use as needed at the 2.5 hour time point. Basically, if the participants’ headache hadn’t been adequately relieved, they could take the medication.
One of the strengths of this study is that there really wasn’t much interaction with the physicians running the study, thus minimizing the effects of personal interaction with health care providers after the first visit when subjects were recruited for the study. There ended up being six groups divided into three groups of two, as shown in the image below:
The idea is that there were three conditions: “negative information” (placebo labeling), “neutral” or uncertain information (label says that the pill could be Maxalt or placebo), and “positive information” (Maxalt labeling). Each of these conditions is either true or not; i.e., the “placebo” envelope can contain placebo or the actual Maxalt or the “Maxalt” envelope could contain placebo or the actual Maxalt.” Two main outcomes were measured: (1) the decrease in pain score from 30 minutes after onset to the 2.5 hour mark; i.e., two hours after taking the drug or placebo; and (2) whether or not the subject was pain-free at the 2.5 hour mark.
However, contrary to a lot of the discussion that occurs later expressing how “powerful” placebo effects alone were even under “truthful” conditions, there was a bit of priming going on in the study materials, as published in the supplemental data and information:
Scripted Information Read to Participants. “You are invited to take part in a research study for the purpose of understanding the effects of repeated administration of Maxalt for the treatment of acute migraine attacks, and why placebo rates are so high in migraine therapy. Our first goal is to understand why Maxalt makes you pain-free in one attack but not in another. Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free. Our third goal is to understand why Maxalt works differently when given in double-blind study vs. real-life experience when you take it at home. These goals are scientifically important for developing new therapies for migraine.
I repeat for emphasis: “Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free.” Not to understand why placebo pills might be able to make you pain-free or could possibly make you pain free. “Can make you pain free.” To be fair, this isn’t nearly as blatant as the IBS study in which subjects were told that placeboes could produce “powerful mind-body effects” in the study information. Also, mentioning that “placebo rates are so high in migraine therapy” primes the subjects to expect placeboes to work.
With this suggestion, it’s not entirely surprising that placebo effects were fairly robust. The results can basically be summarized thusly as changes in pain scores:
    • No treatment: 15 percent increase in pain.
    • Known placebo: 26 percent decrease.
    • Placebo labeled Maxalt: 25 percent decrease.*
    • Maxalt labeled as placebo: 36 percent decrease.*
    • Mystery pill (Maxalt or placebo): 40 percent decrease.
    • Known Maxalt: 40 percent decrease.
Note that there was no statistically significant difference between the placebo labeled as Maxalt and the Maxalt labeled as placebo. This is perhaps the most interesting finding, and suggests that positive labeling can boost placebo effects (again, not a new finding) and that negative labeling can decrease whatever contribution there is by placebo effects to the action of the real drug). As for the other values in other groups, reported differences are a lot less impressive if you look at the graph, complete with error bars:
Note the huge overlap between decreases in pain scores in the placebo group regardless of whether the label was “placebo,” “unspecified,” or “positive.” The same is true for decreases in pain scores in the Maxalt group regardless of label. This raises the question of whether reported differences, albeit statistically significantly different, are in any way clinically significant.
The second endpoint examined was whether or not the subject was pain free after 2.5 hours. It’s here where the real differences dwell:
Unlike the primary endpoint, the proportion of participants who were pain-free during the no-treatment condition (0.7%) was not statistically different from when participants took open-label placebo (5.7%). As with the primary endpoint, the proportion of participants pain-free after treatment was not statistically different between Maxalt treatment mislabeled as placebo (14.6%) and placebo treatment mislabeled as Maxalt (7.7%). The resulting therapeutic gain (that is, drug-placebo difference) was 8.8 percentage points under “placebo” labeling [odds ratio (OR), 2.80], 26.6 percentage points under “Maxalt or placebo” labeling (OR, 7.19), and 24.6 percentage points under “Maxalt” labeling (OR, 5.70).
One critical finding here is that Maxalt beat any sort of placebo effect, and not by a little bit, either. For all the Maxalt groups, the percentage of subjects who were pain free was 25.5% compared to 6.7% for all the placebo groups. That’s nearly a four-fold difference. Also note that the no treatment condition was not statistically different from the open-label placebo condition.
The error bars, however, remain wide:
So what does this all mean? In the discussion, Burstein and Kaptchuk try to sell the reader on some old ideas about placebo and some CAM-friendly ideas about placebo:
By manipulating the information provided to patients, our primary analysis showed that the magnitude of headache relief induced by Maxalt (10-mg rizatriptan), as well as that of placebo, was lowest when pills were labeled as placebo, and higher when pills had uncertain labeling or were labeled as active medication. Two other findings were that (i) placebo treatment mislabeled as 10-mg Maxalt reduced headache severity as effectively as did Maxalt mislabeled as placebo, and (ii) open-label placebo treatment was superior to no treatment. We conclude that raising the likelihood of receiving active treatment for pain relief significantly contributed to increased success rate of triptan therapy for migraine, that open-label placebo treatment may have an important therapeutic benefit, and that placebo and medication effects can be modulated by expectancies.
Although Maxalt was superior to placebo under each type of information, we were surprised that the efficacy of Maxalt mislabeled as placebo was not significantly better than the efficacy of placebo mislabeled as Maxalt. We were also surprised to find that open-label placebo treatment induced pain relief as compared with the worsening of pain during the untreated attack. A therapeutic benefit of open-label placebo versus no treatment was also recently reported for patients with irritable bowel syndrome in a randomized controlled study (8) and in a pilot study in depression (9).
Methinks the authors doth protest too much surprise at seeing placebo effects in the open label placebo group, given that the study materials suggested that subjects would experience pain relief or even be pain free based on placebo effects and subjects were told that migraines are subject to placebo effects. Mentioning Kaptchuk’s previous IBS study in which he tried to argue that placeboes without deception were possible is just another way of insinuating the idea that it’s possible to have placebo effects without deception into this study, even though superficially the authors appear to be much more straightforward about discussing their results. On the other hand, when it comes to the endpoint that people with migraines really care about, being pain-free, open label placebo was no different than no treatment at all, a point that gets lost in all the discussions of “the power of positive thinking.”
It’s also rather frustrating that the authors state that many placebo researchers would have considered the providing of information about whether or not patients were receiving placebo, real drug, or had a 50:50 chance of receiving real drug as something that would affect expectancy; i.e., the expectation of benefit. However, they didn’t make any effort to assess expectancy because they were afraid of causing patients to question the accuracy of the information provided on the envelopes. The lack of assessment of expectancy greatly decreases the utility of this study and the ability to generalize from it a potential mechanism to explain their results. Worse, no assessment of blinding was performed because the investigators were worried that this would provoke suspicions in an in-study design. Quite frankly, this is not a convincing excuse. Assessment of blinding is such a routine and key part of randomized clinical trials that to not include it in the trial design is bound to leave an opening for suspicion that the subjects might have been able to guess whether the envelope containing the pill they were using for each migraine incident contained real drug or placebo.
In the end, however, this study really doesn’t tell us much that is new or that we didn’t already know. For a subjective finding, a significant part of the drug effect appears to be placebo. We knew that, which is why I found it rather odd that Kaptchuk exulted over how “half the effect” of Maxalt is due to placebo effects. I also find it rather odd how, in his interview on Science Friday, Kaptchuk emphasized how subjects were given different expectations; yet he didn’t actually assess expectancy. He also goes on about how most studies don’t include a no-treatment control, as if that were a major observation. Of course, the reason that most studies examining subjective outcomes don’t include a no-treatment control anymore is because scientists know from previous studies that placebo effects can be significant confounders.
So the observation that there was a difference between the no-treatment control the placebo arm was not unexpected for the main endpoint, decrease in pain, because that’s a subjective endpoint. Even less unexpected is the observation that there was no statistically significant difference in the chances of being pain-free at the 2.5 hour time point between the no-treatment control and the open-label placebo group. This is entirely consistent with what we’ve been arguing here at SBM for a long time, that the more “objective” or “hard” the endpoint (and, although there is still a subjective component, being pain-free is a harder endpoint than stating a pain score), the weaker any placebo effects observed are, to the point that the very “hardest” endpoints, such as tumor regression or survival, are not affected by placebo. None of this stops Kaptchuk from emphasizing the decrease in pain scores in the open label placebo group in his Science Friday interview but not mentioning that no more people were pain free in that group than in the no treatment group.
I think we get a glimpse into Kaptchuk’s mind in the part of the Science Friday interview when he says:
I think that in the same way a physician has to calculate what pharmaceutical I have to give, how many milligrams he has to give of that drug, he or she might have to calculate the exact right words to accompany the pharmaceutical. In this study the words actually double the effect or cuts the effect of the drug in half. What exactly those words are, I think that’s more research. Our experiment was a proof of concept to see if words work. Then we now have to figure out what’s an ethical way to provide a positive message that’s true, accurate, and is not an exaggeration.
Basically, Kaptchuk appears to be saying that we have to find the right magical words to invoke the mystical placebo effect. Seriously. This experiment had only three sets of words, the two of which that mattered were either affirming that drug was present or stating that placebo was present. It’s not fancy.
Certainly, Kaptchuk does nothing to discourage headlines like:
    • Migraines can be tamed with positive thinking, study finds
    • Study: Thinking Positive Helps Migraine Drug Work
    • Positive thinking a big factor in effectiveness of migraine pills
    • Migraine Study Placebo Effect: New Study Shows The Power of Positive Thinking Makes Migraine Medicine Work
    • The placebo effect: A new study underscores its remarkable power
All of which miss the point. It’s not “positive thinking.” It might be expectancy, but we don’t know that because it wasn’t assessed in this study. The two are different.
In the end, this isn’t really a bad study. It’s just that, even though he’s doing a lot better than he used to, Kaptchuk still can’t seem to resist reading a bit too much into it. He’s not as blatant about it as he used to be, but he’s still implying that placebo effects without deception are possible and desirable. It really doesn’t tell us much that we don’t already know. Placebo effects can enhance subjective effects of pharmaceuticals, expectancy can affect the perception of how well drugs work on subjective outcomes. Understanding placebo effects is important. Overselling them does not help our understanding.

Is “harnessing the power of placebo” worthwhile to treat anything?
David Gorski on January 11, 2016
Link
We frequently write about placebo effects here on Science-Based Medicine. The reason is simple. They are an important topic in medicine and, at least as importantly, understanding placebo effects is critical to understanding the exaggerated claims of advocates of “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), now more frequently called “integrative medicine” (i.e., integrating pseudoscience with science). Over the years, I (and, of course, others) have documented how CAM advocates have consistently moved the goalposts with respect to the efficacy of their pseudoscientific interventions. As larger and better-designed clinical trials have been done demonstrating that various CAM therapies without a basis in science—I’m distinguishing these from science-based modalities that have been co-opted and “rebranded” as CAM, such as exercise and nutrition—have no specific effects detectable above placebo effects, CAM advocates move the goalposts and claim that CAM works through the “power of placebo” and do their best to claim that “harnessing” that “power of placebo” is a justification to use their treatments. It turns out, however, that when placebo effects are examined rigorously there’s just not a lot of there there, so to speak. Results are underwhelming, and trying to “harness the power of placebo” without an intervention that actually impacts the pathophysiology of disease can even be dangerous. That’s not to say that learning to maximize placebo responses (whatever they are) while administering effective medical treatments isn’t important; rather, it’s to point out that, by themselves, placebo effects are not of much value.
Unfortunately, none of this has stopped what Steve Novella refers to as the “placebo narrative” from insinuating itself into lay discussions of medicine. That narrative proclaims in breathless terms (as Steve put it) the “surprising power of the placebo effect” without putting it into reasonable perspective or even really defining what is meant by “placebo effect.” First, as we have tried to explain time and time again here, there is no single “placebo effect.” There are placebo effects. Second, the only really correct reference to “the placebo response” or “placebo effect” is the outcome measured in the placebo arm of a clinical trial. The problem is that, all too often, discussions of placebo responses conflate the placebo effect measured in a clinical trial with all the other various placebo effects that add up to the response that is measured in that trial. Those effects include reporting biases, researcher biases, regression to the mean, conditioning, and many other components that contribute to what is measured in the outcome of a clinical trial. Another common misconception about placebo effects is that they are somehow “mind over matter,” that we can heal ourselves (or at least reduce our symptoms) through the power of will and mind. This is not true. Placebo effects are not the power of positive thinking.
Unfortunately, over the weekend as I was perusing the New York Times, I saw another article full of the flaws in understanding and argument discussed above, so much so that seeing it made me change my topic from one that I had planned to write about earlier. It’s by Jo Marchant and entitled “A Placebo Treatment for Pain“. You can tell right from the title that it’s going to promote the usual CAM tropes about placebos, and indeed it does. In fact, it reminds me of another article that Marchant wrote back in October that was inexplicably published in Nature, “Consider all the evidence on alternative therapies“.
Before the Nature piece, the name Jo Marchant had been vaguely familiar, but I didn’t really know who she was; I just remembered having heard the name before. At the time, I looked her up and found that she is a freelance journalist specializing in science and history. I also learned that she has written a book entitled Cure: A journey into the science of mind over body that is due to be released in just over a week. Just by reading the blurb, you can see where Marchant is coming from in her two articles:
Cure begins with a simple question: can our minds really heal our bodies?
It is a controversial subject. The idea of ‘healing thoughts’ was long-ago hijacked by new age gurus and spiritual healers. But as this compelling new book shows, serious scientific researchers from a range of fields are now uncovering evidence that our subjective thoughts, emotions and beliefs can have very real benefits for our health, from easing symptoms and influencing immune responses to reducing our risk of getting ill in the first place.
In Cure, the award-winning science writer Jo Marchant travels a wide terrain of ideas – from hypnosis to meditation, from placebos to positive visualisation – rescuing each from the realm of pseudoscience. Drawing on the very latest research Jo discusses the potential – and the limitations – of the mind’s ability to influence our health, and explains how readers can make use of the findings in their own lives.
Calling Harriet! Have I got a book for you to review! (I wonder if they’ll give us a review copy after this article, though.)
I could save Ms. Marchant the trouble and just answer her question with a simple no plus these three posts by me: Does thinking make it so? CAM placebo fantasy versus scientific reality, The rebranding of CAM as “harnessing the power of placebo,” and Placebo effects are not the “power of positive thinking” and leave it at that. But, as Han Solo once said, “Hey, it’s me.” So let’s dig in.

Placebos: The mechanism of CAM?
The first thing I noticed about the NYT article is that, as opposed to using placebo effects as a rationale to “consider all the evidence on alternative therapies” (as if we at SBM haven’t been doing just that for eight years now), her NYT op-ed, “A Placebo Treatment for Pain“, uses the “crisis of painkiller addiction” as its jumping-off point and rationale to sell placebo effects explicitly as something that might be used to treat chronic pain. In essence, she buys into the claims by CAM advocates like Ted Kaptchuk that it’s possible to produce strong placebo effects without lying to patients, something that has not been demonstrated, certainly not by Kaptchuk, although not for lack of trying. In any case, looking in retrospect, Marchant’s Nature article sets up the argument made in her NYT article, the latter of which, in contrast, only briefly mentions alternative medicine.
One thing that’s clear examining Marchant’s output over the last couple of years is that she appears to believe that you can think yourself healthy, at least to some extent. Perhaps she admits that you can’t cure cancer with your mind, although she does seem to think that meditation can actually slow aging, citing Elizabeth Blackburn’s work, which has been ably deconstructed before right here in SBM. (I suppose I should be grateful that she didn’t invoke epigenetics and the mind’s supposed ability to dictate its gene expression, as some CAM apologists do.) In any case, as you will see Marchant’s article is a sterling example of what you do when you advocate therapies that don’t have any specific therapeutic effects above and beyond that of placeboes. You embrace placeboes as real medicine, and claim your quackery exerts its therapeutic effect through placebo.
For example, Marchant declares in her Nature article:
“Insane”, “a joke”, and “exactly the sort of thing the NHS should not be doing!” are a few of the Twitter responses to last week’s news that Britain’s Princess Alexandra Hospital NHS Trust wants to hire a reiki therapist for a hospital in Epping. On a salary of up to £22,236 (US$34,000) a year, the appointed person “will provide Reiki/Spiritual healing to patients to enable them to cope with the emotional, physical and spiritual issues of dealing with their cancer journey”.
Critics of the advert — and there are many — advocate instead what they call “evidence-based” approaches to health care. These critics should look again at the evidence — because it shows that to dismiss the benefits of alternative therapies is simplistic and misguided.
No. Just no. It’s not “simplistic,” although that’s a frequent simplistic trope used by fans of quackery to dismiss criticisms of said quackery based on science. Oh, they will say, in essence, “You silly English SBM kniggits reductionistic Western scientists, you! I fart in your general direction! You do not understand the deep complexities and interrelatedness of our woo. Now, go away, or I shall taunt you a second time!”
I exaggerate, of course, but not by much.

Actually, British skeptics and advocates of science-based medicine have every right not to want their precious taxpayer funds wasted, funds that could and should be used to pay for treatments shown to be effective based on science, rather than for rank quackery like reiki. It’s particularly irritating to me that this specific ad was looking for a reiki practitioner to ply his or her quackery on cancer patients, particularly breast cancer patients.
Now, I know the British seem to have a soft spot for homeopathy. After all, there was an NHS-funded homeopathy hospital known as the Royal London Homeopathic Hospital, until a few years ago when the people who run it realized that (1) homeopathy is too easy to attack because it’s so obviously not based in science and (2) they needed to diversify their quackery and get hip to the latest lingo, which is to “integrate” quackery with science-based medicine, the better to give it the appearance of scientific validity. That’s why a few years ago the Royal London Homeopathic Hospital was reborn as the Royal London Hospital for Integrated Medicine. The other thing that Marchant seems utterly unconcerned about is that reiki is among the quackiest of quackeries. Indeed, whenever I would contemplate a ranking of quackery, I used to call homeopathy “The One Quackery to Rule Them All.” (It’s true, just search this blog for that phrase.) Lately, however, I’ve been wondering if that’s true. After all, reiki is basically faith healing that substitutes Eastern mystical claims that its practitioners can channel healing energy from “the universal source” through the practitioner into the patient. Substitute the word “God” for “universal source,” and you’ll see why I refer to reiki as faith healing.
So what’s quackier? Faith healing, or a treatment that claims that water “remembers” the healing substance that it’s been in contact with (conveniently forgetting all the nasty stuff it’s also been in contact with, like urine) and that diluting a substance makes it stronger. I don’t know, to be honest. It’s kind of like asking what stinks more, a sewer or a cesspit. I do know that, when you add all the other nonsense that goes along with reiki, like distance healing, reiki does indeed given homeopathy a run for its money as far as quackery goes.
Of course, Marchant is quick to point out after this that she doesn’t believe in all that mystical mumbo-jumbo. Oh, no. She’s into science, maaaan. Rather, she believes in what I just referred to, namely the power of the magical placebo:
Let’s be clear, I don’t buy into the pseudoscientific claims of reiki and spiritual healers. There is no evidence that they can tap into and manipulate human ‘energy fields’ to clear blockages and heal the body. Like many alternative therapies, these practices perform no better than placebos in clinical trials.
Well, that’s a relief. But… Yes, I can hear the “but…” coming, and so it does right away, instead of taking several paragraphs, as it would if the showrunners of The Walking Dead had been writing this article:
But that does not mean that such treatments have no distinct therapeutic value. To dismiss people’s complex psychological and physiological reactions to serious illness — and how it is treated — as mere placebo effects is not helpful.
Neuroscience studies show that placebo effects can trigger significant physiological responses that are often identical to those created by drugs, ranging from the release of dopamine in the brains of people with Parkinson’s disease to a rush of endorphins for those in pain.
And there you have it. Marchant buys wholeheartedly placebo myth. Sure, she doesn’t go off the deep end, the way that Robert Schiffman did when he cited placebo effects as proof that God exists, but she does buy into the myth. Indeed, she sounds very much like a homeopath who made similar arguments. Anyone remember Heidi Stevenson? Actually, on second thought, maybe not. Heidi Stevenson stated flat out that placebo effects cannot cure, as part of arguing that alternative medicine is more than placebo, while Marchant seems to be arguing, in essence, that placebo effects can cure in certain conditions. Well, not exactly, but close:
The standard ‘evidence-based’ argument is that this is irrelevant. Even if alternative therapies induce a biological response, sceptics argue, patients are still better off receiving trial-proven conventional treatments, because then they benefit from both a placebo effect and the active effect of the drug.
This logic misunderstands the nature of placebo effects. Not all placebos are the same, and alternative therapies can sometimes trigger larger responses than conventional ones do. For example, in one trial, fake acupuncture relieved pain more effectively than a fake pill (T. J. Kaptchuk et al. Br. Med. J. 332, 391–397; 2006); in another, it relieved symptoms of irritable bowel syndrome with fewer side effects than available drugs (T. J. Kaptchuk et al. Br. Med. J. 336, 999–1007; 2008). It is true that if a therapy cannot beat a fake version of itself in trials, it is not working as the therapist claims. But if it triggers a big enough placebo effect, it might still be the best treatment available.
Marchant is actually missing a part of the skeptic argument, which is that placebo effects do not affect “hard” outcomes. For instance, placebo effects have never been shown to increase survival in patients with cancer, (Yes, death is the “hardest” endpoint of all, as it’s (usually) rather indisputable whether a patient is dead or alive.) That is why placebo controls are rarely used in cancer clinical trials any more. Instead, we tend to compare experimental treatment versus standard-of-care or compare adding experimental treatments to the standard of care to the standard of care alone. In addition, placebo effects do not generally affect the physiology behind the disease process. A great example of this is a study of sham acupuncture versus albuterol inhaler in patients with asthma. The results showed that, yes, patients did feel better. They did feel less short of breath. However, the “hard outcome” as measured by spirometry showed absolutely no effect on lung function. So, basically patients felt better but weren’t actually better. In the case of asthma, this could lead to death, as a patient could have the false assurance that, because he doesn’t feel as short of breath, he must be doing better when he could be very close to full decompensation.
So what about the studies cited by Marchant? The first one was only a single-blinded study examining acupuncture and amitriptyline for arm pain versus their respective placebos from repetitive stress injury. The acupuncturists were not blinded to whether they were providing “real” or “sham” acupuncture. It also has an utterly unsurprising result: More invasive placebos, like sham acupuncture, have long been known to produce more placebo effect than less invasive placebos, like pills. This study in no way shows that “alternative therapies can “sometimes trigger larger responses than conventional ones do.” It just provides one more bit of evidence supporting the unremarkable conclusion that invasive interventions produce more placebo effects than non-invasive measures.
The second study was no better. It, too, was single blind, with practitioners not blinded to assignment. It, too, does not show what Marchant thinks it shows. In fact, the study abstract looked very, very familiar. So I searched and found a lovely deconstruction written when it first came out. The CliffsNotes version is that what this study really showed is the importance of practitioner-patient interaction in enhancing placebo effects. I mean, seriously. Did Marchant even read the same study I did? I went back, read the study again. I didn’t recognize her summary in the conclusion.
So, having demonstrated that she has been thoroughly taken in by alt-med propaganda, Marchant happily goes all-in advocating placebo medicine. Pointing out that people tend to look at alternative medicine for problems that don’t have a good treatment available in conventional medicine, she advocates this:
The benefits of therapies such as reiki and acupuncture go beyond what we normally think of as placebo effects, however. Alternative therapists do not get results just because they are particularly good at fooling people into thinking that they will get better. Many elements of the care they provide — from talking to touch — seem to have the power to relieve symptoms and even influence physical outcomes. These elements do not show up when therapies are compared against sham treatments, because they are present in both arms of a trial.
Such benefits can be indirect. For example, tackling patients’ anxiety during invasive procedures such as keyhole surgery can reduce the risk of dangerous fluctuations in heart rate. This results not only from the direct effects on physiology, but also probably from patients needing lower doses of sedatives and painkillers.
Conventional medicine, with its squeezed appointment times and overworked staff, often struggles to provide such human aspects of care. One answer is to hire alternative therapists.
No, no, no, no, a thousand times no! To expand on Ben Goldacre’s famous quip about how problems in the airline industry do not mean that flying carpets work, just because there are problems in medicine does not mean that we should hire quacks like reiki practitioners to fill in the gaps. If physicians and nurses do not have the time or training to provide the “human touch,” then the answer is to change the system so that they do have that time (hiring more science-based practitioners would be a start) and to train them so that they are better at it. The reason is simple, and it’s all the pseudoscientific baggage that comes along with alternative medical practice. It’s a problem that Marchant acknowledges as a “legitimate concern” only to dismiss that same concern thusly:
Critics say that this is dangerous quackery. Endorsing therapies that incorporate unscientific principles such as auras and energy fields encourages magical thinking, they argue, and undermines faith in conventional drugs and vaccines. That is a legitimate concern, but dismissing alternative approaches is not evidence-based either, and leaves patients in need.
Instead of rejecting such approaches wholesale, let’s learn from them. That means going beyond the simplistic practice of jettisoning anything that cannot beat placebo. We must tease out the real active ingredients of these therapies — things such as ritual, mental imagery, empathy, care and hope — so that we can learn how they work and find ways to incorporate them into patient care.
Marchant is actually attacking a rather massive straw man here. Yes, endorsing treatments incorporating unscientific principles does encourage magical thinking. That is true. However, the reason we oppose “integrating” such nonsensical therapies goes beyond just that. Such therapies are rejected because they don’t work. Yes, the criterion used to evaluate them is that horribly “simplistic” standard of doing better than placebo. It’s a single, science-based standard that we advocate, one that applies to potential medicines and treatments, wherever they come from, “conventional” drug development pathways or “alternative” medical traditions. There are only three kinds of medicine: Medicine that has been shown to work scientifically, medicine that hasn’t been shown to work scientifically, and medicine that has been shown not to work. Guess which two categories apply to the vast majority of alternative medicine, if not all of it? Yes, the latter two. Of course, alternative medicine that is shown scientifically to work ceases to be “alternative” and becomes just medicine. Unfortunately, the concept of “integrative medicine” is special pleading, a transparent attempt to bypass the step of scientific validation in going from “alternative” medicine to medicine.
But what about using placebos?
If there’s one thing about Marchant’s message, it’s that it’s consistent. Presumably it’s the same message in her book, given that these articles are clearly intended to promote her forthcoming book. So in her NYT op-ed, after relating the scope of the problem of opioid dependence and abuse, Marchant suggests a solution to the problem. Surprise! It’s very much the same solution she hinted at in her Nature article:
How do we tackle this crisis? We often hear about efforts to clamp down on abuse, for example by regulating pain clinics and monitoring prescription patterns. But these won’t dent the demand for opioids unless we can find better ways to treat the hundred million Americans said to suffer from chronic pain. Simply switching to other drugs isn’t the answer. Few new painkillers are being approved, and existing ones, like Motrin and Tylenol, come with their own risks when used long-term, and some appear to be less effective than we once thought.
Help might instead come from an unexpected corner: the placebo effect.
This phenomenon — in which someone feels better after receiving fake treatment — was once dismissed as an illusion. People who are ill often improve regardless of the treatment they receive. But neuroscientists are discovering that in some conditions, including pain, placebos create biological effects similar to those caused by drugs.
Which leads her to suggest:
Placebo effects in pain are so large, in fact, that drug manufacturers are finding it hard to beat them. Finding ways to minimize placebo effects in trials, for example by screening out those who are most susceptible, is now a big focus for research. But what if instead we seek to harness these effects? Placebos might ruin drug trials, but they also show us a new approach to treating pain.
Sigh. Placebo effects do not “ruin” clinical trials. Rather, they are arguably mostly an artifact of modern clinical trial design, in particular the close observation and reporting. Indeed, the Cochrane review on placebo effects for all interventions notes that placebo effects vary from large to non-existent, even in well-conducted clinical trials and that these variations were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted, the type of placebo used, and whether patients were informed that the trial involved placebo. The review also noted that it is “difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting.” Overall, the authors did not find that placebo interventions had important clinical effects in general. Similarly, in 2001, an analysis of clinical trials published in the New England Journal of Medicine comparing placebo with no treatment found “little evidence that placebos have powerful clinical effects” and had “no significant effects on objective or binary outcomes.” Basically, the preponderance of science suggests that placebo effects are probably mostly illusory, artifacts of clinical study design. That’s why I am very hesitant to rely on them for treatment of any clinically significant symptoms and very skeptical of claims like Marchant’s that our minds can heal our bodies through the placebo effect and we should therefore use that effect, apparently even if it means accepting reiki.
Later in the NYT article, Marchant references a study from earlier this year about how placebo effects appeared to be increasing, at least in clinical trials performed in the US. Steve has covered the study and what it showed, concluding that it really raises more questions than it answers. In reality, the central question from that study is not whether it indicates that we should use placebos as treatments but rather whether clinical trials are showing less of a difference between treatment and placebo because they are becoming more rigorous (i.e., older studies produced more false positives) or because they are getting worse and producing more false negatives.
Marchant also brings up again the “honest placebo,” like the one Kaptchuk claimed in a study whose results he characterized as a “placebo without deception,” even though the information given patients stated that “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.” In this case, she referenced a study for migraine:
It is unethical to deceive patients by prescribing fake treatments, of course. But there is evidence that people with some conditions benefit even if they know they are taking placebos. In a 2014 study that followed 459 migraine attacks in 66 patients, honestly labeled placebos provided significantly more pain relief than no treatment, and were nearly half as effective as the painkiller Maxalt. (The study also found that a placebo labeled “placebo” was 60 percent as effective as Maxalt if it was labeled “placebo.” If the placebo was labeled “Maxalt,” it was again 60 percent as effective as the real drug under its real label.)
With placebo responses in pain so high — and the risks of drugs so severe — why not prescribe a course of “honest” placebos for those who wish to try it, before proceeding, if necessary, to an active drug?
I wrote about this very study when it was published. Let’s just say that it doesn’t really show what Marchant (and, truth be told, many science writers) thought that it showed. For instance, there was a bit of priming in the study literature implying—you guessed it!—the power of placebo:
Scripted Information Read to Participants. “You are invited to take part in a research study for the purpose of understanding the effects of repeated administration of Maxalt for the treatment of acute migraine attacks, and why placebo rates are so high in migraine therapy. Our first goal is to understand why Maxalt makes you pain-free in one attack but not in another. Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free. Our third goal is to understand why Maxalt works differently when given in double-blind study vs. real-life experience when you take it at home. These goals are scientifically important for developing new therapies for migraine.
As I said at the time and repeat for emphasis: “Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free.” Not to understand why placebo pills might be able to make you pain-free or could possibly make you pain free. “Can make you pain free.” To be fair, this isn’t quite as blatant as the Kaptchuk study, in which subjects were told that placeboes could produce “powerful mind-body effects” in the study information. On the other hand, mentioning that “placebo rates are so high in migraine therapy” primes the subjects to expect placeboes to work. Another big flaw in the study (explained in more detail in my post) is that the investigators failed to assess expectancy. In any case, while an intriguing study, it was hardly evidence that it is possible to induce placebo effects without at least some deception.
Why SBM objects to using placebos as primary treatment
Like so many others who have fallen under the spell of CAM, Marchant appears to misunderstand the reasons why advocates of science-based medicine are alarmed by the “integration” of pseudoscience and mystical thinking into medicine in the form of “integrative” medicine. She seems to think it’s just because we “medical skeptics” don’t like them. While it’s true that most of us have a distaste for the utter nonsense behind alternative medicine like homeopathy and reiki, our objection goes beyond mere disgust at what we perceive (correctly) as quackery. There is also the issue of prior plausibility and Bayesian thinking, in which the posterior plausibility that a “positive” result of a clinical trial is really indicative of an effect depends on the prior plausibility. To put it very simply, the lower the prior plausibility, the more likely seemingly “positive” results are real effects are “false positive” results. That is the key difference between evidence-based medicine and science-based medicine: SBM incorporates prior plausibility based on basic science considerations into its assessment of treatments. EBM, in essence, does not, which is why quackery like acupuncture, homeopathy, and even reiki can be touted by some as “evidence-based.”
Finally, contrary to Marchant’s implication otherwise, we already do “tease out the real active ingredients” of placebo effects. Indeed, several of the papers she cited were efforts to do just that! However, as virtually all proponents of “integrative medicine” do, whether they realize it or not, Marchant is advocating a classic false dichotomy: Embrace quackery or abandon patients. It’s a false dichotomy because we don’t have to abandon science and reason to avoid abandoning patients, and problems with the “human touch” in medicine can be don’t require embracing magic to solve.
It’s not as though we haven’t been making these same points again and again and again for as long as I can remember. The problem is that advocates of “integrating” quackery into medicine keep making the same fallacious arguments. Now Jo Marchant is doing the same thing. These same old pseudoscientific arguments regurgitated by her are no more compelling or impressive than they’ve ever been. Now, depending on how popular her book ends up being, we’re likely in for another round of the same ol’ same ol’.
Most importantly, contrary to Marchant’s view, it is not unscientific to reject alternative medicine, nor do critics do so because of their lack of sophistication leading them to embrace “simplistic” ideas. We understand alternative medicine all too well, clearly better than Jo Marchant, who could really use to read this article on integrative oncology. We also understand that, as study after study fails to find effects of various alternative medicine treatments above placebo effects, the narrative about “integrative medicine” is morphing to embrace placebo medicine. It’s what you do when what you have doesn’t have any specific therapeutic effects. You treat placebo effects as though they are some sort of magic, Secret-like way of “healing yourself.”
Unfortunately, contrary to the faith in placebo medicine exhibited by Marchant, Kaptchuk, and others, there is precious little evidence that placebos on their own have any significant clinical value. That’s not to say that it’s not worth studying placebo effects to determine if there are strategies that we can use to maximize the perceived effectiveness of interventions through practitioner-patient interactions (which are incredibly important). Indeed, we advocate studying just that. Just don’t expect these studies to show that using placebo medicine will in any way impact the toll of opioid addiction or chronic pain. That is a promise of CAM believers that is about as likely to be kept as I am to win the record-setting $1.3 billion Powerball jackpot Wednesday night.

Placebo Effect Revisited
The New York Times and Ted Kaptchuk feed into more confusion about placebo effects.
Steven Novella on October 11, 2023
Link

In a recent editorial for The New York Times, researcher Ted J. Kaptchuk, who directs placebo studies at Harvard, gives his summary of the current state of research (much of it his own) into placebo effects. While much of what he says is true, or at least uncontroversial, in my opinion he shoehorns the facts into his preferred narrative – a popular narrative that can be counterproductive and feeds into unscientific medical treatments.
He lays out one of his premises here:
I’m a researcher who studies the placebo effect, and in some situations, it’s powerful. That said, oral phenylephrine sold over the counter should be removed from the market; despite some people’s love of phenylephrine cold medicines, there’s no evidence that the drug even provides placebo benefits. In clinical trials reviewed by the F.D.A. committee, phenylephrine and a placebo affected patients’ perceptions of nasal congestion equally, but the existing trials do not tell us to what extent people felt better because of placebo effects or because their colds simply resolved on their own.
There is already a lot to unpack here, starting with the premise that the placebo effect can be powerful. But I cannot really comment on a thing without having a working definition of what that thing is. He takes a while to give a definition of placebo effects, which he characterizes as, “Placebo effects are health improvements initiated from the rituals, symbols and behaviors involved with healing.”
That is an inaccurate definition, which I think biases the article and his entire approach to placebo effects. They are apparent or measured “health improvements”, if you include subjective symptoms as health improvements, which is reasonable but needs to be explicitly stated. Apparent improvements may not be real. They may entirely be illusions of how health outcomes are being measured.
For example, there is regression to the mean. Symptoms fluctuate, and people are more likely to seek treatment when symptoms are at their worst, which is statistically likely to be followed by spontaneous improvement. Give someone an inert placebo and they will improve. The improvement was not “initiated” by the placebo in any way. It would have happened without any intervention. It is simply a statistical illusion of observation – but such effects are included in what we measure as placebo effects.
There are other illusory effects in there as well. Clinical trial subjects, for example, may be biased in their perceptions and reporting of their symptoms because of their perceived expectations of the researchers, and their own desires to have the treatment work.
Kaptchuk is focusing on only a subset of placebo effects and treating it as if it is the entire phenomenon. But this fits his narrative, that placebo effects are something to be harnessed and are valuable in and of themselves. He states, correctly, that phenylephrine should have been removed from the market, but not only because it does not work, because it has not been demonstrated that it provides placebo benefit. The implication being that if it did, then it should stay on the market.
The non-specific effects of forming a therapeutic alliance, of the hope and positive human interaction that results, can be psychologically very powerful. For subjective symptoms that appear to have a large psychological component, such as pain and nausea, psychological interventions can be very effective and should be leveraged, especially when treating chronic symptoms. But are such interventions even “placebo” effects? It depends.
In clinical trials placebo effects are everything that happens in the placebo arm of the trial – everything other than a physiological response to an active intervention. So if you are studying the pharmacological effects of a drug, incidental psychological effects are placebo effects. But if you are studying psychological interventions as a treatment, then they are the treatment, not the placebo.
He hints at this dual nature of placebos with his next premise:
In research settings, placebo responses are powerful but a nuisance, as they make detecting a drug’s superiority over a placebo difficult. And in clinical practice they are powerful, but they often require deception, making them unethical. But can placebos ever come out of the shadows and become a legitimate component of health care? My research suggests so.
Again, I would push back against the blanket statement that placebo effects are “powerful”. The research shows they are mostly illusory. For subjective symptoms they can be significant. But as he says, in clinical practice they are not a nuisance, they are part of the treatment. He then sets up a straw man – that the only problem with leveraging placebo effects in clinical practice is that the use of placebos requires deception. But this is false, because it contains a massive and incorrect unstated assumption, that you don’t get placebo (or nonspecific psychological) effects from ethical effective treatments.
If you give a patient an effective painkiller, for example, in addition to a good therapeutic alliance, you will get the full placebo effect plus the pharmacological benefits of the medication. What if you want to avoid the side effects or risk of medication? For most patients you can start with the most benign intervention, such as low dose acetaminophen. You don’t have to give fake medicine to get the placebo effect. You can also measure and then correct any low vitamin levels. And of course, you can also directly give psychological or physical (non-pharmacological) interventions. Most patients have something positive and effective to focus their attention on – sleep hygiene, diet, physical activity, or stress reduction.
But Kaptchuk argues as if placebo effects only come from fake or inert interventions that theoretically require deception. This is why some of his research has focused on that element – what if we remove the deception, do placebo effects from fake medicine still happen? I think this premise is wrong. Kaptchuk summarizes his own research in this area:
As it turns out, placebos can work even when patients know they are getting a placebo. In 2010 my colleagues and I published a provocative study showing that patients with irritable bowel syndrome who were treated with what we call open-label placebos — as in, we gave them dummy pills and told them so — reported more symptom relief compared with patients who didn’t receive placebos.
David Gorski has already critiqued that 2010 study. Patients were told the pills they were receiving were sugar pills, but they were also told, “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes”. That is not true (subjective improvement in symptoms is not “self-healing”), and therefore he did not remove deception from the intervention.
In the end I think Kaptchuk is well-meaning but misguided. Levering psychological effects in the treatment of chronic symptoms like pain is a good idea, and there are already pushes to increase this within standard medical treatment. It is likely true that we do not utilize these effect enough. This is mainly an infrastructure problem – it’s a lot easier to prescribe a medication than provide psychological intervention. There simply are not enough providers to give everyone who could benefit such interventions, and insurance needs to cover these treatments. That is where these efforts should be focused.
However, conflating legitimate psychological interventions (whether they are part of the therapeutic alliance or a separate intervention) with “placebo effects” is counterproductive. It also feeds into an entire industry of fake medicine that partly justifies itself with hand-waving statements about how powerful placebos are. Further, since the term “placebo effects” are used to refer to any outcome, not just subjective symptoms, it furthers the confusion. Placebo effects for hard outcomes, like survival and improved physiological parameters, are entirely illusory. But this fact often gets lost in the cheerleading for placebo medicine.
Unambiguous technical definitions are required for clear scientific and clinical thinking. This is critically lacking in popular discussions of placebo effects, and unfortunately Kaptchuk is playing into that confusion.

   Studying Placebo Effects
Steven Novella
Link
Measuring placebo effects (often misleadingly referred to as the placebo effect – singular) is a part of standard clinical trial design, because they need to be distinguished from the physiological effects of the treatment under study. Rarely, however, are placebo effects the actual target being measured, but such is the case with a new study published in the most recent edition of the British Medical Journal (BMJ) – Components of placebo effect: randomised controlled trial in patients with irritable bowel syndrome. (Here is a summary if you cannot access the article directly.)
Dr. Ted Kaptchuk et.al. studied the response to various placebo treatments in 262 adults with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). The three groups were designed to address three major categories of placebo effects: 1) response to the process of being assessed and observed, 2) response to being given a placebo treatment, and 3) response to the patient-practitioner relationship. These types of placebo effects were represented by three treatment arms: 1) observation alone, 2) placebo acupuncture, 3) placebo acupuncture plus an “augmented” practitioner-patient relationship – with added “warmth, attention, and confidence.”
IBS was chosen as the target symptom because prior studies have shown it is highly amenable to placebo effects – with most studies showing a 40% response. This is consistent with the observation that IBS (while its ultimate causes are still unclear) is exacerbated by psychological stress, and therefore can response symptomatically to stress reduction.
Patients were assessed on several scales: a 7 point improvement scale (with 4.0 being no change), an IBS symptom severity scale, a quality of life scale, and a yes/no assessment of “have you had adequate relief.” After three weeks of treatment “scores on the global improvement scale were 3.8 (SD 1.0) v 4.3 (SD 1.4) v 5.0 (SD 1.3) for waiting list versus “limited” versus “augmented,” respectively (P<0.001 for trend).” What this means is that the observation and placebo treatment groups had essentially no change while the augmented therapy had “slight improvement.” On the symptom severity scale, at three weeks, the waiting list group had about a 30 point drop in symptom severity with almost 30% of patients reporting adequate relief; for the treatment group it was 42 points and 44% and for the augmented group over 80 points and over 60% respectively.
What does all this mean? Well, it does confirm what was already known – there are significant placebo effects from the process of being treated, especially with symptoms that are amenable to psychological factors. This is the first study, however, that tried to separate out different types of placebo effect. This new data suggests that different sources of placebo effect add together to give a greater overall placebo effect.
The authors conclude that “the patient-practitioner relationship is the most robust component.” While I agree with this assessment, it should also be pointed out that the wait list group produced about 30 points improvement on the severity scale and almost 30% of subjects reported adequate relief of symptoms – even though on average there was no significant change. This is important for understanding placebo effects because it means doing nothing but entering a study will create the appearance of benefit for about 1/3 of subjects. I also agree that this study shows that these different types of placebo effects add together.
I think this is a very useful study in many ways (possibly a first for a study funded by the National Center for Complimentary and Alternative Medicine – NCCAM). It reinforces the important concept that “the” placebo effect is actually a complex combination of many effects – many of which do not involve a “mind-over-matter” physical response to belief in the treatment but are essentially artifacts of the process of observation and reporting.
The study does also reinforce (as the authors emphasized) that having a positive practitioner-patient interaction does provide incremental placebo benefit, at least in symptoms that are responsive to stress reduction. This is an important factor to keep in mind as managed care and the overall economic stresses of modern medicine are causing, if anything, a trend toward decreased quality time between practitioners and patients.
The study further reinforces an important principle of evidence-based and science-based medicine – that studies need to very carefully and thoughtfully controlled for all sources of placebo effects before they can be used to conclude that the treatment in question has any physiological effect. In this study placebo acupuncture plus a supportive therapist caused “adequate relief” in 62% and 61% of subjects at 3 and 6 weeks respectively. This strongly implies that unless acupuncture studies employ properly blinded sham acupuncture, positive results cannot be used to conclude that acupuncture has any physiological effect.
Understanding the nature and role of placebo effects is critical to clinical trial technology, and therefore to the practice of science-based medicine. I hope to see more studies like this that focus directly on placebo effects.
REFERENCE:
Kaptchuk, T.J., Kelly, J.M., Conboy, L.A., Davis, R.B., Kerr, C.E., Jacobsen, E.E., Kirsch, I., Schyner, R.N., Nam, B.H., et al, . (2008). Components of placebo effect: randomised controlled trial in patients with irritable bowel syndrome. BMJ, online first(April 7), 1-8.

   Placebo Effects Revisited
Steven Novella
Link
In the Wall Street Journal last week was a particularly bad article by Melinda Beck about acupuncture. While there was token skepticism (by Edzard Ernst, of course, who is the media’s go-to expert for CAM), the article credulously reported the marketing hype of acupuncture proponents.
Toward the end of the article Beck admits that “some critics” claim that acupuncture provides nothing more than a placebo effect, but this was followed by the usual canard:
“I don’t see any disconnect between how acupuncture works and how a placebo works,” says radiologist Vitaly Napadow at the Martinos center. “The body knows how to heal itself. That’s what a placebo does, too.”
That is a bold claim, and very common among CAM proponents, especially acupuncturists. As the data increasingly shows that acupuncture (and other implausible treatments) provides no benefit beyond placebo, we hear the special pleading that placebos work also.
But is that true? It turns out there is a literature on the placebo effect itself, and the evidence suggests that placebos generally do not work.
That may seem counter-intuitive, since the gold standard of clinical trials is placebo-controlled, because placebo effects can be quite large. However, most such trials do not contain a no-treatment arm (comparing a placebo intervention to nothing at all). What this means, as I have written about before, is that placebo effects, as measured in clinical trials, includes a host of factors – everything other than a physiological response to an active treatment.
These placebo effects include the bias of the researchers, the desire of the subjects to please the researchers and to get well, non-specific effects of receiving medical intervention and attention, and other artifacts of the research process. When we remove all of these biases and artifacts, is there a real effect left behind – what most people think of when they think of “the” placebo effect: a mind-over-matter but real improvement?
Proponents of so-called CAM would like you to believe that “the” placebo effect is all a real biological effect resulting from the body’s self-healing ability. But it turns out, this is simply not true.
Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche have been studying the placebo effect for years, reviewing the literature, especially for trials that contain a no-treatment arm. Their most recent review is very illuminating. They conclude:
We did not find that placebo interventions have important clinical effects in general. However, in certain settings placebo interventions can influence patient-reported outcomes, especially pain and nausea, though it is difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting. The effect on pain varied, even among trials with low risk of bias, from negligible to clinically important. Variations in the effect of placebo were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted and how patients were informed.
Let’s break this down a bit. First, they found that when you look at any objective or clinically important outcome – the kinds of things that would indicate a real biological effect – there is no discernible placebo effect. There is no mind-over-matter self healing that can be attributed to the placebo effect.
What the authors found is also most compatible with the hypothesis that placebo effects, as measured in clinical trials, are mostly due to bias. Specifically, significant placebo effects were found only for subjectively reported symptoms. Further, the size of this effect varied widely among trials.
This latter feature is very important. If there were a significant physiological placebo effect we would expect to see a consistent or baseline effect among trials. The tremendous variability suggests that it was the rigor of trial design that allowed for lesser or greater bias resulting in a measured placebo effect.
Further:
Meta-regression analyses showed that larger effects of placebo interventions were associated with physical placebo interventions (e.g. sham acupuncture), patient-involved outcomes (patient-reported outcomes and observer-reported outcomes involving patient cooperation), small trials, and trials with the explicit purpose of studying placebo.
So the more patients were involved in the reporting of outcomes (as opposed to measuring outcomes) the greater the placebo effect. This is most consistent with bias as a cause. Also, as has been reported before, physical interventions result in a large placebo effect.
Some have hypothesized that time and attention provided by some “alternative” practitioners result in a greater placebo effect, justifying the intervention. However, that was not a factor apparent in this study. Another study, comparing placebo effect sizes for homeopathic treatments and mainstream treatments (which are comparable in terms of the physical intervention) found no difference in placebo effect sizes.
Conclusion
Existing evidence strongly suggests that placebo effects are mostly comprised of bias in reporting and observation and non-specific effects. There is no measurable physiological benefit from placebo interventions for any objective outcome. There is a measured benefit for some subjective outcomes (mostly pain, nausea, asthma, and phobias), but the wide variation in effect size suggests this is due to trial design (and therefore bias) rather than a real effect.
In any case, any perceived benefit in subjective symptoms seems to be greater for physical interventions (perhaps a hands-on benefit) but is the same for mainstream vs novel treatments.
Therefore, there is no justification to be found in the placebo effect for using unscientific or dubious interventions. Placebo medicine is a sham. And any potential placebo benefit worth having can be fully realized with science-based interventions.
Which means that Dr. Napadow may have been unwittingly correct when he said that acupuncture is no different from placebo.

Placebo, Are You There?
Harriet Hall on February 24, 2015
Link

By Jean Brissonnet, translation by Harriet Hall
Note: This was originally published as “Placebo, es-tu là?” in Science et pseudo-sciences 294, p. 38-48. January 2011. It came to my attention in the course of an e-mail correspondence with the editors of that magazine, where one of my own articles was published in French translation in January 2015. I thought this was the best explanation of placebo that I had ever read. It covers the same points my colleagues and I have addressed and more. It describes the pertinent research and uses particularly effective graphs to illustrate the principles (a picture is worth a thousand words). The author, Jean Brissonnet, kindly gave his permission for me to translate it and share it with our readers.

In fact, you don’t need to give a placebo to get a placebo effect and therefore we can now think about how we can maximize the placebo component of routine care.
~ Damien Finniss, 2010
The scene takes place in a surgical suite where they are preparing to do a cataract operation. The patient is lying on the operating table. A few minutes earlier the anesthetic gel was applied to the cornea to permit an operation under simple local anesthesia. The surgeon arrives in the company of the anesthetist. They are engaged in a spirited discussion and don’t seem to be agreeing.
“It has been proven,” says the surgeon, “that 30% of the action of a medical treatment is due to the placebo effect.”
“I doubt that,” retorts his interlocutor, “I think that placebo story is one of those medical myths on a par with the idea that we only use 10% of our brain, that nails and hair grow after death, or that cellphones create interference in hospitals.”[1]
“No,” insists the surgeon with a superior tone, “the fact is established and has been proven by numerous studies.”
The anesthetist shakes his head with a slight smile, but he doesn’t reply. As for the patient, who might have much to say on the subject, he keeps quiet, because it would not be prudent to argue with someone who is about to suck the lens out of your eye.
This true anecdote would not be of interest if it didn’t concern two members of the medical profession. Why such uncertainty? Why such lack of knowledge about such a fundamental subject? This faith in an all-powerful, magical, and mysterious placebo is common among the general public and it serves as justification for resorting to unconventional medicines that have never been able to show solid proof of efficacy; but we see that it still persists among the medical profession.
To know whether the placebo effect is real or should be relegated to the same category as poltergeists, it will help to go back in history.
The history of the placebo effect
Although the placebo effect had long been recognized, official attention to it really followed the generalization of controlled clinical trials by the Cornell Conferences on Therapy in 1946. The popularization of this effect wouldn’t really occur until the publications by Beecher in 1955 and Haas in 1959.
Beecher reviewed 15 articles describing the treatment of 1,052 patients and estimated that across all the conditions studied, the average placebo effect was 32%. These results were confirmed by Haas a few years later based on 1,400 cases from 96 articles. He also found an average of around 30%, but he found a lot of variation depending on what was being studied. The improvement in the symptom of pain varied from 15% to 60%.
The consequence of these articles was the introduction of a simple additive model that considered the placebo effect as the difference between the global effect observed and the pharmacological effect. It was then defined as “the clinical effect produced by the administration of a placebo.”
This definition is important, because it attributes causality (“produced by”) to something that was really no more than a correlation. We had to wait a long time for that conception to be called into question. The reason for that was that the placebo effect was a little-known mechanism, because it had been little studied.
This lack of interest undoubtedly comes from the fact that the placebo effect competes with the actions of the doctor and takes away some of his credit for healing. In addition, the placebo is not interesting to the pharmaceutical industry that finances the majority of research. They are content to research the pharmaceutical effects of their products and don’t much care about other mechanisms of action.
Over half a century, there were around 20 studies on the placebo per se, and only a few hundred on the placebo in the context of pharmacologic studies. Consider this in comparison with the very many studies carried out on drugs.
The consequences of that state of affairs are numerous. They range from the highlighting, even in relatively recent articles, of old studies of questionable methodology, to the persistence of certain accepted ideas – including the famous 30% – and the unwillingness to question the models being used.
The authors of an article (Kienle and Keine,1997) that was one of the first to desanctify the placebo effect wrote, “False impressions of the placebo effect can be produced in various ways.” They cite numerous examples such as spontaneous improvement, fluctuation of symptoms, regression to the mean, additional treatment, scaling bias, answers of politeness, and many others. They find that “These factors are still frequent in modern literature on the placebo.”
Knowing that these authors analyzed over 800 articles, one can note that all references prior to this publication should be regarded with the greatest caution.
Questioning the placebo
This questioning comes from the fact that many researchers have not taken natural healing into account, which is curious considering how many pathological conditions heal spontaneously. For example, the journal Prescrire, in its February 2007 issue, wrote on this subject, “it can be estimated that without treatment, 50-70% of cases of simple acute cystitis resolve spontaneously, usually after having been asymptomatic for several months.”
In fact, what is called the placebo effect is the result obtained in a placebo control group (Figure 1).

Therefore, it is necessary to conceptualize a new model in which the effect observed is equal to the specific effect of the medicine being studied plus a complex nonspecific effect in which the natural healing process plays a large part.
One will then have the scheme seen in Figure 2. The equation becomes:
Observed effect = specific effect + natural course of healing + a residual effect that we will provisionally call the placebo effect.

But isn’t this new “placebo effect” in turn composed of different elements? First among these are measurement errors made during the course of the trial. There are many such potential errors depending on the type of study. The best known are the phenomenon of regression to the mean, the Hawthorne effect, the Simpson paradox, the Will Rogers phenomenon, etc. (see box, below). Others come to mind: for example, an inaccuracy in the inclusion of subjects in the trial or the fact that patients tend to seek help when their symptoms are at their peak.
If all these measuring errors are subtracted, what remains can be called the “true placebo effect,” a term proposed by Ernst (1995), to distinguish it from the “false” placebo effect as traditionally conceived (figure 3).

The polemics
The resulting placebo effect is so reduced compared to the initial concept that some have gone so far as to question whether it exists at all. The first serious blow against the traditional understanding of the placebo effect was struck by Kienle and Kiene (1996).
The authors had the idea of repeating Beecher’s study to verify its validity. In their conclusion, they wrote:
Since 1955, when HK Beecher published his classic “The Powerful Placebo,” it generally has been accepted that 35% of patients with any of a wide variety of disorders can be treated with placebos alone. In recent years, average cure rates of 70%, and up to 100%, also have been quoted. It has been postulated that placebos can prolong life, that their effects occur in surgery as well as in medicine…In this article source material that forms the scientific basis for such claims is examined. Analysis shows that the studies on which such ideas are based, except perhaps in bronchial asthma, do not in any way justify the conclusions drawn from them. The truth is that the placebo effect is counterfeited by a variety of factors including the natural history of the disease, regression to the mean, concomitant treatments, obliging reports, experimental subordination, severe methodological defects in the studies, misquotations, etc; even, on occasion, by the fact that the supposed placebo is actually not a placebo, but has to be acknowledged as having a specific action on the condition for which it is being given.

And the authors are the first to say that “another error of judgment is the lack of clarity of the concept of placebo itself.” They conclude bluntly “that the literature relative to the magnitude and frequency of the placebo effect is unfounded and grossly overestimated, if not entirely false.” Finally, they raise the question of whether the very existence of the so-called placebo effect “is not in fact largely or totally illusory.”
This was like throwing a stone into a pond.
Nevertheless, neither this study nor the following article published a year later by the same authors on the same subject (Kienle and Kiene,1997) provoked reactions, even though they had all the requisite qualities and were published in peer-reviewed journals.
And yet, it is not for nothing that today “Beecher’s error” is commonly talked about! It was necessary to wait six years for another study, arriving at the same conclusions, to awaken the medical community out of its torpor.
In 2001, Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche published an article based on 214 studies with a total of 8,525 patients. Their conclusions were as follows: “We found little evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects…they had possible small benefits in studies with continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain.” And they concluded that “outside the setting of clinical trials, there is no justification for the use of placebos.”
This study, which goes against conventional wisdom, would be widely disputed, but the ensuing controversies would be very fertile.
To better understand this paradox, another team, Vase et al. (2002) repeated Hróbjartsson’s study, separating it into two meta-analyses depending on whether the purpose of a study was to use placebo as a control for an active treatment or to investigate the mechanisms of placebo analgesia. They show that the two groups Hróbjartsson studied were in fact two placebo groups, because the patients in a no-treatment group know they are part of a clinical study and they are regularly evaluated by doctors. So therefore, the use or non-use of a placebo “object” changes nothing. That’s why the authors propose a new definition: “The placebo response is the reduction in a symptom as a result of factors related to a subject’s/patient’s perception of the therapeutic intervention.”
It is therefore found that the terminology surrounding the famous placebo is extremely ambiguous, because it appears that the placebo effect is no longer linked to the placebo object and that this new definition requires that we distinguish “the placebo effect” from “the effect measured in the placebo group” and from “the effect of a placebo.”
We can’t hope to get the public to understand (or even the medical profession, which necessarily lacks the time to delve into these syntactical-semantic subtleties) unless we resort to a clarification and stop using the same word in several unrelated senses.
An attempt at clarification
It seems natural, in the current state of things, to distinguish two situations. In the context of a controlled clinical study, what matters is to determine the specific effect of the treatment. Everything else, which can be called “non-specific effects,” consists of complex elements and is of no interest to the sponsor of the study who is seeking to evaluate the specific efficacy of a given molecule (figure 4).

In the clinical context of treating a patient, on the other hand, the observed effect is equal to the pharmacological effect to which is added natural healing and an effect that we have called “true placebo,” but which, for the reasons indicated above, would now be preferable to call “contextual effect,”[2] as various researchers have proposed. (Di Blasi et al. 2003, Miller and Kaptchuk 2008).
Measurement errors have obviously disappeared from this context, which explains that the overall effect can be slightly inferior to that observed in the case of a clinical study.
Implementation of the contextual effect
It remains to understand what are the elements that can enter into play in the implementation and optimization of this contextual effect.
The first element is the therapeutic ritual: the results are different according to the route of administration, the taste, the name, the price, the color, etc. Several studies have confirmed the action of some of these parameters.
The second has to do with environmental conditions: the personality and beliefs of the patient, the attitude of his companions, the place where care is being administered, the attitudes of the treatment team, etc.
Finally, it seems that the most important element is the doctor/patient relationship.
In order to determine the influence of these three factors, to evaluate their relative importance and to see how they can be combined to provide clinical improvement, Kaptchuk (2008) studied three groups of patients suffering from irritable bowel syndrome. The first group was placed on a waiting list, the second received simple placebo acupuncture treatments, and the third received placebo acupuncture accompanied by special attention from the provider (a warm relationship, building trust, sustained attention). At the end of six weeks, they observed an improvement of 28%, 44%, and 62% respectively. The author concluded that “Non-specific effects can produce statistically and clinically significant outcomes and the patient-practitioner relationship is the most robust component.”
Psychological mechanisms
The psychological mechanisms involve two elements that can act simultaneously or separately: conditioning and suggestion.
ConditioningConditioning has been known since the work of Pavlov. He showed that if a dog becomes accustomed to the arrival of his food being accompanied by a sound stimulus, after a while the salivation reflex can be triggered by the sound alone in the absence of food. The same mechanism occurs when taking a placebo. As Gøtzsche (1994) wrote in The Lancet, “A lactose capsule has a greater effect in people who have previously reacted favorably to taking a benzodiazepine than in those who have never taken it.”
SuggestionThe power of suggestion has been known for a long time. One can cite its utilization by Mesmer under the fallacious pretext of an alleged animal magnetism or, closer to our day, by the famous Coué method.
More recent studies provide evidence of its role in the implementation of the contextual effect. Thomas (1997) followed 200 patients with functional illnesses. He divided them into four groups receiving either a placebo or nothing and either a positive or negative consultation. The first group received a placebo and a positive consultation (assurance of correct diagnosis, certainty of healing), the second, a placebo and a negative consultation (hesitation about the diagnosis, lack of confidence about the course of the disease), and the other two groups got a positive or negative consultation without a placebo. After two weeks, 64% of the patients who got a positive consultation had improved compared to 39% of those who got a negative consultation. But there was no significant difference between those who got or didn’t get a placebo. The improvement they found was therefore due to the suggestion created by the doctor and had nothing to do with taking or not taking a placebo object.
This clearly confirms that, as Bourreau and Coichard (2003) wrote, “It is useless to resort to a placebo to induce a placebo effect.” Which could be written more clearly today by saying that the placebo object is not necessary for the contextual effect.
Neurobiologic mechanisms
It is not enough to understand the psychological mechanisms that mediate between the context of care and the development of a therapeutic effect. We should also investigate how these psychological mechanisms are capable, in turn, of causing biochemical and neurobiological changes that can themselves produce measurable results.
Endogenous opioidsIt is no coincidence that the vast majority of studies on placebo are performed in the area of pain, either artificially provoked or not. It is indeed in this area that one gets the most important nonsignificant effects. We can’t help but note the extreme importance of the contextual effect in relieving pain. This is why it was hypothesized that the observed effect was due to the secretion of opioids by the patient’s body. The results of studies on this subject are quite numerous and consistent. They confirm this hypothesis (see box, below).

Neurotransmitters
DopamineIt has been noticed that the contextual effect appears to be active in Parkinson’s disease. Parkinson’s disease is a condition that causes the degeneration of dopaminergic neurons, resulting in a deficit of dopamine in the nigrostriatal pathway that manifests clinically as a movement disorder.
De la Fuente-Fernandez et al. (2001) used labeled raclopride, a molecule binding to dopamine receptors, to detect dopamine receptors in the brain with PET scan (positron emission tomography). The patients received either an injection of levodopa[3] or placebo. They found that the placebo produced the same effect on dopamine receptors, triggering substantial release of endogenous dopamine in the brain. They concluded: “Our findings indicate that the placebo effect in Parkinson’s Disease is powerful and is mediated through activation of the damaged nigrostriatal dopamine system.”
It still remains to be seen whether these imaging findings translate into clinical results. A more recent study (Fregni et al., 2006) has modified the findings of the preceding study. It studied not just the patient’s subjective response, but also objective tests. The authors sought to investigate the immediate effects of two different kinds of placebo (a pill and sham transcranial magnetic stimulation) and compared them to the effects of standard treatment with levodopa. Subjective motor function was measured with a visual analog scale, and objective motor function was measured with a unified Parkinson’s disease rating scale (UPDRS). They concluded: “…placebo interventions in Parkinson’s Disease may have an immediate subjective sensation of improvement but result in no significant objective motor changes compared with levodopa treatment.”
SerotoninMayberg et al. (2002) carried out a randomized double blind study on 17 patients who were hospitalized for six weeks to test fluoxetine (an anti-depressant) against placebo. They did PET scans before treatment, a week later, and at the end of the sixth week. In each group, they found four patients who improved and who demonstrated increased activity in the part of the brain associated with emotions. However, the relief was less durable with the placebo.
Can placebos be used to treat patients?
We have just seen that the contextual effect is an essential element in terms of pain and probably also the various functional diseases. It affects subjective perception, but no evidence of action has ever been found in the areas of infectious diseases or tumors. As for the reality and the importance of its effects in Parkinson’s disease or depression, that remains unclear. It is obvious that the placebo, as an object, is useful in controlled clinical studies. In that setting, ethics committees require that the patient be informed and give informed consent. The problem that has been debated for a long time is the issue of its use in the clinic. There are many arguments against its use in healthcare practice. Do we have the right to fool the patient? Do we have the right to act without his consent? Can we risk permanently damaging the doctor/patient relationship if the patient finds out that he has been deceived? A better understanding of the phenomenon makes such questions obsolete. To the extent that the “placebo effect” is only a contextual effect that doesn’t depend on the use of an inactive object, it can and should be used in healthcare practice. It can probably be used instead of a prescription in certain functional diseases, and it certainly can potentiate the effect of prescribed drugs in many cases (analgesics, antidepressants…)
The authors of a recent study (Finiss et al., 2010) clarify this issue perfectly when they write, “For many years, placebos have been defined by their inert content and their use as controls in clinical trials and treatments in clinical practice. Recent research shows that placebo effects are genuine psychobiological events attributable to the overall therapeutic context, and that these effects can be robust in both laboratory and clinical settings. There is also evidence that placebo effects can exist in clinical practice, even if no placebo is given. Further promotion and integration of laboratory and clinical research will allow advances in the ethical use of placebo mechanisms that are inherent in routine clinical care, and encourage the use of treatments that stimulate placebo effects.”
So, then! Placebo, are you there? The placebo object is certainly there! It will be irreplaceable for the foreseeable future in carrying out the controlled clinical studies that are essential to medical research. As for the effect of the placebo, that doesn’t exist. As for the effect “called” placebo, if its existence is undeniable albeit limited, it would be better to simply name it “contextual effect” in order to better understand its true nature and to make its magical connotations disappear.
Notes
     1.  These myths and many others are refuted in the article “Medical myths” BMJ 2007:335, 1288-1289 (22 December). return
     2.  In the rest of this article, the term “placebo effect” will be designated “true placebo effect” or “contextual effect. return
     3.  The international pharmacological name for L-DOPA, a substance used in the treatment of Parkinson’s disease that increases dopamine.return
References
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    • Haas (H.) et al. (1959) Das Placeboproblem. Fortschritt der Arzneimittelforschung 1: 279-454.
    • Hrobjartsson A and Gotzsche PC. (2001) Is the placebo powerless? An analysis of clinical trials comparing placebo with no treatment. New Engl J Med 344:1594- 1602.
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    • Levine JD et al. (1981) Analgesic responses to morphine and placebo in individuals with postoperative pain. Pain 10(3):379-89.
    • Mayberg HS et al. (2002) The functional neuroanatomy of the placebo effect. American Journal of Psychiatry 159:728-737.
    • Miller FG and Kaptchuk TJ. (2008) The power of context: reconceptualizing the placebo effect. J R Soc Med 101(5):222-225.
    • Petrovic et al. (2002) Placebo and opioid analgesia– imaging a shared neuronal network. Science 295(5560):1737-40.
    • Thomas KB (1987) General practice consultations : is there any point in being positive? BMJ 294:1200-1202
    • Vase L et al. (2002) “A comparison of placebo effects in clinical analgesic trials versus studies of placebo analgesia.” Pain 99: 443-452.

Placebo by Conditioning
Steven Novella on July 29, 2015
Link

Truly understanding placebo effects (note the plural) is critical to science-based medicine. Misconceptions about placebo effects are perhaps the common problem I encounter among otherwise-scientific professionals and science communicators.
The persistence of these misconceptions is due partly to the fact that false beliefs about placebos, namely that “the” placebo effect is mainly an expectation mind-over-matter effect, is deeply embedded in the culture. It is further exacerbated by recent attempts by CAM proponents to promote placebo-medicine, as their preferred treatments are increasingly being demonstrated to be nothing but placebos.
One idea that proponents of placebo medicine have tried to put forth is that you can have a placebo effect without deception. The study most often pointed to in order to support this claim is Ted Kaptchuk’s irritable bowel syndrome study. However, this study was flawed in that it told participants that placebos can heal, so it wasn’t exactly without deception. 
The role of conditioning
A recent study published in the Journal of Pain focuses on conditioning as a component of placebo effects. The study design is interesting, but I have doubts about its applicability to the clinical setting.
The researchers used a heat model of pain applied to the forearm. They did various runs where participants reported their pain level in response to different temperatures. Their forearms were treated first either with a control cream (petroleum jelly) or a placebo cream (petroleum jelly plus blue food coloring). They were told the placebo cream contained a powerful analgesic that would block pain. The cream was then removed, and a hot stimulus applied.
When subjects were treated with the placebo cream they believed to be active, they were then tested, without their knowledge, with a warm but not painfully hot stimulus. This was meant to convince them that the placebo cream worked. (So again, the protocol used active deception to achieve its ends.)
One group of subjects experienced a single set of runs in this fashion. Another group experienced four sets of runs spread out over different days. Then finally came the test – all test subjects were told about the deception, that the placebo cream was inactive and in fact identical to the petroleum jelly except for the dye. They were then given another run with the control and placebo cream.
The researchers found that in the group that had the long run (four-day series) subjects still experienced reduced pain sensations with the placebo cream, but not the control cream. There was no difference for the short run (single day, single series) subjects. There were controls in place to rule out simple habituation to the stimulus as a factor.
What did we learn about managing pain clinically?
If we take the results of the study at face value, what do we learn? The study does not establish that you can have placebos without deception. The method used in this study depends explicitly on deception.
What the study does potentially show is that conditioning can play a role in placebo effects. This idea is nothing new, as conditioning has been on the list of placebo effects for years (certainly since I have been writing about placebo effects). The study does demonstrate that conditioning alone, without expectation of benefit, is sufficient to produce at least a temporary effect for a subjective symptom (pain, in this case). This is entirely unsurprising, but it’s good to have an experimental verification.
Conditioning probably plays a significant role in many placebo rituals, such as acupuncture, or even non-placebo treatments such as taking medication or getting a valid medical procedure. The process of the treatment becomes associated in our minds with feeling better, and so experiencing the process makes us feel better. Perhaps the conditioned stimulus triggers the release of endorphins, for example.
The main limitation is that the conditioning in this case required a contrived situation, in which patients were deceived by receiving a non-painful stimulus they were told would be painful. They therefore attributed the lack of pain to the placebo analgesic. How would we apply this in the real world?
I suppose one way to accomplish a similar effect is to give the patient a real analgesic along with an associated placebo treatment. Then after sufficient time for conditioning to take place, give the placebo treatment without the analgesic. According to this study, however, you will have to secretly give them a real analgesic, an ethically dubious practice.
There are other ways to shift from active treatment to placebo, but they were not the subject of this study. Follow up studies that attempt to remove all deception would be interesting.
Conclusion – What do we know about placebos?
Taken together, the scientific literature on placebos indicates that it is a complex assortment of various effects. These include conditioning, as well as reporting bias, statistical effects such as regression to the mean, confounding factors, observation bias, and other effects. Expectation of benefit is only one element, and is not necessary by itself.
Often the absence of expectation is used by the naïve public to argue that placebo effects are ruled out, but this is not true. For example, it is frequently argued that babies and animals cannot have placebo effects because they cannot have expectation, but there are many other sources of apparent placebo effects, as this study partly demonstrates.
We further know that placebo effects are only measurable for subjective outcomes. Placebo effects won’t cure cancer or make you live longer. They may cause you to report less pain or nausea, however. Whether you are actually experiencing less pain or just reporting less pain is unclear. Placebo effects are also short lived.
The ultimate question is whether or not placebo effects are clinically valuable and whether attempts to provoke them are worthwhile. My position is that they are of severely limited value, and are not worth compromising the relationship with the patient by incorporating deception into the treatment. It is certainly not worth instilling in the patient false and pseudoscientific ideas about health and medicine.
Any placebo effects worth having can be achieved with legitimate treatments given without deception to fully informed patients.

Behold the spin! What a new survey of placebo prescribing really tells us
Scott Gavura on March 28, 2013
Link
One of the recurring topics here at SBM is the idea of the placebo: What it is, what it isn’t, and how it complicates our evaluation of the scientific evidence. One my earliest lessons after I started following this blog (I was a reader long before I was a writer) was that I didn’t understand placebos well enough to even describe them correctly. Importantly, there is no single “placebo effect”. They are “placebo effects”, a range of variables that can include natural variation in the condition being studied, psychological factors and subjective effects reported by patients, as well as observer bias by researchers studying a condition. All of these, when evaluated in clinical trials, produce non-specific background noise that needs to be removed from the analysis. Consequently, we compare between the active treatment and the placebo to determine if there are an incremental benefits, to which we apply statistical tests to determine the likelihood that the differences between the intervention and the placebo groups are real. Removed from the observational nature of the clinical trial, we can’t expect the observed “placebo effects” to persist, as they’re partially a consequence of the trial itself. A more detailed review of placebos is a post in and of itself, so I’ll refer you to resources that describe why placebo effects are plural, that placebo effects are subjective rather than objective and there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that placebo effects offer any health benefits. What’s most important is the understanding that placebo effects are a measurement artifact, not a therapeutic effect.
Placebo effects are regular topics within in SBM posts because an understanding of placebo effects is essential to evaluating the evidence supporting (so-called) complementary and alternative medicine, or CAM. As better quality research increasingly confirms that the effects from CAM are largely, if not completely, attributable to placebo effects, we’ve seen the promoters of CAM shifting tactics. No longer able to honestly claim that CAM has therapeutic effects, “treatments” such as acupuncture or homeopathy are increasingly promoted as strategies that”harness the power of placebo” without all the pesky costs or side effects of real medical interventions. But this is simply special pleading from purveyors and promoters. Unable to wish away the well-conducted trials that show them to be indistinguishable from placebos, they instead are spinning placebo effects as meaningful and worthy of pursuit – ideally with your favourite CAM therapy. Again, I’ll refer you to posts by David Gorski and Steven Novella who offer a more detailed description of how negative results can be spun to look positive. Because CAM’s effects are indistinguishable from placebo, we should not invest time and resources into pursuing them – we should instead focus on finding treatments that are demonstrably superior to placebo.
But what if physicians are already using placebos widely in practice? Setting aside the ethical issues for now, widespread placebo usage might suggest that physicians believe that placebos are effective treatments. And that’s the impression you may have had if you skimmed the medical headlines last week:
97 percent of UK doctors have given placebos to patients at least once said the press release
Doctors like to ‘sugar the pill’ said The Express
Most doctors prescribe placebos – said The Telegraph
Probing the power of placebos – The Globe and Mail
All of this comes from survey published published in PLOS ONE last week, Placebo Use in the United Kingdom: Results from a National Survey of Primary Care Practitioners. Before diving into the findings, let’s consider the context of placebo use – not in clinical trials, but in the real world.
Is it a placebo in the eye of the prescriber?
The deliberate use of inert therapies in medicine is not a new topic and has been covered before at SBM. Like other contributors to this blog, I find the idea of actively prescribing placebos to be both unethical and highly paternalistic. Why jeopardize patient trust? Back in 2011 I summarized the evidence on the prevalence of placebo prescribing. But to understand the data we need to define “placebo” when it’s being used outside a clinical trial. Not every placebo is a sugar pill, and not every placebo is used with “placebo” intent. There are two forms of placebo in routine medical use: “Pure” placebos are truly inert: they contain no medicinal ingredients. These are the sugar pills, saline injections, and most homeopathic “remedies”. They’re the products we used in clinical trials when it’s “placebo-controlled.” “Impure” placebos, on the other hand, actually contain medicinal ingredients, but are ineffective for the condition being treated. This could be because of a sub-therapeutic dose, or the active ingredient has no effectiveness against the condition being treated (e.g., antibiotics for viral infections). We don’t use impure placebos in clinical trials, as there’s the risk it could cause its own effects or adverse events. Pure or impure, a placebo must be ineffective for the condition being treated – otherwise it’s not a placebo.
There is a lack of good data that summarizes on how routinely placebos are deliberately prescribed. A 2010 paper provides the most comprehensive summary, and the findings are complicated by inconsistent questions, changing definitions of what a placebo actually is, and other study design problems. Consequently the results of reported placebo use by physicians varies: 17-80% for pure placebos, and 41-99% for impure placebos, in response to “have you ever prescribed” questions. But few physicians use placebos regularly, and “impure” placebos are used far more frequently used than “pure” placebos. Which is understandable, as prescribing antibiotics for what’s likely (but not unequivocally) a viral infection should be more common than the deliberate use of sugar pills and deception to make a patient think they’re getting medicine when they’re not.
So let’s take a closer look at the most recent study, the one that generated all of the headlines. As it’s at PLOS ONE, the full text is available. The lead author was Jeremy Howick, a PhD scientist, and the study was funded by The University of Oxford Department of Primary Care Health Sciences and The Southampton Complementary Medical Research Trust. “Complementary”? Howick writes under the name “Dr. Placebo” at trusttheevidence.net, and his writing suggests that he believes placebos have physiologic effects. In fact, Howick goes so far as to suggest that given the side effects of real drugs, “not prescribing placebos might be even less ethical.” Another of the coauthors is George Lewith, a “complementary medicine” physician who has published research on homeopathy and is a proponent of “integrative” healthcare. Lewith has an equally interesting perspective on the use of placebos in clinical practice, one that we’ll come back to, when we interpret the findings of the survey and the conclusions drawn by the authors.
This was a web-based survey of over 1700 general practitioners registered with a marketing service. 783 completed the questionnaire, which is an fair response rate for a survey, but could bias the sample towards those interested in placebos. The sample that responded was 55% male, in practice for an average of 20 years – so these were not new graduates. The way the authors describe the rationale for the study belies their interest “complementary” medicine:
Since this was an empirical rather than conceptual study we adopted a pragmatic approach and asked doctors whether they used various treatments described as placebos in other similar surveys. Our approach has the advantage of being useful: patients, doctors, and policy makers care more about whether particular treatments are effective and ethical than whether these treatments carry the label ‘placebo’.
Rather than useful, the “pragmatic” approach they used gives results that are the opposite of useful – they’re highly biased. As I noted above, the systematic review by Fässler illustrates that different definitions of “placebo” can have a significant influence on the results reported. To their credit, the authors use a “pure placebo” definition that’s consistent with other studies: “sugar pills or saline injections without direct pharmacologically active ingredients for the condition being treated.” But their definition of “impure placebo” is so expansive that it’s not clear to me that the authors understood what an “impure placebo” is supposed to be:
    • Positive suggestions
    • Nutritional supplements for conditions unlikely to benefit from this therapy (such as vitamin C for cancer)
    • Probiotics for diarrhea
    • Peppermint pills for pharyngitis
    • Antibiotics for suspected viral infections
    • Sub-clinical doses of otherwise effective therapies
    • Off-label uses of potentially effective therapies
    • Complementary and Alternative medicine (CAM) whose effectiveness is not evidence-based
    • Conventional medicine whose effectiveness is not evidence-based
    • Diagnostic practices based on the patient’s request or to calm the patient such as
        ◦ Non-essential physical examinations
        ◦ Non-essential technical examinations of the patient (blood tests, X-rays)
There are some reasonable inclusions. Subclinical doses are also appropriately categorized as “impure” placebos, as are products that are ineffective for the condition being treated (e.g., antibiotics for suspected viral infections). But there are some odd entries, too.
Positive suggestions are considered an “impure placebo” yet they can be part of routine patient encounters and not offered with deliberate placebo intent. I give positive suggestions to patients routinely when I reassure them their cold is self-limiting and will resolve in few days, medicated or not. This isn’t an “impure placebo”. Probiotics for diarrhea lack a strong evidence base but may not be given with placebo intent, as practitioners may believe they are effective. Bizarrely, all off-label drug use is considered “placebo”, suggesting either the authors have very little practical knowledge of medical practice, or are deliberately trying to widen the category of “impure placebo”. Off-label use means a drug is unapproved for the intended use. It does not indicate there is a lack of evidence, only that a regulator hasn’t formally approved use. When drugs are used for niche purposes (e.g., pediatric prescribing or rare diseases) pharmaceutical manufacturers may not bother seeking regulator approval. Bizarrely, they also include “conventional medicine whose effectiveness is not evidence based” as a separate category. Finally, the inclusion of CAM “whose evidence is not evidence-based” is telling. CAM which is evidence-based isn’t CAM any more – it’s simply medicine. And ineffective CAM may not be a placebo, as ineffective doesn’t mean safe, or free of side effects. Diagnostic practices are also included here as “impure placebos” which stretches the definition of what a a placebo is. Physical exams are not placebos – they may be used to rule out a diagnosis or to reassure a patient about the certainty associated with a diagnosis. They’re not expected to have therapeutic effects, but may be done to comfort patients, or reassure them of the diagnosis. Similarly, lab tests are not “placebo” treatments – no-one expects a therapeutic benefit from an X-ray, but may be reassured by the results. They may be completely unnecessary, but they’re not a therapeutic placebo. Again – a placebo must be ineffective for the condition being treated – otherwise it’s not a placebo.
To their credit, the investigators did offer respondents the opportunity to indicate that an intervention was “not a placebo”. But on the primary question of placebo use, we should expect the use of impure placebos to be off the charts. And that’s exactly what we see in the results. Here’s the results to the primary question:
12 % reported using pure placebos at least once in their career and 97% reported using impure placebos at least once. Given the definitions, it should not be surprising that nearly every physician has used what the authors defined as an “impure” placebo at least once.
When we break down the placebo use, the results are a bit more useful:
The frequency at which pure placebos are used frequently or occasionally is very low – consistent with other studies. 97.4% use pure placebo less than once per year, or have never used a pure placebo.
The breakdown of “impure” placebo is much more interesting than what the headlines reported. Not surprisingly, positive suggestions were the most commonly reported (71% reporting frequent or occasional use) with 11% indicating it wasn’t a placebo at all. Beyond that, few were used frequently with the exception of antibiotics for suspected viral infections (75% saying frequently or occasionally) and medicine used in a non-evidence-based way (77%). Non-essential physical exams were the most common non-therapeutic offered (54% reporting frequently), but again, I don’t feel this is a placebo treatment – but only 5% of physicians apparently agreed with me.
Then there’s the “other” category which again left me wondering what isn’t considered a placebo in this study, as cognitive behavioural therapy, iron tablets, physiotherapy, reassurance and even “referral to website” are included as well.
Finally physicians were asked a series of questions about situations where placebo use would be considered acceptable and unacceptable:
Physicians were largely split on their acceptability of placebo for psychological effects, or when “the patient wants or expects this therapy”. In response to their acceptability “when clinical experience has shown a benefit” seems carefully worded to dodge the reality of placebo and instead appeal to anecdotes – “clinical experience”. In this case, the reported acceptability climbs to 60% for pure placebos and 79% for impure placebos. Reassuringly, there were strong opinions that placebos are not acceptable when they involve deception or may jeopardize patient trust. Perhaps not surprisingly the authors call these ethical constraints “perhaps sometimes unjustified” in the discussion section of the paper.
A nation of placebo prescriptions?
The authors go for the headlines and paint a picture of widespread placebo use in their discussion of the results:
Placebos may represent one of the more commonly used treatments in UK primary care in spite of (perhaps sometimes unjustified) ethical constraints. Twelve percent of respondents reported using pure placebos, and 97% reported using impure placebos at least once in their career. Many placebos were used frequently by over half the respondents, and most general practitioners felt there were circumstances in which impure and pure placebos were ethically acceptable. Half of the practitioners who use placebos informed their patients that this intervention has helped other patients without specifically telling them that they were prescribing a placebo. This raises unresolved ethical issues about how GPs approach informed consent in relation to their prescriptions of placebos.
My interpretation is a bit different. The survey was explicitly designed to make placebo use appear widespread. A closer look suggests that physician behavior is more nuanced and circumspect than what the headlines suggested. Regular prescribing with pure placebos is exceptioanlly rare. Physicians agree that they are not acceptable when they involve deception or endanger patient trust. In some situations, they feel they’re acceptable. But this clearly seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. On balance, it’s what I’d expect in a physicians or health professional.
However, given the background of the authors, and their interest in promoting the active use of placebo treatments, the paper has a different conclusion:
The time has come to use similar methods to investigate ways to rationalize placebo use. The long term viability of placebo use in clinical practice depends on whether placebo benefits outweigh harms, their cost, and whether patients and practitioners deem their use to be ethically acceptable. Further investigations are warranted to develop ethical and cost-effective placebos.
I’m sure the authors have some ideas about just what those ethical and cost-effective placebos might be. The design and results seem perfectly designed to position the use of CAM to generate what they believe are clinically relevant placebo effects. In media quotes, the intent is obvious:
“This is not about doctors deceiving patients,” said Dr Jeremy Howick, co-lead author of the study from the University of Oxford. The study shows that placebo use is widespread in the UK, and doctors clearly believe that placebos can help patients.”
Professor George Lewith, co-lead author of the study from the University of Southampton, said: “Other previous published studies by Southampton have clearly shown placebos can help many people and can be effective for a long time after administration. The placebo effect works by releasing our body’s own natural painkillers into our nervous system. In my opinion, the stigma attached to placebo use is irrational, and further investigation is needed to develop ethical, cost-effective placebos.”
The SKEPT!CAL blog ran the press coverage through the churnalism.com website and, disappointingly, found the media largely reported the press release nearly verbatim.
Conclusion
Given what appears to be an established interest by at least some of the authors in promoting the routine use of placebos and placebo treatments in medical practice, the design and results of this study should surprise no one. The survey was designed to give the impression of widespread, active placebo use by UK physicians. That’s what they found, that’s what they announced, and that’s what the media reported. The authors used this carefully designed argument from popularity to support their statements about the therapeutic legitimacy of placebo usage. Finally, add in some spin to suggest that placebo effects are therapeutically meaningful. And to what end? Because if physicians are already using placebos routinely, why not fund a few more – like…say…CAM? I’m sure the Southampton Complementary Medical Research Trust can think of a few products that might fit the bill.
The reality, of course, is quite different, and the survey results reflect this. Physicians use placebos relatively infrequently and generally recognize that they are unacceptable when they involve deception and jeopardize patient trust. Quite frankly, it’s not worth that risk. The most we can hope for when we use placebos are subjective reports of changes in a patient’s symptoms. Placebos have no objective, clinically meaningful effects. When a drug cannot be show to be more effective than placebo, we stop using the drug – we don’t repackage the placebo as a therapeutic agent. But that’s exactly what placebo proponents are proposing.
Reference
Howick J., Bishop F.L., Heneghan C., Wolstenholme J., Stevens S., Hobbs F.D.R., Lewith G. & Manchikanti L. (2013). Placebo Use in the United Kingdom: Results from a National Survey of Primary Care Practitioners, PLoS ONE, 8 (3) e58247. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0058247.t003

Adventures in defending science-based medicine in cancer journals: Energy chelation
David Gorski on January 30, 2012
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My co-bloggers and I have spent considerable time and effort over the last four years writing posts for this blog (and I for my not-so-super-secret other blog) bemoaning the infiltration of quackademic medicine into what once were bastions of evidence- and science-based medicine. We’ve discussed at considerable length reasons for why this steady infiltration of pseudoscience into medical academia has been occurring. Among other potential explanations, these reasons range from the ascendence of postmodernism in areas where it really doesn’t belong; to a change in our medical culture to a more “consumer”-oriented, “keep the customer satisfied”-sort of model in which patients are often referred to as “clients” or “customers”; to the corrosive influences of moneyed groups (such as the Bravewell Collaborative) and government agencies (such as the National Center for Complementary and Alternative medicine, a.k.a. NCCAM); to the equally corrosive influences of powerful woo-friendly legislators who use their position and influence to create such agencies (such as Senator Tom Harkin and Representative Dan Burton) and otherwise champion “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) and “integrative medicine” because they are true believers in quackery; to cynical legislators, like Senator Orrin Hatch, who champions such government programs supporting pseudoscience because he represents a state that is home to the largest concentration of supplement manufacturers in the United States and is consequently a master at bringing any initiative to regulate the supplement industry more tightly to a screeching halt.
As a result of our efforts and the need for a counterweight to the quackery that has infiltrated so much of academia, SBM has become fairly prominent in the medical blogosphere. Our traffic is good, and we have a number of “thought leaders” who regularly read what we write. We’ve even caught the attention of Dr. Josephine Briggs, director of NCCAM, and our founder Steve Novella was even invited to appear on The Dr. Oz Show for “balance.” All of this is something that we are justly proud of. On the other hand, I can’t help but keep things in perspective. While our traffic as a blog is quite respectable and we have become prominent in the skeptical and medical blogosphere and even, to some extent, in academia—we’re particularly gratified at the number of medical students who are regular readers—compared to the forces arrayed against SBM in academia and the media, we have to face facts: We are truly a tiny voice in the wilderness. For instance, we average around 9,000 to 16,000 visits a day. Compare that traffic to the many millions who used to watch Oprah Winfrey and still watch her protégé Dr. Oz or to health media and product empires of people like Andrew Weil and Deepak Chopra, and you get the idea.
All of this is why I started looking for opportunities to respond more directly to incursions of pseudoscience into medical academia. Occasional SBM contributor Peter Lipson provided me with just such an opportunity last summer when he sent me a link to a brain-meltingly bad study about the use of CAM in cancer that shows just how bad a study can be and still be published in what I used to consider a reasonably good cancer journal. I say “used to consider,” because the fact that this journal accepted a study this ludicrous indicates to me that its peer review is so broken that I now wonder about what else I’ve read in that journal that I should now discount as being too unreliable to take seriously. Maybe everything. I don’t know. What I do know is that seldom have I seen such a bad study in such a good cancer journal. Studies like the one about Tai Chi in fibromyalgia or placebo acupuncture applied to asthma don’t even come close.
Soon after this study appeared online ahead of print, James Coyne contacted me and asked me if I wanted to be co-author on a letter to the editor of the journal. Honored by Dr. Coyne’s request, I immediately said yes (of course), and together with Dr. Christoffer Johansen at the Survivorship Unit of the Danish Cancer Society, we submitted our letter to the editor. To my surprise, given the utter failure of past efforts to publish letters to the editor about studies of this sort, our letter was accepted for publication. Last week, the study in question saw print, and our letter was published online ahead of print, along with the response of the authors. All are instructive and, to me, show just what we are up against in trying to prevent pseudoscience from creeping into academia.
The study: “Energy chelation”? I kid you not!
No doubt at this point, some of you are thinking that perhaps I’m being way too harsh when I called this study “brain-meltingly bad.” That is why, even though Peter has already discussed this paper, I feel obligated to describe the study and my objections to it at some length. So let’s dig in, shall we? The journal is Cancer, which is the official journal of the American Cancer Society and has an impact factor of 5.131. That is, as we say in the biomedical research biz, not too shabby. The investigators are from the Samueli Institute (which, as you might recall, published a recent survey on CAM adoption by hospitals), the University of California San Diego, the RAND Corporation, and Healing Light Center Church, and the paper is entitled Complementary Medicine for Fatigue and Cortisol Variability in Breast Cancer Survivors A Randomized Controlled Trial.
Fatigue is a huge problem in cancer patients, and this study was designed to test the effect of what the authors call “biofield” therapies on fatigue in 76 breast cancer patients with significant fatigue during chemotherapy. For purposes of this study, “biofield” therapies were defined to be more or less the same thing as energy healing, which encompasses reiki, therapeutic touch (TT), healing touch (HT), and others. In actuality, from a strictly scientific standpoint, the experimental design of this study wasn’t half-bad. The problem comes from how this study examines a therapeutic modality for which there is no evidence, namely something the authors call “energy chelation.” (I kid you not. That’s actually what they call it! In an actual scientific paper!) To sum up the study in a nutshell, this was a phase 2 randomized, intention-to-treat clinical trial that compared biofield healing (“energy chelation”) with a “mock healing” control and a waitlist control.
Never having heard of “energy chelation” before and having written a lot about chelation therapy as a form of quackery claimed to be useful as a treatment for autism caused by “vaccine injury” and for cardiovascular disease, I was very curious. So I read with interest how the authors described this modality:
The specific technique used in the biofield healing group is termed energy chelation, and was selected by 1 of the authors (R.L.B.), whose healing techniques have been incorporated in modalities such as Healing Touch and Therapeutic Touch.26,27 During energy chelation, the practitioner practices hands-on healing with standard hand positions, beginning with hands on the feet, then to the knees, hips, bladder area, stomach, hands, elbows, shoulders, heart, throat, head, and back to the heart. The practice of energy chelation is 45 to 60 minutes, with a practitioner generally focusing for 5 to 7 minutes on each position.
Naturally, my next question was: Who is “R.L.B.”? R.L.B., it turns out, is Reverend Rosalyn L. Bruyere from the Healing Light Center Church. I did some Googling and found her quickly enough. On Bruyere’s website, she is described thusly:
Founder and director of the Healing Light Center Church, Reverend Bruyere has committed her life to the teaching of these sacred and ancient disciplines, thereby providing her students with practical tools for living the spiritual life, while introducing them to the venerable traditions from which those tools are derived. Her goal is to encourage the compassionate healing and empowerment of the individual, believing that as we each heal, we can be of greater assistance in the healing of the world.
She is the originator of the whole-body technique known as Chelation which has become a classic, taught in many modern healing schools, as well as Brain Balancing and a pain-reducing skill which some have called Pain Drain.
Her book, Wheels of Light, A Study of the Chakras, is an invaluable text for the bridging of ancient and modern healing arts. Rev. Bruyere has studied extensively in areas of Egyptian temple symbology, Sacred geometry, ancient Mystery School rites, international shamanic practices, the pre-Buddhist Tibetan Bon-Po Ways, and various Native American Medicine traditions.
Rosalyn’s knowledge of ancient traditions and practices has led to requests for her technical assistance on several films and documentaries. Among the more notable features on which she has served as technical consultant are “Resurrection” and “The Last Temptation of Christ”.
Although I don’t recall having blogged about “Brain Balance” before, fortunately Harriet Hall already has and quite correctly concluded that it is “based on speculation, not on credible evidence.” Pain Drain is an HT technique in which the “practitioner” holds one hand above an area of complaint until the pain recedes and then places the other hand near the area of relief. In other words, it’s yet another variant of “energy healing” modalities like TT and reiki. As for energy chelation, I Googled that as well and found quite a few links describing it. For instance, here is a Q&A by a healer named Kay Morris Johnson, who charges $65 an hour for her energy chelation (righteous bucks for waving your hands around people) and ensures us that it “works by moving heavy or stagnated energy, once this movement takes on a transformation then your whole body system reacts similar to downloading, accepting the changes in your energy field into your physical being” and that there is indeed detoxification with energy chelation (much like real chelation, I would imagine). She even gives a helpful primer on the difference between energy chelation and reiki:
Reiki is best use for general consistent work to maintain your energy whole field balance. Energy Chelation is best applied to detailed energy needs in defined areas of one energy field. Energy Chelation also has different vibrations associated with it, such as sound energy. Sound Energy is described as a deep vibration and is very effectively use on areas of old stagnate energy, such as childhood issues. These old issues are stubborn dense often times large energy blocks that require that extra boost of vibration to initiate movement.
Well, that’s useful. Reiki is faith healing in which the person being healed is usually not touched but the practitioner believes that he’s channeling healing energy into the patient from a “universal source,” while energy chelation “hands on” energy healing. They’re totally different! Really!
Another website helpfully proclaims the “physical reality on which human energy chelation therapy is based” as:
Human Energy Chelation Therapy (HECT), a process of transmitting or channelling energy, is based on the electromagnetic nature of the human body. The body’s electromagnetic or auric field is generated by the spinning of the chakras. As it spins, each chakra produces its own electromagnetic field. This field then combines with fields generated by other chakras in the body to produce the auric field. An individual’s auric field is manifested via a combination of energies from three chakras. Generally these are the first, third and fifth chakras, which empower the person’s physical, intellectual, and etheric bodies. It is a combination of these three chakras that produces the primary auric field (the inner shell of the aura), which can be physically felt by the therapist’s hand as it is passed over the client’s body in the process of scanning.
And where does energy chelation get its name? Here’s an explanation:
Heavy metals are toxic to the human body. Chelation has been a tried and true method in removing them from the body. The toxins must be removed before the body can benefit from any health promoting actions.
Stuck emotions are very similar to heavy metals in that they too are toxic to the body, mind and spirit. Healthy emotions are energy in motion. However when emotions are stuck, not acknowledged, stuffed and ignored they become like heavy metals and are toxic to the human system. They need to be removed before health-promoting actions can produce beneficial results. Just like chelation removes heavy metals from the body, energy chelation is a method which removes sticky, heavy dark energy from the human energy field.
Is “sticky, heavy dark energy” anything like the long, dark tea-time of the soul? It rather sounds that way to me. In actuality, it might as well be, because energy chelation is every bit as much a work of fiction as anything ever written by Douglas Adams, except that Douglas Adams had far more imagination. In any case, it amuses me to no end when CAM advocates start using metaphors as names for their nonesense. Be that as it may, the next question I had, after learning that energy chelation is “hands-on energy healing” was what the control group would be. In other words, what, exactly, was “mock healing”? Here is a description of the mock healing control group taken straight from the Methods section of the paper (yes, this is verbatim):
Mock healing practitioners were skeptical scientists who were trained to use the identical hand placements as biofield healing practitioners. Mock healing practitioners were asked not to intend to heal the patient when touching, but rather to disengage into “planning mind” by contemplating current and upcoming research-oriented studies and grants they were currently involved in. Given that biofield healing practitioners would have more familiarity with working with patients than mock healing practitioners, to preserve participant blinding mock healing practitioners practiced procedures with study personnel until the mock healing practitioner demonstrated mastery of the hand placements and confidence interacting with and fielding potential questions that a patient might ask the mock healing practitioner before or after the session.
It never ceases to amaze me how science drives out magic; even practitioners of energy chelation seem to accept that. After all, if they didn’t, then why would they have chosen the control group that they did and gone to all the trouble to train scientists to put their hands on people in the same positions that Rev. Bruyere uses while thinking extra super hard about how they don’t believe any of this nonsense? In actuality, it’s not a bad control group–if you accept the premise of the study. What is that premise? It’s that there is a human energy “biofield” that healers using “energy chelation” can manipulate to therapeutic intent and that there has to be a degree of belief for that to work. I do like how that evil “planning mind” (as opposed, I suppose, to a “believing mind”) can destroy the magical rays that supposedly heal by chelating all that bad energy. In any case, this is exactly what Harriet Hall meant by “tooth fairy science” when she wrote:
We can study the amount of money left by the Tooth Fairy in different settings, but since we haven’t determined that there is really a Tooth Fairy, any conclusions we reach will be falsely attributed to an imaginary being rather than to the real cause (parental behavior). In acupuncture studies, the acupuncture points/meridians/qi may be imaginary and we may be studying an elaborate placebo rather than a real physiologic phenomenon.
It has not been established that such a thing as a “human energy field” (at least not what “energy healers” mean by the term) exists, that humans can perceive and manipulate it, or that that perception and manipulation of energy fields allows them to heal. In fact, it’s about as clear as clear can be that humans can’t, as a 12-year-old girl named Emily Rosa demonstrated so clearly back in 1998.
So, after all that introduction, what were the results? What do you think they were? I’ll give you a hint. These results were entirely consistent with placebo responses. Basically, there was no difference in total fatigue levels between biofield healing and mock healing. Both produced a decrease in fatigue that patients on the waitlist control did not. In other words, for the primary outcomes measured in the study “biofield” therapy didn’t work compared to the “mock healing” placebo control. So, given this completely negative result, what did the authors do next? They did what any good CAM believer does (and, for that matter, all too many scientists do) and started mining the data for associations, delving into the Multidimensional Fatigue Symptom Inventory short form subscales. Not surprisingly, they found barely statistically significant differences between biofield healing and mock healing in a couple of measures, as is frequent whenever researchers start making a bunch of pairwise comparisons. They also measured salivary cortisol levels and found a significant decrease in cortisol slope over time for the biofield healing versus both mock healing and control. What this means, I have no idea, given that salivary cortisol “variability” (which they calculated) hasn’t been validated as a reliable diagnostic tool for much of anything that I’m aware of or correlated with fatigue.
I’m not impressed. Here’s why. First, I can’t help but note that none of these differences were mentioned in the abstract, which implies to me that even the authors didn’t consider them particularly significant. More importantly, we have multiple comparisons among small groups of patients. (Remember, there were only 76 patients in this study.) Finally, fatigue is a variable symptom that waxes and wanes frequently. it’s very prone to regression to the mean, placebo responses, and reporting bias. It’s very hard to say a lot about whether these barely detectable differences in a couple of subscale measures are in any way clinically significant. Probably not. Not that that stops the authors from laboring mightily in the discussion section to make it sound as though their biofield therapy is the greatest thing since sliced bread. Let me ask you a question whose answers regular readers of SBM should know: What do we normally call it when there is no difference between the real treatment and a sham treatment in a clinical trial testing a drug or device? That’s right. We say there’s no effect greater than that of a placebo and that the trial is negative; i.e., the tested experimental intervention doesn’t work.
Not this study:
This RCT examined whether biofield healing, compared with both active (mock healing) and waitlist control groups, positively affected fatigue as well as cortisol slope, depression, and QOL in breast cancer survivors with persistent fatigue. In addition, this study explored the role of belief in receiving healing as a potential predictor of responses. Findings indicate that both touch-based interventions reduce fatigue in fatigued breast cancer survivors, with considerable effect sizes. Previous research by our group on a separate sample of breast cancer patients indicated that the mean Multidimensional Fatigue Symptom Inventory-short form total scores was 5.99 immediately before the start of anthracycline-based chemotherapy, and rose to 19.9 immediately before the fourth cycle.38 Our fatigued survivors in the mock healing group (mean postintervention score ¼ 10.9) dropped to fatigue scores lower than those found for breast cancer patients toward the end of chemotherapy, and the biofield healing group (mean postintervention score ¼ 4.2) fell to fatigue scores that were below prechemotherapy scores, as well as below previously published means noted for breast cancer patients overall.28 This drop in fatigue appears to have clinical as well as statistical significance.
In other words, according to the authors, because both the “real” biofield healing and the “mock” biofield healing resulted in a decrease in fatigue scores and a barely statistically significant difference in a chosen surrogate marker, biofield healing “works.” This is the same sort of dubious rationale frequently used to claim that acupuncture “works” when they find that sham acupuncture results in the same apparent measured effects as “real” acupuncture. The correct interpretation of this study is that it’s a negative study, and “energy chelation’ does not work. It is placebo. Stick a fork in it; it’s done. Or, as Drs. Coyne, Johansen, and I wrote in our letter:
The registered primary outcomes of the trial were self-reported fatigue, depressive symptoms, and quality of life. No significant differences were obtained between TT and the mock treatment, whereas both conditions were superior to waitlist control. Essentially, the authors examined 3 primary outcomes, with secondary analyses of 5 subscales of the fatigue measure, and a secondary outcome, cortisol, with all pairwise differences explored between the TT, mock treatment, and waitlist control conditions. With any control for multiple comparisons, the modest difference between TT and mock treatment in cortisol is no longer significant.
And:
There is no known therapeutic benefit to changed cortisol slopes. To justify cortisol as a secondary outcome, the authors selectively cite findings that flatter cortisol slopes are modestly related to metastatic disease and predict mortality in breast cancer patients. These limited correlational data alone do nothing to establish that cortisol is a suitable surrogate endpoint.
We concluded that this trial is negative, something I believe to be even more true when one takes into account prior probability and the lack of correcting for multiple comparisons, which led us to wind up our letter thusly:
We believe that publication of this TT trial encourages more pseudoscientific studies of energy fields or auras and gives the wrong message to clinicians and patients.
The authors respond
Not surprisingly, the authors were not too happy about our letter. Even less surprisingly, in their response they retreated to common tropes used by apologists for reiki and “energy healing.” Their response to our letter is a veritable template for defending tooth fairy science. First, the authors tried to disabuse us of our “misconceptions” about the study by pointing out how very wrong we were to lump “energy chelation” in with HT, TT, and reiki as an “energy healing” modality:
We wish to clarify some misconceptions put forth by Coyne, Johansen, and Gorski regarding our reported randomized controlled trial.1 First, the intervention used was not therapeutic touch but a specific hands-on technique commonly used in many types of biofield therapies for ameliorating fatigue.
Which matters not at all. It was the authors, after all, not we, who said that energy chelation was a biofield therapy, which is another name for “energy healing.” In any case, their complaint reminds me of arguing that reiki is different from TT because reiki masters use different hand motions to channel the “healing energy” or that in reiki the energy comes from the “universal source” while energy chelation removes “energy blocks” in the patient. Until you can convincingly demonstrate that the “universal source” exists and can be manipulated by reiki masters and/or that there are “energy blockages” that “energy chelation” practitioners can remove, all you’re doing is comparing two different forms of magic. Alternatively, you can demonstrate with overwhelming indisputable evidence so powerful as to make us question previously understood laws of physics indicating that these techniques cause objective responses, but unfortunately for the authors of this paper this study does nothing of the sort. We’re looking at effects no greater than placebo on primary endpoints in the study, all of which are subjective responses, and an unvalidated surrogate endpoint that demonstrates a barely statistically significant effect (p=0.04), after no correction for multiple comparisons. In other words, the authors’ criticism completely misses the point.
Here’s their next objection:
Second, there is an evidence base for biofield therapies.2,3
The authors cite this Cochrane Review and one of their own reviews. The problem with this argument, of course, is at the very core of the reason why we call this blog “science-based medicine” rather than “evidence-based medicine.” There is no consideration of prior plausibility in the studies examined, where were all over the place as far as quality goes. Add to what the Cochrane Review characterizes as poor quality, equivocal data the fact that the clinical trials involved testing a class of healing modalities whose explanation if effective would require, like homeopathy, that huge swaths of well-established physics, chemistry, and biology (particularly neurobiology) to be overthrown, and the reasonable conclusion is that “biofield therapies” do not work. In particular, this is a case where “statistically significant” doesn’t mean “clinically significant,” given that the decrease in pain reported in the Cochrane review was less than 1 unit on a typical pain scale that goes from 1 to 10. One unit has commonly been viewed as the smallest decrease in pain that a patient can perceive.
Objection number three follows:
Third, the study was designed to examine nonspecific and placebo elements that may drive responses: This is why we used the mock healing group as a comparison along with the waitlist control group. We also examined patient expectancy, belief, and patient ratings of practitioner attributes all elements of placebo as potential predictors.
So what? It was the authors who concluded against the evidence in their very own study that, in essence, their “energy chelation therapy” works to relieve symptoms of chemotherapy-induced fatigue even though the “real” energy chelation and the “mock” energy chelation were indistinguishable. The correct conclusion should have been that energy chelation performed no better than placebo and therefore did not work. Again, if energy chelation were a drug therapy, would the authors conclude from a result in which the drug does no better than placebo for the primary outcome measures that the drug worked? Why the double standard?
Up next, is this objection:
Fourth, despite Coyne et al.’s seemingly contradictory statements (stating that the study is underpowered while also suggesting cortisol slope results should have been Bonferroni corrected), the power analysis and statistics are correct and clearly described.
“Contradictory”? I fail to see what’s “contradictory” in pointing out that the study was underpowered and that the cortisol slope results should have been Bonferroni-corrected; i.e., corrected for multiple comparisons. They are separate criticisms. Even if the study were adequately powered, it would still be flawed because of the lack of correction for multiple comparisons. At least if the authors had properly corrected for multiple comparisons then they could have blamed their negative result on the inadequate statistical power of the study!
Finally, the authors write something that both amused and depressed me at the same time:
The larger issue is what constitutes “pseudoscience” and what information is worthy of dissemination to the public. Should the data from our well conducted, rigorous, randomized controlled trial be dismissed because the mechanisms are unknown or because some scientists do not believe in the specific therapy? We make no claims surrounding mechanisms. We do note that this intervention has significant promise for reducing fatigue, which is the most common complaint among cancer patients, and the therapy produces no harm. Therefore, it merits further investigation. Premature rejection of findings from rigorous randomized controlled trials are as big a threat to science as the continuation of falsehoods based on belief. Thus, as clinicians and scientists, our highest duty to patients should be to investigate promising solutions with high benefit/risk ratios, not to act as gatekeepers of information based on personal opinion.
There’s so much wrong in this paragraph that I could spend an entire blog post deconstructing it line by line. Note the wounded cry about “dismissing” results based on dogma rather than science. Note the straw man argument that we reject the results of this study because we “do not believe in the specific therapy” or because the “mechanisms are unknown.” The first trope is a massive misstatement of our objections. What we argue is that the results of this trial do not mean what the authors think they mean. The authors conclude that the trial indicates that energy chelation shows “significant promise.” (They even repeated that assertion in their response!) We conclude that the study’s own results indicate that energy chelation functions no better than placebo and therefore does not work. It would have been nice if the authors had addressed our actual criticism than such an easily revealed straw man version of it. The second trope is commonly used in defense of pseudoscience because it is difficult for many to understand that there’s a huge difference between a mechanism that is “unknown” and a mechanism that is physically impossible based on current scientific understanding. An example of the former is a drug whose mechanism of action is as yet unknown but whose effects are easily documented. We know that the drug must function through some sort of biochemical interaction with a receptor, enzyme, or other macromolecule within the cell that we can discover and that we do not need to invoke mechanisms that break the laws of physics and chemistry to explain the drug’s effects. Again, to illustrate the difference between such a drug and impossible mechanisms, I like to use the example of homeopathy, which, if it worked would necessitate the overthrow of huge amounts of exceedingly well-established science in multiple disciplines, including physics, chemistry, and biology. Let’s just put it this way. Energy chelation is the same. For it to “work,” the same sorts of vast quantities of well-established science would need to be overthrown.
As a skeptic, I have to admit that it’s certainly possible, albeit infinitessimally so, that so much of what we understand about science is not just wrong and/or incomplete, but so incredibly wrong and/or incomplete that there might be an as yet undiscovered physical mechanism by which energy chelation and “biofield therapies” could work. However, if you’re going to convince me that something like energy chelation can truly work as a treatment modality, you’d better have evidence far more compelling than a small, equivocal clinical trial like this in which the effect on primary outcomes was no greater than placebo and whose analysis of secondary outcomes didn’t even bother to correct for multiple comparisons. Heck, even Dr. Pasche’s data that I discussed last week was far more compelling than this study, and his results are still not particularly convincing. Bringing a study like this “energy chelation” study to argue that “biofield therapies” work (or even that they might work) is akin not just to bringing a knife to a gun fight. It’s akin to bringing fists to an M2 Browning machine gun and grenade fight.
And that’s not just our “personal opinion,” either. Of course, it’s far easier to dismiss criticisms that one can somehow label “personal opinion” than it is to address our actual criticisms. That’s probably why the authors try to characterize our objections to their study as nothing more than a disagreement of opinion, before floating off into the ether of a self-righteous and condescending lecture to us about our “highest duty” as clinicians and scientists. I retort that, as clinicians and scientists, it is our highest duty not to engage in magical thinking that subverts science-based medicine. It’s our highest duty not to waste precious resources investigating therapies so utterly implausible that their efficacy requires that the laws of physics be overturned in favor of magic. It’s our highest duty to base our treatments in science, not in prescientific vitalism and religion, which is all that most “biofield” therapies are: faith healing, the laying on of hands. I would also retort that our tax dollars should not be funding magic like this. Yes, you guessed it; this study was funded in part by NCCAM.
As I conclude, I’m left wondering, jaw agape: What were the editors of Cancer thinking? I know what I’m thinking now: From now on, I’m going to be extra skeptical of any articles I see in Cancer, and you should too. I’m also depressed. If such a study and such a trope-laden response to criticism of that study can find its way into Cancer, the official journal of the American Cancer Society, what other cancer journals are publishing pseudoscience?
REFERENCES:
     1.  Jain S, D Pavlik, J Distefan, RR Bruyere, J Acer, R Garcia, I Coulter, J Ives, SC Roesch, W Jonas, and PJ Mills (2012). Complementary medicine for fatigue and cortisol variability in breast cancer survivors: A randomized controlled trial. Cancer 118: 777-787. DOI: 10.1002/cncr.26345
     2.  Coyne JC, C Johansen, and DH Gorski (2012). Letter re: Complementary medicine for fatigue and cortisol variability in breast cancer survivors: A randomized controlled trial. Cancer, E-pub ahead of print. DOI: 10.1002/cncr.27415.
     3.  Jain S, D Pavlik, J Distefan, RR Bruyere, J Acer, R Garcia, I Coulter, J Ives, SC Roesch, W Jonas, and PJ Mills (2012). Response re: Complementary medicine for fatigue and cortisol variability in breast cancer survivors: A randomized controlled trial. Cancer. E-pub ahead of print. DOI: 10.1002/cncr.27421.
     4.  So PS, Y Jiang, and Y Qin (2008). Touch therapies for pain relief in adults. Cochrane Database Syst Rev CD006535. DOI: 10.1002/14651858.CD006535.pub2

Does thinking make it so? CAM placebo fantasy versus scientific reality
David Gorski on February 6, 2012
Link
Last week, I discussed a rather execrable study. Actually, the study itself wasn’t so execrable, at least not in its design, which was a fairly straightforward three-arm randomized clinical trial. Rather it was the interpretation of the study’s results that was execrable. In brief, the authors tested an “energy healing” modality known as “energy chelation” versus a placebo (sham “energy chelation”) and found, as is so often the case in studies of “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) or “integrative medicine” (IM) that both modalities did better than no treatment on the primary outcomes but that the “real” treatment (if one can call energy chelation “real treatment”) produced outcomes that were statistically indistinguishable from the “sham” treatment. Not surprisingly, the next move on the part of the researchers was to do a bunch of comparisons, and, as is so often the case (particularly when one fails to correct statistically for multiple comparisons), they found a couple of secondary endpoints with barely statistically significant differences and trumpeted them as meaning that their “energy chelation therapy” has “significant promise for reducing fatigue.” They then argued that the study was also ” designed to examine nonspecific and placebo elements that may drive responses.”
Which brings us to the “power” of placebo.
As I was contemplating what I wanted to discuss this week, I thought about the study that Drs. Coyne, Johansen, and I objected to, but then I also thought about Dr. Crislip’s post last week and post I did about a month ago in which I noticed how lately CAM apologists seem to be—shall we say?—retooling their message in the wake of negative trial after negative trial of their implausible treatments. Gone (mostly) are claims of powerful specific effects and efficacy from treatments such as various “energy healing” modalities, acupuncture, homeopathy, and the like themselves, to be replaced by claims that physicians should embrace CAM because it’s “harnessing the power of placebo” to produce “powerful mind-body healing.” It’s a powerful message that has sucked in people who normally would be considered skeptics, such as Michael Specter, who, as I described, apparently bought into the message sufficiently that when Ted Kaptchuk was making the media round right before the holidays he happily published a fairly credulous interview with him entitled, The Power of Nothing: Could Studying the Placebo Effect Change the Way We Think About Medicine? (My answer: Very likely no.) Even Ira Flatow of Science Friday fell hard for Kaptchuk’s message, declaring at the beginning of the interview that Kaptchuk’s irritable bowel syndrome study is evidence that “placebos work even when patients are in on the secret.” (It’s not.)
That skeptics and scientists find the idea that the mind has the power to heal the body, often referred to as “self-healing” or “mind-body healing,” so seductive should probably not be surprising. After all, who wouldn’t want to be able to cure themselves simply by willing it to be so? It’s a concept that, like so many concepts in CAM, goes far back into ancient times and stretches forward to today in ideas like The Secret, which goes quite a bit beyond the whole idea of “mind-body healing” or healing yourself because you wish it to be so, and declares that you can have virtually anything you want simply by thinking the right thoughts. In fact, to me it appears that the “powerful placebo” is being drafted in the service of supporting what are, at their core, mystical beliefs far more than science. I’d like to elaborate on that idea a bit more than I did last time I discussed this isssue, where I concluded by writing:
In the end, all too much of the rebranding of CAM as placebo and the selling of placebos as some sort of powerful “mind-body healing” strikes me as being much like The Secret, in which wishing makes it so.
Let’s take a look at just how far this goes.
God and placebos
Late last week, a reader sent me an article from that wretched hive of scum and quackery, The Huffington Post, by a journalist named Robert Schiffman entitled How the Placebo Effect Proves That God Exists. I had thought to start out this post using Schiffman’s article as a sort of reductio ad absurdum demonstrating how far some people will go to ascribe supernatural powers to placebo effects, and, I must admit, it’s a tasty enough target to warrant a brief post of its own. In the context of my argument for this post, I think I’ll just “cherry pick” two passages from Schiffman’s argument:
The placebo effect is arguably the most underrated discovery of modern medicine. Replace “just the placebo effect” with “the amazing placebo effect,” “the mind boggling placebo effect.” To my way of thinking, the very existence of this mysterious effect proves that God exists. That’s right, you can find evidence for the foundational truths taught by religion in virtually every double blind medical research study!
Later, Schiffman exults:
Which brings us back to the placebo effect. It is mysterious, right? We don’t know how it happens. A person was sick and they take a sugar pill and next thing you know — voila — they are healthy. To call this “the placebo effect” is to dress up our ignorance in words. What has actually happened is nothing short of a miracle. Science has got no explanation for it– something immaterial (a thought?) has impacted something material (our body) in a way which utterly defies logic.
My citing Schiffman serves two purposes. First, I am using his arguments as an explicit example of how proponents of placebo medicine seem to view placebo effects as somehow supernatural or mystical; i.e., beyond “boring” normal human physiology made up of trillions of cells, each interacting with others and driven by thousands upon thousands of biochemical processes. In this case, Schiffman views placebo responses as “proof” that God exists! Second, it demonstrates a misunderstanding of placebo response common not just to CAM proponents, but to many other people and even all too many scientists, namely the misconception that placebo responses have any effect on the pathophysiology of disease. Schiffman, for instance, characterizes placebo responses explicitly as a sugar pill making a sick person healthy again, which to him is a phenomenon that is miraculous and without explanation. Of course, it would be nice to establish that such a phenomenon even exists in the first place, because certainly my reptilian pharma overlords would be very interested in being able to sell cheap sugar pills at a hugely inflated price in order to cure disease. The profit potential would be enormous!
Yes, I’m joking, but there is little doubt that people like Schiffman have a vastly inflated view of the power of placebo responses. Placebo responses are worth studying, to be certain, but unfortunately they are heterogeneous and derive from multiple factors, each of which contributes to observed responses in different proportions in different clinical situations. These include observation bias, regression to the mean, and differences in how patients perceive their symptoms, to name a few. Another problem with such an argument is that placebo doesn’t do anything to impact the pathophysiology of disease or conditions, and it’s often arguable whether it even impacts subjective symptoms all that much in many conditions, as Mark Crislip has emphasized to the point that he refers to the “placebo myth.” Unfortunately, in much the same way that Schiffman attributes placebo effects to God, CAM/IM advocates often ascribe near mystical powers to placebo, a sort of “mind over matter” or “mind over body” view that gives the happy but false impression that just by thinking happy, positive thoughts, you can have a major impact on your disease. Schiffman’s argument might be very obviously over-the-top, but at its core it’s not really different than a lot of arguments I see in favor of “harnessing the power of placebo.”
The fantastical power of willpower placebo
As comical as Schiffman’s argument is, he’s not alone in making some version of it. It’s just that, being more “spiritual” than religious, many CAM advocates don’t refer to the mystical force they believe to be behind placebo effects as God. Further evidence of prevalence of the viewpoint that we can heal ourselves solely with our minds comes from a post by Andre Evans entitled Proof that Your Own Thoughts and Beliefs Can Cause Self-Healing. In this post, Evans cites placebo effects as “evidence” that, if you just think about it hard enough, you can “heal yourself” of almost anything:
Numerous studies abound on the nature of the mind-body relationship, and how your mind can affect your biological functions. Much like how a hypochondriac may convince himself that he is sick, and subsequently ‘find’ (or make up) symptoms of his illness, a negative or even apathetic mindset may induce you into a lesser state of health. Conversely, having a generally positive disposition or outlook with regards to your health may actually make you healthier.
In clinical studies where patients are given placebos, they often will respond positively to them due to the expectation that they are receiving some form of beneficial medicine. Although not talking about placebo sugar pills specifically, this kind of self-treatment can be seen in one case where a woman’s own thoughts made her lose nearly 112 pounds.
Evans concludes:
The power of the mind is immense. Its influence can literally bend reality to match its perspective. You can often influence a situation more by thinking about it meticulously, as opposed to simply acting. If you believe something to be true, you will conform the world around you to match this expectation.
If you believe that your illness is getting worse, it will probably get worse. If you believe that your treatment is helping you, you could actually cause massive self-healing to occur. Assuming a disposition will automatically prejudice your mind, and therefore cause your body to react either positively or negatively.
The influence of the mind can “literally bend reality to match its perspective”? Note that Evans doesn’t mean this figuratively. Oh, no. He means it literally. The only way to describe this viewpoint is pure magical thinking, a mystical, religious belief that, if you only have enough faith, you can have whatever you want and you can heal yourself. Would that it were so! Unfortunately, it’s not. Sure, having a positive attitude can make one feel better about his or her situation, and having a negative attitude can sometimes get in the way of doing what needs to be done to treat a condition, but it’s a huge exaggeration to claim that the mind can “literally bend reality” to match its perspective. If that were the case, why can’t I bend reality to guarantee that I live to 120? Or why can’t I “bend reality” to make myself a billionaire? Why can’t I think my way to having the body of 25-year-old again? This sort of thinking is at the level of a three or four year old, who can’t always tell the difference between fantasy and reality. Normally, we grow up; CAM/IM thought of this sort strikes me as a severe case of arrested development.
People often think I’m exaggerating when I speak of CAM advocates arguing extreme versions of “mind over matter.” I used to think that no one could make such arguments seriously, but I learned a long time ago that I was wrong in that assessment. If you don’t believe how far this thinking goes in a lot of CAM, I think it’s instructive to show you an example from–who else?–the quack apologist supreme, Joe Mercola, who a few years ago wrote a post entitled How your thoughts can cause or cure cancer. Mercola, as he so often does, starts out with a video:
This video, not surprisingly, is chock full of misinformation. For instance, it claims that no cancer gene has ever been found. Really? How about BRCA1 and BRCA2? Or BRAF mutations? Or one of a number of oncogenes and tumor suppressors that have been discovered in the last 40 years? Admittedly, it turns out that cancer is much more complicated than what we originally thought in that individual genes are usually (but not always) the cause and that there is not usually a straight progression of genes that are mutated in order to result in cancer progression. This is the primary reason why cures for most cancers that can’t be cut out surgically have proven elusive, with leukemias and lymphomas being exceptions to this rule. However, that is an entirely different thing than there being no cancer genes. It also uses and abuses the concept of epigenetics (the regulation of gene expression by factors other than the genome, such as methylation of genes,chromatin structure, and other things that can regulate DNA structure and function) to claim that cancer is “optional–not determined by genetics, nor an unavoidable fact” and that “your mind, your beliefs–not defective genes–create a ripple effect that ‘turns on’ cancer cells.”
Apparently, if Mercola is to be believed, your mind is apparently so powerful that it can control the expression of oncogenes and tumor suppressors to result in cancer. According to this view, your “genetic blueprint” is not the problem” but rather “how your cells interpret the directions of your mind.” In fact, this view even goes so far as to claim that spontaneous remissions of cancer are “tied to having a profound change in a perception or belief about life.” I kid you not. What this boils down to is the overarching claim that your mind can create disease and that, through the placebo effect, you can heal yourself. In fact, Joe Mercola makes explicit what is stated in the video:
Your beliefs are energy fields, and they are working to promote either health or disease in your body right now. Which one is up to you.
When it comes to the ability of your mind to heal you, there are NO limitations. The sky is the limit.
Got that? There are NO limitations! One wonders why if that’s true, amputees can’t think their way to growing a new limb. Yes, I know, it’s the same rationale behind the sarcastic question directed at faith healers, namely Why won’t God heal amputees? However, the question applies here just as well. If there are truly “no limits” to the power of the mind and if the mind can control epigenetics so profoundly, then it should be possible, through the mind directing the epigenetics of the cells at the end of the amputated stump, to reprogram the cells to become embryonic stem cells again and then to grow and differentiate into the cells necessary to regenerate a new limb, just like a salamander. The genetic blueprint is there; the genetic program to turn a cell back into a stem cell is just dormant and can be reactivated. Indeed, how to do that is one of the hottest areas of biomedical research right now. So, if all it takes is changing the gene expression of a cell, then why can’t we think our way to new limbs? Unfortunately, we never see a person thinking himself a new limb. There are other examples. For instance, if there are “no limits” to what the mind can do, why can’t patients in end stage organ failure do a little epigenetic programming and regenerate and thereby repair the failing organ?
Yes, yes, I know. It’s difficult. So difficult that no case of limb regeneration due to thought alone has been reported, nor has a case of someone thinking their way to a new organ.
Maybe it’s the fault of those nasty scientists and skeptics:
However, there is something you should know. Other people can influence your perception of things and ultimately your ability to express your true beliefs.
So, perhaps you feel thrilled to have learned this information, but when you share it with your spouse or coworkers, they will not feel the same way. Their negativity could then easily transfer to you and cause you to doubt your mind’s healing abilities (thus making your mind unable to manifest healing).
You heard it right. All those negative vibes of skeptics are what’s standing between you and the ability to think your way to perfect health! I can’t help but find it highly ironic in light of Mercola’s statement that the investigators who did that misbegotten trial of “energy chelation” I described last week chose a control group in which:
Mock healing practitioners were skeptical scientists who were trained to use the identical hand placements as biofield healing practitioners. Mock healing practitioners were asked not to intend to heal the patient when touching, but rather to disengage into “planning mind” by contemplating current and upcoming research-oriented studies and grants they were currently involved in.
I remind readers that there were no statistically significant difference in the primary outcomes of this trial; apparently for energy chelation and fatigue at least, the negative vibes from the skeptics failed to harsh the happy buzz from the good vibes from the energy chelation, mainly because there was no happy buzz from the good vibes from energy chelation to begin with! In any event, it is clear that even the investigators responsible for the “energy chelation” trial at some level must buy into a variant of the ideas above about “mind-body” effects. If they didn’t, they wouldn’t have decided upon the sham energy chelation therapy that they used for their control group.
Still don’t believe me? Then let’s take a look at what Oprah Winfrey says because, as we all know, if Oprah says it it must be true. In this case, Oprah is republishing an article by that guru of “quantum mind-body medicine” himself, Deepak Chopra:
Yet somehow, for all its complexity, the healing system can be triggered by a simple intention of the mind. To be your own placebo, then, requires the same conditions that apply in a classic placebo response:
    • You trust what is happening.
    • You deal with doubt and fear.
    • You don’t send conflicting messages that get tangled with each other.
    • You have opened the channels of mind-body communication.
    • You let go of your intention and let the healing system do its work.
But what does Chopra mean by the “mind”? When neuroscientists speak of the mind, they generally are referring to consciousness, which the evidence in neuroscience increasingly indicates is nothing more than a product of the function of the brain. If placebo effects are a real biological phenomenon and not just an artifact of clinical trial design (or, as Mark Crislip put it so amusingly, the beer goggles of medicine), they will work through biology. Yet infused in so many of these invocations of the “powerful placebo” is a solid core of Cartesian mind-brain dualism; i.e., the concept . Indeed, Deepak Chopra makes it explicit in another post he did for Oprah:
Just as a radio picks up the signals that transmit music, so the brain functions to bring mind into everyday reality. If the radio is smashed, the music goes away. If the brain is ill, defective or damaged, some aspect of mind will go away. But to use this reasoning as proof that the brain is the mind or more real than the mind, is utter folly.
Chopra concludes:
It’s my personal conviction that the brain was created by consciousness. There is no other viable explanation, because our current explanation, that the human brain evolved through random mutations, simply doesn’t hold water. Our brains are the single most complex structures in the universe. To say that they were randomly created is a million times more unlikely than having 10 monkeys sitting at typewriters produce all of Shakespeare. But that’s a topic for deeper thought. It will be good enough if coming generations turn back to the mind and stop reducing the richness of experience to a mushy machine made of meat.
Shorter Chopra: I don’t like how biology, evolution, and neuroscience have decreased my feeling of “specialness” and connection with the supernatural; so I reject scientists’ reality and substitute my own.
Lest the reader think that it’s only hard core woo promoters like Chopra who fall into this sort of thinking, let me just point out that Dr. Crislip provided an example just last week of an editorial in JAMA by Howard Brody MD, PhD and Franklin G. Miller PhD entitled Lessons From Recent Research About the Placebo Effect—From Art to Science. Dr. Brody is the author of a book entitled The Placebo Response: How You Can Release the Body’s Inner Pharmacy for Better Health, which is described thusly:
According to Brody, the placebo phenomenon–which he pronounces mysterious and unknowable at its very heart–is when the convergence of healing signals, assigned meaning, and human expectations stimulates the body’s inner healing power. The patient’s positive mental and emotional reaction to a medical intervention releases what Brody terms the “inner pharmacy.” In other words, even though the treatment is benign, the body’s biochemical pathways are stimulated to induce healing in the same manner actual medicines do. “Could harboring hope, faith, or expectation be genuinely potent factors in the healing process?” Brody asks, “I believe they are. In fact, I see them as the heart and soul of the placebo response.
In his editorial, Brody makes similar arguments, completely buying into Kaptchuk’s irritable bowel syndrome study that is touted as evidence that placebo effects can be induced without deception. His arguments are not explicitly dualistic, as Chopra’s are, but I do detect more than a few overblown claims for what placebos can do, and that’s even after his editorial was peer reviewed for inclusion in JAMA. I can only imagine what Brody writes in his book. That Brody was invited to write this editorial suggests that CAM-like ideas about placebo are infiltrating conventional medicine in a feedback loop in which CAM apologists see these sorts of articles and trumpet them as evidence that they are on to something and that medicine is finally coming around to their way of thinking. I fear they might be correct.
What placebo responses are not
Unfortunately, this sort of magical thinking pervades a lot of “alternative medicine,” just as it pervades The Secret. Such thinking is profoundly infantile in that it presumes that wishing makes it so, just as a child thinks that his thoughts make reality what he wants it to be. When you come right down to it, it’s a lot like religion. But what happens when the wish doesn’t work? What happens when wishing doesn’t make it so? What happens when mind doesn’t control matter? Blaming “negative energy” delivered by skeptics keeping you down only goes so far. There comes a time when you have no choice but to face reality. Even worse, as much as CAM apologists will labor mightily to deny it, there is a real undercurrent of blaming the victim in these ideas; i.e., it’s your fault if you get sick because you don’t think the right thoughts and/or it’s your fault if you’re not getting well because you don’t believe strongly enough, didn’t carry out the woo prescription closely enough, or—horror of horrors—you actually used standard-of-care chemotherapy to treat your cancer, thus contaminating your body and destroying any chance that faith-based treatments will cure you (and, of course, providing a convenient excuse when they fail). In reality, the sorts of extreme invocations of placebo effects made by Evans, Mercola, and Chopra are nothing more than old wine in a new bottle, in which vitalistic, dualistic beliefs are imposed on a known phenomenon (placebo responses) and used to conclude that magic works.
You can find this sort of thinking in reiki, which is basically faith healing substituting Eastern mysticism for Christianity; the so-called “German New Medicine,” which postulates that cancer and serious illness are due to “unresolved childhood trauma” and that you have to recognize and resolve such traumas in order to heal yourself; and Biologie Totale, which is the bastard offspring of the German New Medicine. All of these alt-med modalities postulate that disease is either a reaction to emotional trauma and that you can heal it with your mind. What is the whole area of “energy healing” but the idea that, if you just have enough faith, you can heal either yourself or others? Sure, alt-med enthusiasts gussy it up in language that co-opts (and corrupts) the concepts of epigenetics and placebo effects to make it seem as though anything is possible, but when you come right now to it, what we’re looking at is far more religious in nature than scientific. Maybe Kimball and I were closer than we thought when we referred to CAM and IM as the “new paternalism.”
Perhaps the must frustrating part of this “woo-ification” of placebo effects by CAM apologists is that the science of placebos is a fascinating topic that might actually have some potential applications in medicine. These applications would at the very minimum include how to design better clinical trials whose results are not confounded by placebo factors. At the most, however, they would involve understanding how neurochemical functions can affect a patient’s perception of his or her symptoms and using that understanding to maximize the effects of science-based interventions. One thing that is clear from a science-based standpoint is that these applications will not be the sorts of applications envisioned by the likes of Chopra and Evans, in which placebo effects are portrayed as some sort of healing “mind-body” magic. Indeed, notice the choice of terms, “mind-body.” Not “brain-body” or “nervous system-body,” which is in reality how placebo responses must, if they exist, work through mundane physiology and biochemistry given that the brain and nervous system are part of the body. No, their choice of the term “mind-body” is to me an implicit admission of the dualism and vitalism behind their “medicine.”
I keep hoping that the likes of Chopra, Mercola, and Evans do not succeed in completely co-opting placebo responses as a form of shamanistic magic, to be used as a primary force for healing. Unfortunately, I’m finding it harder and harder to be optimistic. How can I be when so many physicians appear to be not only ready to go back to the “good old days” of medical paternalism and placebo medicine under the guise of “empowering patients” to “heal themselves,” but to forget (or at least partially forget) the very foundations of science itself?

Can the mind really heal the body? The false narrative of placebo “healing” revisited
Placebo effects are inextricably bound to the question of whether the alternative medicine modalities that are being “integrated” into medicine actually have any useful therapeutic effects or not; i.e., whether they are merely placebos. Here, I examine an article in National Geographic that peddles the false narrative that placebo effects have real “healing” powers against diseases like Parkinson’s disease.
David Gorski on December 12, 2016
Link

We at SBM write a lot about placebo effects. Of course, part of the reason is that placebo effects are just plain interesting from a scientific perspective. After all, if one can relieve symptoms with inert sugar pills or other ineffective interventions because of the power of expectation, that’s something we want to understand. Also, given the mission of this blog, another major reason is that placebo effects are inextricably bound to the question of whether the alternative medicine modalities that are being “integrated” into medicine through the brand of integrative medicine actually have any useful therapeutic effects or not, aside from placebo effects. Of course, as we’ve discussed time and time again, pretty much all “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) or “integrative” medicine modalities that are not herbal medicine, nutrition, or exercise (which can have measurable physiological effects due to understandable physical mechanisms) have no detectable effects above and beyond placebo effects, no matter how much proponents of integrative medicine try to show that they do. There’s a reason why, given the utter implausibility of many of these treatments, such as homeopathy, reiki, and the like, I refer to integrative medicine as “integrating” quackery with real medicine; that is, when integrative medicine is not rebranding perfectly respectable science-based modalities like diet and exercise as somehow “alternative” or “integrative,” so that they can claim at least some efficacious modalities in their armamentarium and thereby imply that the quackery has value too.
That’s why I was so disturbed when a former SBM blogger e-mailed me a link to a credulous article in National Geographic that basically promotes every pseudoscientific trope about acupuncture entitled, “Here’s What Placebos Can Heal—And What They Can’t” by Simon Worrall, with the subtitle “The latest research in biochemistry reveals that your brain can actually self-medicate.” Yes, that’s like waving the proverbial cape in front of the proverbial bull. The article is an interview with Erik Vance about his new book, Suggestible You: The Curious Science of Your Brain’s Ability to Deceive, Transform, and Heal. Its blurb is not encouraging:
This riveting narrative explores the world of placebos, hypnosis, false memories, and neurology to reveal the groundbreaking science of our suggestible minds. Could the secrets to personal health lie within our own brains? Journalist Erik Vance explores the surprising ways our expectations and beliefs influence our bodily responses to pain, disease, and everyday events. Drawing on centuries of research and interviews with leading experts in the field, Vance takes us on a fascinating adventure from Harvard’s research labs to a witch doctor’s office in Catemaco, Mexico, to an alternative medicine school near Beijing (often called “China’s Hogwarts”). Vance’s firsthand dispatches will change the way you think—and feel.
Expectations, beliefs, and self-deception can actively change our bodies and minds. Vance builds a case for our “internal pharmacy”—the very real chemical reactions our brains produce when we think we are experiencing pain or healing, actual or perceived. Supporting this idea is centuries of placebo research in a range of forms, from sugar pills to shock waves; studies of alternative medicine techniques heralded and condemned in different parts of the world (think crystals and chakras); and most recently, major advances in brain mapping technology. Thanks to this technology, we’re learning how we might leverage our suggestibility (or lack thereof) for personalized medicine, and Vance brings us to the front lines of such study.
You know, someone should tell whoever wrote the blurb that being referred to as “Hogwarts” is not a good thing in medicine. Of course, I can’t resist indulging in one of my favorite quips here regarding Hogwarts and alternative medicine: What’s the difference between magic Harry Potter’s world and alternative medicine? In Harry Potter’s world, magic works. Alternative medicine, not so much.
Unfortunately, this article promotes what we at SBM have come to refer to as the “placebo narrative” in apologia for integrative medicine. If what Vance says in his interview reflects what’s in his book (and there’s no reason to think it doesn’t), then the book is basically promoting the same message. Before I look at the interview itself, though, let’s recap what we mean by the “placebo narrative.”
The placebo narrative
I consider it a truism that, as more and more rigorous clinical trials with proper blinding and controls show that popular alternative medicine modalities like acupuncture, reiki, and the like that are furiously being “integrated” into medicine have no detectable specific effects on any disease or condition distinguishable from placebo effects, increasingly integrative medicine proponents have shifted to arguing that that’s OK, that these modalities actually work through the “power of placebo.” Thus was born what Steve Novella has referred to as the “placebo narrative.” I like that term, but I sometimes refer to the placebo narrative as the myth that “thinking makes it so,” which is the basis for the rebranding of integrative medicine as harnessing “the power of placebo” or, alternatively, the power of positive thinking. Never mind that it’s highly questionable whether it’s ever worthwhile to do so and that trying to use placebo effects to intervene in real disease processes could potentially have deadly consequences by making the patient think he feels better without actually affecting the underlying pathology.
That’s not to say that there aren’t still believers out there trying to demonstrate through “bait and switch” studies that, for example, acupuncture is more potent than antidepressants (it’s not); that acupuncture is effective in relieving hot flashes, be they due to menopause or breast cancer chemotherapy or hormonal therapy (no, it doesn’t work for either); or that acupuncture is effective in improving the pregnancy rate in women undergoing in vitro fertilization (it’s not). There are even meta-analyses claiming that acupuncture “works.” One meta-analysis by Andrew Vickers claiming that acupuncture is effective for pain, is cited almost as gospel by acupuncture advocates, even though its methodological deficiencies are significant and the effect “detected” is almost certainly not clinically significant, issues detailed by Steve Novella, Mark Crislip, and, of course, yours truly. I could go on, but you get the idea. In fact, I’d argue that it’s because of how difficult it has been for acupuncture advocates to show that acupuncture and other alternative therapies work for anything that the narrative has shifted to placebos. It’s also why integrative medicine advocates like pragmatic trials so much.
Still, those who still think various highly implausible alternative medicine treatments actually work notwithstanding, increasingly the placebo narrative has become the dominant message among integrative medicine advocates to explain how the woo in integrative medicine “works.” Basically, any time you hear someone referring to the “mind-body” connection, they’re invoking a disguised form of the placebo narrative, wrapped in discredited mind-body dualism to boot.
The problem with the placebo narrative
As you might imagine if you’ve been reading SBM a while, there’s a problem with the placebo narrative—many problems, actually. These fall into two categories, in general: The scientific and the ethical. The ethical problem is easy to understand, and it’s very, very daunting for the promoters of the placebo narrative. Basically, in medicine it is very unethical to lie to patients, and inducing placebo effects requires lying to patients. Period.
That’s why integrative medicine believers have made such an effort to provide evidence that it is not actually necessary to lie to patients to induce placebo effects. The big name in integrative medicine who has done the most to promote this narrative of “placebos without deception” is without a doubt Ted Kaptchuk at Harvard. Indeed, Kaptchuk has tried repeatedly to demonstrate that it is possible to trigger placebo effects “without deception,” and three of his clinical trials are the ones often cited to argue that placebo effects don’t require lying to the patient. Unfortunately, it takes very little in the way of a critical reading of all three studies to realize that there was indeed deception in them, as well as selection bias. The advertising and the consent forms for both trials basically served the purpose of the physician telling a patient that the treatment would work. For instance, in one of Kaptchuk’s studies, which tested placebo pills on patients with irritable bowel syndrome (a syndrome very sensitive to placebo effects) emphasized how “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.” Another of his studies, which tested the drug Maxalt versus placebo pills for their effect on migraine headache symptoms, included in its language about the placebo: “Our second goal is to understand why placebo pills can also make you pain-free.” Not to understand why placebo pills might be able to make you pain-free or could possibly make you pain free. “Can make you pain free.” The other study, billed an open-label placebo trial for chronic low back pain, included this language:
After informed consent, all participants were asked if they had heard of the “placebo effect” and explained in an approximately 15-minute a priori script, adopted from an earlier OLP study, the following “4 discussion points”: (1) the placebo effect can be powerful, (2) the body automatically can respond to taking placebo pills like Pavlov dogs who salivated when they heard a bell, (3) a positive attitude can be helpful but is not necessary, and (4) taking the pills faithfully for the 21 days is critical. All participants were also shown a video clip (1 minute 25 seconds) of a television news report, in which participants in an OLP trial of irritable bowel syndrome were interviewed (excerpted from: http://www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/40787382#40787382).
So basically, they used the same talking points from the previous study, plus clips from a news reports about happy study participants to prime the patients that placebo effects can be “powerful.” In pretty much every study of “placebo without deception,” you will find a problem like this.
None of this doesn’t mean that the science of placebo effects isn’t worth studying. The problem is that integrative medicine proponents have taken over much of the research and tried to make it conform to their preferred narrative
Enter Erik Vance
When I encountered Worrall’s interview with Vance on NatGeo, I thought Vance’s name sounded vaguely familiar. A quick search revealed him to be a science writer whose work has appeared in Discover and the New York Times. When I saw how much Vance has written about placebo effects before, I was surprised that, as far as I could tell, neither I nor any of the other SBM bloggers had written about one of his articles before, particularly given that he’s written articles like “Power of the Placebo,” complete with a placebo narrative trope, ‘Once dismissed as a curiosity, the placebo effect is now recognized as the key to the brain’s “inner pharmacy.” If only doctors knew how to open the medicine cabinet.’ Is it? Is it really?
In the introduction to the interview, Worrall informs us a bit about Vance, including that he trained as a biologist but had been raised in a Christian Science household. That’s probably why Worrall’s first question was about whether faith healing actually can work, to which Vance answered:
Wow, that’s tough! I was brought up in Christian Science, which, at its heart, believes that the world, including our bodies, is a reflection of our minds. So, if you change your mind, you can change your body.
Growing up in Christian Science I saw a lot of healings, which piqued and sustained my interest in this subject. I saw people who claimed to be healed of cancer, or a guy who cut off his toe and the toe grew back. But my hope for this book is not to prove or disprove these things I saw as a child. Do placebos and the power of the mind work? What I’ve found is yes, but not with everything. There are rules and conditions in which healing can be incredibly effective. Parkinson’s, chronic pain, irritable bowel syndrome, depression, anxiety, certain types of asthma, and autoimmune deficiencies are all very placebo-responsive. But cancer is not.
Christian Science, homeopathy, or other unproven alternative medicines may make someone feel better, but when it comes to curing a life-threatening tumor, that isn’t an appropriate place to be using these methods.
At least Vance isn’t completely unreasonable. At least he attributes some limitations to placebo medicine. (Would that some others were a bit more circumspect!) He’s also not antivaccine, as we learn when he states that his kids have all their shots and how he understands how vaccines work and therefore has full faith in them. In fact, part of the problem with the placebo narrative is how it’s taken in people who believe themselves to be scientific and who are generally pretty reasonable.
Vance is, however, dead wrong about asthma being particularly placebo-responsive—and my choice of the word “dead” is intentional because placebo medicine could easily lead to the death of asthmatic patients. Indeed it’s worth expanding a bit on a point to state that one of Kaptchuk’s own studies showed just how dangerous using placebo effects in asthma is. The CliffsNotes version is that placebos made asthma patients undergoing an asthma attack feel as though they were breathing better, but the cold, hard evidence from incentive spirometry showed that their breathing function did not improve. As Peter Lipson pointed out, that’s a good way to kill a patient, because that patient could feel less short of breath even though he is on the verge of respiratory collapse.
Vance is not incorrect when he discusses how placebo effects impact Parkinson’s disease:
Parkinson’s is the perfect disease to talk about placebos. It is a chronic deficiency of dopamine, which is one of those brain chemicals that does a lot of jobs in our bodies. One of [dopamine’s] important roles is in reward processing: how we think about good things we might get in the future.
Expectation drives placebos. And dopamine is a chemical that’s very responsive to our expectations. Parkinson’s happens to be a deficiency in the very chemical that’s very important in placebo effects and rewards.
If you look at Alzheimer’s, which does not have a high placebo response, you start to see that there are rules at play when it comes to placebos. It’s not your brain magically doing all these crazy things. There are certain chemicals we have access to and others we don’t.
It is true that clinical trials of Parkinson’s disease do report significant placebo effects. For example, Dr. Christopher Goetz examined 11 clinical trials with 858 patients and found that in drug trials 0-27% of patients experienced improvement in their symptomatology, while in surgical trials the number could be as high as 42%. (More invasive placebos produce more significant placebo effects.) Overall, 16% of patients in the placebo groups of the trials experienced improvement. Of course, I would point out that most patients with a serious disease would not be particularly happy to have only a 16% chance of improving due to a treatment. Yes, there are pharmaceuticals that are that poorly effective, usually against bad diseases, but those are exactly the drugs that integrative medicine proponents often rail against—with some justification. Yet here, Vance likes an intervention that produces such a modest result.
He also doesn’t consider that even that modest result is probably illusory.
The illusion of placebo effects
One thing not mentioned here is that placebo effects can only be quantified in clinical trials, which are, by their nature, highly artificial treatment situations. We at SBM often point out that it’s incorrect to refer to “the placebo effect,” because there is not just one placebo effect. Instead, we refer to placebo effects. Much of what is lumped together as “the placebo effect” include study artifacts that have little or no bearing on real world outcomes and/or modulation of the patient’s perception of his symptoms. Indeed, there are those who question, based on evidence, whether there is even such a thing as placebo effects. For example, in 2001 Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche published an article in which they asked whether the placebo was powerless based on 214 studies with a total of 8,525 patients in which they concluded:
We found little evidence in general that placebos had powerful clinical effects. Although placebos had no significant effects on objective or binary outcomes, they had possible small benefits in studies with continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain. Outside the setting of clinical trials, there is no justification for the use of placebos.
In support of the idea that much of what passes for “placebo effects” is in reality a sum of artifacts of clinical trials, Jean Brissonnet in a French language article translated by Harriet Hall pointed out that clinical trials are different. We measure many more things—and measure them more intensively. Treatments are much more standardized. Brissonnet proposes defining the placebo effect thusly, “Observed effect = specific effect + natural course of healing + a residual effect that we will provisionally call the placebo effect.”
I’m going to steal a couple of illustrations to illustrate Brissonnet point, but do read the whole article if you want the details:
Brissonnet also notes that this “placebo effect” is made up of multiple elements:
But isn’t this new “placebo effect” in turn composed of different elements? First among these are measurement errors made during the course of the trial. There are many such potential errors depending on the type of study. The best known are the phenomenon of regression to the mean, the Hawthorne effect, the Simpson paradox, the Will Rogers phenomenon, etc. (see box, below). Others come to mind: for example, an inaccuracy in the inclusion of subjects in the trial or the fact that patients tend to seek help when their symptoms are at their peak.
If all these measuring errors are subtracted, what remains can be called the “true placebo effect,” a term proposed by Ernst (1995), to distinguish it from the “false” placebo effect as traditionally conceived (figure 3).
Graphed thusly:
When you look at placebo effects this way, they become a lot less impressive than proponents like Vance portray them. I’m not sure I’m quite ready to go as far as Mark Crislip in rejecting the idea that placebo effects are even a real thing, but I have been convinced that, if placebo effects are real apart from artifacts in clinical trial construction, measurement biases, and the like, they are quite modest at best and, in the case of alternative medicine, not worth lying to the patient.
None of this is to say that placebo effects might not be useful, because it is certainly possible that doctors can enhance the perceived effectiveness of evidence- and science-based treatment by using strategies that enhance placebo effects, in particular the doctor-patient relationship. One of my favorite studies was another Kaptchuk study that actually told us something interesting about placebos. Basically, Kaptchuk randomized patients with irritable bowel disease into three groups. Subjects in Group 1 were in the wait list control and received no intervention. Subjects in Group 2 received placebo acupuncture treatments from an acupuncturist showing no empathy. Subjects in Group 3 received the same acupuncture treatments as patients in group 2 under the same conditions and in the same room, except that the practitioners interacted with them extensively. The difference was that subjects experienced an “augmented” patient interaction (45 minutes) at the first visit in which detailed questions about their symptoms were asked, including how their IBS symptoms affected their lifestyles and relationships. The interviewers asked if subjects understood the “cause” and “meaning” of their conditions and at each visit incorporated at least five primary behaviors, including a warm, friendly manner; active listening (repeating the patient’s words and asking for clarifications); empathy; 20 seconds of thoughtful silence while feeling the patient’s pulse or contemplating a treatment plan; and communication of confidence and positive expectation. At each visit, the acupuncturist would place the placebo needles and then leave the subject in a quiet room for 20 minutes. When the practitioner came back to remove the needles, he or she also made sure to exchange some words of encouragement.
The results? At the end of six weeks, Kaptchuk observed an improvement of 28%, 44%, and 62% in groups 1, 2, and 3, respectively, concluding, “Non-specific effects can produce statistically and clinically significant outcomes and the patient-practitioner relationship is the most robust component.” Basically, what we used to call a good bedside manner matters.
Even Vance seems to realize that the trappings of medicine and the practitioner-patient relationship are very important, as he says:
I also traveled to Catemaco, a town in Vera Cruz famous for its witch doctors. I met with one of the leading witch doctors there to try and understand what we call the theater of medicine—all the trappings that go into the healing practice, like the stethoscope and white lab coat. In different cultural contexts, those things change. What was interesting in Catemaco is that many of the traditional healers have adopted the theater of modern medicine. They wear lab coats, cut their hair short, and use long words, which gives them the “flavor” of what we recognize as conventional medicine.
And:
The message for doctors is the importance of being more empathetic and taking more time. You may be throwing away 30 percent of your cure just by having a poor bedside manner. If you do, you can’t be surprised if people go looking for other means of healing. The witch doctors, traditional Chinese medicine practitioners, and homeopaths I spoke to all understand this.
Of course, the proper response to this is to point out that, yes, bedside manner matters. That’s why training physicians to be more empathetic is a far better course than to embrace witchcraft like homeopathy, acupuncture, and other forms of magic that make up much of the alternative medicine being “integrated” into medicine through integrative medicine.
The seductiveness of the placebo narrative
Paul Ingraham summed up placebo effects well:
Placebo gets more love than it deserves. I am interested in the biology and psychology of placebo, but it is not a magical mind-over-matter phenomenon, or even a good consolation prize when treatment is otherwise ineffective. Many medical problems are entirely immune to positive thinking and expectation (try treating tuberculosis with a sugar pill and see how many Nobel Prizes you pick up for that innovation). The power of belief is strictly limited and accounts for only some of what we think of as “the” placebo effect. There are no mentally-mediated healing miracles. But there is an awful lot of ideologically motivated hype about placebo…
There’s a reason for this hype, though. The placebo narrative is very seductive, as I’ve pointed out many times before, for reasons that are not hard to guess. First and foremost, it taps into a deep, longstanding aspect of humans. Specifically, the placebo narrative offers the patient—and, truth be told, the physician as well—an illusion of control. What is the reward for the physician? That’s simple. These days medicine is a collaboration between doctor and patient, and, although the doctor still holds most of the power, the patient must be involved in the decision-making process. However, part of the appeal of being a physician is actually rooted in paternalism (these days, disguised under the term “patient-centered care,” where we are the nearly all-knowing physician who does what is necessary to heal the sick and the patient simply accepts whatever we deem necessary. We don’t have to tell them everything, and they don’t expect to be told everything. There is also a very real appeal to being a “shaman-healer,” who takes care of the “whole patient” spiritually as well as physically. Being able to perceive oneself as teaching a patient to “heal himself” could thus be very tempting, and there’s a reason why anthropologists are attracted to alternative medicine.
As for patients, placebo medicine literally tells them that their mind—and therefore they—can relieve their symptoms and “heal” their bodies just by unleashing some innate power within oneself to heal the body. You don’t have to have chronic pain or a serious illness to understand how appealing such an idea is. Patients love it, for much the same way that people love The Secret. It tells you that you attract what you want to yourself and that, basically, if you only want something bad enough, including healing, the universe will provide.
It’s not for nothing that I coined the term “the central dogma of alternative medicine” and concluded that that central dogma is: Wishing makes it so. The placebo narrative fits perfectly with that and is of a piece with previous religious healing traditions in which the ill pray for healing and, if that healing comes, God did it. The main difference here is that we’re told that, instead of the universe providing through a god or spirit, the universe provides through your mind—as though the mind and the body were separate things.
The reality of course, is much more prosaic and much less “sexy,” as even Vance seems to realize. Late in the interview he notes that he’s “tried a lot of alternative medicines and haven’t stuck with any of them.” Why not? If placebo effects are so powerful, you’d think Vance would have found an alternative medicine modality that he liked enough to stick with.
He also cautions:
The message for the patient is that [alternative medicine] can be effective. But I do lay out some rules for when to do it and when not to.
One is, don’t hurt yourself. If you have a life-threatening disease, that’s not the time to play with expectations.
Don’t go broke. I’ve talked to many people who’ve spent their life’s fortune chasing after healings that were never going to happen.
The last one is, don’t harm the environment. If your placebo involves endangered animals, it might be a good idea to pick a different one.
Within those rules and within certain diseases, there’s a lot you can do. Just because it’s a placebo doesn’t mean it won’t work. This has been shown again and again in laboratories.
Except that it hasn’t “been shown again and again in laboratories” that placebos “work.” It’s still not even clear that placebo effects are anything but artifacts of clinical trials.
Placebo research can be valuable, but it has, unfortunately, been largely hijacked by integrative medicine, whose adherents want to demonstrate that alternative medicine works and that placebo medicine is efficacious and therefore worthwhile. (Would that it were true!) What placebo research has shown us is not that alternative medicine works, nor has it shown us that the brain is the body’s “pharmacy” that can be tapped at will to heal all manner of ailments. Rather, what it has done is to reinforce something known since ancient times, the importance of empathy and a trusting practitioner-patient relationship. That’s more than good enough.

The Placebo Gene?
Steven Novella on October 24, 2012
Link
A study recently published in PLOS one (Catechol-O-Methyltransferase val158met Polymorphism Predicts Placebo Effect in Irritable Bowel Syndrome) purports to have found a gene variant that correlates strongly with a placebo response in irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). The study is small and preliminary, but the results are interesting and do raise important questions about placebo responses.
Researchers are increasingly trying to tease apart the various components of “the placebo effect.” In reality we should use the term “placebo effects” as it is demonstrably multifactorial. “The placebo effect” really refers to whatever is measured in the placebo arm of a clinical trial – everything other than a physiological response to an active intervention. Within that measured response there are many potential factors that would cause an outcome from a fake treatment to be different from no treatment at all. These include statistical effects like regression to the mean and the natural course of symptoms and illness, reporting bias on the part of the subject, and a non-specific response to the therapeutic interaction with the practitioner.
It is also critical to realize that placebo responses vary greatly depending on the disease or symptom that is being treated and the outcome that is being measured. Placebo response is greatest for subjective symptoms of conditions that are known to be modified by things like mood and attention, while it is virtually non-existent for objective outcomes in pathological conditions. So there is a substantial placebo response for pain and nausea, but nothing significant for cancer survival.
In the current study researchers performed a retrospective analysis of an existing study population in which there was a no-treatment arm (waitlist control), placebo acupuncture with minimal practitioner interaction, and placebo acupuncture with enhanced emotional support (the “warm and fuzzy” arm). The study population are those with IBS, a syndrome known to have a substantial emotional component. Further, the outcome was the subjective report of symptoms from the subjects. In other words – the syndrome and outcomes were amenable to maximal placebo responses. Prior studies have consistently shown that for subjective symptoms such as this the interaction with the practitioner is the single most important factor in reporting a subjective improvement in symptoms from a placebo intervention.
In this study subjects were also genetically typed for the COMT gene – an enzyme that breaks down dopamine. The met variant of this gene is associated with decreased activity of the gene, and therefore greater availability of dopamine. The authors report:
The methionine isoform has reduced thermostability, resulting in a three to four-fold decrease in activity relative to the ancestral valine isoform. This functional polymorphism has been correlated with variations in memory function, cognition, attentional processing, affect, confirmation bias, pain processing and sensitivity.
They found:
In this study, we demonstrated that IBS patients homozygous for the COMT val158met methionine allele (met/met) were the most responsive to placebo treatment. Heterozygous (val/met) patients showed an intermediate response, and homozygous valine (val/val) patients showed essentially no placebo mediated symptom improvement.
Patients with the gene variant associated with increased dopamine activity in both alleles (copies of the gene) showed more of a placebo response, especially to the warm and fuzzy intervention. While again I have to emphasize the preliminary nature of this research, the results are plausible and do make sense. IBS is particularly susceptible to suggestion and a warm interaction with a practitioner, interventions that reduce anxiety and improve mood. Anxiety, mood, and the emotional response to pain and discomfort are all brain phenomena, and dopamine is an important brain neurotransmitter involved with emotion and reward, so it’s not surprising.
Assuming this result is reproducible, what are the implications of this finding? First, 20 out of 104 subjects had the met/met genotype – the type that responded to placebo interventions. That means for about one fifth of the population placebo responses for subjective symptoms, especially those modifiable by anxiety and mood, are likely to be significant. About 52% had an intermediate response, and another 28% had essentially no response. This fits the typical overall 30% placebo response for subjective symptoms seen in clinical trials.
There isn’t much of a downside to being caring and supportive to patients (other than the time investment) and this can enhance the patient’s sense of well-being, reduce anxiety, encourage compliance with treatment and good lifestyle choices, etc. But the effect size is perhaps only significant for a minority of patients, around 20%.
It is also unclear if this result will extrapolate to other conditions. Perhaps dopamine activity is particularly important for gastrointestinal symptoms. It remains to be seen for how many other conditions the met polymorphism will be predictive of placebo response.
None of this implies that placebo responses involve a real biological “healing” mechanism. We are still dealing with the reporting of subjective outcomes. Dopamine may even predict bias in reporting symptoms rather than what the patient experiences (similar to the association with confirmation bias found previously). We may be seeing a suggestibility effect more than anything else.
This research also brings up another interesting possibility – screening out placebo responders from clinical trials. The pharmaceutical industry in particular has been interested in the idea of finding some way to eliminate likely placebo responders from clinical trials so that the effect of the intervention (medication) would be easier to detect statistically. This could result in smaller and less expensive trials, or even detecting a positive effect that would have been obscured by placebo responders.
This study therefore raises the possibility of having a met/met genotype for the COMT gene (or other genetic typing) be an exclusionary criteria for a clinical trial. Will this increase or decrease the reliability of the study findings and its applicability to the general population?
It also raises the possibility of targeting specific therapies at those with the met/met genotype or other identified types that predict placebo responses. This kind of information could play a role in personalized medicine – targeting therapies to individual patients based upon their genetic makeup. We may be seeing a gene variant that predicts response (or lack of response) to certain kinds of psychological interventions. I wonder if such gene variants would predict response to cognitive behavioral therapy for certain conditions.
This is a good study in that it raises more questions than answers.

Are placebo effects genetically determined?
We frequently write about placebo effects here at SBM because understanding placebo effects is essential to understanding a lot of clinical trial science and, most relevant to the topics of this blog, how those promoting unscientific medicine misunderstand and misuse placebo effects to promote quackery. Last week, The NYT published an article asking if placebo effects are genetically determined. The evidence supporting this hypothesis, thus far at least, is underwhelming.
David Gorski on November 12, 2018
Link

We frequently write about placebo effects here at SBM, because they are a misunderstood phenomenon that is frequently abused by purveyors of unscientific and pseudoscientific treatments that fall under the rubric of alternative medicine, “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), or, as CAM is now more frequently called, “integrative medicine” or “integrative health.” (Note the plural, as there is no one “placebo effect”.) We’ve noted that understanding current science about placebo effects is critical to understanding science-based medicine, because misconceptions about placebo effects are rampant among even scientific and medical professionals who otherwise embrace a science-based worldview and those misconceptions make them prone to claims by practitioners of pseudoscientific medicine involving the attribution of great “healing power” to placebo effects. As our fearless leader Steve Novella has noted, the persistence of these misconceptions is due partly to the fact that false narratives about placebos, namely that “the” placebo effect (as opposed to placebo effects) is mainly an mind-over-matter effect based on expectation or even “harnessing the power of positive thinking“, is deeply embedded in our culture. This belief has started to infiltrate the belief system of even doctors who should know better, aided and abetted by recent attempts by CAM proponents to promote placebo medicine as their preferred treatments are increasingly shown to be nothing but placeboes. They are, in essence, falsely “rebranding” CAM as “harnessing the power of placebo.”
Over the last ten years of writing for SBM, I haven’t (quite) gone as far as Mark Crislip (who is missed here) to conclude that placebo effects are a myth, or, as he put it in his own inimitable way, the “beer goggles of medicine“, in which the patient’s perception is changed but nothing else. On the other hand, there is hard evidence that placebo effects can lead people with real diseases like asthma into a false sense of security. A 2011 study found that a placebo could make asthma patients feel less short of breath to nearly the same degree as a pharmacological treatment (albuterol), but that in reality nothing about their physiology had changed in response to the placebo intervention and their pulmonary function tests were still just as bad. This is the sort of false sense of security that can lead to death.
Still, doctors studying “integrative medicine” looking for evidence that ineffective treatments like acupuncture, energy medicine, homeopathy, and the like have real physiological effects can’t resist the placebo narrative because increasingly the evidence that their preferred treatments have no detectable effects above placebo is becoming harder to ignore. So the placebo narrative has evolved, just as CAM evolved into “integrative medicine” as a form of rebranding. In this new narrative, placebo effects aren’t psychological at all, but have a real physiological basis. In other words, they’re real! Of course, most skeptics have never actually said that placebo effects aren’t real, just that they probably aren’t that powerful, are likely mostly artifacts of the clinical trial process, and, most importantly, are not what CAM practitioners claim that they are and not a justification for the use of unscientific, pseudoscientific, and mystical treatments. Indeed, our argument is that, if placebo effects are more than an illusion, one should not use the deception of ineffective pills or treatments to invoke them because (1) deceiving patients is now considered unethical, a throwback to a much more paternalistic form of medicine in which lying to patients “for their own good” was considered acceptable and (2) there’s no reason why what we learn about the role of practitioner-patient interaction and placebo effects can’t be used to make science-based medicine better, more effective, and more satisfying to patients, all without deception.
So it was that I saw a long article Gary Greenberg in last week’s The New York Times Magazine entitled “What if the Placebo Effect Isn’t a Trick?”
The false premise of placebo
Regular readers probably realized right away upon reading the title of the article that it would be like waving the proverbial cape in front of a bull, particularly given the blurb for the article, “New research is zeroing in on a biochemical basis for the placebo effect — possibly opening a Pandora’s box for Western medicine”. Notice how the framing of the article is that somehow “Western medicine” is afraid of the new science being published about placeboes. I can’t help but point out right here how much I can’t stand the term “Western medicine,” which in these narratives always implies a form of medicine that is scientific, reductionist, and non-holistic compared to, of course, “Eastern medicine” or “holistic medicine” and “integrative medicine,” which are portrayed as being just the opposite. It’s an arguably racist construct that portrays “Western medicine” as scientific and “Eastern medicine” as inscrutable, mysterious, and more attuned to emotion, belief, and the whole person. Sure, there can be cultural differences in medical beliefs and how science is applied, but science has become over the last century basically universal. Medical scientists in Asia would likely beg to differ that their science is somehow inferior to “Western” medical science.
That’s just one of my pet peeves, though, and Gary Greenberg probably had had nothing to do with the title and blurb for his article. (New York Times Magazine editor, I’m talking to you.) Unfortunately, Greenberg can’t resist a very conventional reading of the placebo narrative to start his article out, starting out with a dig at Mayor Henri Lenferink of the Dutch city of Leiden, where the 300 members of the Society for Interdisciplinary Placebo Studies met, who called placebo medicine “fake medicine.” (He was probably more close to the true situation than most of the members of the Society.) Now here’s the dig:
Lenferink might not have been so glib had he attended the previous day’s meeting on the other side of town, at which two dozen of the leading lights of placebo science spent a preconference day agonizing over their reputation — as purveyors of sham medicine who prey on the desperate and, if they are lucky, fool people into feeling better — and strategizing about how to improve it. It’s an urgent subject for them, and only in part because, like all apostate professionals, they crave mainstream acceptance. More important, they are motivated by a conviction that the placebo is a powerful medical treatment that is ignored by doctors only at their patients’ expense.
Greenberg apparently doesn’t realize that these “leading lights of placebo science” have no one to blame but themselves for their reputation, given how, as we’ve documented time and time again on this blog, they have an annoying tendency to exaggerate the “power” of placebo effects. Also note the narrative of how they are “apostate professionals.” That term implies that science is a religion and that they only reason these scientists are viewed so dimly is because they have rejected the dominant religion, rather than because they have not yet produced evidence sufficiently compelling to persuade mainstream science that they’re on to something. I really, really, really detest when journalists resort to such lazy tropes about science. Science is not a religion, as tempting as it might be to portray it otherwise.
Next up, the standard “placebo narrative” as described by Steve Novella looms large:
And after a quarter-century of hard work, they have abundant evidence to prove it. Give people a sugar pill, they have shown, and those patients — especially if they have one of the chronic, stress-related conditions that register the strongest placebo effects and if the treatment is delivered by someone in whom they have confidence — will improve. Tell someone a normal milkshake is a diet beverage, and his gut will respond as if the drink were low fat. Take athletes to the top of the Alps, put them on exercise machines and hook them to an oxygen tank, and they will perform better than when they are breathing room air — even if room air is all that’s in the tank. Wake a patient from surgery and tell him you’ve done an arthroscopic repair, and his knee gets better even if all you did was knock him out and put a couple of incisions in his skin. Give a drug a fancy name, and it works better than if you don’t.
Not exactly. The first example should read: Give people a sugar pill and those patients are more likely to report that they have improved, whether they actually have improved from a physiologic perspective or not.
I will admit that some of these examples I hadn’t heard of before. (No one, not even I, can keep up with all the placebo literature all the time, particularly when I have to keep up with the surgical literature in my specialty and the research literature covering my area of research interest.) I was also rather annoyed that no links to the actual studies were included in the online version of the article. (Bad NYTM! Bad! Bad!) Seriously, this is 2018. When are newspapers going to reliably include the damned link to any study referenced in a story?
Another of my pet peeves aside, I hadn’t seen the milkshake study before. Reading the actual study, I was less impressed. In brief, on two separate occasions, participants consumed a 380-calorie milkshake under the pretense that it was either a 620-calorie “indulgent” shake or a 140-calorie “sensible” shake. Ghrelin, a gut peptide mediating the sensation of hunger, was measured via intravenous blood samples at three time points: baseline, anticipatory, and postconsumption. During the first interval participants were asked to view and rate the (misleading) label of the shake. During the second interval (between 60 and 90 minutes later) participants were asked to drink and rate the milkshake. The mindset of indulgence was reported to produce a “dramatically steeper” decline in ghrelin after consuming the shake, whereas the mindset of sensibility produced a relatively flat ghrelin response. Looking at the paper, I saw several problems. First, although the participants didn’t know that both shakes were the same, it’s not clear whether the investigators were blinded at each session. Second, the “dramatically steeper decline” is less dramatic than presented. There are no error bars on the “money graph” to show variability, and the p-value of the repeated measures effect was only 0.04. Third, the authors did some truly annoying data presentation, showing the X-axis only between 880 and 960 pg/ml, with the final values differing only by around 20 pg/ml, or around 2.2%. In other words, this was a small study with a small effect that was barely statistically significant. Quite underwhelming, and the authors barely mentioned placebo effects, although in the last paragraph they did liken their findings to them.
What about the next study, the one about the athletes and altitude training? It took some more work to find out what Greenberg was talking about, and I’m still not sure that I have the right study (damn you, NYTM, again!), but it appears to be this one testing the “live high train low” (LHTL) paradigm used for altitude training in athletes. Sixteen endurance cyclists trained for eight weeks at low altitude and then, after a two-week lead-in, athletes spent 16 hours a day for four weeks in rooms with either normal air or normobaric hypoxia corresponding to an altitude of 3,000 meters. Neither the subjects nor the scientists knew which group was “living high”. On five occasions before, during, and after the four weeks, the subjects underwent a whole series of performance and physiological tests. Basically, there was no difference between the two groups. The authors speculated that it was likely placebo effects in previous studies that suggested that (LHTL) improved performance, leading some to conclude that altitude training is little more than placebo. Again, I’m not sure I got the right study, but without a reference I can never quite be sure.
As for the others, these are conventional studies that we’ve discussed time and time again about how surgery is particularly prone to placebo effects and how higher expense and fancier names of drugs increase placebo effects. Then, unsurprisingly, Greenberg buys into the “placebo without deception” narrative:
You don’t even have to deceive the patients. You can hand a patient with irritable bowel syndrome a sugar pill, identify it as such and tell her that sugar pills are known to be effective when used as placebos, and she will get better, especially if you take the time to deliver that message with warmth and close attention.
No. Just no. Really, no. As we’ve discussed numerous times, whenever we’ve examined a study that claims to find placebo effects without deception, we have always—always!—been able to identify unacknowledged deception in the experimental design, primarily through the hyping up of “powerful placebo effects.” There is no placebo without deception, at least none that anyone has ever been able to show, no matter how much Ted Kaptchuk, who’s been a frequent topic here on this blog and is the co-star of Greenberg’s article, tries to argue otherwise.
Greenberg’s history of placebo effects is quite…odd…as well. He goes back to Franz Anton Mesmer and attributes the poor reputation of placeboes to the poor reputation of Mesmer and Mesmerism, which Mesmer ascribed to “animal magnetism” that he could use to affect patients. Basically, Mesmer seemed to be able to cure symptoms that no other doctor could, simply by manipulating “animal magnetism”. (I know, this is a simplistic portrayal of the history, but Mesmerism is not the main point of the post.) It turns out that Benjamin Franklin was in Paris at the time Mesmer was at his maximal fame and King Louis XVI was receiving complaints. Louis appointed a commission headed by Franklin to investigate:
To the Franklin commission, the question wasn’t whether Mesmer was a fraud and his patients were dupes. Everyone could be acting in good faith, but belief alone did not prove that the magnetism was at work. To settle this question, they designed a series of trials that ruled out possible causes of the observed effects other than animal magnetism. The most likely confounding variable, they thought, was some faculty of mind that made people behave as they did under Mesmer’s ministrations. To rule this out, the panel settled upon a simple method: a blindfold. Over a period of a few months, they ran a series of experiments that tested whether people experienced the effects of animal magnetism even when they couldn’t see.
And:
It was possibly the first-ever blinded experiment, and it soundly proved what scientists today call the null hypothesis: There was no causal connection between the behavior of the doctor and the response of the patients, which meant, as Franklin’s panel put it in their report, that “this agent, this fluid, has no existence.” That didn’t imply that people were pretending to twitch or cry out, or lying when they said they felt better; only that their behavior wasn’t a result of this nonexistent force. Rather, the panel wrote, “the imagination singly produces all the effects attributed to the magnetism.”
It is, of course, fascinating history, but it’s not the reason why placebo effects are so “disreputable”. Rather, it’s how throughout the last several decades promoters of unscientific medicine have been using placebo effects as a justification for how rank quackery supposedly “works.” Greenberg is, however, correct that the modern appreciation of placebo effects began in earnest in 1955 when Harvard surgeon Henry Beecher lectured about placebo effects at the meeting of the American Medical Association, leading to a new calculus in which drugs had to be tested against placebo controls in order to determine if they actually were efficacious or not.
Which brings us, of course, to Ted Kaptchuk.
“I don’t love science”
I’ll give Greenberg credit for revealing something about Ted Kaptchuk, the Harvard “scientist” who’s become the guru of placebo medicine science. Kimball Atwood wrote extensively about him early in the history of this blog in an epic multipart series (part 1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 2.3) showing how he is a believer in all manner of quackery, but especially acupuncture. He is also the foremost promoter of the “placebo without deception” narrative. In Greenberg’s piece, he comes across as only grudgingly accepting science. For example:
When Ted Kaptchuk was asked to give the opening keynote address at the conference in Leiden, he contemplated committing the gravest heresy imaginable: kicking off the inaugural gathering of the Society for Interdisciplinary Placebo Studies by declaring that there was no such thing as the placebo effect. When he broached this provocation in conversation with me not long before the conference, it became clear that his point harked directly back to Franklin: that the topic he and his colleagues studied was created by the scientific establishment, and only in order to exclude it — which means that they are always playing on hostile terrain. Science is “designed to get rid of the husks and find the kernels,” he told me. Much can be lost in the threshing — in particular, Kaptchuk sometimes worries, the rituals embedded in the doctor-patient encounter that he thinks are fundamental to the placebo effect, and that he believes embody an aspect of medicine that has disappeared as scientists and doctors pursue the course laid by Franklin’s commission. “Medical care is a moral act,” he says, in which a suffering person puts his or her fate in the hands of a trusted healer.
“I don’t love science,” Kaptchuk told me. “I want to know what heals people.” Science may not be the only way to understand illness and healing, but it is the established way. “That’s where the power is,” Kaptchuk says. That instinct is why he left his position as director of a pain clinic in 1990 to join Harvard — and it’s why he was delighted when, in 2010, he was contacted by Kathryn Hall, a molecular biologist. Here was someone with an interest in his topic who was also an expert in molecules, and who might serve as an emissary to help usher the placebo into the medical establishment.
“Science may not be the only way to understand illness and healing”? Maybe so, but it is the only established way to figure out how to diagnose illness and to determine what is and isn’t effective in treating illness. Look at the passage above, and it’s clear that Kaptchuk isn’t interested in science other than to use it the way a drunk uses a lamppost, for support rather than illumination. Just look at how bitter he is that placebo effects were supposedly “created in order to exclude” them, which is not exactly true. When placebo effects were appreciated, it became clear that if you want to know how much of an effect is due to a drug you need to take placebo effects into account. That’s a different thing.
In any event, Kaptchuk decided that he had to find molecular pathways to explain placebo effects if he ever wanted to see them taken seriously. So he teamed up with Kathryn Hall. Yet, later in the article, when Hall had seemingly found an enzyme that might impact placebo effects, he wasn’t as happy as you would expect him to be:
But Kaptchuk also has a deeper unease about Hall’s discovery. The placebo effect can’t be totally reduced to its molecules, he feels certain — and while research like Hall’s will surely enhance its credibility, he also sees a risk in playing his game on scientific turf. “Once you start measuring the placebo effect in a quantitative way,” he says, “you’re transforming it to be something other than what it is. You suck out what was previously there and turn it into science.” Reduced to its molecules, he fears, the placebo effect may become “yet another thing on the conveyor belt of routinized care.”
So what does Kaptchuk want? For placebo effects to be taken more seriously and for scientists to understand them better or not? And what is Hall’s discovery anyway. Enter catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT).
Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT): The placebo enzyme?
Before I describe what I found perusing the scientific literature, I’ll let Greenberg tell the tale of catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT), the enzyme that Hall believes is a key mediator of placebo effects:
When Hall contacted him, she seemed like a perfect addition to the team he was assembling to do just that. He even had an idea of exactly how she could help. In the course of conducting the study, Kaptchuk had taken DNA samples from subjects in hopes of finding some molecular pattern among the responses. This was an investigation tailor-made to Hall’s expertise, and she agreed to take it on. Of course, the genome is vast, and it was hard to know where to begin — until, she says, she and Kaptchuk attended a talk in which a colleague presented evidence that an enzyme called COMT affected people’s response to pain and painkillers. Levels of that enzyme, Hall already knew, were also correlated with Parkinson’s disease, depression and schizophrenia, and in clinical trials people with those conditions had shown a strong placebo response. When they heard that COMT was also correlated with pain response — another area with significant placebo effects — Hall recalls, “Ted and I looked at each other and were like: ‘That’s it! That’s it!’ ”
Notice something right away. Instead of going into this study without preconceptions, looking at potential genomic determinants of placebo response without bias, Hall and Kaptchuk had identified an enzyme that, conveniently enough, metabolizes norepinephrine, epinephrine (a.k.a. adrenaline), and dopamine. These molecules are already known to be involved with responses to stress, as well as with reward and good feeling (e.g., dopamine). COMT has also been implicated in quite a few diseases and conditions, including hypertension, preeclampsia, cardiovascular disease, psychiatric disorders, cancer, and chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS). But that’s not all. COMT can also modify clinical response to both active drugs in randomized clinical trials.
What they claim to have found is this:
It is not possible to assay levels of COMT directly in a living brain, but there is a snippet of the genome called rs4680 that governs the production of the enzyme, and that varies from one person to another: One variant predicts low levels of COMT, while another predicts high levels. When Hall analyzed the I.B.S. patients’ DNA, she found a distinct trend. Those with the high-COMT variant had the weakest placebo responses, and those with the opposite variant had the strongest. These effects were compounded by the amount of interaction each patient got: For instance, low-COMT, high-interaction patients fared best of all, but the low-COMT subjects who were placed in the no-treatment group did worse than the other genotypes in that group. They were, in other words, more sensitive to the impact of the relationship with the healer.
There are a lot of assumptions in this narrative, which, no doubt, Greenberg got straight from Kaptchuk and Hall, It’s also rather telling how, when it has something to do with something that’s not well supported by science (some would add the word “yet” here, but I’m not so sure…yet) The NYTM doesn’t insist on telling “both sides.” Greenberg’s entire narrative appears to come from primarily two sources, Kaptchuk and Hall, with no one expressing a skeptical viewpoint.
Be that as it may, let’s take a look at one of the studies by Hall and Kaptchuk that purports to show that COMT activity affects placebo effects. Basically, they took an old study in which they examined components of the placebo effect through a clinical trial in which patients were randomized into three groups: (1) no-treatment control (“waitlist”); (2) placebo acupuncture (“limited”); (3) placebo acupuncture plus a supportive patient-provider (“augmented”). We’ve written about this study before. This was actually an interesting study in that it identified the practitioner-patient relationship as the most important component of placebo effects. However, it had some issues, too. For example, Steve noted that the waitlist group showed considerable improvement on the severity scale as well and that almost 30% of the subjects reported adequate relief of symptoms—even though on average there was no significant change, further noting that this is important for understanding placebo effects because it means doing nothing but entering a study will create the appearance of benefit for about 1/3 of subjects. From my perspective, this is likely an artifact of randomized clinical trials.
But what about the new study? Out of 262 subjects in the original study, 112 gave consent for genetic screening, and a total of 10 more were excluded for various reasons, such as missing data, leaving 102 samples to be examined. Genomic DNA was extracted from whole blood and analyzed for the COMT SNP rs633. (SNP stands for single-nucleotide polymorphism and are the most common type of genetic variation among people. Each SNP represents a difference in a single DNA building block, called a nucleotide. For example, a SNP may replace the nucleotide cytosine with the nucleotide thymine in a certain stretch of DNA.) Authors were able to use this SNP to determine the presence of specific alleles in the COMT gene and reported that one allele was linearly related to placebo response as measured by changes in the IBS severity score (p = .035).
Here are the problems with this study. First, the original study didn’t show results that were that robust. Second, the authors didn’t even measure rs633 for all or even most of the subjects. Third, the correlation found in this study, although statistically significant, was not all that impressive and one has to wonder if it’s clinically significant. Indeed, I notice a similar pattern with other COMT studies, such as this one, which purports to show that genetic variation in COMT modifies effects of clonidine treatment in chronic fatigue syndrome. Examining other such studies, Hall is quoted in Greenberg’s article thusly:
…Hall argues, what’s important isn’t the direction of the effect, but rather that there is an effect, one that varies depending on genotype — and that the same gene variant also seems to determine the relative effectiveness of the drug. This outcome contradicts the logic underlying clinical trials. It suggests that placebo and drug do not involve separate processes, one psychological and the other physical, that add up to the overall effectiveness of the treatment; rather, they may both operate on the same biochemical pathway — the one governed in part by the COMT gene.
This, of course, should not be surprising if true. In fact, I’d find it surprising if molecular pathways governing drug effects didn’t have considerable overlap or crosstalk with molecular pathways governing placebo effects. This is particularly true given that COMT is involved in so many pathways influencing so many diseases.
Which brings us to…the placebome!
The magical mystical placebome
At this point, I can’t help but mention that I get annoyed at how scientists have put the suffix “-ome” after everything. It started with “genome”, which means all the genes in the cell. Now, however, we have metabolome, transcriptome, epigenome, and so many others. As they always do with any medical or scientific concept, alternative medicine practitioners have glommed on to “-omics” to the point of producing what I like to call “woo-omics.”
The problem with all these “omics” is that they are hideously complicated, with interactions of thousands of genes, proteins, and other entities that must be made sense of in order to understand what is going on. Indeed, arguably the reason we never bothered with these sorts of analyses before is that, until the last 10-20 years quite simply they were impossible. The computing power and algorithms necessary to do them simply didn’t exist and had to be developed. Neither did the technology. Then, beginning in the late 1990s, techniques were developed to measure expression profiles that included every known gene in the human genome. Building on techniques developed for the Human Genome Project and other genomics initiatives, in the early 2000s, we had cDNA microarrays, the ability to scan thousands of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and look for associations with diseases, and the like. Systems biology started to come into its own, wherein biology was studied not so much at the level of the single gene and protein but by looking at expression and activity data and constructing networks. The result of the new systems biology and “omics” has been a torrential flood of data that’s far ahead of our ability to analyze it fully.
So naturally, Hall and Kaptchuk want in on all this -omics goodness, which led to:
The discovery of this genetic correlation to placebo response set Hall off on a continuing effort to identify the biochemical ensemble she calls the placebome — the term reflecting her belief that it will one day take its place among the other important “-omes” of medical science, from the genome to the microbiome. The rs4680 gene snippet is one of a group that governs the production of COMT, and COMT is one of a number of enzymes that determine levels of catecholamines, a group of brain chemicals that includes dopamine and epinephrine. (Low COMT tends to mean higher levels of dopamine, and vice versa.)
Because of course she wanted to create a new “-ome.” And what is the placebome? This:
Hall has begun to think that the placebome will wind up essentially being a chemical pathway along which healing signals travel — and not only to the mind, as an experience of feeling better, but also to the body. This pathway may be where the brain translates the act of caring into physical healing, turning on the biological processes that relieve pain, reduce inflammation and promote health, especially in chronic and stress-related illnesses — like irritable bowel syndrome and some heart diseases. If the brain employs this same pathway in response to drugs and placebos, then of course it is possible that they might work together, like convoys of drafting trucks, to traverse the territory. But it is also possible that they will encroach on one another, that there will be traffic jams in the pathway.
Yes, maybe. But first it has to be shown that there even is such a thing as the “placebome.” That has yet to be demonstrated convincingly. What has been demonstrated is that COMT alleles can be associated with differences in drug effects and might—at best, might—be associated with more response to placebo. It’s a lot of correlation, and no evidence for causation. Desperately needed is evidence that there is a distinct pathway associated with placebo effects that justifies a new name like “placebome” and that COMT activity is more than just correlated with differences in placebo responsiveness. (Baby steps. You have to walk before you can run.)
The bottom line is that this is new, interesting science. Unfortunately, it is being used for an ideological message in promotion of what can only be called quackery. Even worse, The NYTM didn’t even show an ounce of skepticism and acknowledge that.

Mr Hyde – The Dark Side of Placebo Effect
We hear very often about the benefits of auto-suggestion (a.k.a. placebos) in medicine, but much less about their risks and harms.
Tomasz Witkowski on May 7, 2021
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[Editor’s note: Once again, limitations in WordPress force us to attribute this article solely to returning author Tomasz Witkowski, but once again, it was written and submitted by both Dr. Witkowski and his colleague Maciej Zatonski, co-authors whose books have been favorably reviewed by Harriet.
Note that this post touches and expands upon a publication readers might be familiar with, as it was discussed by Harriet in January.]When Mr A. finally reached the Emergency Department of his local hospital. “Please, please help… I swallowed all of my pills” he mumbled to the attending nurse. An empty, unlabelled medicine box dropped from his hands only seconds before he collapsed on the hospital floor. The staff immediately started the required emergency procedures. The twenty-six-year-old male appeared very pale and apathetic but was still in limited verbal contact. He managed to explain to the emergency room staff that as a clinical trial participant, he took 29 remaining tablets of an unknown experimental therapeutic investigated as a potential treatment for depression. His impulsive decision to commit suicide was soon followed by a reflection that he is not ready to die just yet. As he realised that his life might be about to end, he asked his neighbour to take him to the nearest hospital. Initial examinations revealed severe hypotension. His blood pressure was 80/40 mmHg and dropping, and his heart rate was elevated to 110 beats per minute. He was shivering and breathing rapidly. To prevent the blood pressure from falling even more, he was immediately given an intravenous infusion of 0.9% solution of sodium chloride. Over the next 4 hours, he received over 6 litres of intravenous fluids, which only partially helped to stabilise his blood pressure. The patient was still lethargic and apathetic. During the attempts to stabilise his condition, the staff has tried to learn more about the experimental treatment he was taking. It quickly turned out that he was indeed a participant of a registered clinical trial investigating new treatments for depression, however…he was in the placebo control group! In less than 15 minutes from informing Mr A about being in the placebo arm, his heart rate and blood pressure returned to normal, and he has recovered from his lethargic state. Luckily there was no permanent kidney damage caused by the administration of life-saving fluids.
Statins, sex and aspirin
Mr A’s history is one of the most famous documented examples of the nocebo effect – the evil twin of the well-known placebo effect. Placebo is derived from Latin and can be translated as I shall be pleasing. The first use of this word in the medical context most likely dates back to a book titled Mother’s New Dictionary from 1785. Placebo was used to describe a sham therapy or a sham medicine that was supposed to mimic an actual treatment. Today a placebo is a substance or treatment which is designed to have no therapeutic value. On the other hand, the placebo effect (or indeed, placebo effects) can be used to describe therapeutic outcomes that are derived from administering an inert treatment reported by people taking such placebo. The same inactive substance (placebo) can also cause quite severe negative results, as we have seen in Mr A’s case. Such a negative outcome caused by administration of an inert treatment is called a nocebo effect. The term “nocebo” means “I shall harm“. During the process of discovering and testing new medicines, the placebo and the nocebo effects occur very frequently. The nocebo is estimated to be responsible for 19-71% of all untoward adverse reactions to a medicinal product. Quite often, both of those effects cancel each other out in the data collected from the clinical trial participants. Among the subjects who received the placebo, the numbers of reported benefits are comparable to the numbers of reported adverse events due to exposure to an inert substance.
There are some terminological challenges related to reviewing both of those effects. Many authors choose to describe the negative impact of a placebo, rather than the nocebo effect. On the one hand, this could be related to a rather nonchalant use of medical terminology. On the other hand, it could be caused by the difficulty in distinguishing if the impact of a neutral substance is beneficial or harmful. For example: is a reduction in blood pressure a positive or negative consequence of administering a placebo?
For some reason, only the placebo effect has made it into the minds of the public, while the nocebo effect remains mostly unknown. Furthermore, the nocebo effect shows up for the first time in a medical context as late as 1961, due to the works of Walter Kennedy. Meanwhile, the under-appreciation of the nocebo effect allows it to continue to cause quite a bit of harm.
A particular illustration of this problem was recently highlighted in the recently published research (discussed in January by Dr. Hall) conducted at the Imperial College London. The researchers showed that the nocebo effect is largely responsible for patients’ discontinuations of their treatment with statins – a group of medicines usually prescribed to prevent heart attacks and strokes. The research was conducted at the Hammersmith Hospital in London among hospitalised patients who previously discontinued taking statins due to the perceived side effects of the treatment. Each patient received a 12-month supply of medicines in separate containers: four boxes contained statins, four contained placebos, and four were empty so the patient took no pills for those months. Patients did not know which of the containers with tablets contained statins and which contained a placebo. All participants were asked to carefully describe how they felt on each day of the year. Regardless of whether patients were taking statins or placebo, they have reported a similar number of significant adverse events. The symptoms disappeared only in the months when the trial subjects did not take any pills. Just as Mr A., they became the victims of the nocebo effect.
Statins are not the only victims of the nocebo effect. In 2002 Arthur Barsky with his colleagues demonstrated that 97% of reported allergic reactions to penicillin (often a life-saving antibiotic) can actually be attributed to the nocebo effect. Their analysis has shown that adverse effects experienced by the vast majority of patients are caused by the widespread public awareness of the possible risk of allergic reactions to penicillin. It should be noted that penicillin has one of the largest therapeutic windows among all known medicines.
The adverse reactions caused by acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) show a similar pattern. Aspirin was compared to another anticoagulant in three research centres. In two of the centres, but not in the third one, the patients were informed about the possibility of experiencing gastrointestinal disorders. The analysis of reported adverse events showed that patients warned of potential risks reported them three times more often than patients who were unaware of the danger. Objective assessment of actual damage to the digestive tract, including stomach ulcers, showed absolutely no differences between the groups.
The nocebo effect can potentially ruin the sexual life of men and their partners. Urologists from the University of Florence explored the adverse events of finasteride, often used in the treatment of enlarged prostate. Their research showed that the nocebo was responsible for a significant percentage of reported sexual dysfunctions among men treated with finasteride. The effect occurred primarily among those informed about this potential side effect, regardless if taking finasteride or placebo.
The power of information
In 2017 Science published an article reporting on the application of different topical medicines in the treatment of inflammatory skin conditions. One cream was presented in expensive-looking packaging, while the other was placed in a box deliberately designed to look cheap. None of the creams contained any therapeutic substances. Subjects were informed that their medicines can increase their pain sensitivity. It turned out that skin areas covered with placebo creams were, in fact, more sensitive to pain when compared to the untreated areas. The effect was also more pronounced with the more expensive-looking placebo, likely to being perceived as “stronger”. What is even more interesting, the reported sensations were not only subjective: MRI imaging of the subjects’ brains showed changes characteristic of other painful conditions.
The nocebo effect, just as the placebo effect, is caused by the expectations generated by acquired information. During clinical trials, patients receive information about expected positive outcomes of medicine, as well as possible side effects. In some subjects, the combination of the provided information and the administration of inert placebo can lead to positive or negative outcomes. Both the placebo and the nocebo effects are virtually impossible for physicians to predict. Doctors would require an in-depth knowledge of patients’ personalities and a record of their experiences with various treatments. The nocebo effect can be triggered by merely reading about potential side effects from the patient information leaflets included with the medicine. Some doctors even forbid their patients from reading the package inserts. Relatively frequent nocebo effects reported with statins is likely caused by their unfounded negative reputation amplified by the media. The challenge is that statins were unquestionably proven to prolong the lives of the patients who take them, yet the implied side effects often lead to poor compliance and low adherence to prescribed treatments. Patients pay the ultimate price: a significantly increased risk of heart attacks and strokes.
Suppose the nocebo effect is as frequent as the placebo effect. Why does the former remain largely unknown, while virtually everyone appears to know about the latter? The answer could be simple: the placebo effect helps to sell worthless therapies and products. Our familiarity with the placebo effect is caused mainly by marketing activities. Defenders of alternative medicine often repeat some variation of “It might be worth to try, even if this does not work! Perhaps the placebo effect will work?” They neglect to mention the opposite effect is just as likely. “Why oppose homoeopathy? Even if there is nothing in it, it will not harm anyone, and the patient might benefit from the placebo effect?” Well, shouldn’t an honest proponent of sham treatments also discuss the likelihood of the nocebo effect?
The nocebo effect is not often mentioned at all. Why would it be? After all, it does not help to sell any sham therapeutics. Information-induced adverse reactions can pose a real threat to our health or even life, especially when we consider the impact on discontinuing treatments aimed at management of genuine medical conditions. Unnecessary suffering caused by the nocebo effect, such as the decreased tolerance to pain, is an equally significant price that patients pay. The marketing use of the potential benefits of the placebo effect without informing of the impact of nocebo is at least dishonest. It is no different to selling tobacco, alcohol or other medicines without the information about the harms they may cause. There are no control measures related to the provision of information about any potential harmful effects of therapies. Media outlets are free to discuss subjective opinion statements about medicinal substances. Some treatments get an undeserved bad press that is not reflected in the available evidence. Other medicines enjoy wide public acceptance, even when their therapeutic value is hardly justifiable.
Another issue is related to the product information leaflets provided with placebos, such as homoeopathic “remedies”. Homeopathic products usually contain no active ingredients, or their concentrations are so low that it is often impossible to find a single molecule in the entire pack. Despite this, homoeopathic products are often accompanied by packaging inserts designed to create an impression that we are dealing with a real medicinal product. The manufacturers of homoeopathic products often warn about adverse events such as hypotension, breathing difficulties, dyspnoea, itchy rash, nausea, vomiting, various kinds of pain, gastrointestinal disturbances, agitation, hallucinations, even…paralysis! In 2011 sceptics from around the world “overdosed” massive amounts of homoeopathic products in a large international campaign called “Homeopathy – there is nothing in it”. From tens of thousands of volunteers, not a single one reported any of the adverse reactions that the makers of those products warned against. However, all of the volunteers were critical thinkers. They also had an in-depth knowledge of the manufacturing processes and of the actual contents of homoeopathic products. How can we guarantee that there are no patients like Mr A. among people who take such products?
Placebo instead of morphine
The conscious and deliberate prescription of placebos is often discussed by therapists and physicians. The vast majority agrees that the use of placebo is unethical. Such views are not by caused fears of the nocebo effect, nor by the conviction that placebo treatments exactly resemble selling of red-coloured water as wine. If placebos do not yield measurable results, patients can lose trust in the treatments and in the physicians who prescribe them. In some cases it can lead to learned helplessness – if nothing has helped so far, they may stop any further attempts to address their condition.
Liberal physicians do allow the use of placebo in certain situations only. For example, a hypochondriac may be harming him or herself with real medicines and refuses to stop to take them, arguing that they are helping him. Swapping potentially harmful medications with placebo seems to be justified in such cases. Similarly, during the treatment of drug addictions, the active substance may be slowly replaced by inert substance, which could have a measurably positive impact on the patients. Such an approach, however, is often discussed with the patient during the consent process. Placebo treatments are sometimes used by physicians in cases where there are no effective treatments available, and doctor’s knowledge of the patient allows them to assume that placebo might help. Such an approach is mostly used (often consensually) in the management of pain in terminally ill patients. Placebo has been shown to reduce pain just as effectively as morphine in some instances. An effective application of placebo requires significant clinical knowledge and experience. This is why placebo treatments should only be used in exceptional circumstances by trained medical staff – just like any other pharmacotherapy. Only specialist physicians should be assumed to have sufficient knowledge and judgment to assess the risk and benefit ratio of the intervention.
Another important consideration related to placebo and nocebo should be taken into account. Although both of the effects can seem impressive, they are related exclusively to subjective symptoms and conditions. They include pain, insomnia, impotence, nausea and vomiting, anxiety, mood disorders, itching, gastrointestinal problems, etc. Symptoms are not diseases, and placebos have never been shown to act against the natural course of an organic condition. Administration of placebo has never resulted in the regrowth of an amputated limb, disappearance of a tumour, remission of metastases, functional improvement in a permanently damaged kidney, or any other permanent damage in any organ, process or bodily function. Similarly, despite widespread legends of voodoo deaths, it was never proven that inert substances or practices have ever caused it.

   Dummy Medicine, Dummy Doctors, and a Dummy Degree, Part 2.2: Harvard Medical School and the Curious Case of Ted Kaptchuk, OMD (cont. again)
Kimball Atwood
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“Strong Medicine”: Ted Kaptchuk and the Powerful Placebo
At the beginning of the first edition of The Web that has no Weaver, published in 1983, author Ted Kaptchuk portended his eventual academic interest in the placebo:
A story is told in China about a peasant who had worked as a maintenance man in a newly established Western missionary hospital. When he retired to his remote home village, he took with him some hypodermic needles and lots of antibiotics. He put up a shingle, and whenever someone came to him with a fever, he injected the patient with the wonder drugs. A remarkable percentage of these people got well, despite the fact that this practitioner of Western medicine knew next to nothing about what he was doing. In the West today, much of what passes for Chinese medicine is not very different from the so-called Western medicine practiced by this Chinese peasant. Out of a complex medical system, only the bare essentials of acupuncture technique have reached the West. Patients often get well from such treatment because acupuncture, like Western antibiotics, is strong medicine.
Other than to wonder if Kaptchuk had watched too many cowboy ‘n’ Native American movies as a kid, when I first read that passage I barely blinked. Although the Chinese peasant may have occasionally treated someone infected with a bacterium susceptible to his antibiotic, most people will get well no matter what you do, because most illnesses are self-limited. Most people feel better even sooner if they think that someone with special expertise is taking care of them. If you want to call those phenomena the “placebo effect,” in the colloquial sense of the term, fine. That, I supposed, was what Kaptchuk meant by “strong medicine.”
Turns out I was mistaken. Let’s briefly follow Kaptchuk’s career path after 1983. In the 2000 edition of The Web, he wrote:
In the almost 20 years since the first edition, I have continued to learn and study. I have treated many patients and worked in many hospitals. I have come into contact with the many other health care systems. For the last ten years I have had a full-time academic appointment at Harvard Medical School (HMS). For four years I worked as a series consultant for a nine-hour British Broadcasting Company (BBC) television series on health care and I was sent to visit various healers on three continents. Currently, I am serving a term on the National Advisory Council of the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) where I have the opportunity to contribute to the evolving reconfiguration of America’s pluralistic medical environment.
Kaptchuk used his newfound academic stature to celebrate all sorts of practices in that “pluralistic environment” that had, only a few years before, been widely recognized as quackery. We’ve seen his views on “Chinese medicine”; here, he and co-author (and boss) David Eisenberg wax eloquent on chiropractic:
Treatment by a chiropractor can generate a sense of understanding and meaning, an experience of comfort, an expectation of change, and a feeling of empowerment. Chiropractic’s combination of vitalist “innate intelligence” and simple mechanical explanation can give rich vocabulary for just those illnesses conventional medicine remains poorly equipped to address.
Chiropractors never have to put a patient’s pain in the category of the “mind.” They never fail to find a problem. By rooting pain in a clear physical cause, chiropractic validates the patient’s experience.
Chiropractic is in no sense passive; it is, from the start, engaged. Except when contraindicated (as in patients with neoplastic disease and those with extreme osteoporosis), some form of therapy is almost always indicated. For most symptoms, there is a suitable manipulation or a designated mode of redress.
From the first encounter on, chiropractors generate different expectations from conventional physicians. Because conventional practitioners assume that back pain, in the absence of systemic signs, is likely to be self-limited, it is not unusual for a patient to wait weeks for an appointment with a specialist or for a radiographic diagnostic assessment. Because a chiropractor believes that back pain is both explicable and amenable to treatment, a patient can usually obtain an appointment within 24 hours of a telephone call. The message of empathy, urgency, comprehension, and support conveyed by such a rapid response is reassuring and provides a heightened sense of care and compassion.
Chiropractic’s ultimate lesson may be to reinforce the principle that the patient-physician relationship is fundamentally about words and deeds of connection and compassion. Chiropractic has managed to embody this message in the gift of the hands.
Did the authors realize that they were writing a perfect description of quackery? Apparently not: in the fashion of duplicity-by-euphemism that is standard for quackademia, they refer to the overwhelming evidence that chiropractic is a pseudoscience as “contradictions and tensions [that] exist…between chiropractic and mainstream medicine.”
At some point during the nearly 20 years between the first and second Web, Kaptchuk seems to have begun to wonder if acupuncture and other offerings of ‘various healers’ act via “enhanced placebo effects.” Well, duh. But wait: for Kaptchuk, “placebo” doesn’t mean what it means to me or Mark Crislip or even to Peter Moran or Fabrizio Benedetti. For Kaptchuk, as we’ve already seen, placebo seems to mean something similar to what it means to Daniel Moerman. Placebo is “strong medicine”—maybe even stronger than “Western” medicine. When a trial of “EDTA Chelation Therapy for Coronary Artery Disease” was proposed at a 2000 meeting of the NCCAM Advisory Council,
Dr. Kaptchuk noted that they could find the equivalent of the placebo effect at work here, but both could be more beneficial than conventional therapies…The vote was 11 in favor, none opposed, and two abstentions, so the concept passed for funding.
Thus was spawned the most dangerous, unethical, and expensive boondoggle yet wrought by that August Body, paid for by you and me (Dr. Briggs, are you reading this? Are you, Dr. Nabel?).
Placebo Power and “Power Relationships”: a Postmodern Deconstruction of the RCT
Kaptchuk’s interest in the placebo seems to have arisen from his displeasure with modern medicine’s ‘privileged’ status, which had presented a barrier to establishing himself as a ‘doctor’ back in the USA. It must have been particularly rankling to take a back seat to the despised, reductionist paradigm, with its insistence on evidence from randomized, often placebo-controlled trials (RCTs). In the 2001 HMS conference to which I alluded at the end of the previous part of this series, Kaptchuk referred to the aforementioned “well, duh” attitude as an “accusation of placebo therapy,” and to “CAM” as a “domain for methodological doubt.” He based this on his suggestion that various “CAM” treatments may have “enhanced placebo effects,” effects that are even stronger than specific biomedical treatments. “Is a placebo effect,” he asked, “only a placebo?” He explains this further in an appendix to the 2000 edition of The Web:
Until about 1955, both East Asian medicine and biomedicine shared similar explicit standards for determining the acceptability of a medical intervention: legitimacy was determined by beneficial outcome. While physicians in both traditions also spoke of medicine based on ‘proven’ or ‘recognized’ principles, and inevitably were influenced by cultural assumptions, acceptable therapy was ultimately expected to deliver relief if not cure.¹
In the years after World War II, biomedicine underwent a dramatic shift. Major reforms were undertaken in medical research that sought to free therapeutic evaluations from human judgment based on clinical experience and impressions…The apparatus of the double-blind randomized controlled trial (RCT) gradually established itself as the ‘gold standard’ for determining legitimate therapy.
A major shift had occurred. A medical intervention was now scientifically justifiable only if it was superior to a placebo: method became more important than outcome. Superiority to placebo replaced ability to confirm health benefits as judgment criteria in medicine. Ideally, an acceptable treatment was now a relative outcome that could be isolated, disguised, and compared to the entire matrix of effects embodied in an identical healing ritual lacking this single ingredient.* Healing was no longer an absolute outcome that comprised multiple interactive dimensions. Biomedicine reconceptualized legitimate healing as “a cause and effect relationship between a specific agent or treatment and a specific biological result” [citation to 1998 article titled “Powerful Placebo: the dark side of the randomised controlled trial,” Kaptchuk characterizes the RCT as “self-authenticating”:
In a self-authenticating manner, the double-blind RCT became the instrument to prove its own self-created value system. This shift from emphasizing outcomes to the purity of the means directly parallels developments in medical ethics where ‘informed consent’ replaced ‘beneficence’ as the pinnacle of the value system.
(Hmmm? He offers no support for the last assertion). In that article he also asserts, with justification, that the premise for the placebo-controlled trial, as advanced by Beecher in 1955,
…took for granted that the active drug response results partly from a placebo effect and that the placebo effect buried in the active arm is identical to the placebo effect of the dummy treatment. The placebo was a single and stable ‘power’ that behaved in a consistent manner.
Kaptchuk, with reason, disagrees with that assumption. With less reason he calls for research to “disentangle the ‘non-specific’ and ‘art-of-medicine’ aspects of healing and therapeutic evaluation.”
In a 2001 article titled “The double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled trial: gold standard or golden calf?” Kaptchuk again characterizes the RCT as “authenticating itself.” He quotes the philosopher Ian Hacking:
The truth is what we find out in such and such a way. We recognize it as truth because of how we find it out. And how do we know that the method is good? Because it gets at the truth.
In that article Kaptchuk tries to make what might seem, at first glance, a good case for the RCT not being all it’s cracked up to be. He begins with a mildly surprising statement:
Until very recently, there was a widespread perception that the absence of the usual components of the masked RCT will “exaggerate estimates of treatment effects“…It was generally believed that identical treatments “are much less likely to be judged efficacious in double-blind, randomized trials than in uncontrolled case series or unblinded, ‘open’ comparisons with contemporaneous or historical series of patients.”
Yes, but there is still that widespread perception. This “discrepancy argument,” as Kaptchuk calls it, is the basis for the RCT’s sitting atop the Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) evidence hierarchy, and if it weren’t true it would certainly throw the whole project into disarray. Kaptchuk appears to do exactly that by citing several reviews (here, here, here, here, and here, for example) that “make a compelling case that poor methodology could either overestimate or underestimate treatment effects” (emphasis added). He asserts that such findings have led to a “modified challenge to the discrepancy argument,” such that one study’s authors have argued that “research design should not be considered a rigid hierarchy.” He mentions that the editorial accompanying that and a similar study “has cast doubt on the validity of these conclusions,” without revealing the basis of that doubt; according to Kaptchuk, this shows that “The discrepancy debate has intensified.”
Reading Kaptchuk’s essay you might think, if you were unaware of the crescendo of EBM-chatter in the medical literature over the previous 10 years, that he had discovered a heretofore barely acknowledged, critical, even subversive (as he might put it) Truth about the nature of ‘evidence’ in modern medicine; a truth that would, among other things, liberate “CAM” from the ‘microfascism’ of EBM. Just at that point, however, Kaptchuk adds an afterthought:
In terms of blinding, recent comparative assessments remains [sic] consistent with the older evidence. Three studies showed that double-blind RCTs yielded significantly smaller treatment results than trials that were not double-blind. Also, three studies showed that successful concealment of randomization (compared with inadequate concealment of randomization) produces smaller treatment outcomes. Proper masking seems to create distinct outcomes; the discrepancy argument is intact in this domain.
In this domain? IN THIS DOMAIN? Excuse the yelling, but what “domain” was he talking about in the first place? In other words, after spending about 1000 words trying to convince us that “the usual components of the masked RCT” don’t do what we think they do, he off-handedly mentions that, er, the RCTs that he’d been talking about didn’t have those usual components; meaning, like, they weren’t masked. Which was exactly the point that the mysterious “accompanying editorial” had made.
The discrepancy debate has fizzled. And so, to the satisfaction of most observers, has the “self-authenticating” gambit.
Never mind: in that and other essays, Kaptchuk goes to great lengths to argue that masking, “investigator self-selection,” randomization, informed consent, and other standard research methods introduce “possible systematic errors intrinsic in even an ideal RCT” (in a term reminiscent of another current pseudoscience that closely resembles Quackademia, he dubs this process “irreducible uncertainty”). In this he is undoubtedly correct to an extent, but not to the extent that RCTs must be judged no more valid measures of efficacy than are less rigorous tests claiming larger treatment outcomes. Kaptchuk might protest that he does not explicitly make that claim, but I would respond that he certainly implies it, over and over again.
Kaptchuk is in the company of other influential academic “CAM” advocates, such as Andrew Weil, David Katz, Wayne Jonas, and Mehmet Oz, who’ve been making similar, special pleadings for years.
“The Need to Act a Little More ‘Scientific’ “
We’ve previously heard this from Kaptchuk:
When people became interested in alternative medicines, they asked me to help out at Harvard Medical School. I realized that in order to survive there, one had to become a scientist. So I became a scientist.
I won’t take Kaptchuk too much to task for the obvious faux pas in that statement, even though it is entirely consistent with everything that you’ve read above; he has cultivated a pseudo-bumbling, Columbo-like persona for the purposes of some public presentations, and he came of age during the 1960s, when it was fashionable to be utterly serious while pretending not to be (think: Bob Dylan). So it’s quite possible that he pursued science not merely to survive at Harvard Medical School, but because he hoped to learn something about nature—a ‘domain’ about which, as demonstrated by the first edition of The Web, he’d been quite naive. But did Kaptchuk become a scientist? He seems to have learned a fair amount about clinical trial design and probably a fair amount about frequentist statistical inference. Does that make someone a “scientist” these days? What about nature?
I’m doubtful. In addition to his difficulty in distinguishing science from cultural ‘narrative,’ Kaptchuk stumbles in other fundamental ways. In a 2003 article titled “Effect of interpretive bias on clinical research,” he offers this list:
Definitions of interpretation biases
Confirmation bias—evaluating evidence that supports one’s preconceptions differently from evidence that challenges these convictions
Rescue bias—discounting data by finding selective faults in the experiment
Auxiliary hypothesis bias—introducing ad hoc modifications to imply that an unanticipated finding would have been otherwise had the experimental conditions been different
Mechanism bias—being less sceptical when underlying science furnishes credibility for the data
“Time will tell” bias—the phenomenon that different scientists need different amounts of confirmatory evidence
Orintation bias—the possibility that the hypothesis itself introduces prejudices and errors and becomes a determinate of experimental outcome
Some of his discussion is perfectly reasonable; some is further conflation of science and cultural narrative; some is confusing and even contradictory; some is selective in a way that suggests an agenda:
Good science inevitably embodies a tension between the empiricism of concrete data and the rationalism of deeply held convictions. Unbiased interpretation of data is as important as performing rigorous experiments. This evaluative process is never totally objective or completely independent of scientists’ convictions or theoretical apparatus…
Well, which is it? How can unbiased interpretation be so important if it never happens?
Science demands a critical attitude, but it is difficult to know whether you have allowed for too much or too little scepticism. Also, where is the demarcation between the background necessary for making judgments (such as theoretical commitments and previous knowledge) and the scientific goal of being objective and free of preconceptions?…
Interpretation is never completely independent of a scientist’s beliefs, preconceptions, or theoretical commitments.
Again, which is it? Why propose a goal of being free of preconceptions if scientists always have preconceptions?
Evidence is more easily accepted when supported by accepted scientific mechanisms. This understandable tendency to be less sceptical when underlying science furnishes credibility can give rise to mechanism bias. Often, such scientific plausibility underlies and overlaps the other biases I’ve described. Many examples exist where with hindsight it is clear that plausibility caused systematic misinterpretation of evidence. For example, the early negative evidence for hormone replacement therapy would have undoubtedly been judged less cautiously if a biological rationale had not already created a strong expectation that oestrogens would benefit the cardiovascular system. Similarly, the rationale for antiarrhythmic drugs for myocardial infarction was so imbedded that each of three antiarrhythmic drugs had to be proved harmful individually before each trial could be terminated. And the link between Helicobacter pylori and peptic ulcer was rejected initially because the stomach was considered to be too acidic to support bacterial growth…
Let me explain. Kaptchuk is correct that unbiased interpretation can never happen, so it makes no sense for him to propose otherwise on the same page. Biased interpretation is inevitable, moreover, not merely for the mundane or mischievous reasons that Kaptchuk implies, but because it makes no sense to attempt “unbiased interpretation.” That was shown by Thomas Bayes more than 200 years ago.
Kaptchuk seems to know something about this: in the Comments section he writes, without further explanation, “the arguments presented are obviously compatible with a subjectivist or bayesian framework that formally incorporates previous beliefs in calculations of probability.” If he understands what Bayes demonstrated—that attempting to interpret the results of an experiment without regard to previous knowledge is logically incoherent—he withholds it from his readers, whom he has nevertheless presumed to be largely naive.
My view: if he understood the point when he wrote his treatise, he was dishonest in not explaining it and in not citing at least one pertinent article, such as Steven Goodman’s (which I’m willing to bet he had read). If he didn’t understand the point he should have withheld his paper.
Kaptchuk’s portrayal of interpretive bias being based on “beliefs, preconceptions, or theoretical commitments” implies that such bias is more about cultural assumptions and “power relationships” than about science. That, I believe, is his agenda: to suggest that such ‘commitments’ are likely to ‘privilege’ the status quo and to distract from the truth, thus casting enough doubt on the entire project to give at least a tentative free pass to, well, almost anything.
The reality of science is somewhat different: While it is undoubtedly true that an individual scientist’s biases often reflect personal wishes (not so much cultural assumptions), many of the biases of scientists are not only inevitable, but desirable. Kaptchuk’s discussion of “mechanism bias” is notable for its selection of examples that serve only to condemn such bias. A different sort of example would demonstrate an important truth about science, a truth that Kaptchuk either doesn’t understand or would prefer to conceal from his readers.
Such an example would be a ‘positive’ trial of a claim that, if deemed valid, would require discarding a firmly established principle of nature, such as the 2nd law of thermodynamics—a principle that is not merely a preconception or a “theoretical commitment,” but a fact based on data vastly more rigorous and voluminous than the entire body of biomedical literature. In such a case, not to invoke plausibility would (and has, many times) “cause systematic misinterpretation of evidence.”
The inverse of what Kaptchuk calls “this understandable tendency to be less sceptical when underlying science furnishes credibility” is “this understandable tendency to be more sceptical when underlying science furnishes no credibility,” which I would call “good science.” Does Kaptchuk even have a sense of what to look for in a hypothesis? Simplicity, conservatism, fruitfulness, and scope, for example?
Kaptchuk seems to believe his own hype: “method” is more important than science itself. I don’t think that he appreciates, or at least acknowledges, some of the fundamental aspects of science. I also suspect that he isn’t forthcoming about some of the things that he does know, if they don’t suit his agenda.
To be fair, I’ll report that Kaptchuk specifically denies, in the final paragraph of his “interpretive bias” paper, one of the accusations that I’ve made against him:
I do not mean to reduce science to a naive relativism or argue that all claims to knowledge are to be judged equally valid because of potential subjectivity in science. Recognition of an interpretative process does not contradict the fact that the pressure of additional unambiguous evidence acts as a self regulating mechanism that eventually corrects systematic error.
I can’t help but be reminded of another of Kaptchuk’s articles, quoted here a couple of years ago. Its abstract:
The advent of scientific research on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) has contributed to the current state of flux regarding the distinction between biomedicine and CAM. CAM research scientists play a unique role in reconfiguring this boundary by virtue of their training in biomedical sciences on the one hand and knowledge of CAM on the other. This study uses qualitative interviews to explore how CAM researchers perceive and negotiate challenges inherent in their work. Our analysis considers eight NIH-funded CAM researchers’: (1) personal engagement with CAM, (2) social reactions towards perceived suspiciousness of research colleagues and (3) strategic methodological efforts to counteract perceived biases encountered during the peer review process. In response to peer suspicion, interviews showed CAM researchers adjusting their self-presentation style, highlighting their proximity to science, and carefully ‘self-censoring’ or reframing their unconventional beliefs. Because of what was experienced as peer reviewer bias, interviews showed CAM researchers making conciliatory efforts to adopt heightened methodological stringency. As CAM researchers navigate a broadening of biomedicine’s boundaries, while still needing to maintain the identity and research methods of a biomedical scientist, this article explores the constant pressure on CAM researchers to appear and act a little more ‘scientific’.
Placebo Research: a Critical Positive Impact on Health Care?
What about Kaptchuk having mostly (not entirely) abandoned his advocacy of the purported specific effects of highly implausible medical claims, in the last decade or so, in order to pursue his interest in their non-specific effects? Well, perhaps that has separated him from the rest of the quackpack, to an extent, and for that, some observers feel he deserves credit (Peter?). On the other hand he is no Fabrizio Benedetti, who can call quackery “quackery,” who insists that real, neurobiological placebo effects can’t be studied in clinical trials, not only because of regression to the mean and spontaneous remission, but because of biases introduced by both investigators and subjects (as was likely the case in Kaptchuk’s albuterol vs placebo for asthma trial that triggered this series), and who recognizes that any potential clinical applications beyond the obvious “caring for the patient” are apt to be elusive:
I use the placebo response as a model to understand how our brain works. I am not sure that in the future it will have a clinical application. This is a very important point—a translational research: can we use placebo in routine clinical practice? Well, sometimes it works; but that’s not the important problem. The important thing right now is to understand how our brain works. And I would say the placebo response is a fascinating phenomenon, because it is a sort of melting pot of concepts, of ideas for neuroscience. So, if you use a placebo response, you can understand a lot of brain functions, like anxiety, like social learning, classical conditioning, reward mechanisms, and so forth. So, the clinical application is—I think in English you say it is a ‘different kettle of fish.’
Kaptchuk, on the other hand, in keeping with his belief that the placebo is ‘strong medicine,’ argues that
Learning how to enhance medical outcomes via placebo research could have a critical positive impact on health care and scientific knowledge.
It takes only a bit of perspective to realize that learning how to enhance medical outcomes via placebo research, questionable in itself, is unlikely to have more than a minor impact on health care. That perspective consists of the state of health anywhere in the world prior to the advent of scientific medicine and public health. Kaptchuk, who cut his teeth on “Traditional Chinese Medicine,” might review, in William H. McNeill’s Plagues and Peoples, the appendix titled “Epidemics in China” (part of it can be found here). Does Kaptchuk really believe, or expect the occasional sophisticated reader of The Web to believe, that “biomedicine was adopted by Asian and African countries most often not because of medical outcomes but because of the prestige associated with the other developments of science”?
On Contradiction
For a preview of the final posting in this series, consider these statements:
In clinical practice a sham medical procedure would be fraudulent and deplorable; in research such activities can be legitimate, and this outlying research practice underscores the important ethical differences between clinical trials and medical care.
—Miller and Kaptchuk, “Sham procedures and the ethics of clinical trials“
…both traditional and sham acupuncture were shown to provide clinically significant improvement in back pain and function, as compared with either no treatment or usual medical care, suggesting that the benefit from acupuncture probably derives from the placebo effect. Although this alternative standard for evidence-based validation deserves critical scrutiny and serious debate, we believe that it reflects a more patient-centered perspective for symptomatic treatment. Patients who have continuing pain are interested in pain relief; they are unlikely to care whether this derives from the inherent ability of a treatment to modify pathophysiology or its propensity to promote a significant placebo response.
—Miller and Kaptchuk, letter to the New England Journal of Medicine following the report discussed here, here, and here.

Are Placebos Getting Stronger?
Steven Novella on October 21, 2015
Link

A new study looked at clinical trials for neuropathic pain over the last 23 years and found that the response of subjects in the placebo group has been increasing over time, but only in the United States. The cause of this increase is unknown, and has provoked a fascinating discussion about the nature of placebos and their role in medical research.
What is the placebo effect?
We have discussed the placebo response at length here at SBM because the concept is critical to understanding clinical science, and it is largely misunderstood. Most often it is presented as a mind-over-matter response to the expectation of benefit. Proponents of worthless treatments often hype the placebo response as if it can have real healing power, when the evidence shows it does not.
In reality, there are a large number of placebo effects and the phenomenon is quite complex. In clinical trials “the placebo effect” is whatever happens in the placebo group of the study, the group receiving an inactive treatment. This is not one effect, however, but a complex combination of many effects.
These placebo effects include the non-specific effects of participating in a clinical trial, regression to the mean, reporting bias, improved mood from the hope of being treated and getting attention from a practitioner, researcher bias, and other effects. Placebo responses vary by the outcome being measured. In general pain and other subjective outcomes have a larger placebo response than objective hard outcomes.
The evidence suggests that placebo effects are mostly an illusion of doing clinical trials. They are artifacts, not real healing effects. Any real placebo benefits are due to such things as taking better care of yourself and being more compliant with your treatments in general because you are being watched in a clinical trial.
Placebos “getting stronger”
What the current research shows is that the size of the response in the placebo arm of US clinical trials looking at drugs to treat neuropathic pain has increased steadily over the last 23 years (1990 to 2013). This has reduced the margin of benefit for the active drugs, essentially making it more difficult to demonstrate a statistical benefit.
The data is fairly clear. The only real question is what is causing this trend. Here even the authors of the article disagree. The hypotheses seem to fall into two main categories – Americans are having a greater psychological response to placebos, or the way that clinical trials are being conducted is resulting in a greater placebo artifact. I tend to find the latter explanations more compelling.
One cultural factor that has been suggested is that drug advertising has subtly made Americans have higher expectations in the effectiveness of drugs overall. This seems like a bit of a stretch.
I could not find any specific study addressing this question, but there are a number of studies looking at public attitudes toward direct-to-consumer drug advertising. One survey found that advertising does affect consumer preference for a branded drug, but that consumers do not feel the advertised drug is superior to another option offered by their physician. This would seem to undercut the above hypothesis, but again this should be considered an open question.
Other speculations focus on the trials themselves. The authors did find that clinical trials in pain have been getting bigger and longer over the study period, and that the size of the study is associated with a larger placebo response. This could just be due to the fact that both trends were occurring over the study period, without the one causing the other.
If the change in the size of the placebo response is due to the way clinical trials are designed, is this a good thing or a bad thing? In other words, are trials showing less of a difference between treatment and placebo because they are getting better (implying that older studies were more false positive) or because they are getting worse (newer studies are more false negative)? This is a critical question.
One possibility that has been raised is that often pharmaceutical companies turn over the running of their clinical trials to private companies. These companies are motivated to recruit large numbers of subjects. This may motivate them to fudge the inclusion criteria by encouraging prospective subjects to exaggerate their symptoms. The exaggeration would then go away once they are in the trial, resulting in an apparent treatment effect. This would affect both the treatment and placebo arms of the study, but would statistically obscure the treatment effect (which would be proportionally smaller).
The way subjects are being treated in trials is also changing over time. They are getting more attention, perhaps more encouragement, and their overall experience in the trial is better. All of these things would magnify their placebo response to the experience.
How to fix it?
It is difficult to know how to fix the problem of growing placebo responses obscuring treatment effects without knowing the cause(s) (and even if it’s a problem). Reducing possible artifacts, however, is generally a good idea and might fix the problem (and provide evidence for the cause(s)).
For example, subjects in a clinical trial could be given more balanced information about what to expect. They could be given, for example, statistically accurate information about the chance of getting the drug vs placebo, the probability that the drug works and the percentage of subjects for whom drugs typically work. This would shift subject expectations. It may also hamper recruitment, but recruitment number does not seem to be an issue.
Steps could be taken also to make it more difficult for recruiters to fudge inclusion criteria. Perhaps they are not told what the criteria are, only what information to gather. Then a centralized unit will review the data and determine if the criteria are met. Careful attention can also be paid to inclusion criteria, to make them as objective as possible.
Another approach already being used is to have a placebo lead-in period. In this study design all subjects are given a placebo prior to randomization, and those that have a placebo response are then statistically excluded from the primary outcome. Those who did not have a significant placebo response are randomized to treatment vs placebo. The effectiveness of this approach has yet to be determined, with results so far being mixed.
Conclusion: Tuttle et al. raises more questions than it answers
The new study provokes more questions than it answers, which is the sign of a good study. It is yet more evidence that placebo effects are complicated and are largely due to artifacts in the way clinical trials are designed and executed.
The technology of clinical trials is getting more sophisticated, and this is yet one more factor that needs to be taken into consideration. It is potentially a huge problem, as hundreds of millions of dollars of development costs can be wasted if clinical trials are coming up false negative because of a subtle flaw in their execution.
Another lesson to derive from this controversy is how difficult it is to determine if a treatment works. This is precisely why anecdotal evidence is mostly worthless, and cannot be used as definitive evidence of efficacy. Even under careful scientific conditions it is difficult to tease out all the various placebo effects. It is virtually impossible in anecdotal conditions.

Should placebos be used in randomized controlled trials of surgical interventions?
Trials of new experimental drugs frequently compare them to placebo, particularly when there is a large subjective component to the disease being treated, such as pain. In contrast, placebo-controlled trials are rarely undertaken in surgery, mainly because it’s been considered ethically dicey to do sham surgery on one group. Should this change? Should we be more open to doing randomized, placebo-controlled surgery trials, complete with sham surgery?
David Gorski on May 25, 2015
Link

Alone of all the regular contributors to this blog, I am a surgeon. Specifically, I’m a surgical oncologist specializing in breast cancer surgery, which makes me one of those hyper-specialized docs that are sometimes mocked as not being “real” doctors. Of course, the road to my current practice and research focus was long and involved quite a few years doing general surgery, so it is not as though I am unfamiliar with a wide variety of surgical procedures. Heck, I’m sure I could do an old-fashioned appendectomy, bowel resection, or cholecystectomy if I had to. Just don’t ask me to use the da Vinci robot or, with the exception of the case of a cholecystectomy, a laparoscope, although, given the popularity of robotic surgery, I sometimes joke that I really, really need to figure out how to do breast surgery with the robot. After all, if plastic surgeons are using it for breast reconstruction, surely the cancer surgeon should get in on the action.
I keed. I keed.
Clinical trials of surgical procedures and placebo controls
I have, however, from time to time addressed the issue of science-based surgery, and this weekend seems like as good a time to do so again, given that I just came across an article in the BMJ reporting a systematic review of the use of placebos in surgical trials. It’s a year old, but worth discussing. Before I get to discussing the nitty-gritty of this particular trial, let me just note that the evaluation of surgical procedures for efficacy and safety tends to be more difficult to accomplish than it is for medications, mainly because it’s much harder to do the gold standard clinical trial for surgical procedures, the double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trial. The two most problematic aspects of designing such an RCT in surgery, as you might imagine, are the blinding, particularly if it’s a trial of a surgical procedure versus no surgical procedure, and persuading patients to agree. I’ll deal with the latter first, because I have direct personal experience with it.
Way, way back in the Stone Age of my career (around 15 years ago), there was a surgical trial going on known as the NSABP-B32 trial. This was a trial designed to test whether a procedure called sentinel lymph node (SLN) biopsy in breast cancer, which involves using dye (either radioactive or blue or both) to identify the lymph node(s) under the arm most likely to contain cancer. The idea was to determine if a patient had positive lymph nodes without doing the old standard of care, removing all the axillary lymph nodes, a procedure with a high risk of lymphedema (arm swelling due to interruption of lymphatic drainage) and other problems that made evaluating the lymph nodes more complication-prone than the surgical excision of the actual breast cancer. The problem was that we didn’t know how accurate SLN biopsy was or how often it misclassified a woman with node-positive disease as node-negative. So a trial was undertaken in which women were randomized either to (1) SLN biopsy followed by axillary lymph node dissection (removal of all the axillary lymph nodes to compare the results of the SLN biopsy) or (2) SLN biopsy alone, with an axillary lymph node dissection only if the SLN was positive for cancer. The results ultimately demonstrated that overall survival, disease-free survival, and regional control (control of the disease in the axilla) were the same in all groups, and SLN biopsy became the new standard of care in women with early stage, clinically node negative breast cancer, replacing axillary lymph node dissection.
Here’s the issue. Persuading women to be randomized was difficult. Very difficult. Most wanted the newer and less-invasive procedure, the SLN biopsy, because they feared the complication of lymphedema that axillary lymph node dissection produced. A few were risk-averse and not willing to be randomized if they might get just the “new” procedure (at the time, the SLN biopsy). And this was with a trial that had no placebo (i.e., “sham” surgery) arm and was not blinded. Of course, the B-32 trial didn’t need to be blinded because we were examining “hard” outcomes: overall survival (the “hardest” endpoint of all), disease-free survival, and recurrence in the axilla. What about trials that are not examining endpoints like this? I’ve discussed one such example before, vertebroplasty for vertebral fractures resulting from osteoporosis. Vertebroplasty, a widely used procedure to reduce pain from these fractures, basically involves injecting glue into the fracture to stabilize it. Because it wasn’t a full surgical procedure and only involved injecting glue (or not injecting glue), the two vertebroplasty trials I discussed were relatively easy to blind compared to trials of more invasive surgical procedures, and the vertebroplasty trials ultimately showed that “real” vertebroplasty is no better than placebo vertebroplasty.
Then there are the ethical and practical issues as well. For instance, in the case of a surgical procedure involving more extensive rearrangement of anatomy (as I like to put it), a blinded trial would require that at least an incision be made on the patient identical to that of the surgery, but that nothing be done. This presents an ethical dilemma, since clinical trials rely on the principle of clinical equipoise (not knowing which treatment is better or whether the treatment being tested is better than no treatment) and beneficence, which means that risk must be minimized for clinical trial subjects. Indeed, clinical equipoise is often in conflict with scientific rigor in clinical trial design. Also, from a practical standpoint, in a placebo-controlled surgical trial, the surgeons would know which subjects were in each group, which leads to the question of whether the doctors taking care of the patient postoperatively would have to be different than the ones doing the surgery. Still, as the example of the vertebroplasty trials shows, for surgical procedures designed to relieve pain or other symptoms with subjective components, it’s important to include placebo controls in clinical trials.
This latest systematic review just emphasizes this even more. This is particularly true given how prone surgeons are to adopt new procedures before they have been adequately tested, as the example of laparoscopic cholecystectomy demonstrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the widespread adoption of robotic surgery for various conditions does today. (I’m sure that by saying that I’ll tick off a surgeon who swears by robotic surgery, but I don’t care.) Unfortunately, placebo-controlled trials of surgery for such conditions remain relatively rare.
The need for more placebo-controlled trials of surgery
The systematic review that spurred this post was conducted by a group that included mainly researchers from the UK (University of Oxford, the University of Southhampton, and the National Institute of Health Research), but also a researcher from the Harvard Stem Cell Institute. The authors first note:
In considering any scientific evaluation, it is important to remember that an outcome of a surgical treatment is a cumulative effect of the three main elements: critical surgical element, placebo effects, and non-specific effects. The critical or crucial surgical element is the component of the surgical procedure that is believed to provide the therapeutic effect and is distinct from aspects of the procedures that are diagnostic or required to access the disease being treated. The placebo effects are related to the patients’ expectation and the “meaning of surgery,” whereas the non-specific effects are caused by fluctuations in symptoms, the clinical course of the disease, regression to the mean, report bias, and consequences of taking part in the trial, including interaction with the surgeons, nurses, and medical staff. It is reasonable to assume that surgery is associated with a placebo effect. Firstly, because invasive procedures have a stronger placebo effect than non-invasive ones and, secondly, because a confident diagnosis and a decisive approach to treatment, typical for surgery, usually results in a strong placebo effect.
I’ve discussed the necessity of a surgeon projecting a “decisive” and confident air to patients before and the elements of placebo effects. In any case, it does appear to be true that the more invasive the treatment, the stronger the placebo effects, which would appear to make consideration of these nonspecific effects even more important in surgery than in medical interventions. Indeed, given that surgical procedures and associated devices tend not to be as strictly regulated as drugs (in fact, surgical procedures themselves are scarcely regulated at all other than by the professional societies encompassing the relevant surgical specialties), rigorous surgical trials are critical, but unfortunately they are uncommon, as noted by the authors:
Placebo controlled randomised clinical trials of surgical interventions are relatively uncommon. Studies published so far have often led to fierce debates on the ethics, feasibility, and role of placebo in surgery. One reason for the poor uptake is that many surgeons, as well as ethicists, have voiced concerns about the safety of patients in the placebo group. Many of the concerns are based on personal opinion, with little supporting evidence. In the absence of any comprehensive information on the use of placebo controls in surgery, and the lack of evidence for harm or benefit of incorporating a placebo intervention, a systematic review of placebo use in surgical trials is warranted.
So the authors performed their systematic review. They defined surgical trials as trials testing an interventional procedure that changes the anatomy and requires a skin incision or use of endoscopic techniques. Placebo was defined as a sham surgery or imitation procedure intended to mimic the active intervention in a manner such that the patient could not tell the difference, which generally required that the patients be sedated or under general anesthesia. Examples include inserting an endoscope but doing nothing or making a skin incision. Relevant studies were identified through a search of Medline, Embase, and the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, followed by independent screening by three of the investigators for the eligibility of each trial to be included. The references were also screened to identify any recently completed or ongoing studies. Duplicates were handled by only examining the publication that reported the main outcome for the trial.
Here is the summary for the selection process:

Overall, 39 of the 53 (74%) included studies were published after 2000. One aspect of these trials is that most of them investigated relatively minor conditions that were not directly life-threatening, such as gastro-esophageal reflux (n=6; 11%). Indeed, nearly half (43%) of the included studies were trials involving endoscopy as part of the investigated procedure. Thirteen trials (25%) used some exogenous material, implant, or tissue, and a further six used balloons. Also:
Most studies reported subjective outcomes such as pain (n=13; 25%), improvement in symptoms or function (n=17; 32%), or quality of life (n=8; 15%). Less than half of the trials (n=22; 42%) reported an objective primary outcome—that is, measures that did not depend on judgment of patients or assessors. The majority of trials were small; the number of randomised participants ranged between 10 and 298, with a median of 60. No placebo controlled surgical trials investigating more invasive surgical procedures such as laparotomy, thoracotomy, craniotomy, or extensive tissue dissection were identified.
So right there we see a bias in the study towards less invasive procedures. This is not surprising, given that it is likely less ethically problematic to propose, for instance, sticking an endoscope into the rectum or stomach of a subject in the placebo-control group and looking around while doing nothing than it is to propose doing a non-therapeutic thoracotomy or laparotomy on a control subject. Be that as it may, it is useful to reference here one of the most famous surgical trials of all that utilized sham surgery, arguably the first that ever did, a randomized clinical trial of internal mammary artery ligation for angina performed in the 1950s. Beginning in the 1930s and continuing until this study, angina pectoris was sometimes treated with a surgical procedure known as mammary artery ligation. The idea was that tying off these arteries would divert more blood to the heart. The operation became popular on the basis of relatively small, uncontrolled case series. Then, two randomized, sham surgery-controlled clinical trials were published in 1959 and 1960. Both of these trials showed no difference between bilateral internal mammary artery ligation and sham surgery. Very rapidly, surgeons stopped doing this operation. More recently, a randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled trial of arthroscopic partial meniscectomy showed the same thing: Arthroscopic repair for a degenerative tear of the medial meniscus produced results indistinguishable from sham surgery. Only time will tell whether this procedure is abandoned.
So what did this review find? First, as one would expect, the authors noted that in 39 of 53 (74%) of the trials, there was improvement in the placebo arm. No surprise there. In 27 (51%) of the trials, there was no difference between the sham surgery and real surgery arms. In the remaining 26 (49%) of the trials, the authors reported that “surgery was superior to placebo but the magnitude of the effect of the surgical intervention over that of the placebo was generally small.” Overall, in 43% of the trials, the authors stated that there were no serious adverse events, although one trial didn’t report anything about adverse events. In the remaining 27 (51%) of trials, serious adverse events occurred in at least one study arm. They also noted that serious adverse events were reported in the placebo arm in 18 trials (34%) but that in many of these studies the adverse events were associated with the severity of the condition rather than the intervention itself, such as rebleeding after an attempt to stop bleeding using endoscopy, which happened in both treatment and placebo groups.
One key weakness of the study is that the chosen existing studies did not allow assessment of the magnitude of placebo effects, as only one study included an observational, “no treatment” group. The authors specifically did not include studies with wait list controls, for reasons that I find unclear. The authors state that “analysis of the placebo effect without controlling for non-specific effects of being in the trial would be flawed,” but that could be said about any analysis seeking to estimate the magnitude of placebo effects. You go with what you have, and for some reason these investigators chose not to, citing two Ted Kaptchuk papers as justification. (Yes, this Ted Kaptchuk.) I wish they had included such trials, even if the analysis ended up being somewhat “flawed.”
The authors note, as I have noted before, that the record of how physicians react to negative RCTs is mixed. (I myself have discussed this issue before.) This is how they put it:
The results of the placebo controlled surgical trials performed so far have had a varied impact on clinical care. With the exception of the trials on debridement for osteoarthritis or internal mammary artery ligation for angina, most of the trials did not result in a major change in practice. Moseley’s study on debridement for knee osteoarthritis was well received and resulted in limiting the recommendations for debridement and lavage for osteoarthritis of the knee to patients only with clear mechanical symptoms such as locking. The reaction of the medical community to the trials on tissue transplantation to treat Parkinson’s disease was also favourable. Although this treatment is not currently recommended, the need for more studies on mechanisms of disease and on tissue transplantation is recognised. These studies also provoked a discussion about ethical aspects of randomised clinical trials and placebo.
In contrast, the results of the trials on the efficacy of vertebroplasty were challenged and their authors were criticised for undermining the evidence supporting this commonly used procedure. The critics acknowledged that the injection of cement might be associated with many side effects, some of them potentially dangerous, but they argued that the treatment was justified because earlier unblinded trials had shown superiority of vertebroplasty over medical treatment. This argument against the validity of placebo controlled trials neglected any potential placebo effect of vertebroplasty.
It’s true, too. Just last fall, I noted that, five years after the resoundingly negative randomized, double-blinded clinical trials of vertebroplasty for osteoporotic vertebral fractures and nearly ten years after earlier trials suggesting that vertebroplasty does no better than placebo for such fractures, those with a vested interest in performing vertebroplasty continue to attack the studies their investigators. Indeed, I pointed out that, even though use of this procedure has decreased in the wake of negative RCTs and ultimately recommendations against it by the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, it hasn’t gone away by any means. I also pointed out how arguments for the procedure by certain radiologists were scientifically dubious and uncomfortably close to the sorts of arguments used by practitioners of “complementary and alternative medicine” who justify use of their modalities because they provoke placebo effects.
The authors conclude with a powerful argument in favor of more sham-controlled randomized trials of surgical procedures, arguing that they are as important in surgery as they are in medicine:
Placebo controlled trials in surgery are as important as they are in medicine, and they are justified in the same way. They are powerful, feasible way of showing the efficacy of surgical procedures. They are necessary to protect the welfare of present and future patients as well as to conduct proper cost effectiveness analyses. Only then may publicly funded surgical interventions be distributed fairly and justly. Without such studies ineffective treatment may continue unchallenged.
As surgery is inherently associated with some risk, it is important that the surgical treatment is truly effective and that the benefits outweigh the risks. Placebo controlled surgical trials are not free from adverse events but risks are generally minimal in well-designed trials and the control arm is much safer than the active treatment. However, this review highlighted the need for better reporting of trials, including serious adverse events and their relation to a particular element of surgical procedure.
A need exists to “demystify” and extend the use of the surgical placebo in clinical trials. These should result in a greater acceptance of this type of trial by the surgical community, ethics committees, funding bodies, and patients. In turn, this would lead to more studies, better guidelines on the design and reporting of studies, and a larger body of evidence about efficacy and the risks of surgical interventions. Placebo controlled surgical trials are highly informative and should be considered for selected procedures.
There is no doubt that carrying out randomized, sham-controlled clinical trials of surgical procedures presents challenges greater than the already formidable challenges of doing such trials in medicine. Neither is there any doubt that there will be a lot of procedures and interventions for which carrying out a sham-controlled RCT will be problematic from a standpoint of ethics and/or practicality. For these interventions, we will continue to have to rely on a combination of unblinded randomized trials and/or observational data. However, this review presents a conclusion that should not be a surprise to any surgeon: That there are a lot of procedures out there for which the evidence base is weak and that might not even do better than sham surgery. The only way to correct that is to carry out sham-controlled blinded randomized clinical trials whenever there is doubt for as many surgical procedures as is feasible. Then we surgeons have to pay attention to the results and act upon them.
And there are quite a few surgical interventions that could use this approach.

The use of placebo controls in clinical trials
Why the value of placebo controls is not an affirmation of a powerful placebo effect
David Weinberg on March 20, 2025
Link
Placebo controls are a mainstay of clinical research in medicine. They are one of the features imparting gold standard status to the iconic “randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial.” This is surely a recognition of the potency of the placebo effect. Why else would designers of clinical trials be obsessed with placebo controls? In this article, I hope to explain why the value of placebo controls is not an affirmation of a powerful placebo effect.
The primary value of placebo controls in clinical trials is the minimization of bias.
The Rise and Fall of the Placebo Effect
A placebo is an intervention intentionally devised to be devoid of relevant physiologic effects. The apparent over-performance of placebo groups in some studies created the impression of a potent therapeutic effect from these intentionally impotent interventions. This apparent response to an inert intervention has been labelled the “placebo effect” and granted a reputation as a mysterious phenomenon with great scope and power.
More careful studies, and more critical analysis have taken much of the mystery and potency out of the placebo effect. A variety of biases and statistical artifacts can conspire to create the illusion of a response to the placebo. When carefully controlling for these variables, the placebo effect virtually disappears for objective measures. Objective measures are variables that the investigator can measure, such as survival, blood sugar, and temperature. Responses that are reported by the study participants like pain and anxiety are vulnerable to influences that are hard to measure. Subjective responses like these remain the last hiding place for the placebo effect.  The neutering and demystification of the powerful placebo narrative has been a frequent subject on SBM, as discussed by Dr Novella and by Dr Gorski in a refutation of a NY Times editorial.   
Placebos and clinical trials
Not every research question in medicine is appropriate for a placebo-controlled trial. Such a design may be impossible, impractical, or unethical for certain questions. But when it can be included in the design of a trial, it contributes valuable protection against bias in the conduct of the study. For the remainder of the discussion I will stick to the best-use example of placebo-controlled studies: investigating the safety and efficacy of an experimental medication.
If so-called placebo effects do not influence an outcome we need to measure, why bother with a placebo control in a clinical trial? Let’s break down the components of a randomized, double blind, placebo controlled clinical trial and explain how design features individually and collectively protect against bias.
A few words about bias
Bias in clinical trials may be described as systematic errors that encourage one outcome over others. The potential effect of bias is that investigators will come to the wrong conclusions about the beneficial and harmful effects of interventions. Several mechanisms may bias clinical trials, affecting the estimated intervention effects.
Bias is the enemy of sound research. It can never be eliminated completely, but good researchers understand potential sources of bias, neutralize them to the extent possible, and acknowledge other potential sources in their analysis and reporting of data.
Different biases can contaminate the results in different ways. In one situation biases could simulate or exaggerate a therapeutic effect. In another situation biases could minimize or hide a therapeutic effect. Assessment of the harmful effects of a treatment are also highly sensitive to bias.
Mitigation of bias in randomized, double-blind, 
placebo-controlled trials
The value of a control group
We want to test the effectiveness of our new drug, humbly called “Panacea” for condition X. We find 1000 patients with condition X and treat them with Panacea. At the end of the study our measurements of condition X are unchanged. Can we conclude that Panacea is ineffective for condition X? Maybe not. If condition X is a relentlessly progressive condition, something like amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), no change of condition X might be a therapeutic victory. On the other hand, if condition X is self-limited and usually improves spontaneously, like singultus (hiccups!), no change in the condition might be an indication that Panacea is actually making the condition worse.
In order to figure out if a treatment is having a positive or negative effect, we need some reference for comparison. The reference should represent what would be expected of our participants if they did not receive the study drug. There are many possible comparison groups we could imagine, but the ideal control group would be identical to the treatment group except for the study drug. 
The value of randomization
There is no perfect control group but, when possible and practical, using a random process to sort experimental and control groups minimizes the risk that the two groups will differ in significant ways.
In a randomized clinical trial, each potential participant is first screened to determine their eligibility. They are informed that they will be randomized into a treatment group or a control group. If a potential participant is eligible and agrees to the terms of the study, they sign a consent form and are enrolled.  Only AFTER the participant is enrolled are they randomized to the treatment or control group. 
A confounder is a factor, other than the experimental treatment that influences a study participant’s clinical responses relevant to the study. Randomization is likely to balance known confounders such as age, gender, baseline disease severity, etc. But the real power of randomization is that it will balance unknown confounders as well.  If some proportion of a population has an undiscovered genetic mutation that predisposes to a more severe form or more rapid progression of disease X, randomization is likely to sort the mutation so it is equally represented in the treatment and control groups, minimizing the chance that this mutation will disproportionally influence the drug or the control group. This is a very powerful advantage! Randomization balances known and unknown confounders, minimizing the potential bias
Randomization enhances the likelihood that treatment and control groups will be similar when they enter the study.
The value of blinding
“Blinding” describes a study design in which knowledge of treatment group (drug vs control) is withheld from relevant individuals involved in the conduct of the study.
Imagine that you are a participant in a clinical trial of an experimental drug. Now imagine that you know you are in the treatment group. You might be more enthusiastic about participating in the study. You might be more likely to comply with study activities. You also might be more likely to report every headache, cough, sleepless night, etc. as a potential drug side effect. 
Now imagine that you know that you are in the control group. You might be more concerned that your condition is worsening. You may be more likely to access treatments outside the study protocol. You might be more likely to drop out of the study. You might be less likely to report life events as side effects.
These differences in perceptions and behaviors are likely to have asymmetric influences in important study results. These asymmetric effects are forms of bias.
Designing a study so that participants are not aware of treatment (or lack of treatment) they are receiving is known as “blinding.” 
Investigators are not immune to bias. Knowledge of a participant’s status as drug or control might influence the way an investigator interacts with those participants. It might influence the way they interpret findings, and decisions they make during the conduct of the study. It might influence what is collected as an adverse event. It might allow the investigator to accidentally “unblind” the participant to their treatment group. When possible, it is desirable to “blind” the investigator to the assigned treatment group of each participant. A study for which the study participants AND the investigators are unaware of treatment assignment is referred to as “double blind.”
Blinding is a powerful tool to minimize bias during the conduct of a study.
The value of a placebo control
It should be evident that without a placebo control, it is impossible to keep the participants blinded to their assignment. A control participant in a drug trial cannot be blinded to their group assignment if they are aware of whether or not they are taking the study drug. The placebo is designed to resemble the treatment as closely as possible to maintain the blinding of the participants. “Sugar pill” is a term sometimes used to express the inert nature of a placebo. A placebo pill will generally look identical to the study drug. It often contains the same inactive ingredients as the study drug.
Conclusion
Randomization ensures that the treatment and control groups are as similar as possible when they enter the study. Blinding (including the use of placebo controls) ensure that the treatment and control groups are as similar as possible during the conduct of the study. All of these measures are intended to minimize bias so that the study drug can be assessed as fairly as possible. Even if the placebo effect is irrelevant to the drug and the disease being studied, a placebo control remains a powerful tool to maximize the validity of a clinical trial.


   Placebos as Medicine: The Ethics of Homeopathy
Scott Gavura 
Link
Is it ever ethical to provide a placebo treatment? What about when that placebo is homeopathy? Last month I blogged about the frequency of placebo prescribing by physicians. I admitted my personal discomfort, stating I’d refuse to dispense any prescription that would require me to deceive the patient. The discussion continued in the comments, where opinions seemed to range from (I’m paraphrasing) “autonomy, shmatonomy, placebos works” to the more critical who likened placebo use to “treating adults like children.” Harriet Hall noted, “We should have rules but we should be willing to break them when it would be kinder to the patient, and would do no harm.” And on reflection, Harriet’s perspective was one that I could see myself accepting should I be in a situation like the one she described. It’s far easier to be dogmatic when you don’t have a patient standing in front of you. But the comments led me to consider possible situations where a placebo might actually be the most desirable treatment option. If I find some, should I be as dogmatic about homeopathy as I am about other placebos?
Nicely, Kevin Smith, writing in the journal Bioethics, examines the ethics of placebos, based on an analysis of homeopathy. Homeopathy is the ultimate placebo in routine use — most remedies contain only sugar and water, lacking a single molecule of any potentially medicinal ingredient. Smith’s paper, Against Homeopathy — A Utilitarian Perspective, is sadly behind a paywall. So I’ll try to summarize his analysis, and add my perspective as a health care worker who regularly encounters homeopathy.
The first third of the paper is a concise summary of the scientific absurdity of homeopathy. Hahnemann’s “Law of Similars”, based on a single observation of the effects of quinine on malaria, is the basis for the non-scientific process of “provings” to match symptoms to substances. The results of provings are compiled in the Homeopathic Materia Medica, which homeopaths select their remedies from. (So now we have remedies based on products including “sleep”, Stonehenge, shipwrecks, ascending colons, light bulbs, and vacuum cleaner dirt.) Smith summarizes this law as:
More fundamentally, there is simply no plausible or rational basis for supposing that substances that produce particular symptoms can cure the same symptoms. The assumption that ‘like cures like’ places the onus on proponents of homeopathy to elucidate the special logic involved: to the knowledge of the present author, a satisfactory account of this logic has not been made.
Hahnemann’s second law, the “Law of Infinitesimals” is as absurd as the law of similars. That a product can gain potency and effect with dilution, and that effect persists (and even grows stronger) even after being diluted completely away defies physical laws. Smith points out the contradiction between the idea that water is touted to have a memory of the “proved” substance, yet has forgotten everything else that has every been dissolved in it:
The fact that physiological chaos does not ensure whenever we drink a glass of water provides a simple but powerful refutation of the ‘memory’ concept in homeopathy.
Smith then covers the research on homeopathy. Given its premise is implausible (or impossible), it is not surprising that the highest quality clinical trials have demonstrated no efficacy beyond placebo effects. Yet positive trials are to be expected from statistical effects alone. And when combined with bad design, weak blinding and other potential biases, it should not be surprising that a supportive clinical trials appear in the literature — and some even show up in Cochrane reviews. His conclusion is very much along the lines of the position taken by SBMers:
From Hume onward, it has been accepted that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Considering the extent to which the fundamental tenets of homeopath run counter to established rules of science and reason, empirical evidence in support of homeopathy would have to be particularly robust, in view of the fact that acceptance of homeopathy would entail a major epistemic scientific revolution.
So it’s implausible, the remedies contain no medicinal ingredients, and, not surprisingly, it works no better than a placebo. Yet it is popular, even among some physicians and scientists. But is it ethical? And here’s where we get to the meat of the ethical analysis.
Non-Invasiveness/Cost-effectiveness
Placebos, as commenters to my past post noted, do have one merit. If the alternative to antibiotics for a cold is homeopathy for a cold, then homeopathy is probably a better therapeutic choice, because “no treatment” is the preferred treatment. There are many medical conditions for which we have few effective medical therapies, and in some cases the impetus to prescribe a placebo may be simply to obtain the psychological (placebo) effects associated with their use. And given the habit (as I described last month) for some physicians to select impure placebos (those containing subtherapeutic or non-toxic ingredients), then isn’t a pure placebo like homeopathy sometimes preferable? Here’s where Smith gives homeopathy credit:
In cases where ineffective medication is considered to be in the best interests of the patient, which form of such medicine should be prescribed?
The answer to this question seems clear: the ineffective medicine that is the least invasive and least expensive should be used. On these criteria, homeopathy scores highly.
So in situations where a placebo is felt to be in the patient’s best interest, homeopathy might be felt to be favorable, particularly if an “impure” placebo has a greater potential for unwanted effects. But Smith makes a small error here: Homeopathy isn’t always the least expensive option – a point I’ll return to.
Holism
Holistic is a popular term among alternative medicine proponents and is usually used to deride science-based medicine, with the fallacious claim that various alternative treatments treat the “whole patient” while medicine does not. And as has been described elsewhere on this blog, the extended consultation offered by alternative medicine providers is probably the source of most if not all of the benefits of treatments. However the non-specific benefits of talk therapy, dialogue, empathy and reassurance are not limited to homeopathy, and can be incorporated into science-based practices. And importantly, since homeopathic “remedies” can be purchased in pharmacies and other stores without consultation, the “holistic” approach, and its benefits, are by no means certain when consultation is omitted. For these reasons, Smith rejects holism as providing any unique support for homeopathy.
Placebo effects
In the research setting, placebo effects are any measured response in patients that receive the inert (placebo) treatment. But as has been noted on this blog, there are actually multiple elements and observations that sum into what’s described as “placebo effects.” Some of what can contribute to the apparent efficacy of a placebo may not be due to patient-reported outcomes: Researcher bias, poor blinding, and weak overall study design and conduct can all add to the measurement of, and subsequent conclusion that a placebo has effects. Even a disease’s natural history, or regression to the mean can lead one to conclude a correctly-timed placebo treatment is effective.
Smith does not dive deeply into placebo effects, but makes two arguments against homeopathy’s value as a placebo. First, he notes that placebo effects are generally restricted to subjective symptoms like pain and fatigue, with no evidence supporting any meaningful disease-modifying effects. This limits the usefulness of homeopathy to those conditions for which there is some evidence to show that there may be placebo effects. Smith then raises the ethical appropriateness of a key component of successful placebo use: in order for placebos to work, patients must believe something that is untrue. From a utilitarian perspective, Smith notes that lying may be acceptable when it (on balance) is an overall positive — that is, it generates a positive utility. However, patient autonomy must also be considered — the right for patients to make an informed decision about their treatments. Smith suggests that if you personally rank autonomy above the potential placebo benefits, then the use of homeopathy is untenable from an ethical perspective.
But are homeopaths deliberately deceiving their clients? Smith argues (and I agree) that most homeopaths genuinely believe “remedies” to be effective — so they are not acting in bad faith when they advocate their use. However, the fact remains that patients that are told that homeopathy is effective are being given information that is contrary to the scientific evidence. Consequently Smith describes their actions as “ethically unacceptable” regardless of their sincere (but wrong) beliefs.
But what about placebo use by health professionals? While routine use of placebos wouldn’t be considered ethically acceptable, Smith notes that reinforcing the efficacy of a conventional medication, in a way that could enhance potential placebo effects, is acceptable. This is a routine part of the pharmacist’s dialogue with patients – understanding and addressing concerns, summarizing therapeutic effects, and managing overall treatment expectations. It can be done in a non-deceptive way that should maximize the non-specific effects. But what about pure placebos? Smith gives the example of battlefield use of saline injections for pain as a circumstance where pure placebo use would be ethically acceptable. So in situations where no other options exist, perhaps. But as a matter of course, providing pure placebos would not be considered ethically appropriate.
Autonomy
What if patients elect to choose homeopathy, despite counsel that the product is inert? I’ve encountered this situation in the pharmacy: when asked for advice, I inform the patient that the product has no active ingredients and has no medicinal effects. They’re usually grateful for that, but sometimes my advice will be challenged or ignored, and they’ll purchase it anyway. In situations where it’s clear that the patient may be avoiding appropriate consultation or treatment, I may press my argument further. But once I’ve described the scientific evidence, and given my advice, I’m comfortable letting the patient make their own purchasing decision. And that’s consistent with Smith’s analysis:
If utility is generally maximized by allowing patient autonomy, then patients should be free to choose homeopathy. Secondly, exercise of autonomy provides psychological benefits for the agent: it is well accepted that denial of free choice, or coercion, results in reduced happiness in the subjects concerned.
Smith describes the challenge of drawing lines between paternalism and autonomy, concluding that restriction of autonomy is probably reasonable when the risk of self-harm is greater — which is consistent with the case for restricting drugs to “prescription-only” status. While risks of contamination and unwanted medicinal effects do exist, the more common and real risk is probably the avoidance of proper medical treatment — which is one of the major disutilities of homeopathy.
Failing to Seek Medical Care
While some might be willing to accept the use of homeopathy in cases where placebo effects are possible and probably adequate, most draw the line when homeopathy is positioned as a substitute for effective medical treatment. Yet that’s the case when homeopathy is promoted as malaria prophylaxis, a substitute for vaccination, or even as a treatment for HIV or tuberculosis. Probably the best approach to mitigating this risk, while promoting individual patient autonomy, is to ensure that adequate information is provided to patients so that they are well informed of the lack of medicinal ingredients and the demonstrated lack of efficacy, beyond placebo, for any condition. Smith questions the ability of CAM practitioners to provide reliable advice on efficacy, and describes the promotion of a therapeutic doctrine, rather than reliable advice, as “ethically unacceptable.” He further characterizes any harms resulting in those unable to give fully informed consent (e.g., children or non-competent adults) as “ethically indefensible.”
Waste of Resources
If you’ve never bought it before, homeopathy is not cheap: its prices are comparable to conventional products with active ingredients. Given the lack of efficacy, every dollar spent on homeopathy is a waste of resources, in that it could otherwise be put to more effective use — for plausible treatments, or anything else, for that matter. So from a utilitarian perspective, Smith argues that this expenditure is unethical. Smith notes that homeopathy may not just act as a substitute for other care due to its lack of effect: When the homeopathy fails to work, conventional care may subsequently be sought.
Smith makes the same ethical evaluation of research into homeopathy, where because of a lack of “logico-scientific validity”, human trials of homeopathy are ethically contentious and an inappropriate use of resources.
Credibility Issues
One of the issues that concerns me as a pharmacist is the veneer of credibility that homeopathy gains when it’s packaged and positioned alongside conventional medicine in pharmacies. I suspect that most consumers expect the products on pharmacy shelves to contain medicinal ingredients, and to have some sort of evidence to support their sale. If I substituted placebos for prescription drugs, I’d quickly lose my license to practice. And if I sold boxes of toothpaste or tissue that were empty inside, I’d probably be out of business pretty quickly. So I’m dismayed when I see pharmacies selling cough syrups without active ingredients, sending an unwarranted message of homeopathy’s effectiveness.
Another credibility issue arises from an educational perspective, when homeopathy is “integrated” into science and and medical education as well, increasing the perception that homeopathy has medical credibility. Smith sums it up:
“…inappropriate ‘approval’ for homeopathy serves as a disutility, as it will tend to magnify several negative outcomes, namely resource wastage, risk of patients failing to seek effective healthcare, and reduced patient autonomy through the promulgation of erroneous medical knowledge”
Smith goes on to note a number of other concerns documented repeatedly at SBM, including a weakening of a societal commitment to scientifically-established treatments, as well as the confusion of ineffective treatments such as homeopathy with treatments that he describes as genuinely complementary, such as mediation, relaxation, music and exercise — something that has been described here as the CAM Trojan horse.
Conclusion
So where does that leave us? Unfortunately we cannot simply sum up the arguments in a formula to give us the ethical answer. It seems clear that the ethical downsides to homeopathy outweigh its benefits under most circumstance I can envision. Smith uses the example of an ineffective defibrillator to point out that the use of such a device device in the context of medical care would be “morally unjustifiable.” He notes,
Because it is inherently ineffective, homeopathy cannot be ethically neutral. It follows that the purchase, deployment or promotion of homeopathy is morally unacceptable.
Perhaps there may yet emerge a framework where placebos can be ethically (and judiciously) justified. Homeopathy isn’t it. So what should health professionals do? For one, we should stop promoting homeopathy, and the sale of homeopathic remedies. We should advocate against the allocation of limited health resources to researching, facilitating or providing homeopathy. We should avoid giving homeopathy undeserved credibility by selling it alongside actual medicine, or allowing it to be sold without clear labelling that describes its lack of ingredients and effectiveness. And when we’re asked, we have an ethical responsibility to explain why we believe homeopathy is no ‘alternative” at all.
Reference
Smith K (2011). Against Homeopathy – A Utilitarian Perspective. Bioethics PMID: 21320146

Cure Is About Caring, Not Curing: Placebos, Alternative Medicine, and Patient Comfort
Harriet Hall on January 26, 2016
Link

In a recent post, Dr. Gorski criticized two articles by Jo Marchant on placebos and alternative medicine. He mentioned that she had a book coming out and suggested I might want to review it. The title is Cure: A Journey into the Science of Mind Over Body.
I don’t know of any evidence that the mind has ever cured a disease, so I would have been prejudiced against this book just from its title, and Dr. Gorski’s post prejudiced me even more. But I was willing to give it a fair trial. The publisher sent me a review copy of the book and I read it. I was expecting to hate it, but I was pleasantly surprised. I enjoyed reading it. I found it fascinating. I found myself agreeing with much of what Marchant says, and I was intrigued by some of the recent research she reports that I was not yet aware of. Preliminary studies, to be sure, but thought-provoking. The book challenged me to think more deeply about placebos, alternative medicine, and patient comfort.
Moving the line in the sand
In the introduction, she mentions Dr. Gorski as one of the scientists who are fighting back against the tide of irrationality, who have drawn “anti-woo” lines in the sand. She suggests that those lines might be relaxed a bit to the benefit of both sides. Before you have a knee-jerk reaction to that suggestion, I encourage you to read her book for yourself to try to understand the nuances of her position. She is saying what I think frequent SBM commenter Peter Moran may have been driving at, but she expresses herself much more clearly and tries to support her claims with evidence. I think he might like this book.
She clearly understands and supports science. She starts by giving examples of how people have been misled into believing that bogus treatments were effective, and how controlled studies are the only way to determine whether a treatment really works. She explains that while placebos influence how we feel, they don’t influence objective measures like cancer survival. But she points out that survival time is not the only thing that matters to a cancer patient: pain control and quality of life are important too. If doctors lose sight of that, patients suffer. Alternative medicine has filled the gap with methods that are honed to maximize placebo responses; the treatments themselves do nothing but patients experience real relief. She argues for reinstating the doctor’s role as healer so that patients can benefit from both personal caring and scientifically proven treatments.
Placebos and Kaptchuk
One doctor wants to change the name of the placebo effect to “the meaning response.” The most important factor is the meaning that is attached to and surrounds any medical treatment, fake or otherwise. Instead of focusing on sugar pills, we should turn our attention to the trappings of medicine that make us expect to feel better, things like the white coat and stethoscope of a doctor or the incense and incantations of a traditional healer.
She covers Ted Kaptchuk’s placebo research and explains how he became interested in it. While practicing acupuncture, he noticed that some patients experienced improvement before they even got the treatment, and he wanted to understand why. It is common for patients in the placebo arm of a trial to experience a dramatic improvement and to want to keep taking the placebo after the trial even after they’ve been told it was a placebo. But Kaptchuk puts a damper on Marchant’s enthusiasm by reminding her that there’s nothing in the research to suggest that positive expectations can do anything to change the underlying physiology of the disease.
Marchant buys some placebo pills online and takes one for a headache. 20 minutes later, her pain subsides. She knows it isn’t a scientific trial, but she feels empowered because her own mind was able to make her feel better. There is an argument for trying a placebo before trying a drug that could have side effects; but she also presents the other side of the argument, quoting Edzard Ernst, who explains why he is against using placebos in clinical practice.
The nocebo effect
She delves into the dark side of placebos, the nocebo effect. Suggestion accounts for all those cases of mass psychogenic illnesses in schools. She describes a patient in a clinical trial of antidepressants who tried to overdose and collapsed with a racing heart and low blood pressure; after 4 hours of resuscitation in the hospital and six liters of IV fluids, the trial organizers divulged that he was in the placebo group. His symptoms disappeared within 15 minutes. When doctors warn patients about potential side effects of a drug, they are more likely to get those side effects. In one study of men on the drug atenolol, patients who didn’t know it could cause erectile dysfunction had an ED rate of 3.1%; those who were told it could cause ED had a rate of 31.2%. Many if not most of the side effects of drugs may be due to nocebo effects. I can’t help wondering what that implies for informed consent: if we fully inform patients about the pros and cons of a treatment, it makes some of the “cons” more likely.
Benedetti’s placebo research
I have written about Fabrizio Benedetti’s placebo research here and here. Marchant visits his high-altitude lab in the Alps and describes some of his recent studies. They are fascinating stuff. For instance, they hint that placebos might sometimes work by removing pre-existing nocebo effects.
Placebo-controlled dose reduction
Researchers are studying whether the effect of a treatment can be enhanced by creating a ritual around pill-taking or by getting someone else to administer it. They are studying classical conditioning and other ways to utilize placebo responses to reduce the dosage of drugs that have side effects, ranging from anti-rejection drugs for transplant recipients to medications for ADHD in children. It’s called placebo controlled dose reduction (PCDR). The results are encouraging but they are preliminary and can’t yet be recommended for clinical practice.
Beliefs matter
Even the doctor’s beliefs make a difference: in one study the doctor’s beliefs about whether they were prescribing a painkiller or a placebo dramatically altered the amount of pain felt by the patient, even though what they told the patient didn’t change.
The mind even determines the limits of physical performance and fatigue. Cyclists given a pill that they believed was a performance enhancer cycled 2-3% faster. Chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) patients who believe that exercise will harm them are less likely to recover.
Focused attention: hypnosis and virtual reality
Hypnosis has been largely discredited, but there are studies suggesting that hypnosis improves outcomes in irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) and other conditions. Hypnosis is basically a way to focus attention, and another fascinating way to focus attention is virtual reality (VR). Burn patients tolerate painful treatments better while they are flying through a VR ice canyon and throwing virtual snowballs at virtual snowmen. The Snow World program is already being used in 15 hospitals and has been very helpful at Brooke Army Medical Center for treating soldiers burned in combat. VR home units are becoming less expensive, and the gaming industry might be a source of funding for pain relief trials.
Other things that might help
Being accompanied by one caregiver throughout labor has been shown to decrease the need for C-sections. Hospice patients given only comfort care not only have a better quality of life than patients getting aggressive treatment, but they live longer! A program called Comfort Talk reduced pain scores during invasive medical procedures from 7.5 out of 10 to 2.5, and reduced anxiety scores to zero. Instead of saying “Now this may hurt a bit” they go over all the details ahead of time and during the procedure they simply say “Now I’m injecting the contrast.” Something so simple can make a big difference to patient comfort, and it could be so easily implemented everywhere. Isn’t it better to harness patients’ psychological resources than to medicate them?
We are learning that the stress of poverty in early life has lasting health consequences, because stress rewires our brains. Meditation can rewire the brain too. A program called Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (MCBT) makes depressed patients 24% less likely to relapse. But Marchant quotes David Gorski’s warning that the benefits of meditation are being oversold, and that it is impossible to carry out double-blind trials.
There is good evidence that social support is important to health. Just interacting with other people can be therapeutic. A program called Experience Corps sends elderly volunteers into deprived elementary schools to help kids learn to read; there is preliminary evidence suggesting that it reverses age-related changes in their brains. Marchant asks, “What if we reshaped care for the elderly not around managing their decline, but harnessing their abilities?” Attitudes matter. Research suggests that “seeing ourselves as part of something bigger, or having a meaning or purpose beyond ourselves, helps us to do better physically.”
In the chapter on heart rate variability, I think Marchant oversells the benefits of HRV biofeedback, even after she quotes Steven Novella’s warning in an SBM article that it is nothing but “bad tracings, technical artifacts and noise.” She also reports preliminary evidence of benefit from vagal nerve stimulation in various disorders.
Marchant visits Lourdes and is impressed by how much comfort patients experience just from visiting there, even if there is no change in their physical condition. She speculates that it might be because at Lourdes they are treated as people rather than as cases of a disease. She doesn’t believe in miracles. She describes how a “best case” miracle cure of a patient with an apparently incurable osteosarcoma turned out to be based on a misdiagnosis: re-examination of the histology slides showed that the patient actually had lymphoma and may even have been treated with chemotherapy.
Is alternative medicine worth trying?
Edzard Ernst did a controlled study of faith healing using actors as therapists, and while there was no difference between the real and fake therapy, there were patients in both groups who improved dramatically and abandoned their wheelchairs. So should we give alternative medicine a try, even obviously fake therapies like homeopathy and Reiki?
Marchant doesn’t argue that we should replace conventional treatment with alternative medicine. She points out that alternative medicine can have bad outcomes. Patients can be made to feel they are responsible for their illness. Patients who eschew conventional cancer therapy die unnecessarily. People who consult homeopaths reject effective malaria prophylaxis in favor of nonsensical remedies that “make it so your energy doesn’t have a malaria-shaped hole in it.” Physical complications from alternative medicine are rare, but they do occur (infections from acupuncture needles, adverse effects from unlicensed herbal medicines).
She got some things wrong
I can’t wholeheartedly recommend the book. Overall, it gives the impression that we know much more than we do. The studies described are very preliminary and far from ready for prime time; we know that preliminary studies are often overturned by larger, better-designed studies. I found some things in the book disturbing. I don’t condone her use of the term “Western medicine;” there is only one medicine. I was appalled that after a C-section she had a VBAC at home, giving birth to her second baby underwater with the assistance of a non-NHS midwife who she believed was less likely to transfer her to a hospital if something went wrong. In my opinion, that showed very poor judgment. She misrepresents the safety of home births. She even trots out the old “death by medicine” canard. She claims that statins may only benefit 1 in 50 patients (true, but misleadingly alarmist when taken out of context as statins do save lives).
Conclusion: Marchant has interesting ideas, but a bad title
The title of this book, Cure, is simply wrong: Marchant does not claim that placebos cure disease in any objective sense. Rather, they comfort. And the subtitle, A Journey into the Science of Mind Over Body, is equally misleading. Marchant does not believe mind and body are separate. In fact, she says “What is psychological is physical and what is physical has a psychological perception to it.”
The role of a doctor is “To cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always.” In modern medicine, doctors don’t always do a good job of comforting. Research on placebos and on why patients are attracted to alternative medicine and derive comfort from can it lead to practical applications within the practice of science-based medicine. This book describes cutting edge research that may lead to methods that don’t require lying to patients or providing alternative medicine treatments. There are exciting developments, but still in their early days. We need more research. We need to learn how to incorporate things like empathy, social support, and hope into better patient care. It’s not just about curing; it’s about caring and comforting when we can’t cure.

   The Ethics of Deception in Medicine. 
Steven Novella 
Link
A recent study published in the Journal of General Internal Medicine and featured in a Time Magazine article, indicated that of 466 academic physicians in the Chicago area, 45% indicated that they have prescribed a placebo for a patient. This has sparked a discussion of the ethics of prescribing placebos in particular and deception in general in medicine.
A placebo is a biologically inactive treatment, such as a sugar pill. Any perceived benefit from taking a placebo is due to a combination of factors, mostly biased observation and non-specific effects, collectively referred to as the placebo effect. I discussed the placebo effect at length last week, and now will delve deeper into the question of deception in medicine more generally.
Historical Perspective
Prior to about 30 years ago the relationship between a physician and their patient was functionally paternalistic. This means that the physician did what they thought was best for their patients as a parent would for their child. It also meant that “benign deception” was often used, including prescribing treatments that were known to be inactive or ineffective. Sometimes the deception was one of omission – for example, not telling a patient that their disease was terminal and incurable so as not to upset them needlessly.
An illustrative example of this type of deception was the practice of prescribing methylene blue to patients as an active placebo. This substance is quickly filtered unaltered by the kidneys and will turn the urine deep blue. I was told first hand by older physicians of the practice of telling patients that their condition was caused by a benign tumor, and that the medicine (methylene blue) would entirely dissolve the tumor. The patients were told that they would know the treatment has worked when their urine turns blue. The purpose of this was to convince a patient thought to be a hypochondriac, or to have psychologically-based symptoms, that their fake ailment was treated, in the hopes that they would take comfort from this and their symptoms would resolve.
It is easy from our modern perspective to be judgmental of the paternalism of past generations, but I feel that it is proper to judge people in their own historical context. The fact that such practices seem so outrageous to modern sensibilities is not necessarily a marker of modern moral superiority but may simply reflect the general changes in American society in the last half-century.
The Physician-Patient Relationship Today
The more accepted model of the physician-patient relationship today (or health care provider-client, to be more general) is that of cooperation, with the patient as a full partner. This is based upon the principle that everyone has a right to be fully informed so that they can make the best decisions for themselves. Further, individuals generally wish to be more empowered to control their own health care. This trend has also been driven by the easy accessibility of medical information to the general public. It is not uncommon now for patients to present to their doctor with a hand full of pages printed from the internet.
In reality there is still a broad spectrum from old-fashioned paternalism to the modern cooperative model. This is partly regional – in the US the coasts tend to follow a more cooperative model, while in the mid west and a lesser degree the south still retain a degree of paternalism. It is therefore not a surprise that the above referenced study was conducted in the mid west, and I suspect that the numbers would have been different if conducted in the northeast.
There is also a generational difference, as we would expect, with older physicians tending to have an older style of practice. Superimposed upon these trends are individual differences among physicians. And, in my experience, I think that patients themselves largely determine the nature of the relationship they have with their physicians. Even when patients are fully empowered to control their health care, some will voluntarily surrender to a greater or lesser degree to the expertise of their physicians. Physicians have to, in fact, be in tune with their patient’s desires in this regard. Put simply, some patients want information, and other patients want to be told what to do, and most want some combination of both.
Deception
In the context of the modern physician-patient relationship deception is generally not acceptable. Within the practice of medicine there are various specific situations that need to be discussed.
Medical research is the easiest situation to deal with because there are specific regulations that remove most of the guesswork. Research involving humans requires adherence to strict ethical rules and the oversight necessary to enforce those rules. The guiding principle of medical research is informed consent. Subjects need to be told exactly what the potential risks of an experimental treatment are, what (if any) are the potential benefits to them, and the probability that they are receiving a placebo treatment. They need to be told exactly what will happen to them in the study, what the treatment alternatives are, what will happen if they have a negative side effect, and they need to be given the opportunity to ask any questions to their satisfaction.
Informed consent also applies to the practice of medicine outside of research. This means that patients have a right to similar information and to have any questions answered prior to agreeing to have surgery or receive a drug or treatment. However, the complexity here is that there is really no such thing as “full” disclosure. It is not practical for a physician to go over every possible consequence of a treatment prior to prescribing or initiating it. Potential side effects that are benign and/or extremely rare do not necessarily need to be discussed directly. Physicians do exercise judgment in deciding what patients need to be told.
Often, after the important facts about a new drug are discussed, patients may be referred to the package insert, which has the full prescribing information approved by the FDA. This way the patient can have as much information as they desire about a new drug, and then can ask their physician about anything that concerns them.
Keep in mind that I am not saying that what I described above is what always happens, but it is generally accepted to be good practice. Also, physicians that neglect to follow such good practices open themselves to liability if a negative outcome does occur.
Another context which is fairly straightforward is the need for full disclosure. This means that physicians are ethically required to tell patients any relevant information. In addition to having full consent prior to a treatment, patients are considered to own their health care information and have a right to access to it. Likewise, physicians have a duty to inform patients about anything relevant, such as test results or their diagnosis or prognosis.
I find this to be the most fuzzy area, however. Certainly, factual information needs to be given to patients. However, facts do not always tell the whole story, they must be put into a clinical context. Therefore, for example, a physician may emphasize the possibility for hope or they may downplay unrealistic hope in order to focus the patient on making practical decisions. Neither approach is objectively better – they represent trade offs, a balance between keeping the patient’s outlook positive to avoid depression or nihilism, while still giving them a realistic view of their condition so they can make rational decisions.
Also, when a patient is facing a difficult health decision, for example whether or not to have a risky but needed surgical procedure, the facts can often be used to support either decision. A physician may believe, and the facts may support the conclusion, that the patient’s best chance to avoid a bad outcome is to have surgery. The physician may therefore emphasize the risks of not getting the surgery. Exactly how much time and effort is spent going over the possible negative outcomes if a condition is not treated can affect the patient’s decision. In the end the physician’s clinical judgment determines what is proper disclosure to the patient.
On the other end of the spectrum, a physician may emphasize to a patient that there is ongoing research into their disease that may produce a treatment. Is this giving the patient false hope, or is this just good bedside manner?
A very common context in which the need for full disclosure comes up is when a physician believes that a patient’s symptoms are entirely psychiatric. (For the sake of this discussion I am considering situations in which the symptoms are actually psychological, not a misdiagnosis.) A brutally honest opinion given to the patient may sound something like this: “I believe that you do not have any real physical ailment. The symptoms you are having are purely psychological – they are nothing more than a delusion on your part. Therefore the real underlying problem is a mental illness, or perhaps simply a personality disorder. These are notoriously difficult to treat, but you may benefit from counseling or psychiatric treatment.”
I have, in fact, heard a colleague say almost exactly that to a patient – with perhaps just a bit more tact. There is evidence, in fact, that in certain situations brutal honesty, while uncomfortable for the physician and the patient, may result in the best outcome. The patient may protest, but then the symptoms will stop.
However, such honesty will often sacrifice the therapeutic relationship, so in most situations physicians will take a gentler approach. For example, I might state that certain symptoms are known to be caused by stress and that they tend to resolve on their own. This is completely true, but has a different tone and emphasis than the brutally honest statement above.
What about the outright deception of prescribing a known placebo to a patient? Today this is generally considered to be unethical, not only because it prevents informed consent but because it interferes with the trust that is a necessary prerequisite for the physician-patient therapeutic relationship. I agree with this position and would never prescribe a placebo or directly deceive a patient.
However, again there is a gray area. My perspective is biased in that I am a neurologist, so many of the medications I prescribe have multiple uses. A pain medication may also be an antidepressant, or a muscle relaxant may also be a sleep aid. I therefore might recommend a specific medication to a patient for one effect but partly base my choice on a secondary effect that I think will also be helpful. I may emphasize to the patient the effect they are more likely to understand and accept and will not necessarily get into all the details that led me to that specific choice. But if a patient asks me a direct question, I always give them a straight and truthful answer.
Another gray area is that physicians may be very optimistic with their patients about the potential of a new treatment in order to maximize (or so they think) the placebo effect. If a physician prescribes a legitimate pain killer for an appropriate situation and tells the patient “I think this is really going to help with your pain,” when a more accurate statement might be “there is about a 60% chance this will help with your pain” is that subtle deception justified on the grounds that it may enhance a placebo benefit from the medication? (As an aside, I am not convinced that it will, but that is a separate question.)
The same is true of negative side effects. Some physicians worry that if they go over every possible little side effect that patients will get side effects just because they are worrying about it so much or because they become hypervigilant to any slight symptom. While I disclose anything important, and point them to the package insert for full information, I may say truthfully to patients that most people I have prescribed this drug report no side effects. Again – there is wiggle room in terms of emphasis and detail.
To summarize, I think that within modern ethical medicine there is no room for deliberate outright deception. Informed consent, full disclosure, and honesty are necessary within the context of medical research and a cooperative therapeutic relationship. However, there is room for good bedside manner, compassion, and for balancing hope with realism in terms of what information is emphasized, but this is a gray area.
All of this, of course, is in the context of scientific medicine. It is impossible to apply these ethical standards when dealing with a health care system that is not evidence-based. Virtually all treatments given under the umbrella of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) or integrative medicine would be considered experimental within mainstream medicine, yet are generally given without their experimental or unproven nature being disclosed and without all the other ethical guidelines that govern mainstream medicine.
Also, many CAM treatments, like homeopathy, are nothing but placebos. Some practitioners even acknowledge this, but argue that placebos have real effects. (Again, see my prior entry for a discussion of this.) Within scientific medicine this would amount to unacceptable deception. The sectarian views of many CAM practitioners, however, often means that they believe the misinformation they give to their patients.
It is therefore difficult to impossible to have a workable system of medical ethics within an unscientific sectarian health care belief system. Some ethics can only be applied within a system that relies upon verifiable and objectively established standards. Therefore only a system based upon transparent and objective science can be truly ethical.

Is the use of “Open-Label” Placebo Ethical in the Treatment of Children?
Is the use of “open-label” placebo ethical in pediatric medical care, or any care for that matter? A recent article in Pediatrics discussing this issue comes to a flawed conclusion based on a misunderstanding of placebo and of the literature on placebo without deception.
Clay Jones on August 25, 2017
Link

I was delighted to find an article on the ethics of “open-label” placebo use in the pediatric population in the August issue of Pediatrics, particularly one partially penned by Arthur Caplan and Perri Klass. The primary author, however, appears to be Brit Trogen, a medical anthropologist currently studying medicine at NYU School of Medicine with an accomplished background in science journalism. Sadly I was more than a bit disappointed in their discussion of the subject, as it revealed a poor understanding of placebo, making the common mistake of confusing what we see in clinical trials with real world practice. But it wasn’t all bad.
The concept of placebo comes up frequently in discussions of both science-based medical practice and the seemingly infinite array of pseudomedical approaches to healthcare we write about here on SBM, and there is certainly some room for disagreement between reasonable people. Trogen, Caplan, and Klass make this clear, and they accurately point out some of the potential pitfalls of incorporating “open-label” placebo into pediatric treatment protocols. But they give placebo effects too much credit in my opinion, and rely too heavily on studies performed by Ted Kaptchuk, who frequently proselytizes the existence of “placebo without deception” based on studies that use deception.
I’ll run through the main points made by the authors since most readers will be unable to access the full article.
They start with a general description of what a classic placebo response is:
Placebos (sham treatments such as sugar pills or saline injections) are thought to elicit improvements in clinical outcomes by mimicking medical therapies, thereby improving patients’ expectations of getting better
This is overly simplistic.
Later in the article they add a bit more nuance:
The term “placebo effect” is often used colloquially to describe a small, confounding, or insignificant response. In both child and adult populations, however, placebos can reduce the frequency and severity of disease symptoms in patients at a level on par with many pharmacologically active drugs.
And this is extremely misleading.
Placebo in the context of a clinical trial is a combination of many factors, such as regression to the mean and the natural course of subjective complaints, and largely an artifact of the way we run clinical trials and measure outcomes. Patients in the placebo arm of a trial may appear to have symptom reduction on par with the treatment group, but it’s mostly an illusion. Patient expectation likely plays a very small role and, when it is compared to patients in a “no treatment” group, often doesn’t amount to much at all. In fact, the longstanding belief in the existence of a significant true placebo effect in clinical trials is based on some highly dubious research.
Placebo in clinical trials doesn’t result in the improvement of objective outcomes. Patients may subjectively believe that their pain, which is where there is the most potential for actual clinically meaningful benefit, is improved but they won’t have much in the way of improved function. I’m not saying that there might not be a role for improved patient perception in certain circumstances, but this can be achieved without sacrificing patient autonomy or parent authority.
The authors even mention this fact:
While the placebo effect plays a role in virtually every clinical intervention, the use of placebos as stand-alone treatments within medicine has largely been discouraged due to concerns about patient deception.
A deception that is unethical in my opinion. Unfortunately they follow this statement with the increasingly common narrative of the “placebo without deception”, or “open-label” placebo. They claim that these “concerns have been addressed” by research over the past decade, research primarily belonging to Harvard’s Ted Kaptchuk, who is trotted out whenever NPR or some other news organization wants a comment on how magical placebo can be. They describe “open-label” placebo as a “powerful new methodology” that involves full transparency and patient awareness, in the same breath as they admit that patients are lied to:
Patients also are told, however, that such placebos have been found to produce benefits in individuals with their condition, preserving positive patient expectations.
They claim that “open-label” placebo has been determined to be consistent with the ethical principles of informed consent and patient autonomy. This determination was made by, you guessed it, Ted Kaptchuk. So the man whose focus in life appears to be the justification of incorporating placebo into clinical practice agrees with himself.
I found the following claim very interesting:
Although studies of open-label placebos in pediatrics are scarce, reviews and meta-analyses generally find that children have higher placebo-response rates than adults, suggesting pediatric populations may benefit at least as much, and perhaps more, from attempts to implement placebo treatments into clinical practice.
I would have assumed that this would be the case. Remember that these responses are seen only in subjective outcomes. It makes sense to me that there would be higher risk of study artifacts resulting in the perception of improvement in kids, who are also more amenable to improvement with distraction/TLC. And there might be added artifact because of the necessity of parental assessment of outcomes. And higher placebo response in clinical trials does not automatically mean that they would have clinically meaningful responses outside of the context of a trial.
Remember that this is supposed to be an unbiased assessment of the ethics of “open-label” placebo in pediatric care when you read the following statement:
Based on these considerations, the a priori prohibition of placebos from clinical practice may deprive patients of a potentially effective mode of treatment, while simultaneously exposing them to the heightened side effects, uncertain efficacy, and higher financial costs associated with pharmacologically active medications.
This bold claim, and some blatant fearmongering about prescribing drugs “off-label” in children, is supported by a pilot study on “open-label” placebo in children with ADHD. The results weren’t impressive and it only involved 26 kids and a 2 week observation period. I don’t think it’s fair to make any causal claims, especially regarding ethical considerations, even if the parents in the study were big fans of placebo. I don’t think they would have signed their child up for the trial if they weren’t.
Now the good parts.
When it comes to potential problems with the use of “open-label” placebo, the authors do much better. After claiming that the “functional mechanism” of placebo is poorly understood and a rather silly mention of possible “nocebo effects” that is. I agree with them, however, when they raise the concern that increased use of placebo, deceptive or not, might add to the common belief that all complaints require a medical or pharmaceutical treatment of some kind. We might condition even more parents to seek medical care for minor pediatric complaints that are self-limited and benign.
They also raise the concern that widespread use of “open-label” placebo might interfere with the establishment of trusting relationships between patients and their medical providers, particularly if done in a haphazard fashion. It might be interpreted by some as an implication that the complaint is all in the patient or parent’s head. It may seem as if the doctor is giving up.
They absolutely nail the final potential problem with this approach, so much so that I’ll just quote the entire paragraph because I couldn’t put it better myself:
More concerning is the possibility that placebo use could lead patients to develop false or misguided beliefs either about the placebo compound itself or the concept of “mind-body healing” overall. It is possible that patients and/or parents could equate the benefits they receive from placebos with a legitimization of other forms of so-called alternative medicines, or develop the inaccurate belief that “positive thinking” is sufficient to cure all manner of serious illnesses, forgoing proven treatments. Similarly, on learning of the benefits of placebos from their physician (or, just as likely, from the Internet or by word of mouth), individuals could feasibly attempt to “self-prescribe” inert substances to themselves or their children to lessen their use of other medications. Particularly in situations in which drug dosages must be maintained above critical levels over time, such as for antiseizure or hypothyroid medications, independent and unsupervised attempts to cut back or eliminate drug dosages could pose a serious health risk.
Other than the whole, “lying to patients is unethical” issue, that right there is my biggest fear. Practitioners of various forms of irregular medicine who truly believe in their own implausible nonsense have denied that their treatments rely on the various placebo effects historically. But as scientific evidence has time and time again proven their magical thinking wrong, many proponents have shifted focus over to placebo. In particular, many so-called integrative medicine providers working in academic settings, as well as folks like Ted Kaptchuk, not only want us to believe in placebo, they need us to believe in placebo without deception.
Conclusion: A mixture of good and bad
Trogan, Caplan, and Klass don’t appear to have a good grasp of the concept of placebo effects, but they ultimately do not endorse the widespread implementation of “open-label” placebo in pediatric medical practice. They do suggest a “possible limited role” instead, and one that is “closely monitored.” And, naturally, more research to better sort this out. In my opinion, the available research does not support claims that placebo has clinically meaningful benefits outside of what can be achieved through good science-based care, or that “placebo without deception” even exists.

   Sterile Water Injections for Pain Relief
Harriet Hall
Link
Before ethical standards changed, doctors used to occasionally fool patients with placebo injections of sterile saline or water. If my obstetrician had tried to give me sterile water instead of an epidural, I probably would have hit him. But apparently women are getting sterile water injections for childbirth and are telling us they work. What’s going on?
A recent study in Sweden compared sterile water injections to acupuncture for relief of labor pain. It found that sterile water produced significantly greater pain relief and relaxation. It concluded, “Women given sterile water injection experience less labor pain compared to women given acupuncture.”
I’m puzzled, because the study also says “there were no significant differences regarding requirements for additional pain relief after treatment between the 2 groups.” 85% and 90% got nitrous oxide, 40% and 47% got epidurals, and other conventional interventions were also used. It seems to me the conclusion could just as well have been “Women given sterile water injections report less labor pain than women given acupuncture, but require just as much additional pain relief.”
Could this be a case of biased researchers selectively interpreting data in the most favorable light? I read the abstract to my husband (who is not a doctor) and he immediately noticed the apparent contradiction. But Dr. George Lundberg didn’t mention it when he reported on the study for the Medscape Medical Minute. In fact, he inexplicably said “Pain relief was sufficient in both groups to prevent the need for other pain therapy.” That’s not what the article says.
I won’t attempt to dissect the study. I’ll assume that it was properly carried out and that its main conclusion (water injections better than acupuncture) is correct. But I do have questions about what it really tells us.
This experiment was not blinded: patients can tell whether they are getting an injection or acupuncture. I wondered why they didn’t include any placebo controls like sham acupuncture or dry needling. It seems they already assumed that both treatments were more effective than placebo; but I don’t think that has been established.
Perhaps all this study shows is that a placebo injection is more effective than a placebo needling procedure. We already knew that placebos are “effective” in reducing pain, and that there is a hierarchy of placebo effects with injections being higher on the list than practically anything besides sham surgery. If we assume that sterile water injections are a placebo, this study just provides one more confirmation that acupuncture is no more effective than placebo.
Do sterile water injections make sense?
Is the method plausible? Anywhere from 0.1 ml (that’s 1/50 of a teaspoonful) to 0.5 ml of sterile water is injected into or just under the skin, forming a small bleb. How could a small superficial bleb affect deep nerves and affect pain transmission up the spinal cord?
Several hypothetical mechanisms have been proposed:
1. A counterirritant effect. Sterile water injections hurt. This hypothesis fits with the fact that sterile saline is less painful and doesn’t work as well as sterile water (sterile water has an osmotic effect in addition to the distention of tissues by the fluid). If it’s only a counterirritant, there might be better, less invasive ways of providing it.
2. Endorphin production. But we know placebos can produce endorphins too.
3. The gate control theory of pain. But other methods that are supposed to work by the gate control theory, like acupuncture or TENS (transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation), don’t work as well as sterile water.
4. “It may work like acupuncture.” But there is no good evidence that acupuncture is anything more than an elaborate placebo system. And if it works like acupuncture there would be no need for the water; needling could be used alone.
5. “The needles may be hitting acupuncture points.” But no one has convincingly shown that acupuncture points even exist, and acupuncture needles are inserted deeper below the skin.
Sterile water works fast: it sometimes relieves pain for the very next contraction. My colleague Dr. Atwood is an anesthesiologist who has done a lot of epidurals. Before inserting the spinal needle, he numbs the skin by injecting lidocaine intradermally and subcutaneously. It stings. He tells me he has never noticed any effect on the patient’s perception of pain over the next few contractions. Then when the epidural kicks in, there is a dramatic effect.
So sterile water injections don’t look very plausible. Admittedly, implausible things do sometimes turn out to be true. So what does the evidence really show about the effectiveness of this treatment?
The Evidence
I found quite a few studies, but they are problematical. Most are small studies. Some are from non-English-speaking countries that are statistically less likely to publish negative studies (Iran, Thailand, etc.). Some used intradermal injections, others used subcutaneous injections. One study showed that intradermal injections were more painful than subcutaneous ones. Some injected one site, others injected four. Some repeated the injections when the effect wore off after 2-3 hours. Several studies were from Scandinavia, where sterile water injections are popular among midwives. I couldn’t find any US studies.
Most studies used normal saline as a control, and it may not be an adequate control. Several studies reported severe pain with water injections but little or no pain with saline injections. Subjects might be able to guess which group they were in by the amount of pain. If their guesses were better than chance, you wouldn’t have an adequate placebo control. I couldn’t find any evidence of “exit polls” asking patients which group they thought they were in.
A systematic review concluded that it was effective but it was based only on 4 studies they found suitable for analysis:
• Ader et al. compared sterile water to saline. Sterile water worked better but there was no difference in the requirement for pethidine (Demerol).
• Trolle et al. compared sterile water to saline and found it twice as effective (89% vs. 45%).
• Martensson et al. compared 0.1cc of intradermal water, 0.5 cc of subcutaneous water, and 0.1 cc of subcutaneous saline. The two water groups were equally effective and superior to the saline.
• Labreque et al. compared sterile water injections to TENS and to standard care (massage, etc.) Water worked better than the other two, but there was no difference in epidural requests, and fewer women said they would choose it again.
Systematic reviews are limited by the quality of the studies they review. Since the controls in these studies are questionable, I don’t know how much we can trust the conclusions.
What about Non-Obstetric Pain?
What really bothers me is that if these injections really work so well, why aren’t they being used for other types of pain like post-op pain and trauma? I found only 3 studies of other types of pain. A study from Iran showed sterile water was more effective than saline for renal colic. A small study in Norway showed no benefit from either saline or sterile water injections for cervicogenic headache. And there was a whiplash study, but it was not really comparable because it targeted trigger points and the pain relief lasted much longer.
Ideological factors
Sterile water injections seem to appeal mainly to midwives and natural childbirth advocates. They argue that it’s inexpensive, readily available, does not require a prescription, has no risks, is easily administered, and “won’t make the drug companies rich.” And it doesn’t require an obstetrician or an anesthesiologist. One commenter on Medscape said, “Sad that the technique isn’t being given a chance here in the U.S. Probably because it doesn’t fit in with the paternalistic, manipulative, technologically dominated, controlled style of obstetric medicine in this country.”
A bias and an agenda shine through such comments. It’s strange that natural childbirth advocates support sterile water injections, because there’s nothing “natural” about them. Some people seem to think there is merit in women suffering pain in labor rather than accepting interventions. I don’t. I think it’s cruel to persuade women to suffer pain unnecessarily when modern obstetrics can relieve pain safely and effectively.
Some support using any placebo that helps the patients get through the ordeal. Placebos relieve pain and are unlikely to harm women or their babies, but they’re UNETHICAL! We need to look for ways to harness the power of the placebo without lying to patients. One way to do that might be to tell them it’s a placebo and get their informed consent. Studies have shown that knowing you’re getting a placebo doesn’t necessarily destroy the placebo effect. I will always remember a patient in my internship who was given a placebo injection instead of the Demerol she usually got in the ER for her severe headaches. It worked just as well as the Demerol! When she was confronted with the fact that a placebo had relieved her pain, she asked if she could get it the next time she had a headache because it really worked!
I wonder about the wisdom of using counterirritants. Hitting your thumb with a hammer would probably work great as a counterirritant, but I couldn’t recommend it. I suspect simple distraction measures and suggestion might be nearly as effective, and they are not invasive and don’t produce pain or stinging.
Mind you, I’m not claiming that sterile water is not better than placebo; I’m just saying it’s premature to conclude that that it is better, based on currently available evidence that is questionable and has not been shown to be properly blinded.

   Spin City: Using placebos to evaluate objective and subjective responses in asthma
David Gorski 
Link
As I type this, I’m on an airplane flying home from The Amazing Meeting 9 in Las Vegas. Sadly, I couldn’t stay for Sunday; my day job calls as I’ll be hosting a visiting professor. However, I can say—and with considerable justification, I believe—that out little portion of TAM mirrored the bigger picture in that it was a big success. Attendance at both our workshop on Thursday and our panel discussion on placebos on Saturday was fantastic, beyond our most optimistic expectations. There was also a bit of truly amazing serendipity that helped make our panel discussion on placebo medicine an even bigger success.
If there’s one thing about going away to a meeting, be it TAM or a professional meeting, it’s that it suddenly becomes very difficult for me to keep track of all the medical and blog stuff that I normally keep track of and nearly impossible to keep up with the medical literature. This is the likely explanation for why I had been unaware of a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) on Thursday that was so relevant to our discussion and illustrated out points so perfectly that it was hard to believe that some divine force didn’t give it to us in order to make our panel a total success.
Just kidding. It was TAM, after all. It was, however, embarrassing that I didn’t see the study until the morning of our panel, when Kimball Atwood showed it to me.
Before I get to the meat of this study and why it fit into our nefarious plans for world domination, (or at least the domination of medicine by science-based treatments), a brief recap of the panel discussion would seem to be in order. First, for the most part, we all more or less agreed that the term “placebo effect” is a misnomer and somewhat deceptive because it implies that there is a true physiologic effect caused by an inert intervention. “Placebo response” or “placebo responses” seemed to us a better term because what we are observing with a placebo is in reality a patient’s subjective response to thinking that he is having something active done having something done. In general, we do not see placebo responses resulting improvement in objective outcomes; i.e., prolonged survival in cancer. The relative contributions of components of this response, be they expectancy effects (if you expect to feel better you likely will feel better), conditioning, or one that is frequently dismissed or downplayed, namely artifacts of the design of randomized clinical trials and even subtle (or even not-so-subtle) biases in trial design. This issue of placebo responses being observed only in subjective patient-reported clinical outcomes (pain, anxiety, and the like) and not in objectively measured outcomes is an important one, and it is one that goes to the heart of the NEJM study that so serendipitously manifested itself to us. As Mark Crislip so humorously pointed out, the placebo response is the beer goggles of medicine (this is not a spoiler or stealing Mark’s line; several TAM attendees have already tweeted Mark’s line), and much of what is being observed are changes in the patient’s perception of his symptoms rather than true changes in the underlying pathophysiology. This study drove the point home better than we could.
Another point discussed by the panel is also quite relevant. As more and more studies demonstrate very convincingly that “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) or “integrative medicine” (IM) therapies do not produce improvements in symptoms greater than placebo. Moreover, multiple studies, including a famous NEJM meta-analysis and a recently updated Cochrane review, demonstrate, placebo responses probably do not constitute meaningful responses. In light of these findings, CAM apologists, driven by ideology rather than science and masters of spin, have begun to admit grudgingly that, yes, in essence their treatments are elaborate placebos. Not to be deterred, instead of simply concluding that their CAM interventions do not work, they’ve moved the goal posts and started to try to argue that it doesn’t matter that CAM effects are placebo effects because placebos are “powerful” and good and—oh, yes, by the way—there are a lot of treatments in science-based medicine that do little better than placebos. In other words, CAM advocates elevate the subjective above the objective and sell the subjective, and that’s exactly what they are doing with this study.
Perception versus physiology
The study under question was performed at Harvard, with Michael E. Wechsler as its first author and Ted Kaptchuk as its senior author. Studies done by groups including Ted Kaptchuk have actually presented us here at SBM with copious blog fodder before, all designed to promote placebo medicine, either through making an argumentum ad populum, claiming in a truly Humpty Dumpty moment that it is possible to have placebo effects without deceiving the patient, and or rebranding of exercise as “alternative” in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) last year.
The current study is entitled, Active Albuterol or Placebo, Sham Acupuncture, or No Intervention in Asthma. Personally, I like this title. It’s a fine title, as it tells the reader in essence what the trial design is in only a few words. And it’s actually a reasonably good pilot study. Of course, it’s not so much the trial design that goes disastrously awry. Rather, it’s the interpretation of the results of the RCT that devolves into propaganda for quackademic medicine in which subjective improvement is used to argue that placebo medicine is good, even when no objective improvement is observed in a disease for which we have good drugs that produce objective improvements as well as subjective improvements.
This study basically compared four different interventions
    • Treatment with Albuterol
    • Sham acupuncture using the classic retractable needle (note that this was only single-blinded)
    • Placebo inhaler
    • No treatment at all
Inclusion criteria were as follows:
    • Men and women age>or= 18 with a diagnosis of asthma
    • Meet American Thoracic Society diagnostic criteria for asthma
    • Currently using a stable asthma regimen (no med. changes for 4 weeks)
    • Ability to withhold short-acting bronchodilators for 6 hours prior to each visit (see Spirometry description)
    • Ability to withhold long-acting bronchodilators for 48 hours prior to each visit (see Spirometry description)
    • Presence of reversible airflow obstruction as demonstrated by an improvement in FEV1 of at least 12 % following the inhalation of a β-agonist after 10 am. at screening visit.
Exclusion criteria were straightforward:
    • Lung disease other than asthma
    • Respiratory tract infection within the last month
    • Active tobacco use
    • Asthma exacerbation requiring the use of systemic
    • corticosteroids within the past 6 weeks
    • Prior experience with acupuncture
These criterial guaranteed that the patients selected have only mild to moderate asthma with no complications from the asthma, such as pneumonia or pulmonary fibrosis. Of course, it would be highly unethical to take people with severe asthma off of their bronchodilators; so medical ethics pretty much prevents testing placebos on people with more severe disease. Still, I can’t help but wonder whether the results reported would have been different in more severe asthma and if the subjective improvement would have been nearly as great. In any case, this study ended up including 39 patients, after 79 were screened, 46 underwent randomization, and 7 dropped out during the protocol. Patients who completed the protocol underwent the following procedure:
These patients returned within a week and were assigned to a randomly ordered series of four interventions — active albuterol inhaler, placebo inhaler, sham acupuncture, or no-intervention control — administered on four separate occasions, 3 to 7 days apart (block 1) (Figure 2). This procedure was repeated in two more blocks of four visits each (blocks 2 and 3), during which the interventions were again randomly ordered and administered. Thus, each subject received a total of 12 interventions. Albuterol and the placebo inhaler were administered in a double-blind fashion and sham acupuncture in a single-blind fashion, and the no-intervention control was not blinded. As before, short-acting and long-acting bronchodilator therapy was withheld for 8 hours and 24 hours, respectively, before each intervention. The no-intervention control condition differs from the natural history of asthma, since it controls for nonspecific factors such as attention from study staff, responses to repeated spirometry, regression to the mean, natural physiological variation, and any effects arising from the hospital setting. Nonetheless, no-intervention controls are the best approximation of no treatment in an experimental design. The study was conducted in accordance with the protocol (available at NEJM.org).
I’m not entirely sure why Kaptchuk thought he had to place a comment in there about no-intervention controls being only an approximation of no treatment in an experimental design. After all, that’s the sort of thing that clinicians and clinical researchers simply know; it does not need to be pointed out to them, much as it shouldn’t need to be pointed out that an RCT is an intentionally artificial method designed to remove as many biases as possible. Be that as it may, one thing that is clear is that these patients could not have truly severe asthma. Ruling out anyone requiring steroids for an acute exacerbation in the recent past and only including patients who could be off their long-acting bronchodilators for 48 hours and their short-acting bronchodilators for 6 hours pretty much guaranteed that.
Everyone’s heard the old cliche that a picture is worth a thousand words, and this is exactly the sort of situation where that’s true. All I need to do is to show you two graphs, and instead of one of my usual 5,000 word blog posts, you can have a 4,000 word post. Funny how that works. In any case, for your edification, here a graph of the objective results of this study, namely the FEV1 for the four groups:
Link
Not surprisingly, a known, effective bronchodilator had a very strong effect on the actual, objectively measured lung function of these patients. However, it should be noted that all groups improved, even the no-treatment group; it just improved much less than the albuterol group, and the sham acupuncture and placebo albuterol groups were indistinguishable from the no-treatment arm. In fact, in the supplemental data, there is also a table showing that in 32 of the patients exhaled nitric oxide (FENO) was measured, with identical results. Immediately after treatment, FENO increased in patients treated with double-blind albuterol by 5.9%, in contrast to patients treated with placebo inhaler, placebo acupuncture, and no treatment, all of whom demonstrated no significant change in FENO. This graph is about as clear and compelling evidence as there can be within the limits of a relatively small trial, that placebo responses do not change the underlying physiology of the disease of asthma or produce any objectively measurable improvements in lung function the way that real medicine does.
Now, for your edification and comparison, here is a graph of the self-reported subjective improvements.
Link
The results are pretty striking, aren’t they? They were so striking that Steve couldn’t resist flipping back and forth between these two graphs for several seconds in order to drive home the point to the audience. The albuterol, sham acupuncture, and placebo albuterol groups all demonstrated a significant improvement in symptoms, while the no-intervention control did not. However, here’s an important point. The scale used was a visual analog scale from 0 to 10 in which 0 means no improvement and 10 means complete resolution. So, again, even though the albuterol, sham acupuncture, and placebo albuterol groups all demonstrated subjective improvement, so did the no-treatment control arm, just less. In other words, all groups reported improvement, even those who received no treatment.
There’s another graph buried in the back of the supplemental data that I now wish we had also shown. Basically, it’s a look at how many patients responded objectively to treatment, as defined by an improvement in FEV1 of 12% or more, at each of the three sessions they did. The results and pattern are striking:
Link
Notice that, as expected, the vast majority of the patients responded at each session to the albuterol (3/3 sessions). In contrast, only 3% of patients responded 3/3 times to placebo, sham acupuncture, or no treatment. In fact, what’s striking is how similar the three graphs look and how different they look from the graph of patient responses to albuterol. Again, the message is very clear: Real medicine produces real, objectively measurable changes in physiology towards a more normally functioning state. Placebo medicine does not. In any rational, science-based discussion, this would be the end of the story. Placebos don’t work in asthma.
But that’s not the message that was being spread about this story, and here’s where the NEJM, less than a year after its massive fail in publishing a credulous Michael Berman acupuncture article and a clever bait-and-switch article looking at Tai Chi in fibromyalgia, allowed quackademic language to try to make left right, up down, and a negative result an indication that placebo medicine is a good thing.
Spin, spin, spin, spin
As I read the discussion of this paper, I could almost hear the cracking of bones as Kaptchuk went into major contortions to try to explain his negative result. Even though nowhere did the authors really explicitly state their real hypothesis, the design of the study made it painfully clear to anyone who understands clinical research that their hypothesis going in was that placebo responses would result in changes in objectively measured lung function in asthma. They were sorely disappointed, and the contortions of language that went into the discussion were plain to see. The authors implied that it might have been their use of a new, not really validated, patient-reported measure of asthma improvement. Or maybe, they argue, FEV1 isn’t a good measure of the severity of constriction of the airways in asthma, even though spirometry has been a reliable, well-validated test for asthma severity for decades. This is especially true in an academic medical center with a lot of pulmonary specialists. While spirometry can be unreliable in primary care settings and other settings where there isn’t a lot of experience performing it, such a description does not apply to Harvard-affiliated hospitals. At least I would hope not.
Overall, the spin on this study is not that placeboes don’t result in objectively measurable improvements, which is the correct conclusion. Rather, the spin is that subjective symptoms are as important or more important than objective measures; so let’s use placeboes. In the paper itself, Kaptchuk doesn’t quite say that. He first makes a perfectly reasonable point that, if subjective and objective findings don’t correlate, go with the objective findings. Then he does some handwaving:
Indeed, although improvement in objective measures of lung function would be expected to correlate with subjective measures, our study suggests that in clinical trials, reliance solely on subjective outcomes may be inherently unreliable, since they may be significantly influenced by placebo effects. However, even though objective physiological measures (e.g., FEV1) are important, other outcomes such as emergency room visits and quality-of-life metrics may be more clinically relevant to patients and physicians.
My jaw dropped when I read this. “Other outcomes” besides objective measures of disease severity may be “more clinically relevant”? The spin goes way beyond that, though. I have to think that the reviewers kept the authors from getting too frisky with their desire to advocate placebo medicine and promote subjective outcomes as being more important than objective outcomes. No such restraint seemed to inhibit the author of the accompanying editorial, Daniel E. Moerman, Ph.D., who, alas, appears to be based practically in my back yard at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. I had never heard of him before; so I did what all bloggers do when they encounter an unknown. I Googled him. His CV is here, and this is what I found:
Daniel E. Moerman is the William E. Stirton Professor of Anthropology at the University of Michigan — Dearborn, so recognized for his distinguished scholarship, teaching, and professional accomplishments. Because of his work in the field of Native American ethnobotany, Professor Moerman often receives calls from the American Indian community, such as an inquiry from the Menominee in Wisconsin, asking him what kinds of plants they should include in the restoration of their indigenous ecosystem. He acknowledges that we are deeply indebted “to those predecessors of ours on the North American continent who, through glacial cold in a world populated by mammoths and saber-toothed tigers, seriously, deliberately, and thoughtfully studied the flora of a new world, learned its secrets, and encouraged the next generations to study closer and to learn more. Their diligence and energy, their insight and creativity, these are the marks of true scientists, dedicated to gaining meaningful and useful knowledge from a complex and confusing world.”
He’s also known for having written a book entitled Medicine, Meaning and the “Placebo Effect,” part of which can be found here, in particular this doozy of a quote:
There is much objection among physicians to the very existence of something called the placebo effect. It often seems to bother doctors enormously that the fact of receiving medical treatment (rather than the content of medical treatment) can initiate a healing process. Why? I think it is because medicine is rich in a particular kind of science. Medical education is filled with science. In the US, all students must score high on the “Medical College Admission Test” in order to be admitted to medical school. Students are allowed a total of 345 minutes to complete the exam. Eight five minutes are devoted to “verbal reasoning,” and 60 minutes to “writing sample.” The remaining 200 minutes (58.5%) are split evenly between “physical sciences” and “biological sciences.” It is apparently important that physicians understand levers, inclined planes, the acceleration of falling bodies, the life cycle of insects, and the process of photosynthesis. The kind of science that doctors have to learn is the simpler sort of science, the mechanical kind. Physicists worked out the mechanics of simple machines (levers, planes) in the seventeenth century. In our times, they have been working on much slipperier subjects: quarks, chaos, the “weak force,” and the oddest of quantum phenomena. Cause and effect are far less easy to detect in these matters than in the study of falling bodies…But it is the latter, not the former, in which physicians are schooled. And there is very little social science in medical education where one must address the complexities and subtleties of, say, emotion, or ritual, or culture.
If you detect shades of Deepak Chopra in there, you are correct, all with a dollop of utter contempt for Newtonian physics, which, I will remind you, are still accurate enough for most real-world purposes here, where few things we do reach relativistic speeds. Instead, Moerman invokes quarks, quantum theory, and other complexities and contrasts it to the “simpler” sciences that physicians apparently learn. One can almost feel the contempt for us poor, deluded physicians. Perhaps if I had known a bit about Professor Moerman, my jaw ouldn’t have dropped so far when I read this in the editorial accompanying the NEJM study:
What do we learn from this study? The authors conclude that the patient reports were “unreliable,” since they reported improvement when there was none — that is, the subjective experiences were simply wrong because they ignored the objective facts as measured by FEV1. But is this the right interpretation? It is the subjective symptoms that brought these patients to medical care in the first place. They came because they were wheezing and felt suffocated, not because they had a reduced FEV1. The fact that they felt improved even when their FEV1 had not increased begs the question, What is the more important outcome in medicine: the objective or the subjective, the doctor’s or the patient’s perception? This distinction is important, since it should direct us as to when patient-centered versus doctor-directed care should take place.
Apparently Moerman thinks that patient-centered care means inducing a patient through placebo responses to think that he feels better when in actuality the disease-impaired function of his organ (in this case, the lungs) puts him at risk for serious complications. He then goes on to write:
For subjective and functional conditions — for example, migraine, schizophrenia, back pain, depression, asthma, post-traumatic stress disorder, neurologic disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, inflammatory bowel disease and many other autoimmune disorders, any condition defined by symptoms, and anything idiopathic — a patient-centered approach requires that patient-preferred outcomes trump the judgment of the physician. Under these conditions, inert pills can be as useful as “real” ones; two inert pills can work better than one; colorful inert pills can work better than plain ones; and injections can work better than pills.
I find it hard not to notice that Moerman has cast a very wide net; virtually any condition outside of trauma could fit into his definition. I can’t help but think that, if I, for instance, had asthma and the severity of my symptoms didn’t correlate well with my objectively measured lung function as estimated by FEV1, then I would want my lung function tuned up. And if I didn’t want my lung function to be improved, I would hope that my doctor would be able to educate me as to why it is important to make my lungs function better, even though I feel OK. Moerman would seem to advocate telling me, “Oh, no, Dr. Gorski, don’t worry about those blue lips you have. That’s just an ‘objective’ finding. You feel OK, and, since I practice ‘patient-centered’ care, which teaches, among other things, that symptoms are the most important thing and the reason why you come to a doctor in the first place, your feeling better is all that matters!”
I’ll give you another example. Consider an epidural hematoma. If you crack your head hard enough, it can sheer or damage one of the epidural arteries. The typical clinical course is that the patient will be knocked unconscious due to head trauma. Later, he will regain consciousness and experience what is known in the biz as a “lucid interval” that can last several hours. What’s happening during that “lucid interval” is that the blood is still accumulating, but the hematoma hasn’t reached a large enough size yet to cause damage, but when it does the patient deteriorates rapidly. Frequently, one of those “objective findings” is a CT scan that shows a little epidural hematoma, which may or may not blossom into a life threatening epidural hematoma that can squash the brain against the inside of the skull. That’s an “objective” finding. Even though the patient feels well; that hematoma could expand and kill him in a few hours.
No doubt Professor Moerman or Ted Kaptchuk would claim that these are ridiculous and unfair examples. No doubt they would say that this is not what they’re talking about, and that’s probably true. I’ll even concede that the example of the epidural hematoma example was a bit over the top, but that was intentional.
However, whether they realize it or not, by elevating the subjective beyond the objective, and then offering placebo medicine for the subjective, these are exactly the sort of arguments they are making, when you strip them to their essence. No doubt Moerman or Kaptchuk would like to think that they would never, ever use such an approach for diseases with such potentially bad outcomes, but where do they draw the line? When, exactly, do we decide that subjective improvement is more important than objective improvement and by what criteria?Moerman makes a great show of saying, “First, do no harm”:
Do we need to control for all meaning in order to show that a treatment is specifically effective? Maybe it is sufficient simply to show that a treatment yields significant improvement for the patients, has reasonable cost, and has no negative effects over the short or long term. This is, after all, the first tenet of medicine: “Do no harm.”
Clearly implicit in Moerman’s statement is the assumption that not intervening in the abnormal physiology of some diseases (for instance, asthma) doesn’t do harm. He’s wrong. Sometimes doing nothing is harmful, as it allows the disease to continue unchecked, possibly resulting in permanent end organ damage or even the death of the patient, and placebo medicine does nothing to prevent that.
Let’s return to asthma, since that is the disease that this study examined. Even if a person with asthma seems to feel fine with a lowered FEV1, there is a price to be paid for leaving asthma untreated, which, let’s face it, is what placebo medicine is, leaving the functional disorder untreated. For instance, there is evidence that early treatment after the diagnosis is made can prevent the airway remodeling that occurs in chronic asthma, in which airway constriction and inflammation lead to further narrowing of the airway and further functional decline. Moreover, if a case of asthma’s severe enough, a patient could be walking on the proverbial tightrope, where all it would take is a small insult to push him over into a life-threatening asthma exacerbation or pneumonia, whereas if lung function in an asthmatic is tuned up as well as it can be, I’ll have a lot farther to deteriorate to reach that dangerous point. Let’s also not forget: Asthma can and does kill, some 250,000 deaths per year worldwide. Choosing alternative medicine over effective asthma treatment because placebo responses lead to feeling better without altering the underlying illness, could very well lead to preventable asthma deaths.
In the end, I’m a bit torn about this study. On the one hand, it irritates me to no end how it is being sold to the public as evidence of “powerful” placebo effects and as evidence that we physicians should be doing more placebo medicine. On the other hand, the fact that CAM advocates are reduced to spinning studies like this the way they are is pretty darned conclusive evidence that they now know that, from the standpoint of therapy, the vast majority of CAM modalities do nothing and are in fact placebo medicine. The problem is, in some diseases, such as asthma, placebos run the risk of allowing serious harm from lack of effective intervention that actually alters the course of disease. If the therapeutic relationship is so damaged in the U.S. that the beneficial effects of provider-patient interactions are not being realized, whether you want to refer to these effects at the “placebo response” or something else, the answer is to fix medicine to make it easier and more rewarding for physicians to spend that time with patients. The answer is not to embrace magical thinking like that behind acupuncture, homeopathy, and huge swaths of CAM. To argue otherwise is a false dichotomy.

   Placebos in the news again
David Gorski
Link
Towards the end of last week, I was contemplating what I would be writing about for Monday. No topic had quite floated my boat, but I hated to dip into the archive of topics I’ve written about before to update a post. After all, I like to be topical whenever possible. Then what to my wondering eyes should appear (yes, I know Christmas is still two months away) but a study in the British Medical Journal by a group lead by Jon C. Tiburt at the Department of Bioethics at the National Institutes of Health in collaboration with investigators at the Osler Institute at Harvard University and the McClean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago entitled Prescribing “placebo treatments”: results of national survey of US internists and rheumatologists.
Serendipity? Who cares? The study addresses a very important aspect of science-based medicine.
In essence, Tiburt et al undertook a survey of 1,200 practicing internists and rheumatologists in the U.S. to assess their usage of placebos and their attitudes towards their use. Their results, summarized in the abstract, are as follows:
679 physicians (57%) responded to the survey. About half of the surveyed internists and rheumatologists reported prescribing placebo treatments on a regular basis (46-58%, depending on how the question was phrased). Most physicians (399, 62%) believed the practice to be ethically permissible. Few reported using saline (18, 3%) or sugar pills (12, 2%) as placebo treatments, while large proportions reported using over the counter analgesics (267, 41%) and vitamins (243, 38%) as placebo treatments within the past year. A small but notable proportion of physicians reported using antibiotics (86, 13%) and sedatives (86, 13%) as placebo treatments during the same period. Furthermore, physicians who use placebo treatments most commonly describe them to patients as a potentially beneficial medicine or treatment not typically used for their condition (241, 68%); only rarely do they explicitly describe them as placebos (18, 5%).
And their conclusions:
Prescribing placebo treatments seems to be common and is viewed as ethically permissible among the surveyed US internists and rheumatologists. Vitamins and over the counter analgesics are the most commonly used treatments. Physicians might not be fully transparent with their patients about the use of placebos and might have mixed motivations for recommending such treatments.
The ethics of placebos
The placebo effect has been discussed before on this blog, of course. Dr. Novella gave a good succinct definition the placebo effect as, “any health effect measured after an intervention that is something other than a physiological response to a biologically active treatment. Both Dr. Novella and Dr. Lipson have pointed out that the placebo effect should more properly be called “placebo effects,” because it is more than just one effect. Indeed, the effect can be so complex that it can even seemingly be observed in animals, although, as our new blogger Dr. Ramey has pointed out, the apparent “placebo effect” in animals is far more likely due to the perception and expectation of humans than in any actual placebo or therapeutic effect.
As a clinical investigator, I have to deal with issues of the placebo effect all the time. In any clinical trial, especially for symptoms with a subjective component, it is not unusual for the placebo effect to produce an apparent improvement in symptoms in 30% of subjects or more. Indeed, when it comes to science-based medicine, this effect is one reason why less rigorous studies of “alternative medicine” therapies that are arguably nothing more than a placebo (namely homeopathy, which is, after all, nothing more than vigorously shaken water) appear to show efficacy. Indeed, such effects have confounded many a study of “alternative” medical therapies, as documented by bloggers for SBM (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). One thing that has to be emphasized, though. Placebo effects have limits. For example, I am unaware of any study demonstrating that placebo effects prolonged survival in cancer patients or resulted in objectively measurable tumor shrinkage. In this case, arguably the use of placebos is more to blind the investigators to which experimental group the patient is in rather than to provide a true placebo effect. Also, in the case of cancer, it is rarely ethical to use a placebo, as under the Helsinki Declaration, new therapies must be tested against the current standard of care, not a placebo, and it’s rare that there isn’t a standard of care for even metastatic malignancies.
One of the problems with the use of placebo treatments in routine clinical practice outside of the context of a clinical trial is that placebos pose an ethical problem for clinicians. The reason is that their usage inherently requires deception on the part of the physician and makes informed consent by the patient virtually impossible, because if a patient knows that what he or she is receiving is a placebo it might not work.Moreover, as a recent study pointed out, the most robust component influencing the strength of the placebo effect is the patient-practitioner relationship, leading to the question of whether it is an abuse of that relationship for a physician to give a patient something that is not likely to help but either strongly suggest that it will or outright lie and say that it will. On the other hand, placebos can lead to the perception on the part of a patient that his symptoms have improved, and, for conditions where symptoms with a heavy subjective component are what bothers the patient the most, relief of those symptoms is what the patient comes to a physician for. The temptation to try placebos thus becomes especially strong for chronic conditions, where science-based medicine is often less effective in giving the patient what he wants: reliable relief of pain or discomfort. Given these complexities, it’s of interest to learn whether physicians still frequently use placebos. I say “still” because in the past physicians frequently did prescribe placebos to their patients for whom they couldn’t do much else, hoping to harness the power of suggestion and the placebo effect to have the patient think he’s getting better. The attitude was, “What’s the harm?”
Such an activity could be ethically justified in an earlier era, under a medical system in which paternalism was the model upon which most medical practice was built. Indeed, a blogger by the ‘nym revere pointed out that 60 years ago shots of vitamin B12 used to be used widely as an all-purpose placebo good for what ails you. (Of course, since placebos tend to be more powerful the more invasive they are, a shot would be expected to be better at provoking placebo responses than a pill; surgery is the most powerful placebo of all.) Patients were expected to trust their physicians to know and do what was best for them, and physicians were expected to know and do what was best. If a little deception was necessary, so be it. If what was “best” for the patient necessitated withholding a cancer diagnosis because the family didn’t want grandma to know she had advanced cancer, so be it. The problem is that such deception has no place in a model of a physician-patient relationship in which the paternalistic model has become less valid and the role of the physician seen more as collaborative and as an advisor. Society has evolved such that it is now expected that the physician will tell the patient the options and help the patient reach a decision, rather than simply tell the patient what to do. A medical student blogger, Jake Young, has described the current thinking quite well and rejects the use of placebos, while Associate Professor of Philosophy Janet Stemwedel argues that under some circumstances placebo use may be considered ethical.
Does this study help us with this decision? Not a lot.
The use of “inert” and “active” placebos
One important aspect of this survey of physicians is how the use of a placebo was defined:
…for the purposes of our research we defined a “placebo treatment” as a treatment whose benefits (in the opinion of the clinician) derive from positive patient expectations and not from the physiological mechanism of the treatment itself.
Another aspect of this study is that Tiburt et al asked about “active” versus “inert” placebos. Inert placebos were placebos not expected to have any activity, such as saline or sugar pills. “Active” placebos were defined as placebos containing an active pharmacological component either unrelated or marginally related to the condition being treated (prescribing antibiotics for viral infections, for example). Finally, although the authors go to great lengths to point out how they used “nonjudgmental” questions and never used the word “placebo” in their survey and how they asked the same question in different ways in order to try to nail down consistency of responses, I’m a bit skeptical that this mattered. Any competent internist or primary care physician–any competent physician–could probably see right through the avoidance of the word “placebo” and discern the purpose of the survey. For example, one question involved a fibromyalgia patient with debilitating pain, about which physicians were asked if they would prescribe a dextrose pill if a study had shown that the dextrose pill produced better subjective relief than no treatment. I’m sorry, but only a medical moron would fail to see through the purpose of this question.
It did not surprise me that few physicians use inert placebos anymore. At least since the time I was in medical school (late 1980s) and probably at least a decade before that, this practice has generally been frowned upon as a violation of patient autonomy and for its introduction of deception into the physician-patient relationship. However, the use of “active” placebos can be even more problematic. According to this survey, active placebos most commonly included:
…over-the-counter analgesics (41%) or vitamins (38%), and some used antibiotics (13%) or sedatives (13%) as placebos.
Using antibiotics as a placebo is profoundly unethical because it violates the precept of primum non nocere, more commonly known as “First, do no harm.” The reason is that it selects for antibiotic resistant bacteria, not only potentially harming the patient but others who might have the patient’s resistant bacteria passed on to them. Prescribing antibiotics for anything other than a documented or strongly suspected bacterial infection is almost always bad medicine. Over-the-counter analgesics can also cause harm in the form of stomach ulcers (nonsteroidal anti-inflamatory drugs) or liver damage (acetominophen). True, the risk is small at the doses recommended, but it is not zero. The same can be said to be true of sedatives. However, the issues surrounding analgesics and sedatives become more complicated because often physicians rationalize their use as also being mildly physiologically effective, thus producing both a “real” pharmacologic response and placebo responses. They might have a point.
““Just do something for me, Doc!”
Another interesting question is how much of this willingness to prescribe placebos comes from patient demands that the physician “do something.” Such demands are not trivial. Patients come to us as physicians because they have symptoms that are bothering them. We as physicians in general went into medicine to help people and to relieve suffering. It is very hard to say no to a patient. A medical blogger by the ‘nym #1 Dinosaur put it well:
I read the entire article very carefully and discovered that the investigators never asked WHY the respondents recommended the “placebo” treatments that they did. That would have been illuminating. I’ll bet my annual income (ok; big spender I ain’t) that “placebo” prescribing is a response to patient demands to “do something.” I know, I know; we’re supposed to spend whatever time it takes (never fully compensated) to explain to the patient why there is no effective pharmaceutical intervention for their condition (usually after the patient has refused non-pharmacologic modalities like exercise, diet, physical therapy, etc.) Guess what: the patient then goes next door, to one of the 46% of the 57% of the 1,200, who will suggest that they take OTC vitamins or other innocuous compounds, typically describing them not as “placebos” but as “a medicine not typically used for your condition but might benefit you.” Adding insult to injury, the patient usually considers that “placebo prescriber” (the one being unacceptably dishonest) to be a better doctor than the first; the one who follows “advice from the American Medical Association, which recommends doctors use treatments with the full knowledge of their patients,” by refusing to “prescribe placebos” as described in the journal article.
Of course, the vast majority of “alternative” medicine consists of nothing more than elaborate placebos. (And, remember, the more elaborate the placebo, the more likely a placebo effect.) In addition, most “alternative medicine” practitioners give patients exactly what they want and need: Time and an ear to vent to. It’s also not as simple as that in that in any therapeutic encounter there is always likely to be a component of placebo effect, even when the physician prescribes effective medicine.
Finally, one other aspect of this study is relevant for purposes of this blog, and that is how often vitamins and supplements were used as placebos. Abel Pharmboy over at Terra Sigillata makes an excellent point when he wishes that the investigators had delved more into the use of vitamins and supplements as placebos. The reason is that it is not clear whether this category just referred to vitamins or whether it encompassed various herbs and dietary supplements advertised for various purposes, such as Echinacea or glucosamine. What I tend to wonder about along with him is whether the use of dietary supplements for placebo purposes indicates that physicians know that very few such supplements have been shown to be more effective than an “inert” placebo for any condition. Or has the “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) movement had its effect, and do many physicians now believe in the efficacy of many of these supplements with little or no evidence of efficacy?
The reason I ask this question is a contrarian one. As it has been pointed out before, the likelihood of placebo effects occuring is maximized when both the patient and the practitioner believe in the efficacy of the treatment being prescribed. Arguably, for purposes of placebo prescribing, the “alternative medical” practitioner would be likely to provide a more effective placebo than the physician who does not believe in (or is at least skeptical of) a given supplement’s likelihood to benefit the patient. After all, if most CAM practitioners really and truly believe in their treatments, believe that they benefit patients, and believe that they work, by whatever mechanism. It doesn’t matter to them whether the mechanism is wildly, outrageously improbable, as it is for homeopathy. It only matters that they believe it, and they do. Compared to CAM practitioners, practitioners of science-based medicine are incompetent at prescribing placebos.
The bottom line to me is that I have a grave ethical difficulties when it comes to placebo use outside the context of a clinical trial. Unless I become a true believing CAM practitioner, the use of placebos would involve my telling patients something that I don’t believe, and, like Jake Young, that is something I simply don’t see myself ever feeling comfortable doing.
REFERENCE:
J. C Tilburt, E. J Emanuel, T. J Kaptchuk, F. A Curlin, F. G Miller (2008). Prescribing “placebo treatments”: results of national survey of US internists and rheumatologists BMJ, 337 (oct23 2) DOI: 10.1136/bmj.a1938

   On the dangers of using valid placebo controls in clinical trials of acupuncture
David Gorski
Link
I don’t recall if I’ve ever mentioned this before on this blog, but there was a time when I was less skeptical of acupuncture than I am now. It’s true. Don’t get me wrong, though. I never for a minute considered that the whole rigamarole about “unblocking” or “redirecting” the flow of that mystical life force known as qi had anything to do with whether or not acupuncture did or did not have efficacy treating disease or other conditions. That was clearly a holdover from the pre-scientific medicine times in which most beliefs about the causes of disease involved either the wrath of the gods or vitalism, the latter of which is, when you come right down to it, the philosophical basis upon which many “complementary and alternative” (CAM) modalities are based, especially the so-called “energy healing” modalities, such as reiki, therapeutic touch, and, of course, acupuncture.
However, because unlike so many other “energy healing” methods, acupuncture involved an actual physical action upon the body, namely the insertion of thin needles into the skin to specified depths, it did not seem to me entirely unreasonable that there might be some sort of physiological effect that might produce a therapeutic result. At least, that’s what I used to think until I actually started paying attention to the scientific literature on acupuncture. That’s when I started to realize that “there’s no ‘there’ there,” if you know what I mean. Horribly designed studies with either no controls or utterly inadequate controls tend to be the norm in the acupuncture “literature” (if you can call it that). Moreover, acupuncture was touted as having value for conditions and procedures for which there is no plausible (or even mildly plausible) physiological mechanism by which it could be reasonably postulated to have an effect. Arthritis, allergies, headache, back pain, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), Parkinson’s disease, post-operative nausea, hot flashes in breast cancer patients caused by the anti-estrogen drugs they have to take, infertility, it doesn’t matter. Seemingly acupuncture can do it all; it’s the Swiss Army knife of CAM therapies. Moreover, the “explanations” given to explain “how acupuncture works” seemed increasingly less plausible to me. Most of these explanations involve counterirritation or the release of opioids, and I’ve had an increasingly hard time believing that, even if these mechanisms are at play, they could have anything other than nonspecific effects, with no mechanism to explain how acupuncture could possibly do all things attributed to it. One rule of medical skepticism is that you should be very skeptical of modalities that are touted to be useful for a wide variety of medical conditions that have very different pathophysiology. Indeed, a funny thing happens when rigorous placebo controls are introduced, and that’s sometimes the placebo control does better than the “true” acupuncture; i.e., the evidence for acupuncture, taken in its totality, is completely compatible with placebo effect.
As Harriet Hall put it in her excellent analysis of a study purporting to show that acupuncture is useful for GERD:
This study falls into the category of what I call Tooth Fairy science. You could measure how much money the Tooth Fairy leaves under the pillow, whether she leaves more cash for the first or last tooth, whether the payoff is greater if you leave the tooth in a plastic baggie versus wrapped in Kleenex. You can get all kinds of good data that is reproducible and statistically significant. Yes, you have learned something. But you haven’t learned what you think you’ve learned, because you haven’t bothered to establish whether the Tooth Fairy really exists.
One area that acupuncturists keep needling away at is infertility. Somehow, in the CAM community it’s become conventional wisdom that acupuncture can somehow increase the chance of success for couples undergoing in vitro fertilization (IVF). Indeed, early this year I wrote about a meta-analysis that concluded that acupuncture did actually increase the success rate of IVF and why it did not show what its authors thought it showed. Tooth fairy science, indeed.
Now comes yet another study being publicized in the media that examines once again the question of whether sticking needles into women before they undergo IVF can increase their chances of conceiving. I could not help but be extremely amused by the title given to the ScienceDaily story about it: Placebo Acupuncture Is Associated With Higher Pregnancy Rate After IVF Than Real Acupuncture. You have to love a headline like that, and opening paragraphs like this:
A study comparing the effects of real and placebo acupuncture on pregnancy rates during assisted reproduction has found that, surprisingly, placebo acupuncture was associated with a significantly higher overall pregnancy rate than real acupuncture.
The study, published online in the journal Human Reproduction, looked at real and placebo acupuncture given on the day of embryo transfer in 370 patients in a randomised, double blind trial (where neither the patients nor the doctors knew which treatment was being given).
The researchers found that the overall pregnancy rate (defined by a positive urinary pregnancy test) for placebo acupuncture was 55.1%, versus 43.8% for the real acupuncture.
I bet that result caused some head-scratching.
This reminds me of a study not too long ago that found a similar–shall we say?–disconcerting result in which acupuncture was studied for its ability to relieve arm pain from repetitive use injuries, which was funded, amusingly enough, by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM). Naturally, I had to go straight to the source. Fortunately, you, too, can do the same because the manuscript is available online for free for everyone, unlike most such papers, which are hidden behind a subscription firewall, not easily accessible by any but academics. The study, coming out of China, is entitled A randomized double blind comparison of real and placebo acupuncture in IVF treatment, and its lead investigator is Dr. Ernest Hung Yu Ng, Associate Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology at the University of Hong Kong (People’s Republic of China. So, let’s take a look at this study.
The hypothesis, not surprisingly, is that acupuncture could improve the efficacy of IVF and result in a higher pregnancy rate. The specific acupuncture regimen consisted of two 25-minute sessions, one before embryo transfer and one after embryo transfer was completed. Patient were informed of the study on the day of transvaginal ultrasound-guided oocyte retrieval (TUGOR), at which time a practitioner of traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) “diagnosed” thusly subjects who agreed to participate in the study:
A registered traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) practitioner (E.W.S.S.) categorized these patients’ conditions by the four diagnostic methods: observation, auscultation, interrogation and palpation according to the TCM principles (Maciocia, 1998). They were classified into the related syndromes which included Kidney Yang/Yin deficiency, Liver Qi stagnation with blood stasis, Spleen Qi deficiency with Phlegm and combination of those syndromes.
I wonder if spleen qi deficiency requires a splenectomy or if we can prescribe more yang or yin for a Yang/Yin deficiency. Sorry, couldn’t resist.
Patients were randomized to receive either “real” acupuncture of “sham” (a.k.a. placebo) acupuncture, and the placebo acupuncture needle was described thusly:
The Streitberger’s placebo needles (Streitberger and Kleinhenz, 1998; Asiamed, Pullach, Germany; 0.30 x 30 mm) were used. The appearance of the placebo needle was the same as the needle used in the real acupuncture group. The placebo needle was not fixed into the copper handle and the tip of the needle was blunt. When it was pushed forward against the skin, the needle slid into the handle and the whole needle appeared shortened. This also gave patients a pricking penetration sensation. To place the placebo needle in position, the Park’s placebo device (Park et al., 1999; Dong Bang AcuPrime, Exeter, UK) was used. The same acupoints and procedures as in the real acupuncture group were applied.
Overall, the design of the trial appears pretty sound. It was randomized and double-blinded to the extent possible with a treatment like acupuncture, and, as all good double-blind studies do, patients were asked afterward to guess whether they were in the treatment group or the placebo group in order to assess the quality of blinding. The study was powered to detect a 15% increase in the rate of pregnancy based on the clinic’s usual success rate of 35%, which required 370 patients. (Note how it was assumed that acupuncture would increase the success rate of IVF.) Overall, on first glance, the two groups seemed to be comparable, although I was a bit disturbed to see that the statistics showing that they were, in fact, comparable in all the parameters measured were not included in the table summarizing the two groups. My other quibble is that I was a bit surprised that the primary outcome the investigators chose to look at was pregnancy rates as assessed by urine pregnancy tests. As anyone who’s ever undergone IVF knows, not all positive pregnancy tests result in an ongoing pregnancy or a live birth, not by a longshot. When discussing the success rate of IVF, what patients are interested in is the live birth rate. Anything less is a failure. Looking at the table of the results, I think I see why the authors were more interested in the overall pregnancy rate. It is the only outcome measure the produced a statistically significant difference between the two groups.
Let’s take a closer look. The overall pregnancy rate (a positive urine pregnancy test) was 43.8% for the “real” acupuncture group and 55.1% for the placebo acupuncture group (p =0.038). However, the numbers become less and less different as we go deeper into measurements of pregnancy that matter more. For example, generally after a round of IVF that results in a positive pregnancy test, the first big hurdle afterward is the 4 week ultrasound that is done to see if there is a fetal sac, and ongoing pregnancy is usually defined as a pregnancy resulting in a fetal heartbeat detectable by ultrasound at 8 weeks. The definition of live birth is fairly self-explanatory, although for purposes of this study it was defined as a live birth occurring after 24 weeks. In any case, clinical pregnancy rates for “real” acupuncture and placebo acupuncture were 38.9% and 49.2%, respectively (p=0.059); ongoing pregnancy rates, 31.9% and 40.5% (p=0.105); live birth rates, 29.7% and 38.4% (p=0.100). There was similarly no difference between implantation rates, miscarriage rates, or ectopic pregnancy rates. In fact, this study is not a study showing that acupuncture does anything to improve or harm success rates for IVF. It’s a negative study. There is no statistically significant difference between the outcomes in the only measure that patients really care about, live births. Indeed, there was in addition no difference between the groups in endometrial or subendometrial vascular density, nor were there any statistically significant differences in serum cortisol levels. Add to that the fact that the authors appear not to have controlled for multiple comparisons using an appropriate statistical correction (remember, the more comparisons one makes, the more likely there is to be a statistically “significant” difference by chance alone), and my conclusion is that this study would show us absolutely no difference between the groups if the appropriate statistical correction were applied.
That doesn’t stop the authors from doing all sorts of contortions over the results in the Discussion section. For example, the authors did find a significant decrease in serum cortisol after both “real” and placebo accupuncture, as well as an improvement in uterine blood flow parameters. To me this suggests decreased stress in both groups more than anything else, entirely compatible with the placebo effect. What’s more interesting is how the authors try to explain their result after first expressing their surprise in the discussion:
We found a significantly higher overall pregnancy rate following placebo acupuncture when compared with that of real acupuncture. There was a trend of higher rates of clinical pregnancy, ongoing pregnancy, live birth and implantation in the placebo acupuncture group, although the differences did not reach statistical significance. Surprisingly, significant changes in endometrial and subendometrial vascularity, serum cortisol concentration and the anxiety level were documented following both real and placebo acupuncture.
Why surprising? After all, this is exactly what would be predicted by the hypothesis that acupuncture acts primarily as a placebo; specifically, no differences in primary outcomes (ongoing pregnancy rates and live birth rates) but possibly differences in measurements related to patient anxiety, such as cortisol levels and uterine blood flow. No surprise there, unless you believe in acupuncture. The authors do go on to make a point that I actually somewhat agree with. Specifically, they lament that they didn’t include a no-acupuncture group as a control. Of course, the problem with adding such a group is that it would make it impossible to blind the study subjects in the no-acupuncture control group to their experimental group assignment and thus render this study no longer double blind. That is not an insignificant problem. However, it might be interesting to do in order to estimate the magnitude of the placebo effect.
More amusingly, Dr. Ng went into some contortions to try to explain his “surprising” result in an interview. In essence, he likened placebo acupuncture to acupressure and then waved his hands thusly:
Dr Ng gave two possible explanations for the results: “Placebo acupuncture is similar to acupressure and therefore is good enough to improve the pregnancy rate. Or else, it’s possible that real acupuncture may, in some way, reduce the pregnancy rate of acupuncture.
“So far there is no evidence that real acupuncture would adversely affect IVF outcomes because, in a previous meta-analysis of several acupuncture studies, the pregnancy rate was higher in the acupuncture groups than in the control groups. However, we cannot draw a firm conclusion about this from our current study as we did not compare the two groups with a third control group patients who received neither forms of acupuncture. Further studies should be conducted to compare placebo or non-invasive acupuncture and controls without acupuncture.”
You can sense the desperation. At least, I can, especially looking at his rationalization for the latter explanation, namely that “real” acupuncture somehow reduces the pregnacy rate. Of course, such a result would in fact be interesting if true, because it would indicate a physiological effect due to “real” acupuncture distinguishable from placebo acupuncture, just a negative one. In reality, the best explanation for this result is that there is no difference between the two groups (there isn’t, in fact) combined with a random finding of a seemingly “statistically significant” difference in one parameter, namely the overall pregnancy rate as measured by the rate of positive urine pregnancy tests in each subject group. Combine that with a hypothesis with a very low prior probability, which significantly increases the likelihood of a false positive result, as John Ioannidis has shown, and there’s no real difficulty in explaining Dr. Ng’s result. The only thing unusual in this case is that the false “positive” result was a “positive” in the wrong direction. Alas for poor Dr. Ng, he was tripped up by the vagaries of comparing two different (and almost certainly equal) placebos against each other. Do such studies long enough, and inevitably sometimes the “wrong” placebo will win.
REFERENCES:
E. W. S. So, E. H. Y. Ng, Y. Y. Wong, E. Y. L. Lau, W. S. B. Yeung, P. C. Ho (2008). A randomized double blind comparison of real and placebo acupuncture in IVF treatment Human Reproduction DOI: 10.1093/humrep/den380

   Placebo effects without deception? Well, not exactly…
David Gorski
Link
In discussing “alternative” medicine it’s impossible not to discuss, at least briefly, placebo effects. Indeed, one of the most common complaints we at SBM voice about clinical trials of alternative medicine is the lack of adequate controls — meaning adequate controls for placebo and nonspecific effects. Just type “acupuncture” in the search box in the upper left hand corner of the blog masthead, and you’ll pull up a number of discussions of acupuncture clinical trials that SBM bloggers have written over the last three years. If you check some of these posts, you’ll find that in nearly every case we spend considerable time and effort discussing whether the placebo or sham control used was adequate, noting that, the better the sham controls, the less likely acupuncture studies are to have a positive result.
Some of the less clueless advocates of “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM) seem to realize that much of what they do relies on placebo effects. As a result, they tend to argue that what they do is useful and good because it’s “harnessing the placebo effect” for therapeutic purpose. One problem that advocates of SBM (like those of us at SBM who have taken an interest in this topic) tend to have with this argument is that it has always been assumed that a good placebo requires on some level at least some deception of the patient by either saying or implying that he is receiving an active treatment or medicine of some kind. This, we have argued, is a major ethical problem in using placebos in patients, and advocates of placebo medicine appear to agree, because they frequently argue that placebo effects can be harnessed without deception. Indeed, just last week there was an example of this argument plastered all over multiple news outlets and blogs in the form of stories and posts with headlines and titles like:
    • Sugar Pills Work Even When People Know They Are Fake
    • Fake Pills Can Work, Even If Patients Know It
    • Irritable Bowel Syndrome: Placebo Works Even if Patients Know
    • Placebos help, even when patients know about them
    • Evidence that placebos could work even if you tell people they’re taking placebos
    • Meet the Ethical Placebo: A Story that Heals
Except for one, every one of these articles or blog posts discussing a new study in PLoS ONE that purports to have found that placebo effects can be elicited in irritable bowel syndrome (IBS) without deception buys completely into that very thesis. For example, here is an example, taken from the Reuters story about this study:
Placebos can help patients feel better, even if they are fully aware they are taking a sugar pill, researchers reported on Wednesday on an unusual experiment aimed to better understand the “placebo effect.”
Nearly 60 percent of patients with irritable bowel syndrome reported they felt better after knowingly taking placebos twice a day, compared to 35 percent of patients who did not get any new treatment, they report in the Public Library of Science journal PLoS ONE.
“Not only did we make it absolutely clear that these pills had no active ingredient and were made from inert substances, but we actually had ‘placebo’ printed on the bottle,” Ted Kaptchuk of Harvard Medical School and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, who led the study, said in a statement.
From Robert Langreth:
The latest study, a randomized trial of 80 women and men published in Plos One by Harvard researchers, shows that even when clinicians told women with irritable bowel syndrome they are getting fake pills, the fake pills still worked.
From CBS News:
Incredibly, according to a new study of patients with irritable bowel syndrome, the placebo effect, even when patients were in on the secret, worked almost as well as the leading medication on the market.
It’s also a lot cheaper. And the best part about placebo – no side effects.
From NPR:
However, conventional wisdom is that placebos require deception. In order to work, a patient has to think it’s an active drug. So the American Medical Association and other authorities frown on the use of placebos in everyday medical care for ethical reasons.
But along came the “honest placebo” study.
And, the most overblown report of all comes from Steve Silberman:
A provocative new study called “Placebos Without Deception,” published on PLoS One today, threatens to make humble sugar pills something they’ve rarely had a chance to be in the history of medicine: a respectable, ethically sound treatment for disease that has been vetted in controlled trials.
So, does this study show what all these stories claim that it shows? In a word, no.
When in doubt, go to the study
As you will see, the claims for this study by people like Silberman are overblown compared even to the claims made for it by its authors. I’ll show you what I mean by heading right over to PLoS ONE to find the article Placebos without Deception: A Randomized Controlled Trial in Irritable Bowel Syndrome. Notice right away that the authors of this study, led by Dr. Ted J. Kaptchuk of Harvard’s Osher Research Center, have framed their findings as having shown that it is possible to use the placebo effect without deception. The investigators. The Osher Center, for those of you not familiar with it, is Harvard’s center of quackademic medicine; only this time its investigators seem to be trying to do some real research into placebo effects. I’ll also give them credit for describing concisely the ethical conundrum that results when practitioners use placebos, at least as they are currently understood:
Directly harnessing placebo effects in a clinical setting has been problematic because of a widespread belief that beneficial responses to placebo treatment require concealment or deception. [3] This belief creates an ethical conundrum: to be beneficial in clinical practice placebos require deception but this violates the ethical principles of respect for patient autonomy and informed consent. In the clinical setting, prevalent ethical norms emphasize that “the use of a placebo without the patient’s knowledge may undermine trust, compromise the patient-physician relationship, and result in medical harm to the patient.” [4]
For purposes of this study, Kaptchuk et al wanted to determine if an open-label placebo pill with a persuasive rationale was more effective than no treatment at all in a randomized but completely unblinded study. In this particular study, it was made clear to the subjects in the experimental group that the pills they were getting were placebos — sugar pills. In fact, the pills were even named “placebo,” and the bottles containing them labeled as such! I’ll discuss the serious problems I found in the study in a moment, but first I’ll just take a moment to summarize the results. 92 patients with irritable bowel syndrome were screened and 80 patients randomized either to no treatment (43 subjects) or placebo (37 subjects). The primary outcome measurements were assessed using questionnaires, such as the IBS Global Improvement Scale (IBS-GIS) which asks participants: “Compared to the way you felt before you entered the study, have your IBS symptoms over the past 7 days been: 1) Substantially Worse, 2) Moderately Worse, 3) Slightly Worse, 4) No Change, 5) Slightly Improved, 6) Moderately Improved or 7) Substantially Improved.” Other scales were used as well. The trial lasted three weeks, and the results were as follows:
Open-label placebo produced significantly higher mean (±SD) global improvement scores (IBS-GIS) at both 11-day midpoint (5.2±1.0 vs. 4.0±1.1, p<.001) and at 21-day endpoint (5.0±1.5 vs. 3.9±1.3, p = .002). Significant results were also observed at both time points for reduced symptom severity (IBS-SSS, p = .008 and p = .03) and adequate relief (IBS-AR, p = .02 and p = .03); and a trend favoring open-label placebo was observed for quality of life (IBS-QoL) at the 21-day endpoint (p = .08).
I find it rather interesting that the way the authors chose to frame their results in the actual manuscript, compared to how they described their results to the media. One wonders whether saying that 60% of subjects taking placebos felt better compared to 35% receiving regular care feeling better sounded more convincing that citing improvement scores like the ones listed above. The reason is that I very much wonder whether the improvements reported are clinically significant. For instance, in the main result reported, those in the notreatment arm reported an average IBS-GIS of 4 (no change). In the Open Placebo arm, the average reported was 5 (Slightly Improved). How clinically relevant is this? I don’t know, but it sure seems to skirt the borders of clinical relevance and might not even achieve it. Come to think of it, the reason why news stories reported the results the way they did becomes clearer.
Be that as it may, I think I know why this study is in PLoS ONE, which is not known for publishing high quality clinical trials, rather than in a better clinical journal. New England Journal of Medicine material, this is most definitely not. (Of course, given the NEJM’s recent propensity towards a bit of credulity to woo, perhaps being in the NEJM doesn’t mean what it once did.) The first thing one notices, of course, is that there isn’t a single objective measure in the entire clinical trial. It’s all completely subjective. This is fine, as far as it goes, given that placebo effects affect primarily subjective outcomes, such as pain, anxiety, etc. It would have been quite interesting if the investigators had included along with their subjective measurements some objective measurements, such as number of bowel movements a day, time lost from work, or medication requirements. Anything. The authors even acknowledge this problem, pointing out that there are few objective measures for IBS. This may well be true, but it doesn’t mean it wouldn’t have been worth trying measures that are at least related to IBS. Then there’s the potential issue of reporting bias. Because this wasn’t a double-blinded trial, or even a single-blinded trial, it was impossible to hide from the subjects which group they were assigned to. Combine this with the lack of objective measures, and all that’s there is subjective measures prone to considerable bias, all for a condition whose natural history is naturally one of waxing and waning symptoms.
Lie to me, after all
As I mentioned in the introduction, this study is being touted all over the media and blogosphere as strong evidence that the placebo effect can be induced without deceiving patients. Indeed, the authors argue as much themselves in the discussion:
We found that patients given open-label placebo in the context of a supportive patient-practitioner relationship and a persuasive rationale had clinically meaningful symptom improvement that was significantly better than a no-treatment control group with matched patient-provider interaction. To our knowledge, this is the first RCT comparing open-label placebo to a no-treatment control. Previous studies of the effects of open-label placebo treatment either failed to include no-treatment controls [27] or combined it with active drug treatment. [28] Our study suggests that openly described inert interventions when delivered with a plausible rationale can produce placebo responses reflecting symptomatic improvements without deception or concealment.
No, the reason I say this is because, all their claims otherwise notwithstanding, this study doesn’t really tell us anything new about placebo effects. The reason is that, even though they did tell their subjects that the sugar pills they were being given were inert, the investigators also used suggestion to convince their subjects that these pills could nonetheless induce powerful “mind-body” effects. In other words, the investigators did the very thing they claimed they weren’t doing; they deceived their subjects to induce placebo effects by exaggerating the strength of the evidence for placebo effects and using rather woo-ish terminology (“self-healing,” for instance). Here’s how the investigators describe what they told their patients:
Patients who gave informed consent and fulfilled the inclusion and exclusion criteria were randomized into two groups: 1) placebo pill twice daily or 2) no-treatment. Before randomization and during the screening, the placebo pills were truthfully described as inert or inactive pills, like sugar pills, without any medication in it. Additionally, patients were told that “placebo pills, something like sugar pills, have been shown in rigorous clinical testing to produce significant mind-body self-healing processes.” The patient-provider relationship and contact time was similar in both groups. Study visits occurred at baseline (Day 1), midpoint (Day 11) and completion (Day 21). Assessment questionnaires were completed by patients with the assistance of a blinded assessor at study visits.
This is a description of the script that practitioners were to use when discussing these pills with subjects recruited to the study:
Patients were randomly assigned either to open-label placebo treatment or to the no-treatment control. Prior to randomization, patients from both groups met either a physician (AJL) or nurse-practitioner (EF) and were asked whether they had heard of the “placebo effect.” Assignment was determined by practitioner availability. The provider clearly explained that the placebo pill was an inactive (i.e., “inert”) substance like a sugar pill that contained no medication and then explained in an approximately fifteen minute a priori script the following “four discussion points:” 1) the placebo effect is powerful, 2) the body can automatically respond to taking placebo pills like Pavlov’s dogs who salivated when they heard a bell, 3) a positive attitude helps but is not necessary, and 4) taking the pills faithfully is critical. Patients were told that half would be assigned to an open-label placebo group and the other half to a no-treatment control group. Our rationale had a positive framing with the aim of optimizing placebo response.
How is this any different from what is known about placebo responses? I, for one, couldn’t find anything different. It’s right there in the Methods section: The authors might well have told subjects that they were receiving a sugar pill, but they also told them that this sugar pill would do wonderful things through the power of “mind-body” effects, as though it was entirely scientifically clear-cut that it would.
Finally, the investigators recruited subjects thusly:
Participants were recruited from advertisements for “a novel mind-body management study of IBS” in newspapers and fliers and from referrals from healthcare professionals. During the telephone screening, potential enrollees were told that participants would receive “either placebo (inert) pills, which were like sugar pills which had been shown to have self-healing properties” or no-treatment.
Even the authors had to acknowledge that this was a problem:
A further possible limitation is that our results are not generalizable because our trial may have selectively attracted IBS patients who were attracted by an advertisement for “a novel mind-body” intervention. Obviously, we cannot rule out this possibility. However, selective attraction to the advertised treatment is a possibility in virtually all clinical trials.
In other words, not only did Kaptchuk et al deceive their subjects to trigger placebo effects, whether they realize or will admit that that’s what they did or not, but they might very well have specifically attracted patients more prone to believing in the power of “mind-body” interactions. Yes, patients were informed that they were receiving a placebo, but it must be emphasized again and again that that knowledge was tainted by what the investigators also told them about what the placebo pills could do. After all, investigators told subjects in the placebo group that science says that the placebo pills they would take were capable of activating some sort of woo-ful “mind-body” healing process.
In fact, I would say that what Kaptchuk et al did was no different than what we know about what is required to induce placebo effects. They were also far more suggestive than the explanations that investigators conducting placebo-controlled clinical trials offer subjects during the recruitment process. Consider: In most clinical trials, investigators tell subjects that they will be randomized to receive either the medicine being tested or a sugar pill (i.e., placebo). This, patients are told, means that they have a 50-50 chance of getting a real medicine and a 50-50 chance of receiving the placebo. In explaining this, investigators in general make no claim that that the placebo pill has any effect whatsoever. In fact, in most clinical trials, subjects are explicitly told that it does not. In contrast, Kaptchuk et al explicitly tried to “optimize the placebo response” for purposes of the study by telling their subjects that the sugar pill activated some sort of mind-body response that would make them feel better — but only if they religiously took the sugar pills. Yes, they did tell the subjects that they didn’t have to believe in mind-body interactions to experience the healing response. But did it matter? I doubt it, because people with authority, whom patients tend to believe (namely doctors) also told subjects that there was strong evidence showing that these placebo pills activated some sort of powerful “mind-body” mechanism. This alone makes proclamations about how the investigators triggered placebo effects without deception — shall we say? — not exactly in line with the reality of the situation. A far better design would have included at least one more group, namely a group receiving the placebo but without all the suggestion about how it would activate “powerful mind-body” effects using a neutral script that simply said it was a sugar pill and wasn’t expected to do anything. Lacking that additional group, this study tells us very little that we didn’t already know.
Reality versus perception versus reporting
I’ve been very critical of how this study was reported, but I will admit that, actually, the overall design wasn’t that bad. After all, it’s a pilot study, and, as such, wasn’t that large. We shouldn’t expect too much from it, other than potentially intriguing results that generate hypotheses and justify further study. Rather, what I had a problem with were two issues: execution and spin.. Of the two, by far the biggest problem I have is with how investigators spun their results and how that spin was reported by the press as though this study were evidence that placebo effects can really be triggered without at least some degree of deception or suggestion to the patient. It shows nothing of the sort. That’s the problem.
Think of it this way. How is what Kaptchuk et al did when they came up with a “convincing rationale” for their sugar pills to relieve IBS symptoms any different than what a homeopath does when he concocts stories of “like cures like” and how water “remembers” the therapeutic molecules with which it’s been in contact? Or what a reiki practitioner does when he claims he can channel “healing energy” from the “universal source” through himself an into his clients for healing effect? Or when acupuncturists claim that they are “unblocking the flow of qi” to healing effect? Yes, I know that, to supporters of SBM, claims of unblocking qi, channeling energy, or using the memory of water are not scientifically compelling. In fact, they’re totally ridiculous. However, we often forget that to average lay people without a medical or scientific background, these woo explanations might well be quite reasonable sounding — compelling even. In the case of this study, the investigators did the same thing, only with a somewhat — only somewhat — less woo-filled narrative as to why their sugar pill should relieve the symptoms of their subjects.
One last note. Take a guess who funded this study. Go on. Where did the investigators get the money for this study?
That’s right. The National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) funded the study.
Why am I not surprised? Actually, in all fairness, this is one of the better studies that NCCAM has funded, which should give you an idea of how poor most NCCAM studies are. Even so, it’s only just a so-so study. It has a somewhat intriguing finding that could well be due to differences between the experimental groups, reporting bias, and/or recruiting bias. Or it might even suggest a way to activate placebo effects with a minimum of deception, a minimum of violation of patient autonomy. Maybe. But ground-breaking or somehow demonstrating that the placebo effect can be activated “without deception”? Not quite..

   Benedetti on Placebos
Harriet Hall
Link
There has been an ongoing debate about placebos on SBM, both in the articles and in the comments. What does it mean that a treatment has been shown to be “no better than placebo?” If our goal is for patients to feel better and they feel better with placebos, why not prescribe them? Do placebos actually do anything useful? What can science tell us about why a patient might report diminished pain after taking an inert sugar pill? The subject is complex and prone to misconceptions. A recent podcast interview offers a breakthrough in understanding.
On her Brain Science Podcast Dr. Ginger Campbell interviewed Dr. Fabrizio Benedetti, a physician and clinical neurophysiologist who is one of the world’s leading researchers on the neurobiology of placebos. A transcript of the interview [PDF] is available on her website for those who prefer reading to listening. The information Dr. Benedetti presents and the expanded remarks by Dr. Campbell after the interview go a long way towards explaining the placebo phenomenon and its consequences for clinical medicine. Dr. Campbell also includes a handy list of references. I’ll try to provide a summary of the main points, but I recommend reading or listening to the original.
A common misconception is that the response to placebos is a purely subjective psychological response involving only the cortical level of the brain; but evidence is accumulating that real, measurable, objective subcortical neurophysiologic phenomena are involved. One of the first hints was a 1978 study showing that the placebo response to pain could be blocked by naloxone, a narcotic antagonist drug, indicating that the placebo must have actually caused an increase in endogenous opioids.
Placebos are used in clinical trials methodology, where a placebo group is compared to an active treatment group. Typically, about a third of subjects in the placebo group show improvement, but this doesn’t mean all of them have responded to the placebo. There are many other factors that can cause improvement after administration of any treatment, whether effective drug or placebo, including spontaneous remission, regression to the mean, and various kinds of bias on the part of patients and experimenters.
Clinical trials are done to look for a difference between the outcomes with placebo and the outcomes with the drug. Researchers in those trials are not interested in trying to understand why there is an improvement in the placebo group. That requires a different kind of study. Dr. Benedetti is using “placebo balanced design” to tease out the influence of verbal suggestions — expectations — on the action of drugs. Subjects are divided into four groups. The first group of subjects receives the active treatment and is told it is the active treatment (the truth). The second group receives the active treatment and is told it is placebo (a lie). The third group receives placebo and is told it is the active treatment (a lie). The fourth group receives placebo and is told it is placebo (the truth). This design allows researchers to separate the specific effects of the active treatment itself from the nonspecific effects of suggestion and expectation.
In studies of surreptitious vs. open IV morphine administration, patients experienced less pain relief from the morphine when they were unaware that they were getting it. In one brain imaging study, the metabolic response to methylphenidate decreased by 50% when subjects were told they were getting a placebo.
The placebo response is not limited to pain. In Parkinson’s disease, placebos have been shown to cause a 200% increase in dopamine release in the brain, with an alteration in the activity of neurons and a corresponding clinical improvement in motor function. Dr. Benedetti has even documented a physiologic placebo response at the level of single neurons. In deep brain stimulation studies, the stimulator doesn’t work as well if patients are told it is off when it is actually on.
There is not just one “placebo effect,” but many different placebo effects that work by different mechanisms, including (1) anxiety reduction, (2) activation of the reward mechanism (with dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens), and (3) learning.
Placebo responses can be divided into two types: conscious and unconscious. Conscious responses involve suggestion and expectation. Unconscious responses occur with classical Pavlovian conditioning. If you give morphine 3 days in a row and on the 4th day you replace it with a placebo, almost 100% of patients will respond to the placebo as if they had received morphine. When a pill is administered, there is a completely unconscious association between two stimuli: the pharmacologic effect and the psychosocial context, which may include such things as the color and shape of the pill. Unconscious conditioning has been demonstrated in both animals and humans.
Conscious expectations are important for conscious physiological functions like pain and motor performance. Unconscious conditioning is more important for unconscious physiological functions like hormone secretion and activation of different immune mediators. Dr. Benedetti gives this example: if you give a patient a placebo and tell him it will increase his growth hormone levels, nothing happens. But if you give a drug that really does raise GH levels for two days and on the third day replace it with a placebo, the levels will rise with the placebo.
Clinical Implications
Dr. Benedetti gives placebos to subjects in a research setting; he doesn’t recommend giving them to patients in the doctor’s office. Placebo studies are important for understanding how the brain works, but Dr. Benedetti is not sure that they will lead to any clinical application. He says
the take-home message for clinicians, for physicians, for all health professionals is that their words, behaviors, attitudes are very important, and move a lot of molecules in the patient’s brain. So, what they say, what they do in routine clinical practice is very, very important, because the brain of the patient changes sometimes… there is a reduction in anxiety; but we know that there is a real change…in the patient’s brain which is due to… the ‘ritual of the therapeutic act.’
Experimentally, morphine requirements can be reduced by starting with morphine, substituting a placebo for later doses and periodically reinforcing the conditioning with morphine. This sounds like a good thing, but before it could become a useful option in clinical practice, it would have to overcome a number of ethical and practical hurdles. The unconscious placebo responses require conditioning and the conscious ones are problematic too. Even if some patients might get a degree of pain relief from just being handed a sugar pill with a strong suggestion, the effects can’t compete with effective pain treatments: the response is generally smaller, less reliable, less predictable, and not sustainable over the long term. I can’t imagine that ever becoming standard medical practice, and not just because of the ethical issues.
The doctor-patient relationship is essential to medicine, and placebo effects are an inherent part of that interaction. Communication is vital. Doctors must tell patients what a treatment is supposed to do. When pain medication is given without the patient’s knowledge, it doesn’t work as well. A clear understanding of the diagnosis is important: a positive diagnosis of something menacing like cancer can make the patient anxious and more aware of symptoms, while a negative diagnosis can reassure, relieve anxiety, and divert attention elsewhere. Lying to patients would undermine a trusting doctor-patient relationship and ultimately even interfere with the ability to evoke placebo responses. Prescribing placebos is uniformly rejected by medical ethicists: instead, we can put our increasing knowledge of placebo neurophysiology to good use without lying to patients.

Followup: Benedetti on Placebo Ethics
Harriet Hall on June 19, 2012
Link
A few months ago I wrote about Fabrizio Benedetti’s research on the neurobiology of the placebo response, and a discussion about placebos and ethics ensued in the comments. Now Dr. Benedetti has written about that issue in a “Perspective” article in the journal World Psychiatry, “The placebo response: science versus ethics and the vulnerability of the patient.” 
We have learned that verbal suggestions can activate neurotransmitters and modulate pain perceptions, and positive expectations can activate endogenous opioid and cannabinoid systems. A complex mental activity has objective effects on body physiology. Words and drugs can activate the same mechanisms. Drugs are less effective without therapeutic rituals. We are delving deep into human foibles and vulnerable traits at the center of human interactions. What implications do these insights into mind-body interactions have for patient care?
Things used to be simpler. Placebos are inert by definition. Prescribing an inert treatment constituted lying to a patient, implying that it would have a specific effect when the provider knew it would not. It might fool the patient into thinking he felt better, but it would not actually improve the course of illness, and it involved deception. Prescribing placebos was unethical, period. 
But now we are learning that while the placebo itself is inert, the act of giving a placebo is not: it can produce actual physiological effects through suggestion and expectation. So is it legitimate to prescribe sugar pills or lie to patients if we know it can produce objective health benefits? What was once black and white has now become a gray area.
Another question arises: how can we apply this knowledge to mainstream medicine? When we prescribe drugs, should we be using rituals and words to ensure that they are maximally effective? What limitations or guidelines might govern that practice?
Benedetti says:
If a syringe filled with distilled water and handled by a doctor may induce expectations of benefit, then the same expectations can be induced by talismans, mascots and bizarre rituals carried out by quacks and shamans…Deception is at the very heart of a placebo procedure, and indeed it makes no difference if this deception comes from a doctor or a quack or a shaman.
New knowledge about neurophysiology is being used to justify using any procedure that increases expectations and beliefs, no matter where it comes from. This is worrisome, to say the least. CAM and quackery are trying to exploit this new knowledge in ways that tend to throw medicine back to its pre-scientific days. Acupuncturists who have acknowledged that their procedures are no better than placebo have argued that we ought to use them anyway, since placebos really do work to make patients feel better. Manufacturers of bogus health products have argued in court that they know their products can only have placebo effects but placebo effects help people and they have to lie in their advertising in order to elicit those placebo benefits. What if this line of reasoning were carried over to pharmaceutical research? If a new drug fails in clinical trials, might the manufacturer try to justify marketing it anyway for the placebo effect?
My personal opinion is that lying to patients or misrepresenting the state of the evidence in any way is always unethical and must be scrupulously avoided. Telling the patient that what you are prescribing is a placebo wouldn’t excuse you, because the very fact that you are giving it has persuasive meaning for the patient. I think attempts to elicit a placebo effect should be only used in conjunction with an effective treatment. Words should be used carefully, and the focus should be on general measures that bolster the doctor/patient relationship and enhance the patient’s trust, like spending more time with the patient and showing a greater interest and sympathy.
We face two major challenges. First, we need to improve the ways in which we communicate the results of placebo research so the public won’t think we are willy-nilly recommending placebo deceptions of any kind in clinical practice. Second, we need to answer some difficult questions about the ethical limits of taking various actions to increase expectations. The answers will not be easy. Let the discussion begin.

A world-renowned placebo researcher asks, “Does placebo research boost pseudoscience?”
Professor Fabrizio Benedetti is the most famous and almost certainly also the most influential researcher investigating the physiology of placebo effects. In a recent commentary, he asks whether placebo research is fueling quackery, as quacks co-opt its results. The answer to that question is certainly yes. A better question is: How do supporters of science counter the placebo narrative promoted by quacks, in which placebos represent the “power of the mind to heal the body”?
David Gorski on September 23, 2019
Link

Fabrizio Benedetti is professor of physiology and neuroscience at the University of Turin Medical School in Turin in Italy, who is best known as a researcher studying placebo effects. In fact, arguably Benedetti is the most famous and influential researcher focusing on placebo studies. Indeed, we’ve mentioned him multiple times here on SBM over the years, with, for example, Harriet Hall discussing an interview on placebos that Benedetti did, with a followup on the ethical issues the use of placeboes engenders as well as the misinterpretation of his research by a journalist. His work has been used by purveyors of pseudoscientific medicine for at least as long as I can remember writing about pseudoscientific medicine, which means close to two decades. So it was with great interest that I was made aware by multiple people of a commentary written by Benedetti in Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics entitled “The Dangerous Side of Placebo Research: Is Hard Science Boosting Pseudoscience?” In it, Benedetti laments something that we’ve been lamenting ever since this blog started, namely how quacks are co-opting placebo research to justify their quackery. While I was happy to see a someone as renowned as Benedetti finally notice this and become disturbed enough about it to use his considerable cachet to publicize this problem, on the other hand I can’t help but be a bit frustrated that it’s taken him this long to speak out this way on the record in the peer-reviewed medical literature. (He’s also published in a quack acupuncture journal; he is not entirely innocent of himself promoting what Steve Novella has described as the placebo narrative.)
Of course, we here at SBM have described how quacks co-opt studies on placebo effects to justify their quackery. Indeed, we’ve observed many times that, as more and more rigorous scientific studies have shown that, for example, homeopathy has no effects distinguishable from nonspecific placebo effects, some homeopaths have switched from arguing that homeopathy has actual physiological effects that positively impact disease and its symptoms to arguing that the mechanism through which homeopathy “works” are placebo effects, which are rebranded in quack parlance as “powerful mind-body” effects or the power of positive thinking. Of course, as you will see and as Benedetti emphasizes, placeboes do not heal and do not produce more than transient effects on symptoms without affecting the overall course of the illness. They can’t cure cancer and do not affect the respiratory pathology of asthma. Worse, there is no such thing as placebo effects without deception, as we have repeated here many times, the attempts of acupuncture maven Ted Kaptchuk to “prove” otherwise notwithstanding, making the ethics of placebo use highly problematic at best. We also like to emphasize, as Benedetti himself does, that there is no single “placebo” effect, but rather placebo effects, which range from expectancy effects, to observation and reporting effects, to observer bias, and several others, making the whole topic very complex and often misunderstood.
Also, Benedetti gets on my nerves a little bit in that he makes placebo research sound far more wonderful and promising than it is. We see this in his introduction, where he goes on and on about how the “hard science” is validating placebo effects, even citing two of Kaptchuk’s articles on “open label placeboes without deception” favorably. I must admit that I did a little facepalm when I perused the reference list and saw that. However, he starts to right himself soon enough:
Although this is wonderful news for science, this may not be the case for society. The number of nonmedical organizations and healers that rely on this hard science, and actually justify their odd and bizarre procedures, has increased over the past few years. The main claim is that any procedure boosting patients’ expectations, which represent the main mediator of placebo effects, is acceptable because it can activate the same biochemical pathways and neural networks that have been made credible by hard science. Our department has witnessed an alarming increase in proposals from quacks and charlatans who devised new placebos which, they aver, may have powerful effects on those mechanisms so much emphasized by hard science (Figure 1). The first bunch of proposals our department received started in 1999, and they amount to 298 until the end of 2018, with an increase over time. In Figure 1, the sharp increase in 2009 is attributable to an article that appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine,9 asserting that ours was the foremost laboratory in the world studying placebos, which I believe may have had a great impact on the quackery community. It can be seen that a second sharp increase occurred in 2015, which can be attributed to the publication of this information in Wikipedia,10 which surely spread these concepts in the layman.
And here’s the figure:
Benedetti appears to be correct. There was a big increase in proposals to him in 2009, which does correspond to the publication of his NEJM article. I suppose it could have been something else but it seems reasonable enough that the increase of his fame as the premier placebo researcher in the world as the result of a publication in such a high impact journal would lead to quacks contacting him. He’s also correct. Quacks are glomming on to every new scientific finding with respect to placeboes and placebo effects:
The crucial point here is that when hard science started investigating placebo effects, it unconsciously produced a shift in quackery thinking. In fact, charlatans are becoming more and more aware that their bizarre interventions could work through a placebo effect. Indeed, whereas hard science has so far denied any scientific basis for nonconventional therapies, now the very same hard science certifies that the placebo effect has scientific grounds. Therefore, quacks are no longer interested in showing that their pseudo-interventions work; rather, they justify their use on the basis of the possibility that these bizarre interventions may induce strong placebo effects.
Which is what we’ve been saying for years, as I pointed out above. Indeed, sometimes the claims for placebo effects can include amusing hyperbole, such as when Robert Schiffman wrote, apparently with a straight face, that placebo effects are not only scientific, but they’re proof that God exists. I can’t resist quoting this little snippet from his article:
The placebo effect is arguably the most underrated discovery of modern medicine. Replace “just the placebo effect” with “the amazing placebo effect,” “the mind boggling placebo effect.” To my way of thinking, the very existence of this mysterious effect proves that God exists. That’s right, you can find evidence for the foundational truths taught by religion in virtually every double blind medical research study!
Then of course, there’s Deepak Chopra, who is all over placebo effects as “evidence” of “powerful mind-body healing” or “how the mind can heal the body“:
The placebo effect is real medicine, because it triggers the body’s healing system. One could argue that this is the best medicine, in fact, since: a. drugs do not trigger the healing system and b. the placebo effect has no side effects. Staying well means that the body is taking care of itself – and you – through a feedback loop of chemical messages. Circulating throughout the bloodstream, lymphatic system, and central nervous system, chemical messages are crucial to the healing system, because they keep every cell in communication with every other.
Then there’s Joe Mercola:
Your beliefs are energy fields, and they are working to promote either health or disease in your body right now. Which one is up to you.
When it comes to the ability of your mind to heal you, there are NO limitations. The sky is the limit.
And Andre Evans:
In clinical studies where patients are given placebos, they often will respond positively to them due to the expectation that they are receiving some form of beneficial medicine. Although not talking about placebo sugar pills specifically, this kind of self-treatment can be seen in one case where a woman’s own thoughts made her lose nearly 112 pounds.
Evans concludes:
If you believe that your illness is getting worse, it will probably get worse. If you believe that your treatment is helping you, you could actually cause massive self-healing to occur. Assuming a disposition will automatically prejudice your mind, and therefore cause your body to react either positively or negatively.
I’ve likened this view of placebo effects to the New Age belief system known as The Secret, which posits that if you only want something badly enough the universe will manifest it to you and it can be yours. Indeed, placebo effects are a major aspect of what I like to call the central dogma of alternative/complementary/integrative medicine, in essence, that wishing makes it so. It’s therefore no surprise to those of us who have followed the topics of quackery, CAM, and integrative medicine over the years that quacks immediately embrace any placebo research that they can portray as “proving” the power of the mind to heal the body and that whatever woo they are peddling “works” through placebo effects.
Benedetti notes with alarm the number of conditions for which quacks are advocating placebo medicine, including cancer, infectious diseases, central nervous system disorders like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases, infertility (and to prevent pregnancy), and more. Here’s where we get to the meat of Benedetti’s article, in which he asks several questions and tries to answer them, including:
     1.  What is the ethical limit to hand out placebos and to increase expectations?
     2.  Can we accept every means available, whether a sugar pill or a bizarre concoction?
     3.  What about those patients who trust bizarre rituals but not conventional drugs?
     4.  Should their expectation-related brain mechanisms be activated by means of odd rituals?
Here’s the money paragraph:
Although a definitive solution to these ethical issues is surely difficult to find, I believe that at least two aspects need to be considered in depth: education and communication. We need to educate and communicate with patients and health professionals in order to make them better understand the placebo phenomenon and the related problems. A first point that should be emphasized is that placebos do not cure, but rather, they may sometimes improve quality of life. There is plenty of confusion on this point, and unfortunately, many claim that they can cure virtually all illnesses with placebos. Hard science tells us that placebos can reduce symptoms such as pain and muscle rigidity in Parkinson’s disease, yet the progression of the disease is not affected; for example, in Parkinson’s disease, neurons keep degenerating even though some symptoms can be reduced for a short time.4 The second point is related to the first. The type of disease is crucial, and we need to make people understand that pain is different from cancer and that anxiety differs from infectious diseases. The psychological component of some illnesses can indeed be modulated by placebos, but placebos cannot stop cancer growth, nor can they kill the bacteria of pneumonia. The third point is related to the difference between real placebo effects and spontaneous remissions. So far, hard science has studied the placebo effect within a time span of hours/days, thereby limiting our knowledge to short-lasting effects. Consequently, long-lasting effects can be often attributed to spontaneous remissions.
I’m not sure exactly what Benedetti meant by that last part about spontaneous remissions. The first time I read this, I thought that he was implying that placebo effects could cause spontaneous remissions, but a reread suggests that he meant that fortunate patients who chose quackery and were fortunate enough to have a spontaneous remission misattribute their good outcome to placebo effects. Of course, although I haven’t seen an example of a patient attributing remission of cancer to placebo effects, I certainly have seen (and documented) many cases of patients who underwent both conventional therapy and alternative medical treatments for, say, cancer and did well attribute their good fortune to the alternative medicine rather than the conventional “cut, burn, poison” (as quacks like to call it) therapy.
Benedetti is, of course, correct that placebos, as far as the “hard science” shows, do not heal or cure. Indeed, as we have argued, it’s certainly highly debatable whether they have any clinically meaningful effect at all. In clinical trials, after all, a placebo is nothing more than an inert treatment that serves as a surrogate for all the other confounding factors in patient treatments that can affect results: natural history of disease, physician and patient bias, regression to the mean, Hawthorne effect (observer bias), and more. It has even been argued that placebo effects are primarily an artifact of the clinical trial process. Indeed, a 2010 Cochrane review on placebo effects for all interventions notes that placebo effects vary from large to non-existent, even in well-conducted clinical trials and that these variations were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted, the type of placebo used, and whether patients were informed that the trial involved placebo. The review also noted that it is “difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting”. Overall, the authors did not find that placebo interventions had important clinical effects in general. Similarly, in 2001, an analysis of clinical trials published in the New England Journal of Medicine comparing placebo with no treatment found “little evidence that placebos have powerful clinical effects” and had “no significant effects on objective or binary outcomes”. Basically, the preponderance of science suggests that placebo effects are probably mostly illusory, artifacts of clinical study design. I can’t help but note that even Benedetti himself does not advocate the use of placeboes in clinical practice yet, having stated that they are useful to study in clinical trials but that there are too many practical and ethical issues in clinical practice.
Still, it’s hard to disagree with Benedetti’s conclusion:
Overall, today the placebo phenomenon still remains a paradox and an effect not easy to handle. Besides the recent findings of hard science, many ethical concerns limit the implications and applications. We certainly need to pursue further research in this direction, yet the possible dangers of misuse and abuse should always be kept in mind. Unfortunately, quackery has today one more weapon on its side, which is paradoxically represented by the hard science–supported placebo mechanisms. This new “scientific quackery” can do a lot of damage; thus, we must be very cautious and vigilant as to how the findings of hard science are exploited. The study of the biology of these vulnerable aspects of mankind may unravel new mechanisms of how our brain works, but it may have a profound negative impact on our society as well. We cannot accept a world where expectations can be enhanced with any means and by anybody. This is a perspective that would surely be worrisome and dangerous. I believe that some reflections are necessary in order to avoid a regression of medicine to past times, in which quackery and shamanism were dominant. Unfortunately, the new knowledge about placebos by hard science is now backfiring on it. What we need to do is to stop for a while and reflect on what we are doing and how we want to move forward. A crucial question to answer is, Does placebo research boost pseudoscience?
The answer to that last question is certainly yes. I don’t need to “reflect” upon anything to know that, as I’ve been reflecting on placebo research for close to 15 years now. I would also point out that medicine is already, in at least one aspect, regressing to “past times, in which quackery and shamanism were dominant”. True, quackery and shamanism are not (yet) dominant again, but there is a whole specialty, “integrative medicine” or “integrative health,” that, while claiming to be evidence-based, nonetheless “integrates” pseudoscience and quackery such as acupuncture, “energy healing,” naturopathy, and even homeopathy, among many other forms of unscientific and pseudoscientific practices into its armamentarium of treatments, along with evidence-based lifestyle interventions, such as nutrition, exercise, and the like, thus making the quackery indistinguishable to the lay person from sensible, evidence-based recommendations. Worse, this specialty is becoming increasingly “respectable”, with institutes, divisions, and departments of integrative health popping up like kudzu in academic medical centers.
Of course, if an area of science increases our understanding of a scientific phenomenon and has arguably beneficial practical uses, it should be pursued. A lot of science can be misused (e.g., nuclear power, the scientific understanding of which is also used to create incredibly destructive weapons). The question to ask, I would argue, is not “Does placebo research boost pseudoscience?” The answer to that question is self-evidently yes. Rather, we should ask, “How can we mitigate the boosting of pseudoscience that placebo research inevitably produces?” Benedetti has some ideas on that topic, correctly pointing out that communication with patients is key, noting that “not only should we discuss and consider the positive effects of placebos and the impact they may have in clinical trials and medical practice, but we should also pay much of our attention to the negative counterpart, that is, the misuse and abuse by quacks, charlatans, shamans, and nonmedical organizations”.
We’ve been doing that for nearly 12 years now at SBM, and welcome Prof. Benedetti to the effort.

   Placebo Effect for Pain
Steven Novella 
Link
It has long been recognized that there are substantial multifactorial placebo effects that create real and illusory improvements in response to even an inactive treatment. There is a tendency, however (especially in popular discussion), to oversimplify placebo effects – to treat them as one mind-over-matter effect for all outcomes. Meanwhile researchers are elucidating the many mechanisms that go into measured placebo effects, and the differing magnitude of placebo effects for different outcomes.
For example, placebo effects for pain appear to be maximal, while placebo effects for outcomes like cancer survival appear to be minimal.
A recent study sheds additional light on the expectation placebo effect for pain. The effect is, not surprisingly, substantial. However it does not extrapolate to placebo effects for outcomes other than pain, and the results of this very study give some indication why. From the abstract:
The effect of a fixed concentration of the μ-opioid agonist remifentanil on constant heat pain was assessed under three experimental conditions using a within-subject design: with no expectation of analgesia, with expectancy of a positive analgesic effect, and with negative expectancy of analgesia (that is, expectation of hyperalgesia or exacerbation of pain).
What they found was that the positive expectation group reported twice the analgesic effect as the no expectation group, and the negative expectation group reported no analgesic effect. This is a dramatic effect, but not surprising.
There are systems in the brain that specifically alter the perception of pain. Mood, expectation, and attention all affect the perception of pain. This makes evolutionary sense, since pain is meant to be a warning system for tissue damage or disease, and so needs to have an acute grip on our attention. At the same time, there are circumstances when we may need to function despite our pain, or when it would be adaptive to habituate to chronic pain. There are therefore mechanisms in the brain that function to enhance and draw our emotional attention to pain, and others that function to inhibit pain.
It also needs to be noted that, broadly speaking, there are two components to pain. There is the origin and transmission of the pain signal, which is perceived as any tactile sensation. But then there is a specific emotional component to pain which occurs in the brain – that processing which makes pain hurt, that makes it into an emotionally negative experience. These two components can be separated. Narcotics, for example, are especially good at blocking the emotional component of pain, so that at times patients on opiates may report that they feel the pain but it does not bother them. Additionally, while withdrawing from narcotics the emotional component of pain in enhanced – patients may have what appears to be an exaggerated emotional response to even minor pain.
Therefore – since there is a built in system for modulating pain in response to both the physical and emotional environment, it makes sense that this system can be manipulated with physical and emotional inputs. If you make a patient feel better emotionally or decrease their stress or anxiety, their perception of pain will decrease, or at least it will not bother them as much (or, more precisely, their reporting of pain will decrease). This is why multi-disciplinary pain clinics often include psychological therapy as part of the overall approach.
This study demonstrates that expectation itself can have a dramatic effect on pain perception. They further elucidate, with fMRI analysis, the neuroanatomy that underlies this effect.
These subjective effects were substantiated by significant changes in the neural activity in brain regions involved with the coding of pain intensity. The positive expectancy effects were associated with activity in the endogenous pain modulatory system, and the negative expectancy effects with activity in the hippocampus.
This finding support prior research:
Further PET studies with dopamine D2/D3 receptor-labeling radiotracer demonstrate that basal ganglia including NAC are related to placebo analgesic responses. NAC dopamine release induced by placebo analgesia is related to expectation of analgesia. These data indicate that the aforementioned brain regions and neurotransmitters such as endogenous opioid and dopamine systems contribute to placebo analgesia.
The fMRI shows us where the effect is, and the PET scanning additionally shows us that dopamine is the important neurotransmitter involved in this effect.
What I would have loved to have seen in this study (perhaps this will be part of a follow up) is the same three treatment arms with a placebo treatment. This would enable us to directly compare the relative size of the expectation effect to the opiate effect. There are other questions as well. How much variation is there in the magnitude of this effect from person to person? Does the expectation effect habituate over time? Is the magnitude the same for different kinds of pain?
Conclusion
This study reinforces prior research indicating that there are built-in neurological mechanisms that modulate the perception and emotional content of pain. The study gives us further information about the exact brain structures involved in this effect. The authors conclude:
We propose that it may be necessary to integrate patients’ beliefs and expectations into drug treatment regimes alongside traditional considerations in order to optimize treatment outcomes.
They should have added “for pain.” This study says nothing about other treatment effects for which there does not exist a target system for symptom modulation. This error is distressingly common, especially in the translation of such research to the public. Pain is uniquely amenable to manipulation through mood and expectation. This does not predict that any other symptom or disease state can be so manipulated.
This situation is analogous to stress and heart disease. The heart is specifically susceptible to the physiological effects of emotional stress. Stress reduction, therefore, decreases, for example, the risk of heart attack. This does not mean, however, that stress reduction will therefore decrease the risks of any disease or adverse outcome.
All too often, however, people speak of “the placebo effect” as if it is one effect, equal for all outcomes. This notion is then supported with hand-waving explanations about self-healing. But the research is actually quite clear. There are many placebo effects. Expectation is only one effect among many, and many of these effects are illusory – they create the false appearance of improvement where none exists (like regression to the mean or observational bias). Further, when speaking of the expectation effect we must be careful not to falsely extrapolate this effect from one outcome (like pain) to others.
This and other studies show that the brain is hardwired to modulate pain based upon expectation. There is no reason to think that this effect translates to other subjective symptoms, let alone objective outcomes like survival.
But I do agree with the authors to the extent that this and other studies do suggest that practitioners should seek to ethically maximize the benefits of positive expectation when treating pain. This should not, of course, violate the principles of honesty or informed consent. But putting a positive spin on the potential of a pain intervention is therapeutic. This does not justify, in my opinion, using a known placebo intervention (unless the patient was informed that it was a placebo or a treatment without any biological activity), because otherwise this would involve unethical deception (and could also create and reinforce unscientific beliefs in patients that could result in harm downstream). Further, as this study shows, you can get a sizable placebo effect from physiologically effective treatments.

Cries the acupuncturist, “Medicine is biased against us, and there’s a double standard!”
A recent article in Popular Science argues that medicine has a bias against acupuncture, holding it to a higher standard of evidence than conventional medical interventions. Even if there is a double standard, the answer is not to recommend acupuncture, but rather to stop recommending medical procedures that don’t work.
David Gorski on May 8, 2017
Link

Of all the modalities of alternative medicine currently in use, arguably acupuncture is the one that has achieved the most mainstream acceptance in medicine. I’ve often asked why it has become so common in academic medical centers and elsewhere, despite the evidence being overwhelmingly in favor of the conclusion that it is nothing more than a theatrical placebo. It doesn’t matter that acupuncture is part of a prescientific system of medicine now known as traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), whose concepts are rooted in vitalism. It doesn’t matter that what has passed for acupuncture since the 1940s and 1950s bears little resemblance to what was practiced hundreds or thousands of years ago and even 100 years ago more resembled the bloodletting that was common in ancient European medicine more than the use of thin needles along “meridians” to “redirect the flow” of the life energy or qi to alleged healing effect. It doesn’t even matter that acupuncture, along with the rest of TCM, was basically foisted upon the world when Chairman Mao Zedong, unable to provide real medicine for his people after World War II, decided to make up the difference with folk healers even though he himself basically didn’t believe in TCM and chose “Western” medicine instead. At that point, the history of TCM and acupuncture were effectively “retconned” into the form we know them today. In the case of acupuncture in particular, the retconned version, which posits acupuncture as being thousands of years old and having been practiced in basically the same form over all that time, has little resemblance to the original, which wasn’t documented until the 17th century. Basically, TCM is more philosophy than medicine. None of this has stopped China from continuing to support and do its best to export TCM to the world, even in 2017.
We’ve discussed acupuncture many, many times on this blog because it’s an excellent alternative medicine modality to use to discuss placebo effects, shortcomings of clinical trials, and how alternative medicine is sold to the public—even revisionist history. In particular, it’s interesting to note how very many forms of acupuncture have developed, and how they are used, and how many conditions that acupuncture can supposedly treat, which encompass basically everything. It’s also a great jumping off point to discuss appropriate placebo controls, something that many acupuncture studies conveniently leave out, and how, the larger and more rigorous a study is, the smaller the effect observed is, until the largest, most rigorous studies show no difference between “sham” acupuncture and “real” acupuncture, and how meta-analyses sold as showing the therapeutic efficacy of acupuncture in actuality show no such thing. Basically, it doesn’t matter where you stick the needles or even if you stick the needles in; the effect is the same. And I haven’t even pointed out how studies of acupuncture from China are virtually always positive.
Not surprisingly, acupuncturists and believers in acupuncture always think that their favorite modality is being treated unfairly. Also not surprisingly, many of them publish in the Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine (JACM). Unfortunately, at least one of them writes for Popular Science.
In which medicine is accused of a “double standard” with respect to acupuncture
What made me think about these issues was an article by Kendra Pierre-Louis in Popular Science entitled “Why it’s so hard to figure out if acupuncture actually works: Should you stick a needle in it?” Notice the statement in the title. Yes, I agree that it’s hard to figure out whether acupuncture works. Past tense would be better, though, as figuring out whether acupuncture works is something that has already been done over the last three decades. It doesn’t.
Pierre-Louis, however, doesn’t seem to think so:
Does medicine have a bias against acupuncture?
That’s the verdict of a paper (and an accompanying commentary) published earlier this week in The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine. While there’s still no medical consensus on acupuncture, and most reputable medical organizations do not support its use for arthritic knee pain, the authors’ critique lends interesting insight into the process by which medical procedures are accepted—and which are excluded.
How does alternative medicine get to be plain-old medicine?
In fairness, that last question is a very good question that plays off a common adage in skepticism and science-based medicine: What do you call alternative medicine that has been scientifically proven to work? Medicine. But what does “scientifically proven to work” mean? If Pierre-Louis had focused on that question, using acupuncture as an example, even if I ended up disagreeing with her conclusion, the article would have been much more worthwhile. Unfortunately, Pierre-Louis is not about exploring that question; she’s about proving that acupuncture actually works and the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which provides guidelines for recommended treatments for diseases and conditions, has a bug up its butt about acupuncture:
Led by Stephen Birch of Kristiania University College in Norway, the researchers behind the new study allege that the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which details recommended treatments for given ailments, holds acupuncture to a higher standard than it does traditional medical modalities.
If all of the treatments that NICE recommend for knee arthritis—including weight loss and nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (NSAID) drugs like ibuprofen—had to meet the minimum required standards that NICE sets for acupuncture, “opiates would become the first line of drug prescription,” wrote Birch et al.
I’d hardly call Birch’s article a “study.” It’s more of an opinion piece with some data backing it up kvetching about how NICE came up with its guidelines for the treatment of osteoarthritis of the knee. Before coming back to the rest of Pierre-Louis’ piece, let’s take a look at Birch’s article, whose title gives away the game, “The U.K. NICE 2014 Guidelines for Osteoarthritis of the Knee: Lessons Learned in a Narrative Review Addressing Inadvertent Limitations and Bias.”
Bias. You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.
Birch’s complaint is stated most succinctly in the abstract:
Several systematic reviews suggest that acupuncture is effective for knee osteoarthritis (OA), and furthermore a safe and cost-effective treatment for this condition. A recent clinical practice guideline (CPG) from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), in the United Kingdom, recommended against the use of acupuncture on the grounds that the effect size (ES) in comparison with sham acupuncture is too small.
I read this, and couldn’t help but think, “You say that as though it were a bad thing.” And, yes, Birch does think it’s a bad thing:
The 2014 NICE guideline on OA (CG177) was not a complete revision of the 2008 guidelines, it was more limited. Although originally intended to be more extensive including a broader review of drugs such as NSAIDs, it was decided to review those at a later date. Not only did the update focus on only a few of the interventions, it also applied different criteria for evaluating and accepting interventions. In effect, as will be described, the process selected for evaluating acupuncture required the treatment to meet higher standards than many other included treatments. A key problem in this NICE update is the introduction of a focus on the development of recommendations based on the consideration of which interventions make ‘‘minimal important differences’’ (MIDs) to patients as a replacement for usual CPG comparisons of evidence. The MID was set as an effect size (ES) of 0.5 or greater. The analysis of the evidence for acupuncture in this review emphasized results from sham studies with a de-emphasis on evidence from pragmatic comparator studies. Despite the fact that the assessment of MIDs should include analysis of benefit and harm, this review did not include an analysis of safety data on acupuncture. This coupled with the lack of usual CPG head-to-head comparison of interventions excluded data relevant to the use of acupuncture as an intervention for knee OA in comparison with other standard recommended care options, namely that it is much safer than many other accepted interventions for knee OA pain. This shift in methodological approaches might have inadvertently biased against acupuncture.
Notice the main complaint about the NICE guidelines: That they’re too rigorous. The dead giveaway in the paragraph above is this sentence: “The analysis of the evidence for acupuncture in this review emphasized results from sham studies with a de-emphasis on evidence from pragmatic comparator studies.” I’ve discussed before how much acupuncture advocates love pragmatic studies. Pragmatic studies are designed to demonstrate the “real world” effectiveness of a treatment. Often they are not randomized and don’t have a placebo or sham control. Clinical trials are very regimented, with clearly defined protocols, rigorous inclusion and exclusion criteria for subjects, endpoints, and reporting. When a treatment that’s been shown to be efficacious in randomized clinical trials gets out into the real world, the inclusion criteria inevitably expand and the exclusion criteria contract. When that happens, patients who wouldn’t have been eligible for the clinical trials used to demonstrate the efficacy of the treatment receive the treatment, and the possibility of the treatment not working in these patients or causing adverse reactions becomes a real concern. The idea of a pragmatic trial is to study how well a treatment that has already been demonstrated to be effective and safe works in the real world. Here’s the thing. Pragmatic trials are not meant to be the first to demonstrate efficacy. They are meant to see if a treatment proven in randomized clinical trials still works as well when released “into the wild,” so to speak.
Unfortunately, acupuncture advocates flip the order and put the cart before the horse, emphasizing pragmatic trials. The reason is obvious. Pragmatic trials, because they often don’t have a placebo control arm or a sham treatment arm, by their very nature, will produce positive results. That’s acceptable for pragmatic trials used properly, because they aren’t meant to be the first demonstration of efficacy of a trial. That’s exactly what Birch et al. are doing here, and the reason they focused on osteoarthritis of the knee is because they can point to a meta-analysis that acupuncturists love to cite as evidence that acupuncture “works.” It was discussed many times on this blog when it was first published, and its author, Andrew Vickers, was most unhappy at the criticism.
See what I mean in the accompanying commentary by Hugh MacPherson:
Second, a new methodological approach was used in 2014. Different thresholds were used for the recommendations in 2008 from those made as part of the 2014 update. The new guidance introduced the concept of the minimum clinically important difference (MCID), and required those interventions such as acupuncture that were within the scope of the update to show an MCID of an effect size of 0.5, a difference that is commonly considered ‘‘moderate.’’ When acupuncture is compared with usual care, there is an effect size of approximately 0.5, as has been shown in an individual patient data meta-analysis of acupuncture for osteoarthritis.
As I pointed out, the Vickers meta-analysis did not show an MCID for acupuncture compared to sham acupuncture. That’s why MacPherson harps on an MCID between acupuncture and no treatment/usual treatment, a measure that maximizes placebo effects.
Does acupuncture do anything besides leaving little holes in the skin?
I’ll have more to say about Birch et al., but this seemed like a good point to jump back to Pierre-Louis’ article, because she asks the very pertinent question: Does acupuncture do anything? She seems quite taken by the fact that earlier this year the American College of Physicians listed acupuncture as a minimal invasive treatment of low back pain. But did it? Yes, it sort of did, but it was hardly a ringing endorsement. The actual studies used to justify the recommendations were questionable. For example, this study showed that there was no difference between “true” acupuncture and sham acupuncture (which is what pretty much all well-designed acupuncture studies show). In other words, it showed that acupuncture is a placebo intervention. This study tested a sort of “scalp acupuncture” that I’ve never heard of before. Another study was from China, and, as has been discussed before, pretty much all acupuncture studies out of China are positive.
What about chronic low back pain? Take a look:
Low-quality evidence showed that acupuncture was associated with moderate improvement in pain relief immediately after treatment and up to 12 weeks later compared with sham acupuncture, but there was no improvement in function (125–130). Moderate-quality evidence showed that acupuncture was associated with moderately lower pain intensity and improved function compared with no acupuncture at the end of treatment (125). Low-quality evidence showed a small improvement in pain relief and function compared with medications (NSAIDs, muscle relaxants, or analgesics) (125).
I laughed. At least, I laughed when I looked over the list of references. The authors actually included the GERAC study in its list, which basically showed that acupuncture does not work, given that sham acupuncture was indistinguishable from acupuncture. Another study was a “bait and switch” in that it studied “electroacupuncture,” which is in reality TENS. We’re talking thin gruel indeed.
However, that’s not enough. Pierre-Louis has to pick out another study that really impressed her.
Carpal tunnel and acupuncture a-go-go

The study that impressed Pierre-Louis so much is one that has special resonance for me, because I once suffered from the condition for which acupuncture was tested. I’m referring to carpal tunnel syndrome. Yes, around 16 years ago, I developed a really bad case of carpal tunnel syndrome in my left hand. Given that I’m a surgeon, you can appreciate the anxiety and fear that that caused me. I saw my career as potentially being over. The pain and numbness were manageable for a long time, but I saw the progressive nature of my carpal tunnel syndrome threatening my ability to operate. I even endured a nerve conduction study, which is basically torture with electricity. In the end, I was begging the hand surgeon to operate on me because I couldn’t take it anymore. Eventually, he did, and I recovered. My career was saved, and, other than an occasional twinge, I haven’t had any symptoms since.
So Pierre-Louis invokes a recent study that I meant to blog about when it first appeared, but for some reason never did:
A more intriguing example is a March study that appeared in the journal Brain, which found that acupuncture improved the outcomes for carpal tunnel syndrome by literally remapping the brain. Researchers came to that conclusion after exposing subjects diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome—broken into three groups—to acupuncture treatments.
Patients in the first group received an acupuncture treatment as prescribed by traditional Chinese Medicine—that is, needles were inserted at the site of the pain. The researchers exposed the second group to something known as distal needle acupuncture, in which acupuncture needles aren’t inserted where it hurts, but rather at other sites that practitioners say are connected to the painful regions by “channels of energy.” Yes, we know this sounds like snake oil—and the study authors aren’t alleging that the so-called channels exist. But if you want to know if something—a drug, a workout regimen, or in this case an acupuncture technique—has any effect, you have to test it.
Finally, a third group received what’s known as sham acupuncture, which is essentially the sugar pill of acupuncture. In this case, sham acupuncture involved non-penetrating placebo needles designed to convince participants that they had undergone a real acupuncture treatment. Each participant received 16 treatments of their designated form of acupuncture over the course of eight weeks.
At the end of the study, all groups equally reported that their symptoms had improved. That’s proof that acupuncture is a sham, right? Not exactly.
This is the study. Each group of patients with mild to moderate carpal tunnel syndrome received 16 sessions of acupuncture over eight weeks, with before-and-after carpal tunnel symptom questionnaires, median nerve conduction studies, and, of course, functional MRI (fMRI). In any event, the reason why all three groups improved in the short term should be obvious. All are placebo. This result is exactly what I would have predicted. Of course, the other thing that is obvious is that this is a typical “bait and switch” acupuncture study. It’s not acupuncture at all. It’s electroacupuncture, which is in reality a form of transcutaneous nerve stimulation (TENS). Let’s just put it this way: There was no electricity hundreds or thousands of years ago. Hooking up electrodes to acupuncture needles is a 20th century “innovation” that serves no apparent reason other than to “sex up” acupuncture. It also makes no anatomic sense. The distal acupuncture, for instance, was administered to acupuncture points in the lower leg; there is no anatomic reason to believe that this should have any effect on nerves in the distal arm. Remember, carpal tunnel syndrome is due to a very specific anatomic issue, entrapment of the median nerve as it goes through the carpal tunnel, defined by bones and ligaments in the wrist. That’s why the surgical treatment, cutting the transverse carpal ligament, works; it frees the entrapped nerve.
Now here’s where this study has some interesting results. They are not results that have anything to do with acupuncture, as this is in reality the application of electrical current at acupuncture points. But they are somewhat interesting. First, there was a modest (and not strongly statistically significant) improvement in median nerve conduction in both the distal and local acupuncture groups compared to the sham. This result makes little sense from an anatomic standpoint, although it’s not entirely implausible that running a weak electrical current along the lower arm might potentially affect nerve conduction studies in the same arm. In fMRI studies, the investigators reported brain remapping associated with symptom improvement only in those receiving the local acupuncture, a result that’s somewhat plausible. Of course, again, none of these results has anything to do with acupuncture, the existence of meridians, or TCM, even as they are sold as slam dunk evidence that “acupuncture” remaps the brain.
This study also has some significant flaws. For instance, although it was blinded, it appears not to have been truly double-blinded. Patients were blinded to allocation, as were the study physicians who evaluated patients for inclusion. Experimenters, the people who did the nerve conduction studies and evaluated the fMRIs, were blinded as well. You know who weren’t blinded? The acupuncturists. I’ll give the investigators credit for inserting all the needles in the distal and local acupuncture groups to hide from the patient the allocation. However, the acupuncturists knew which experimental group each patient was in at the first treatment session. So that’s a huge problem right there, especially since adequacy of blinding was only evaluated after the first treatment and the patients were unblinded after the fMRI. There’s also another huge defect in that the sham acupuncture specifically does not pass current through the needles. A much better control would have been to use random acupuncture points and actually run the same current through the needles. My guess is that this group, had it been included, would have shown the same results as the distal and local acupuncture groups.
So basically, what this study shows is mildly interesting, but is not evidence that acupuncture relieves symptoms and function in patients with mild to moderate carpal tunnel. The most generous interpretation is that passing current through the forearm 16 times over eight weeks might improve nerve conduction somewhat. That’s about it. Unfortunately, in a statement issued by Massachusetts General Hospital (which ran the study) and Harvard, the study’s principal investigator Nataly Napadow basically sells this as showing that “true acupuncture” works by a different mechanism than the “placebo” of sham acupuncture:
Even after years of clinical research, controversy continues as to whether acupuncture works primarily by the placebo effect, especially given the slight differences between the efficacy of real and sham acupuncture. The findings of the Brain study help to address this question. Sham acupuncture may produce a stronger placebo effect than a pill because it sends inputs to the brain via skin receptors and is coupled with a specific ritual. But the symptom improvement produced by sham treatment for conditions like CTS also might derive from entirely different mechanisms than those elicited by real acupuncture, the mechanisms of which may more specifically target CTS pathophysiology.
No, no, no. Maybe running electricity through the leg or arm causes an effect, but acupuncture doesn’t. After all, what was the main difference between both “true” acupuncture groups and the sham acupuncture group? It was the application of electrical current!
Studies like this and how they are sold infuriate me and are not evidence that acupuncture “works.” In this case, though, the press pretty much credulously ate up the given narrative, and I couldn’t find a single skeptical take on the study anywhere.
When is a placebo not a placebo?
Pierre-Louis, unfortunately, completely buys into Napadow’s narrative:
Recall that if you were to throw out the objective measure’s—the fMRI and nerve conductivity tests—Napadow’s study looks like a dud, because patients expressed equal levels of pain reduction whether they experienced real acupuncture or sham acupuncture.
The whole point of a placebo is that it’s inert. It doesn’t actually have an effect on the body, making it an excellent control. But physical interventions aren’t quite the same as sugar pills: even in sham acupuncture, there is some pressure or sensation being inflicted on the patient’s body. In fact, some cases of “sham” acupuncture even involve the insertion a needle, though Napadow’s study did not.
“There’s a controversy as to what sham acupuncture is,” said Napadow, “you still have a tactile sensation and a somatosensory input as a result of sham acupuncture.”
No, there really isn’t a controversy over what sham acupuncture is. At least, there shouldn’t be. The idea behind a placebo is to isolate the aspect of the treatment that has a specific physiologic effect, which sham acupuncture does in studies of acupuncture. Napadow failed to do that in his carpal tunnel syndrome study. The way his study was designed, whether you believe the results or not, all it could do was to isolate the electricity, not the “true” acupuncture, as the part of the treatment modality that causes a physiologic effect. His study shows nothing about acupuncture. Again, repeat after me: It doesn’t matter where you stick the needles. It doesn’t even matter if you stick the needles in.
In his commentary, MacPherson argues that acupuncture for knee osteoarthritis was given a bum rap by NICE, that NICE applied a double standard. He points out that the evidence for surgical interventions for this condition, such as arthroscopic debridement and lavage, is not very strong and that these interventions don’t reach the threshold for effect size required by NICE, even though NICE still recommends these procedures. Like so many alternative medicine apologists, he frames it in terms of the opioid epidemic:
As news of these questionable recommendations spreads, many people will be misled, such that acupuncture services may be commissioned less often, conventional medical practitioners may refer their patients less, and patients might find access to acupuncture more difficult. Moreover, misleading guidance related to chronic pain may inadvertently drive up the utilization of opioids, which is already emerging as an epidemic in the United States.
Birch et al. go even further, using the NICE recommendations as an excuse to advocate pragmatic trials:
If NICE were to apply the same criteria to OA [osteoarthritis] treatments, only opioids would be left and with their adverse events profile that may not be acceptable to some patients suffering from OA of the knee. Furthermore, in agreement with other authors, it is time to stop performing sham acupuncture as a control treatment in acupuncture studies.
Just a reminder: No sham acupuncture control = pragmatic study.
So basically, Birch et al. and MacPherson are arguing that the new NICE criteria are too strict and exclude acupuncture without excluding conventional surgical treatments that don’t reach the designated effect size and are not superior to sham surgery. They use these observations to argue that acupuncture should be included in NICE recommendations for osteoarthritis, too.
Pierre-Louis then asks the right question, but implies the wrong answer:
The researchers ask a simple question: if most of the recommended treatments fail to meet this threshold, why is acupuncture excluded while arguably more invasive procedures are included? But as patients, we should perhaps be asking a different question. Why are we being recommended procedures that don’t work?
An excellent question, actually. Unfortunately, the answer given by Birch et al. and MacPherson—for NICE to start recommending acupuncture for osteoarthritis—is the wrong answer. The correct answer is that, if surgical interventions for osteoarthritis truly don’t reach the new NICE threshold for MID, then the answer is not to include acupuncture in NICE recommendations for osteoarthritis, but rather to stop including those surgical interventions. That’s not how alternative medicine practitioners and apologists see the world, though. When conventional therapies don’t reach a given standard of evidence for efficacy and safety, instead of advocating that those treatments be abandoned, as those of us who advocate for science-based medicine do, they use that as a reason for accepting their quackery as valid treatments too. If it requires weakening the standards of evidence to let their quackery stand “integrated” with science-based medicine, so much the better.

Can we finally just say that acupuncture is nothing more than an elaborate placebo?
David Gorski on September 16, 2012
Link
I realize that Steve blogged about this study earlier in the week, but since I also commented on this particular study as my not-so-super-secret alter ego, I figured it rated a place on SBM as well. I emphasized different aspects of the study and tried to quantify exactly why, under even the most charitable interpretation of the study possible, the effects are not clinically significant. Besides, if the level of comments and e-mails is any indication, there is sufficient interest in this particular study to rate a second post.
Not suprisingly, this study is about about acupuncture. Well, it’s not exactly a study, it’s a meta-analysis that aggregates a whole lot of acupuncture studies in which this most popular of woos is administered to patients with chronic pain from a variety of causes. It’s also being promoted all over the place with painfully credulous headlines like:
    • Study: Placebo or not, acupuncture helps with pain (What a horrible headline; the very definition of “helping” is to do better than placebo. This was an AP story. Where’s Marilyn Marchione when you need her?
    • Acupuncture May Actually Work for Pain After All
    • Biological Implausibility Aside, Acupuncture Works (Uh, no. Not quite.)
    • Acupuncture works, one way or another
    • Does acupuncture work? New research suggests it does, for certain conditions
    • Acupuncture may be helpful for chronic pain
    • Not just a stab in the dark: The ancient Chinese therapy of acupuncture ‘does help to relieve pain’ say US researchers
    • Time for acupuncture to come in from the cold?
    • Acupuncture Superior to Placebo, Usual Care for Chronic Pain (Et tu, Medscape?)
    • Not Quackery: Acupuncture Does Relieve Pain
In deference to that last article, I was half-tempted to call this post Quackery: Acupuncture does not relieve pain. Then there were news reports like this:
And, of course, on accompanying the above news segment there was a story like this describing a patient with chronic pain:
In January 2009 she was referred to Dr. Jun Mao, a licensed physician and acupuncturist at the University of Pennsylvania.
“The only thing I had not tried was acupuncture,” Zierler said.
Now, a new review of research suggests that this ancient technique may truly hold benefits for those suffering from certain forms of chronic pain.
In a review of 29 previous well-designed studies, which together looked at almost 18,000 patients, researchers at Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center found that acupuncture does, indeed, work for treating four chronic pain conditions: back and neck pain, osteoarthritis, chronic headache and shoulder pain.
Even “placebo” acupuncture, where the practitioner only pretends to place the needle or places the needle in a random site, is effective at relieving pain, though true acupuncture works better.
And so was born the propaganda line for this particular study, namely that it’s huge; that it is the most compelling evidence thus far that acupuncture “works”; that all that stuff about “sham acupuncture” being as good as “real acupuncture” isn’t true. But is this study strong evidence of any of this? Let’s go to the tape, as I like to say.
The study itself is from a group called the Acupuncture Trialists’ Collaboration. I don’t know about you, but the very existence of something called the Acupuncture Trialists’ Collaboration is disturbing to me. Be that as it may, the study is Vickers et al, Acupuncture for Chronic Pain: Individual Patient Data Meta-Analysis. It was just published online in the Archives of Internal Medicine.
My first inclination when reading this was to apply a dictum to it that applies to all meta-analyses, no matter what the research question is; GIGO, Garbage In, Garbage Out, just like a meta-analysis of acupuncture to treat headache four years ago. On the other hand, on the surface, this meta-analysis looks like it’s a big deal. It uses patient level data instead of aggregated data, which allows for a better meta-analysis in most cases. It tries to restrict its included studies to those with the highest methodological quality (although that doesn’t completely inoculate it from the GIGO label, as you will see).
So what the authors did was to search MEDLINE, ClinicalTrials.gov, and the Cochrane Collaboration Central Register of Controlled Trials for studies testing acupuncture against chronic pain. They then winnowed the pile of studies they found using several criteria:
Randomized controlled trials were eligible for analysis if they included at least 1 group receiving acupuncture needling and 1 group receiving either sham (placebo) acupuncture or no-acupuncture control. The RCTs must have accrued patients with 1 of 4 indications—nonspecific back or neck pain, shoulder pain, chronic headache, or osteoarthritis—with the additional criterion that the current episode of pain must be of at least 4 weeks duration for musculoskeletal disorders. There was no restriction on the type of outcomemeasure, although we specified that the primary end point must be measured more than 4 weeks after the initial acupuncture treatment.
Do you see a problem yet? I do. It is not required that all studies included have a sham placebo group. That means some studies were acupuncture versus no acupuncture controls, the latter of which could include groups that got anywhere from nothing to regular care. That’s just one problem that I see, because mixing studies that compare acupuncture to no treatment, to sham treatment, or to sham treatment and no treatment are comparing apples and oranges in a way. Pooling such studies is inherently problematic.
There are other problems, but let’s first discuss what the study showed. First, Vickers et al reported that patients who underwent acupuncture had less pain. That’s true. However, I find it very hard to be impressed by these results. Indeed, they were most…underwhelming. Basically, the study reported that “real” acupuncture resulted in pain scores that were 0.23, 0.16, and 0.15 standard deviations lower than sham controls and 0.55, 0.57, and 0.42 standard deviations lower than no-acupuncture controls for back and neck pain, osteoarthritis, and chronic headaches, respectively. What does this mean? The authors themselves try to put it into context:
To give an example of what these effect sizes mean in real terms, a baseline pain score on a 0 to 100 scale for a typical RCT might be 60. Given a standard deviation of 25, follow- up scores might be 43 in a no acupuncture group, 35 in a sham acupuncture group, and 30 in patients receiving true acupuncture. If response were defined in terms of a pain reduction of 50% or more, response rates would be approximately 30%, 42.5%, and 50%, respectively.
One notes that Vickers et al have chosen a rather dramatic example, with large numbers. For patients with chronic pain, it’s uncommon to have a 50% reduction in pain scores, and the standard deviation they chose was rather large. By their own argument, even if there weren’t any methodological issues with the meta-analysis and their conclusions were completely justified, Vickers et al have just unwittingly made the argument that the effect of acupuncture might be statistically significantly greater than placebo effects but that it’s almost certainly not clinically significant. What Vickers et al are arguing is that a change of 5 on a 0-100 pain scale (which would be a change of 0.5 on a 0-10 pain scale), a subjective scale, is noticeable by patients. It’s probably not. There is a concept referred to as “minimally clinically important difference” (MCID) defined as “the smallest difference in score in the domain of interest which patients perceive as beneficial and which would mandate…a change in the patient’s management.” A recent review looking at minimal detectable and clinically relevant changes in pain scores in arthritis found a range in absolute terms between 6.8 and 19.9. Tubach et al assessed only the improvement aspect of the MCID and defined the minimal clinically important improvement (MCII) as the minimum improvement in the pain score reported by 75% of osteoarthritis patients ranking their response as “good” and reported that the MCII was -15.3 for hip osteoarthritis and -19.9 for knee osteoarthritis.
Here’s a hint: -5 (the difference between sham acupuncture and “real” acupuncture) is not clinically significant. The only way you can even approach clinical significance is to compare no-acupuncture controls versus acupuncture, in which case you’re adding placebo effects into any other effect observed, even if that effect is real (which I highly doubt it to be). Indeed, Vickers et al labor mightily to try to convince readers that this tiny effect, if it exists, is not just statistically significant, but clinically significant. They doth protest too much, methinks. In fact, I very much like how the grand master of the scientific analysis of “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), Edzard Ernst, put it:
Edzard Ernst, emeritus professor of complementary medicine at the University of Exeter, said the study “impressively and clearly” showed that the effects of acupuncture were mostly due to placebo. “The differences between the results obtained with real and sham acupuncture are small and not clinically relevant. Crucially, they are probably due to residual bias in these studies. Several investigations have shown that the verbal or non-verbal communication between the patient and the therapist is more important than the actual needling. If such factors would be accounted for, the effect of acupuncture on chronic pain might disappear completely.”
Which brings me to another major problem with this meta-analysis. It’s one that I noticed and one that Ernst also comments on. None of the studies included that I perused were double blind, which means that there was the potential for observational bias to creep into the study. While I concede that the authors did a pretty good job of making sure that studies in which there was a possibility of what is known in the biz as unconcealed allocation; i.e., failure to protect the randomization process to guarantee that the treatment to be allocated is not known before a subject is enrolled in the study (in studies with subjective outcomes, like pain, unclear allocation concealment is associated with bias towards beneficial effects), no attempt was made that I could identify to make sure included trials were double blind. In studies of subjective outcomes, blinding is almost certainly as important or more important than allocation concealment, and double blinding is essential. As Ernst put it so well, a trial is “either both patient and therapist-blind, or not blind at all.” The investigators appear to have only assessed the selected studies for whether patient blinding was adequate, looking for descriptions of questionnaires in which patients are asked to guess which group they were assigned to. Without double blinding, it’s hard to call any of these trials included in this meta-analysis “high quality.” And, yes, it is possible to double blind acupuncture studies, as much as acupuncture fans try to argue otherwise.
Finally, there’s the issue of heterogeneity in the trials. The authors report a lot of heterogeneity for most of the analyses that were performed but gave one of the sketchiest descriptions of how they actually calculated that heterogeneity that I’ve ever seen in a meta-analysis anywhere. One wonders what the reviewers were thinking. For supposedly ascribing to the PRISMA methodology for high quality meta-analyses, which specifies the calculation of a statistic (I2) for describing the heterogeneity of each meta-analysis comparison that is done, the authors don’t live up to its principles in at least this one respect. They don’t report that statistic. That strikes me as more sloppy than anything else, given that the authors concede considerable heterogeneity in their studies, making combining them problematic.
Finally, there’s the issue of publication bias. Publication bias, as most of my readers probably know, is the tendency for positive studies to be more likely to be published than negative studies. That’s because scientists don’t like publishing negative studies (they seem like “failures”) and journals don’t like publishing them either (because editors don’t consider them very interesting). That’s why, it’s essential that a meta-analysis include an analysis looking for publication bias. One very common way of doing this is a funnel plot. Yet there is no funnel plot included that I could find (I couldn’t get access to the supplemental material because I had to have someone e-mail the study to me and forgot to ask). Instead, they talk about looking at effect sizes in small studies and large studies and then calculate that “only if there were 47 unpublished RCTs with n = 100 patients showing an advantage to sham of 0.25SD would the difference between acupuncture and sham lose significance.” How they calculated this number is not described. I must say, I’ve never seen this sort of analysis in a meta-analysis before, which is why it stuck out like the proverbial sore thumb, as did the lack of a description of how this estimate was calculated. Modeling? Why 47 unpublished RCTs of 100 subjects and not a smaller number of larger RCTs? The whole thing looks like a number the authors pulled out of their nether regions and then plugged into their meta-analysis software in order to see if it would affect anything. In fact, I have a sneaking suspicion that they probably tried a lot of combinations in order to find the one that would make it look as though it would take a whole boatload of studies going the other way to eliminate the statistical significance of their results. Is that unfair to say so? Well, the authors have no one to blame but themselves, and if I missed the description of how that was calculated I’ll take my lumps.
In the end, I am less than impressed by this study, and it doesn’t surprise me at all that it was funded by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine (NCCAM) and the Samueli Institute.
In fact, I’m pretty much unimpressed at the whole study, although no doubt it will be touted by acupuncturists for years to come as “proof” that acupuncture really and truly works and isn’t just placebo medicine. It doesn’t, and it is. In fact, the study strongly suggests that any effect of acupuncture observed is almost certainly due to nonspecific and placebo effects and that the “positive” result is, as Ernst describes, likely due to small residual biases. Even if we concede that there might be the small effect of “true” acupuncture reported by Vickers et al, it is almost certainly a finding that is statistically significant but clinically insignificant or, as I like to put it because I like baseball analogies, a really long run for a really short slide. As they say, garbage in, garbage out. Can we finally just say that acupuncture is nothing more than an elaborate placebo?

   Vertebroplasty for compression fractures due to osteoporosis: Placebo medicine
David Gorski
Link
If there’s one thing we emphasize here on the Science-Based Medicine blog, it’s that the best medical care is based on science. In other words, we are far more for science-based medicine, than we are against against so-called “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM). My perspective on the issue is that treatments not based on science need to be either subjected to scientific scrutiny if they have sufficient prior plausibility or strong clinical data suggesting efficacy or abandoned if they do not.
Unfortunately, even though the proportion of medical therapies not based on science is far lower than CAM advocates would like you to believe, there are still more treatments in “conventional” medicine that are insufficiently based on science or that have never been validated by proper randomized clinical trials than we as practitioners of science-based medicine would like. This is true for some because there are simply too few patients with a given disease; i.e., the disease is rare. Indeed, for some diseases, there will never be a definitive trial because they are just too uncommon. For others, it’s because of what I like to call medical fads, whereby a treatment appears effective anecdotally or in small uncontrolled trials and, due to the bandwagon effect, becomes widely adopted. Sometimes there is a financial incentive for such treatments to persist; sometimes it’s habit. Indeed, there’s an old saying that, for a treatment truly to disappear, the older generation of physicians has to retire or die off.
That is why I consider it worthwhile to write about a treatment that appears to be on the way to disappearing. At least, I hope that’s what’s going on. It’s also a cautionary tale about how the very same sorts of factors, such as placebo effects, reliance on anecdotal evidence, and regression to the mean, can bedevil those of us dedicated to SBM just as much as it does the investigation of CAM. It should serve as a warning to those of us who might feel a bit too smug about just how dedicated to SBM modern medicine is. Given that the technique in question is an invasive (although not a surgical technique), I also feel that it is my duty as the resident surgeon on SBM to tackle this topic. On the other hand, this case also demonstrates how SBM is, like the science upon which it is based, self-correcting. The question is: What will physicians do with the most recent information from very recently reported clinical trials that clearly show a very favored and lucrative treatment does not work better than a placebo?
Here’s the story that illustrates these issues, fresh from the New York Times this week:
Two new studies cast serious doubt on a widely used and expensive treatment for painful fractures in the spine.
The treatment, vertebroplasty, injects an acrylic cement into bones in the spinal column to ease the pain from cracks caused by osteoporosis, the bone-thinning disorder common in older people. Doctors began performing it in this country in the 1990s, patients swore by it — some reporting immediate relief from terrible pain — and it soon caught on, without any rigorous trials to determine whether it really worked.
The new studies are exactly the kind of research that health policy experts and President Obama have been calling for, to find out if the nation is spending its health care dollars wisely, on treatments that work. A bill passed by Congress this year provides $1.1 billion for such so-called comparative effectiveness research.
The studies of vertebroplasty, being published Thursday in The New England Journal of Medicine, found it no better than a placebo. But it remains to be seen whether the findings will change medical practice, because they defy the common wisdom and challenge a popular treatment that many patients and doctors consider the only hope for a very painful condition.
These are the two studies in question, and they were published in last week’s New England Journal of Medicine. Whenever a journal as prestigious and widely read as the NEJM publishes two studies of the same clinical question in the same issue, as companion studies, it’s trying to send a message. This time, the message is loud and clear:
Kallmes DF, Comstock BA, Heagerty PJ, Turner JA, Wilson DJ, Diamond TH, Edwards R, Gray LA, Stout L, Owen S, Hollingworth W, Ghdoke B, Annesley-Williams DJ, Ralston SH, Jarvik JG (2009). A randomized trial of vertebroplasty for osteoporotic spinal fractures. New Engl. J. Med. 361:569-579.
Buchbinder R, Osborne RH, Ebeling PR, Wark JD, Mitchell P, Wriedt C, Graves S, Staples MP, Murphy B (2009). A randomized trial of vertebroplasty for painful osteoporotic vertebral fractures. New Engl. J. Med. 361:557-568.
Before I get into the meat of the studies, let’s take a look at what vertebroplasty is. Vertebral fractures in patients with osteoporosis represent a very difficult problem to deal with. The reason is that they can be extremely painful and, worse, very difficult to get to heal using conventional methods. Indeed, the pain can be so severe that powerful narcotics are the only thing that can control it. Given that it can sometimes take months for such fractures to heal (if they heal at all), “conservative” treatment is not very satisfactory. Not surprisingly, a search for treatments that could decrease the disability, pain, and even death from these fractures was imperative. Years ago, a procedure known as percutaneous vertebroplasty, which involved the injection of polymethylmethacrylate directly into the vertebral compression fracture under the guidance of fluoroscopy, was first reported. Initial anecdotal reports suggested a very rapid and effective relief of pain after the procedure. The other aspect of vertebroplasty that led physicians to believe that it could work to relieve pain from compression fractures is that the technique had some degree of prior plausibility. The concept was that the injection of cement into the fracture would provide rapid stabilization of the fracture and therefore rapid relief of pain. It’s never been proven that that is the mechanism, but, according to the principles of prior plausibility, there was at least a reasonable hypothesis as to how vertebroplasty might stabilize fractures and relieve pain.
Now let’s take a look at the introduction of Buchbinder et al:
Observational studies suggest that there is an immediate and sustained reduction in pain after this procedure is performed,5 but data from high-quality randomized, controlled trials are lacking. The best currently available evidence for the efficacy of vertebroplasty comes from one randomized, open trial involving 34 patients and two quasi-experimental, open, controlled, before–after studies that compared vertebroplasty with conservative treatment. Although each study showed an early benefit of vertebroplasty, methodologic weaknesses cast doubt on the findings. In particular, the lack of blinding and the lack of a true sham control raise concern that the observed benefits reflected a placebo response, an effect that may be magnified with an invasive procedure.
Does this sound familiar? For long-time readers of SBM, it should. I’ve written about it before, as have others, in two contexts. First, consider acupuncture. Time and time again, we have pointed out how acupuncture studies tend to be positive for early, smaller, less rigorously controlled studies but in larger and better-controlled studies the observed treatment effect disappears. This sort of progression is very typical for interventions that don’t produce an effect that is measurably greater than that of a placebo. And it is this sort of progression that appears to have occurred for vertebroplasty. Indeed, look at this New York Times article from four years ago:
No one is sure why it helps, or even if it does. The hot cement may be shoring up the spine or merely destroying the nerve endings that transmit pain. Or the procedure may simply have a placebo effect.
And some research hints that the procedure may be harmful in the long run, because when one vertebra is shored up, adjacent ones may be more likely to break.
But vertebroplasty and a similar procedure, kyphoplasty, are fast becoming the treatments of choice for patients with bones so weak their vertebrae break.
The two procedures are so common, said Dr. Ethel Siris, an osteoporosis researcher at Columbia University, that “if you have osteoporosis and come into an emergency room with back pain from a fractured vertebra, you are unlikely to leave without it.” She said she was concerned about the procedures’ widespread and largely uncritical acceptance.
Sound familiar? If not, consider this quote:
“I struggle with this,” said Dr. Joshua A. Hirsch, director of interventional neuroradiology at Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston. He believes in clinical trials, he said, but when it comes to vertebroplasty and kyphoplasty, “I truly believe these procedures work.”
“I adore my patients,” Dr. Hirsch added, “and it hurts me that they suffer, to the point that I come in on my days off to do these procedures.”
Again does this sound familiar? How many times have we heard the same sorts of quotes from CAM practitioners? Dr. Hirsch apparently started with the noblest of motives, wanting to relieve his patients’ unremitting pain from spinal metastases due to cancer or fractures due to osteoporosis. He still believed in 2005 that he was helping; otherwise he would probably have abandoned vertebroplasty. Many CAM practitioners start out similarly, no doubt. They come up with a method or a treatment, see what appears to be a good result, become convinced that it works, and thus become true believers. The difference is that, as an academician Dr. Hirsch at least felt uneasy about advocating this therapy without adequate research or strong objective evidence to show that it really works better than a sham procedure, because doing so goes against his academic training. Nonetheless, Dr. Hirsch convinced himself by personal observation and small pilot studies that the procedure works, even though before the studies I’m about to discuss the evidence supporting vertebroplasty was actually very similar to the state of evidence for acupuncture in that the best evidence for the efficacy of vertebroplasty were two unblinded trials comparing vertebroplasty with medical management. Not surprisingly, they were positive trials showing a benefit for vertebroplasty over medical management. That the the Director of Interventional Neuroradiology at Massachusetts General Hospital could convince himself that an unproven treatment works on the basis of personal observation and small pilot studies simply shows how easy it is to persuade oneself to believe what one wants to believe, no matter how scientific one views oneself.
Then comes hard, cold science.
First up is a multi-institutional study (Kallmer et al) involving five centers in the United States, five centers in the United Kingdom, and one center in Australia, led by David F. Kallmes, M.D. at the Mayo Clinic and Jeffrey G. Jarvik, M.D., M.P.H. at the University of Washington. According to the methods, “sites were selected on the basis of having an established vertebroplasty practice for osteoporotic fractures, an enthusiastic local principal investigator, and an available research coordinator.” The study was designed as a randomized, controlled, study, in which the experimental group underwent standard vertebroplasty, while the control group underwent a sham procedure in which local anaesthesia was infused, and verbal and physical cues, such as pressure on the patient’s back, were given. To complete the sham, the methacrylate monomer normally used to make up the glue was opened to simulate the odor associated with mixing of the cement. However, the vertebroplasty needle, the needle was not placed and the cement was not infused into the frature. Patients with fractures due to bone metastases, bleeding disorders, and a few other criteria were excluded. Overall it was a sound design, but the investigators had trouble recruiting patients to the trial. Indeed, the NYT article from 2005 describes just this for Dr. Jarvik’s trial:
In 2002, a group of researchers received a federal grant for a clinical trial that would be the first to rigorously assess vertebroplasty. But their study is faltering.
Patients in severe pain have proved unwilling to enter such a trial, in which they might be randomly assigned to get a placebo, and their doctors have been reluctant to suggest it. In 18 months, the investigators have been able to persuade just three medical centers to recruit patients, and only three patients have enrolled.
Now the investigators are looking for centers overseas, but they agree that the study’s prospects are dim and that its failure would leave critical questions unanswered.
“Whose responsibility is it to decide that something should be part of medical practice without adequate evidence that it works?” asked Dr. Jeffrey G. Jarvik, an investigator with the study and a neuroradiologist at the University of Washington.
Whose indeed? Once a belief has taken hold that a procedure works, it’s sometimes hard to persuade patients and physicians that a randomized study is ethical. Imagine how hard a sell this study would be to a patient at the apogee of pain from a compression fracture. That’s why there was a crossover design, in which patients, after one month, were allowed to crossover to the other group if they did not have adequate pain relief at one month.
In any case, this study was a resoundingly negative study. There were 131 patients enrolled (68 vertebroplasties and 63 simulated procedures), and the two groups were well matched. Both groups noted immediate and comparable improvement in disability and pain scores immediately after the intervention. At one month, there was no statistically significant difference between the control and vertebroplasty groups. The only hint of a possible effect is that there was a trend towards a higher rate of clinically meaningful reduction in pain in the vertebroplasty group, although, quite frankly, this result strikes me as a bit of the old trick of looking at multiple outcomes, trying to find one that comes out statistically significant. Let’s put it this way. This study is about as “positive” as any of the acupuncture studies we’ve dissected.
The second study (Buchbinder et al) was performed in Australia by a group led by Rachelle Buchbinder, Ph.D. It, too, was a multi-institutional study, with a control group that underwent vertebroplasty. The sham procedure was slightly different for this group, and, in my opinion, more rigorous. They underwent the same procedures as those in the vertebroplasty group up to the insertion of the 13-gauge needle, and to simulate vertebroplasty the vertebral body was gently tapped. As was done for Kallmes et al, the cement was prepared so that its smell permeated the room. Unlike Kallmes et al, there was no crossover was permitted in the design of this study. A total of 78 patients were enrolled and 71 completed the 6-month follow-up.
Buchbinder et al reported results that were just as unimpressive as those reported by Kallmes et al. In fact, they were more so, so much so that I will quote the abstract:
Vertebroplasty did not result in a significant advantage in any measured outcome at any time point. There were significant reductions in overall pain in both study groups at each follow-up assessment.
Can you say “placebo”? Sure, I knew you could.
Like Dr. Jarvik, Dr. Buchbinder crunched the data, looking for any outcome that could be considered even trending towards positive. She found none. This was about as negative a study as you can imagine, even more negative than most studies of homeopathy and acupuncture. This study found zero evidence that vertebroplasty is anything more than an elaborate placebo. Like acupuncture and homeopathy, come to think of it, the only difference being that there was some degree of prior scientific plausibility. Prior plausibility made vertebroplasty worth studying; however, these two trials provide emphatic evidence that it does not work, so much so that it surprised the authors, even though the very reason that the study had been done was because of nagging doubts that reported results seemed too good to be true:
Kallmes did the study because he always though the results reported for vertebroplasty seemed too good to be true–everyone got good results no matter how much cement was injected or what technique was used. And the mechanism through which vertebroplasty provided pain relief was a bit of a mystery. He figured if vertebroplasty was as good as promised, it would be easy to prove. He never expected results as stone cold negative as they were.
This is, of course, quite true. If vertebroplasty worked so well, it shouldn’t have taken much of a randomized trial to show it. If there’s one principle in medicine and clinical trials, it’s that dramatic treatment effects are much easier to demonstrate than weak ones. If vertebroplasty was as potent a treatment as advertised, these two trials should have easily shown its benefits. They did not. Indeed, in last week’s NYT article, there were a couple of more revealing quotes from the lead authors of these two studies:
“I’m going to be the most reviled radiologist on the planet,” said Dr. David F. Kallmes, the first author of one of the studies and a professor of radiology at the Mayo Clinic.
And:
“It does not work,” said Dr. Rachelle Buchbinder, a rheumatologist and epidemiologist at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia, and the leader of the Australian team. Dr. Buchbinder does not perform vertebroplasty and would “absolutely not” recommend it to patients, she said.
Dr. Kallmes, who helped develop vertebroplasty and has been performing it for 15 years, said his team was “shocked at the results.”
Shock is understandable. As had been pointed out in both papers, vertebroplasty had become the standard of care for the treatment of vertebral compression fractures. Medicare and insurance companies had, on the basis of unblinded studies, begun to reimburse for the procedure. Dr. Burbacher put it well:
Despite evidence that is acknowledged to be inadequate as a basis for justifying reimbursement, public institutions have recommended reimbursement for vertebroplasty. A recent position statement from various American radiologic and neurologic surgical societies also recommended funding the procedure.6 These endorsements have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of vertebroplasties performed. For example, an examination of aggregate fee-for-service data from U.S. Medicare enrollees for the period from 2001 through 2005 showed that the rate of vertebroplasties performed during that time almost doubled, from 45.0 to 86.8 per 100,000 enrollees.14 There are also reports of repeat procedures for unrelieved pain at previously treated vertebral levels16 and of the prophylactic use of vertebroplasty in normal vertebrae that were deemed to be at high risk for fracture.
Not only is the short-term efficacy of vertebroplasty unproven, but there are also several uncontrolled studies suggesting that vertebroplasty may increase the risk of subsequent vertebral fractures, particularly in vertebrae that are adjacent to treated levels, sometimes after cement has leaked into the adjacent disk; controlled studies have shown conflicting results.
In other words, there’s money to be made. A lot of money. Combine that with “personal anecdotal experience” that suggests to both patients and the physicians who do the procedure that vertebroplasty “works,” giving interventional radiologists the feeling that they’re “doing good while doing well,” and you can see why the procedure’s use has taken off.
But what about all the reports of dramatic pain relief from vertebroplasty? They’re testimonials, of course. I’m going to go back to the 2005 NYT article:
Dr. Jensen knows firsthand how powerful such stories can be. In the late 1990′s, when vertebroplasty was new and many doctors were looking askance at it, she gave a talk to a group of doctors in Chicago.
“I could tell by looking at the audience that no one believed me,” she said. When she finished, no one even asked questions.
Finally, a woman in back raised her hand. Her father, she told the group, had severe osteoporosis and had fractured a vertebra. The pain was so severe he needed morphine; that made him demented, landing him in a nursing home.
Then he had vertebroplasty. It had a real Lazarus effect, the woman said: the pain disappeared, the narcotics stopped, and her father could go home.
“That was all it took,” Dr. Jensen said. “Suddenly, people were asking questions. ‘How do we get started?’”
Even after these two studies, there are patients who will not be convinced, as demonstrated in last week’s NYT article:
One patient in the study, Jeanette Offenhauser, 88, said she was convinced that the cement had helped her severe back pain, even after hearing the results.
One thing that people often don’t realize and even physicians sometimes forget is that surgery and invasive procedures provide one of the most powerful placebo effects there is; so it is not surprising that a procedural intervention like vertebroplasty could appear effective at the anecdotal experience level. A lesson in history might be in order here. There was an operation that was popular in the late 1930s through the 1950s for treating angina due to coronary artery disease. It was called pericardial poudrage, and it involved opening the chest and sprinkling sterile talcum powder on the heart. The idea was that the inflammation would cause angiogenesis (the influx of blood vessels into the heart to revascularize it). We know today that the inflammatory reaction thus caused is far too minor to make up for the loss of blood flow from a major coronary artery. Still, patients reported marked improvement of their symptoms. It wasn’t until the 1950s that an actual randomized blinded trial (the patients could be blinded but the surgeons couldn’t) was performed. It found no difference between patients who had poudrage and those who just had their chests opened and closed. (Imagine trying to get that one through the IRB today.) In other words, poudrage was no different than sham surgery.
So it appears to be with vertebroplasty.
Even doctors are having a hard time accepting these results. Even Dr. Kallmes himself argues that patients who want the procedure should still be able to get it, but only under the auspices of a clinical trial. That’s not entirely unreasonable, but Dr. Burbacher disagrees and says that these studies should be enough to abandon vertebroplasty. In an accompanying editorial, Dr. James Weinstein of the Department of Orthopaedics, Dartmouth Medical School, argued:
President Barack Obama has called for more comparative-effectiveness research as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Although clinical trials are an integral part of such research, from a safety and effectiveness standpoint, data from clinical trials combined with those from registries or other large longitudinal databases are necessary to provide the best evidence. Americans prize advances in technology. However, if in major medical challenges, such as osteoporotic vertebral compression fractures, the alternative is to pay the cost of perpetual uncertainty, we need to support the research necessary to provide sufficient efficacy and safety information for patients to make a truly informed choice. Although the trials by Kallmes et al. and Buchbinder et al. provide the best available scientific evidence for an informed choice, it remains to be seen whether there will be a paradigm shift in the treatment of vertebral compression fractures with vertebroplasty or similar procedures.
That is indeed the question, isn’t it? Here’s the challenge. Given these two rather definitive randomized studies showing in essence no benefit for vertebroplasty over a placebo intervention, what will we as science-based physicians do? Will we abandon a procedure against which the evidence has been accumulating, culminating in two large randomized studies that found no real benefit in terms of pain relief? Unlike homeopathy, for instance, vertebroplasty has a complication rate. It’s low, but it’s there. Harm can be done, and these studies suggest there is no benefit to make the risks worthwhile. Or will we behave as CAM advocates behave and refuse to believe because we know from our own experience that it “works”?
What will we do?
Dr. Weinstein, ironically enough, suggests what may well happen:
In an interview, Dr. Weinstein, who does not perform vertebroplasty, suggested that rather than abandoning the procedure, doctors could let patients decide for themselves, by telling them, “This is a treatment option no better than a placebo, but if you want to consider a placebo because you might benefit from it, you might want to know that.”
A $3,000 placebo? If given the choice between a pricey $3,000 placebo and a CAM placebo like acupuncture, which is likely to cost less than that and not have the potential for complications, I would pick the acupuncture, quite frankly, because the potential for harm is less than sticking needles into vertebrae and injecting cement. Really, if allegedly science-based practitioners make this sort of argument, then why not just offer CAM to patients as a placebo?
Here’s my prediction. These studies will not be enough to change practice, at least not in the short term. Vertebral compression fractures are a serious problem for which other treatment options (bed rest, pain killers, and back braces while the fractures heal) are both slow and not palatable to patients or physicians, who want immediate results. However, unlike CAM practitioners, eventually physicians will yield to the weight of the negative evidence. There may be a few more studies, and it’s even possible that there may be found a subgroup of patients who actually do benefit from vertebroplasty, but eventually the procedure will either be abandoned or scaled back to patients who might actually benefit from it. The process may be far messier than we would like. It may take far longer than we would like. It may even take a turnover to a new generation of physicians for the process to be complete. But, make no mistake, science will win out.
Science-based medicine, in contrast to CAM, is inherently self-correcting. The problem is that we as science-based practitioners are just as prone to the same sort of thinking that causes CAM remedies that are no more effective than placebo persist against all negative scientific evidence. It’s a fact that we can easily forget if we are not careful. If we forget that we are just as prone to being fooled by personal anecdotal experience as any CAM practitioner, then we will be no different than they, the only difference being our choice of placebo-based therapies.

   The Prostrate Placebo
October 7, 2011
Link
I seem to be writing a lot about the urinary tract this month. Just coincidence, I assure you. As I slide into old age, medical issues that were once only of cursory interest for a young whippersnapper have increasing potential to be directly applicable to grumpy old geezers. Like benign prostatic hypertrophy (BPH). I am heading into an age where I may have to start paying attention to my prostate (not prostrate, as it is so often pronounced, although an infection of the former certainly can make you the latter), so articles that in former days I would have ignored, I read. JAMA this month has what should be the nail in the coffin of saw palmetto, demonstrating that the herb has no efficacy in the treatment of symptoms of BPH: Effect of increasing doses of saw palmetto extract on lower urinary tract symptoms: a randomized trial.
It demonstrated that compared to placebo, saw palmetto did nothing. There have been multiple studies in the past with the more or less the usual arc of clinical studies of CAM products: better designed trials showing decreasing efficacy, until excellent studies show no effect. There is the usual meta analysis or two, where all the suboptimal studies are lumped together, the authors bemoan the quality of the data, and proceed to draw conclusions from the garbage anyway. GIGO.
The NEJM study from 2006 demonstrated that saw palmetto was no better than placebo but it was suggested that perhaps the dose of saw palmetto was not high enough or that the patients were not treated long enough to demonstrate an effect, and the JAMA study hoped to remedy that defect.There is, as is often the case, no good reason to suspect that saw palmetto would benefit or harm the prostate. Like many herbal preparations, it had widespread uses back in the day, when I had an onion tied to my belt, which was the style at the time. You couldn’t get white onions, because of the war. The only thing you could get was those big yellow ones.., but I digress:
“It is also an expectorant, and controls irritation of mucous tissues. It has proved useful in irritative cough, chronic bronchial coughs, whooping-cough, laryngitis, acute and chronic, acute catarrh, asthma, tubercular laryngitis, and in the cough of phthisis pulmonalis. Upon the digestive organs it acts kindly, improving the appetite, digestion, and assimilation. However, its most pronounced effects appear to be those exerted upon the urino-genital tracts of both male and female, and upon all the organs concerned in reproduction. It is said to enlarge wasted organs, as the breasts, ovaries, and testicles, while the paradoxical claim is also made that it reduces hypertrophy of the prostate. Possibly this may be explained by claiming that it tends toward the production of a normal condition, reducing parts when unhealthily enlarged, and increasing them when atrophied.”
At the turn of century Edwin M Hale, MD and homeopath, wrote a treatise on the topic, extolling its benefits on the prostate and other organs. You will be happy to know that if you have testicular atrophy from being an old masturbator, saw palmetto will help. For no good reason I can find, it became popular only for BPH. As best I can determine from the internet, there was a natural medicine fad in the early 1900’s, and saw palmetto became part of the fad. No clinical trials were responsible for the use. And, like acupuncture and homeopathy, there are many explanations for an efficacy that does not exist.
The JAMA study followed 369 men for 72 weeks. They received placebo or saw palmetto twice a day, and at weeks 24 and 48 the dose of each was increased.
They were followed for subjective complaints with the AUASI score, which is a 7 question self administered questionnaire:
Link
Well validated as a tool for BPH symptoms, it relies overmuch on memory and is subject to wishful thinking on the part of the test taker. I doubt I could ever accurately remember my urinary patterns over the prior month without writing it down.
There were also objective endpoints like peak urine flow, PSA levels, and post void residual. Makes me wonder again what they want done when the radio advertisement says ‘Void were prohibited by law.’ Would saw palmetto make that easier? When it came to the subjective measurements, there was a slight, and similar, improvements in both groups. Objective, anatomic and physiologic endpoints were not affected. No surprise. So much for the powerful placebo.
Adverse effects were the same in both groups, with the only significant difference that the saw palmetto group had more physical injury and trauma. Was this the dreaded nocebo effect, or the random badness that occurs as a result of life? Probably the latter.
Based on the JAMA and NEJM trials, it is reasonable to conclude that saw palmetto has no efficacy in the treatment of symptoms due to BPH.
More interesting is what this article says about the so called placebo effect. This is yet another article that demonstrates that for hard endpoints, altering abnormal physiology or anatomy, placebo does nothing. I bet if we did brain scans of these patients they would show changes when the patient took the medications, and to that I would yawn. Do anything to anyone, give a placebo, tickle their feet, there will be changes in the brain. And while in some studies, increasing placebo amounts and frequency leads to increasing effects, in this study an increase in placebo dose led to no improvement in subjective outcomes.
More real world data to suggest that there are no real placebo effects.
Of course, I have bias. I have spent 30 years in acute care hospitals. My patients have derangements of anatomy and physiology that, if not corrected or at least ameliorated, lead to death or permanent morbidity. Placebo isn’t going to cure endocarditis, stop a gastric ulcer bleed, or reverse a stroke. And even if the patient feels better from the therapeutic relationship, if the anatomic/pathophysiologic abnormalities continue unabated, the patient is toast.
I am not even certain it can be said that placebos cure gastric ulcers. There is little on the natural history of ulcers in the flexible endoscopy age. The only reference I could find suggests that patients who have ulcers found with x-ray screening (not a reliable way to diagnose ulcers and probably under-represented the incidence) and who are not treated had a 24% cure rate at 6 months and a 29% relapse rate at 24 months. Most of the placebo trials followed patients around 4 weeks and had a higher cure rate in the placebo wing than seen in the natural history report, but the two are not directly comparable. Given the propensity of untreated ulcers to come and go and the unreliability of symptoms for diagnosis, unless there was a study that had a treatment, a placebo, and a no intervention arm, I do not think it is reasonable to conclude that placebos ‘cure’ ulcers. Especially given the NEJM review that suggested that placebo is usually no more effective than a no treatment/waiting arm.
Perhaps it is me. I do have some intellectual blind spots, like the anthropic principal. Every time I come across it in a cosmology book, I think that it is inane. I lack the imagination, or perhaps I am not stoned enough, to recognize its significance. So too with the placebo effect.
Placebo effects are probably more like quantum mechanics. The single slit experiment gives key insights into the fundamental nature of reality, but in the macroscopic world of day to day life my electrons move about just fine to heat my house and run my computer. No need to worry about probability functions, I can throw potatoes at a slit all day and never see a interference pattern. So too with the placebo effect. Most of the practical effect is lost in the noise of the complexity of illness, especially in the acute care hospital where I spend most of my time.
As Harriet quotes Dr. Benedetti:
the take-home message for clinicians, for physicians, for all health professionals is that their words, behaviors, attitudes are very important, and move a lot of molecules in the patient’s brain. So, what they say, what they do in routine clinical practice is very, very important, because the brain of the patient changes sometimes… there is a reduction in anxiety; but we know that there is a real change…in the patient’s brain which is due to… the ‘ritual of the therapeutic act.’
I do not disagree with that. I consciously try to accentuate just those interactions with every patient, because I know my job as a physician is more than ‘Me find bug, Me kill bug. Me go home’. But I do not think it is important for modifying any disease process I am involved with. Grooming each other has salubrious effects in monkeys, and as best I can tell, the placebo is no more than evolutionarily advanced nit picking.
Large swaths of the world rely on native healers and the only tool in their armamentarium is the “ritual of the therapeutic act.” And across the world and throughout time, people have suffered and died in droves. You may argue that is not a fair comparison, people suffered from poor hygiene, no vaccines, malnutrition and no health infrastructure. But the US has a group whose health care is only placebo, relying entirely on the ritual of the therapeutic act, and despite being surrounded by the benefits of western societal infrastructure, they die faster and younger: Christian Scientists.
At the end of the day, the practice of medicine is practical endeavor. I am a builder, not an architect. I have to try to make my patients better objectively and subjectively, and the placebo is a tool that has little utility in my toolbox. When my prostate grows to the size of a tennis ball, I am going to go looking for a therapy that will shrink it, not fool me into thinking I can write my name in the snow a little better.

   Incorporating Placebos into Mainstream Medicine
Harriet Hall
Link
Alternative medicine by definition is medicine that has not been shown to work any better than placebo. Patients think they are helped by alternative medicine. Placebos, by definition, do “please” patients. We would all like to please our patients, but we don’t want to lie to them. Is there a compromise? Is there a way we can ethically elicit the same placebo response that alternative theorists elicit by telling their patients fairy tales about qi, subluxations, or the memory of water?
Psychiatrist Morgan Levy has written a book entitled Placebo Medicine. It’s available free online. In it, he makes an intriguing case for incorporating the best alternative medicine placebo treatments into mainstream medicine.
In a light, entertaining style, he covers the placebo effect, suggestibility, and the foibles of the human thought processes that allow us to believe a treatment works when it doesn’t.
“Thinking like a human” is not a logical way to think but it is not a stupid way to think either. You could say that our thinking is intelligently illogical. Millions of years of evolution did not result in humans that think like a computer. It is precisely because we think in an intelligently illogical way that our predecessors were able to survive… [by acting on quick assumptions rather than waiting for comprehensive, definitive data]… We have evolved to survive, not to play chess.
He offers evidence from scientific studies indicating that belief in a treatment and the power of suggestion can have actual physiologic consequences such as production of endorphins or changes on brain imaging studies. He spices his narrative with colorful stories, including anecdotes from his own sex life and an impassioned plea (tongue in cheek?) for everyone to drink coffee for its proven benefits.
He gives examples (10 each) of three groups of treatments that elicit the placebo effect:
• Herbs and spices, (Bach’s flower remedies, Gingko, Echinacea, etc.)
• Misused therapies (chelation, colonic irrigation, fish oil, etc.)
• Totally fake treatments (acupuncture, homeopathy, ear candles, etc.)
He explains that some of these treatments do have real therapeutic effects, but they are being marketed for claims that are not the same as those real effects, or the real effects are too mild to support the claims.
“Placebo” is commonly thought of as a synonym for “ineffective” but it actually describes a therapeutic phenomenon that is very real and can be quite effective.
The mechanism of action involves the way we think about therapy rather than any actual effect of the therapy.
What if we told a patient:
I’m sending you to a Placebo Medicine specialist who will administer magnetic therapy. This therapy will have no real physiologic effect. However, if you carefully follow the direction of the magno-therapist and fully buy into what he or she is saying, then your brain will produce endorphins that will relieve the pain in your elbow.
This might work even better if we used Levy’s suggested term “Non-Pharmacological Intervention” or NPI instead of using the word “placebo.”
We could select patients by testing with suggestibility and psychosomatic instruments. We could tell the patient that he is fortunate because “Considering your scores on these scales you have a high probability of responding well to NPI treatments.”
What if scientific medicine were to co-opt the CAM movement? We could take these treatments out of the hands of the less ethical practitioners and outright scam artists and place it in the hands of those who are more likely to be altruistic. The truly altruistic practitioners could work within official guidelines. The charlatans would no longer be able to paint conventional medicine as the enemy. Family doctors would get to use placebos again. It would be a win-win situation.
If an acupuncturist is willing to use sham acupuncture and they don’t mind the patient being fully informed and they don’t cost too much, then I would gladly make referrals… I think that I could select an appropriate patient, perhaps one of my more somatic individuals, and educate them about the placebo effect. I would tell them how it can facilitate the brain to produce naturally occurring endorphins. I would refer patients for chronic idiopathic pain or for nausea and I would encourage them to fully buy into the story that the acupuncturist tells. I would say that the more they are able to do this the better it will work. Finally, I would follow the patient up afterwards.
I’m not entirely convinced, but I wonder if Dr. Levy might just be on to something. What do you think?

   It’s All in Your Head
Steven Novella
Link
I have never used those words to a patient or about a patient. I have also never heard a colleague use any similar term to a patient. And yet on many occasions I have had patients ask me, “So you’re telling me it’s all in my head?”
The concept of what are now called psychogenic symptoms is a tricky one for various reasons. There is an unfortunate stigma attached to the notion that our brains can cause physical symptoms. Making the diagnosis is complex. Outcomes are variable and are hampered by the difficulty in communicating the diagnosis to patients. Psychogenic symptoms often mask underlying physiological disease. And the risks of both false positives and false negatives are high.
This complexity leads some to argue, in essence, that psychogenic symptoms do not exist at all – that the diagnosis is a cop out, a way to blame the patient for the failings of the physician. But this approach, ironically, is a cop out, because it seeks to white wash what is a real and complex disorder with an overly simplistic and moralistic approach.
What are psychogenic symptoms?
Various terms have been used over the years to refer to symptoms that are generated by psychological stress or other factors. Hysteria is an unfortunate term which was invented to refer to the uterus, as if such symptom were uniquely female. For obvious reasons the term “hysteria” is no longer used. Psychosomatic is still a proper term, meaning physical symptoms with a mental cause, but the term does have a bit of a stigma attached. The term psychogenic is most widely used today, simply meaning having a mental cause.
A related concept is embellishment or psychogenic overlay. In these cases there is an underlying physiological disease or disorder which then results in stress and anxiety which further generates psychogenic symptoms on top of the physiological symptoms. What this means is that the presence of even demonstrably psychogenic symptoms does not necessarily mean that there is no underlying disease, and a thorough workup is still indicated.
Psychogenic signs and symptoms are real – the patient really experiences them, and often they lack insight into the origin of their symptoms. Psychogenic is not a synonym for fake, they are usually not voluntary, and patients cannot just stop their symptoms. A psychogenic disorder is a real disorder – it is just that the problem is with the brain’s software, not hardware (if you will excuse the geek metaphor).
Sometimes people have a depressive or anxiety disorder, which may be reactive or may be primary and due to a biochemical disorder in the brain. Anxiety puts a lot of stress on the body and can absolutely manifest with physical, and sometimes very dramatic, symptoms. Stress itself can also manifest with physical symptoms.
This should be no surprise to anyone familiar with neurobiology. The brain is an organ, just like any other organ in the body. It is made of tissue, and it is connected to the rest of the body through the nerves as well as the neuroendocrine system. Thoughts alone can speed up your heart by releasing adrenaline, they can cause butterflies in your stomach or nausea through increased vagal activity, or can flood penile tissue with blood causing erection. A fright can cause your blood pressure to drop resulting in fainting. Stress can chronically increase blood pressure.
So we all have psychogenic symptoms at some point in our lives, and we take them for granted. The fact that more dramatic symptoms can also result from purely psychogenic causes should not be that surprising.
How do we known when symptoms are psychogenic?
Often knee-jerk critics of the psychogenic diagnosis claim that it is purely a diagnosis of exclusion – an expression only of lack of knowledge on the part of the diagnostician. Excluding underlying physiological causes is an important part of the diagnosis – but not the only part.
In neurology (my specialty) for example, there are many situations in which positive evidence can be brought to bear to demonstrate that a patient’s symptoms cannot be neurological. There is a well-described entity known as pseudoseizures or non-epileptic seizures in which patients have involuntary seizure-like episodes. A seizure is an abnormal electrical discharge in the brain, firing neurons in unison and causing symptoms based on where in the brain the neurons are firing. There is a limited number of patterns that seizures can have, because they are “sloppy” and just spread directly to neighboring neurons (not following complex networks of neurons). There are some patterns of convulsive movement, for example, that are simply impossible – they cannot be due to motor seizures.
Also, at times patients will have psychogenic weakness, either partial or complete paralysis of a limb. True neurological weakness has certain features which cannot be simulated (voluntarily or involuntarily) and there are techniques we use in the neurological exam to look for these features. Likewise there are features that are very suggestive of what we call effort-dependent weakness (which does not imply insight or deliberateness). Essentially, different causes of weakness have different features on neurological exam that we can distinguish, often quite easily.
Further still, without a detailed knowledge of neuroanatomy, patients with psychogenic symptoms will tend to display distributions of symptoms that do not follow anatomical pathways. Or they will display patterns of movements that do not correspond to any part of the motor system.
Another feature that is suggestive (but not proof) of a psychogenic disorder is that the hard or objective findings that normally accompany a neurological deficit are absent. These include reflexes that do not require any cooperation, voluntary effort, or subjective feedback from the patient – they come pretty close to a direct examination of a circuit in the nervous system.
To summarize, there are cases in which patients exhibit neurological symptoms which seem to defy neuroanatomy, reveal features of effort, do not correspond to known systems in the nervous system, and lack any hard or objective finding that should be present. Even in these cases, we are likely to do a full workup looking for an underlying problem (as stated above, psychogenic symptoms may simply be overlaying a physiological lesion or disease). In psychogenic cases thorough neuroanatomical scans are normal, as are physiological tests for nervous system function.
In cases where there are positive features of a psychogenic disorder, and a thorough absence of other demonstrable causes, the diagnosis of a psychogenic disorder is perfectly reasonable. It is not a negative judgment about the patient, it is simply an attempt to make an accurate diagnosis.
False positives and false negatives
Nothing in medicine is 100%, and all diagnoses have false positives and false negatives. Physicians learn to deal practically with this uncertainty. For example, even though we may have made a confident diagnosis, we will still rule out alternatives we cannot afford to miss. The diagnosis of a psychogenic disorder is no different.
The public tends to focus on the risks of the false positive – diagnosing a symptom as psychogenic when there was a missed underlying physiological disorder. While this happens, it is again no different than any form of misdiagnosis. This is, admittedly, the worst-case-scenario. But to put it in perspective, this often occurs after a thorough workup that has failed to reveal the diagnosis. So the failure to make the underlying diagnosis occurs whether or not the alternate diagnosis of psychogenic is entertained.
Putting the notion of a psychogenic cause aside, physicians often face the situation in which patients have symptoms that cannot be diagnosed. The body is complex, and we cannot always explain every symptom. Workups are designed, in fact, to look for entities which can be treated, not necessarily to explain symptoms at all costs. So when we say we don’t know what is causing a symptom what we really mean is that we have ruled out anything that we could treat. What we are left with are all the subtle biochemical or physiological causes that we either cannot rule out, or are simply not worth investigating because they will not change management.
Sometimes patients are simply uncomfortable with this situation (perhaps because it was not communicated to them well). They may seek a diagnosis until they find someone willing to make one, and then they will blame their previous doctors for “missing” the real diagnosis. Sometimes the actual diagnosis is missed, and patients were right to seek other opinions. But at other times the new diagnosis is the fake, but it is more acceptable to the patient than the stigma of stress or anxiety induced symptoms.
It should also be pointed out that sometimes there is an underlying disorder causing psychogenic symptoms – serious anxiety or depression. These are just as much “real” disorders as anything else.
In short, we see every permutation of diagnostic misadventure because the human body is complex, our knowledge and technology are limited, and the doctor-patient relationship is increasingly complex.
There are also risks to the false negative, however – missing a psychogenic disorder when that is the proper diagnosis. Patients who have disturbing symptoms due to psychological stress or anxiety will often seek multiple opinions. They will get what we call “the million dollar workup” – sometimes over and over again. There are real risks associated with so many tests. Sometimes the tests themselves are invasive and contain risks. But even safe tests, if you get enough of them, are bound to result in false positives, which could lead to a misdiagnosis, further invasive testing, and improper treatment with risks and side effects.
I have seen this scenario play out as well. I have had a few patients who, in my opinion, had entirely psychogenic symptoms, but through their tireless seeking of medical attention ended up being on numerous medications they did not need, and being subjected to many invasive procedures which then led to complications. In the end the patients had physiological and anatomical disorders and symptoms, but all ultimately resulting from the failure to properly diagnose their original symptoms as psychogenic. They would have been much better served if they were aggressively reassured that they did not have the diseases they feared, and if they were directed toward gentle quality of life interventions, as well as psychological attention for their underlying disorder. In one case the patient had what can only be called mental illness, and needed to be aggressively redirected toward psychiatric treatment.
The point is – there are risks both ways (like in all of medicine). There are risks to prematurely making the diagnosis of a psychogenic disorder or missing an additional underlying trigger, and there are risks to missing the diagnosis of a psychogenic disorder.
Conclusion
In a perfect world the unfortunate stigma attached to the psychogenic diagnosis would disappear. It is very counterproductive. We need broader understanding that the brain is also an organ and can manifest symptoms in a variety of ways. Psychogenic causes are just another item on the differential diagnosis.
Physicians, for their part, should likewise remove any stigma attached to patients with psychogenic symptoms and need to approach the diagnosis as if it were any other – with positive and negative signs, and risks to false positives and false negatives.

   Asthma, placebo, and how not to kill your patients
Peter Lipson 
Link
A number of years ago I was walking along Lake Michigan with a friend (a fellow medical resident) when she turned to me and said, “are you wheezing? Do you have asthma?” I had always been physically active and assumed my breathlessness while walking down the trail was due to the thirty extra pounds of pizza and doughnuts I’d acquired during residency. But she was right: I was wheezing and breathless and it didn’t feel good at all. I made an appointment with one of the hospital’s lung docs who took a good history, did a physical, and ran some pulmonary function tests. And I did have asthma. And it felt much, much better when I used proper medication, a feeling confirmed by my improving lung function tests. (Not too surprisingly, the asthma got even better when I lost 40 lbs and started treatment for my acid reflux.)
I still get mild asthma symptoms from time to time, especially when I get sick, but for many others, the picture isn’t so pretty. Asthma kills at least a quarter of a million people every year around the world. If you’ve ever worked in an ER and seen a kid with a bad asthma attack, you’ve earned a healthy respect for the disease. If you’ve ever watched your own kid gasping for breath, begging you to make it better, you’ve learned to fear it.
As our understanding of asthma has improved, so has our ability to treat it (an ability that is strongly linked to a patient’s socio-economic status. Mortality has been rising despite the discovery of better treatments. Wait: let’s pull this out of the parentheses…)… Asthma deaths and hospitalizations are largely preventable, and disproportionately affect Black and Hispanic Americans. We know how to treat the disease asthma, but don’t know how to treat the people who are affected most.
We understand that asthma is not just a tightening of the airways but also an inflammation that can cause long-term damage. Not only can we treat asthma, but we have objective ways of measuring how well our patients are doing. It’s easy and inexpensive to measure airway obstruction and response to medications. We know what works.
For this reason, a new study in the New England Journal of Medicine seems both wise and foolish.
(I thought I was so on the ball. I really did. But while I was busy riding my bike, playing with my kid, and looking at rentals with my wife, David Gorski and my other medical blogger pals were out in Las Vegas at TAM discussing the very study I wanted to tell you about.)
The study, called “Active albuterol or placebo, sham acupuncture, or no intervention in asthma,” was done for reasons that are not clear to me. It may have been done not to test the effectiveness of asthma therapy but to look at what a “placebo” might really be or do. At least, I think that was the idea. When reading the abstract and full text, it’s not actually clear why the study was done. At first it seems as if it were done to see why asthmatics treated with placebo improve:
In prospective experimental studies in patients with asthma, it is difficult to determine whether responses to placebo differ from the natural course of physiological changes that occur without any intervention.
Why ask such a question? We know that poorly-treated asthma is deadly, and well treated asthma much less so. Why do we care about placebo effects here? The authors explain further:
Placebo effects (i.e., benefits resulting from simulated treatment or the experience of receiving care) are reported to improve signs and symptoms of many diseases in clinical trials and in clinical practice. On this basis, the accepted standards for clinical-trial design specify that the effects of active treatment should ideally be compared with the effects of placebo. Despite this common practice, it is unclear whether placebo effects observed in clinical trials (or those that presumably occur in clinical care) influence both objective and subjective outcomes and whether placebo effects differ from the natural course of disease or regression to the mean.
In other words, the authors want to know what placebos actually do to real people, and they chose asthmatics because they are easy to study (there are symptom-assessment tools for subjective data and spirometry for objective data). This makes asthma both the right and wrong choice for the study. It’s an excellent model to assess the affect of placebo, but one in which the use of placebo is hard to justify on an ethical basis.
Not surprisingly, they found that “doing something” worked better than doing nothing. More specifically, they found that any placebo will make a patient feel subjectively better than doing nothing at all. They also found that all three placebos (sham acupuncture, fake inhaled medicine, and simply being enrolled in the study without treatment) improved objective measures of lung function, but not nearly as much as real medicine (in fact, not much at all).
In other words, simply attending to a patient makes them feel better. But to get a significant objective improvement (in asthma at least) you must also give them real medicine. Real medicine comprises both active medications and attending to the patient. There is no separate “placebo” that can be given to treat asthma effectively.
This is actually a quite beautiful study. It demonstrates that “placebo effect” is not the same as a real treatment, that real treatment always includes whatever benefit placebo provides, and that placebo is mostly an effect on subjective rather than objective measures of health. You can’t fix asthma with placebo, only with real treatment. But we’ve already known that from decades of studying asthma. So what other justification is there for doing this study?
Our research has important implications both for the treatment of asthma and for clinical-trial design in general. Many patients with asthma have symptoms that remain uncontrolled, and the discrepancy between objective pulmonary function and patients’ self-reports noted in this study suggests that subjective improvement in asthma should be interpreted with caution and that objective outcomes should be more heavily relied on for optimal asthma care. Indeed, although improvement in objective measures of lung function would be expected to correlate with subjective measures, our study suggests that in clinical trials, reliance solely on subjective outcomes may be inherently unreliable, since they may be significantly influenced by placebo effects. However, even though objective physiological measures (e.g., FEV1) are important, other outcomes such as emergency room visits and quality-of-life metrics may be more clinically relevant to patients and physicians. Although placebos remain an essential component of clinical trials to validate objective findings, assessment of the course of the disease without treatment, if medically appropriate, is essential in the evaluation of patient-reported outcomes. (Emphasis mine, PalMD)
This is folly. First, we have a huge literature on quality of life metrics in asthma. Huge. And we also know that objective changes in asthma are what save patients’ lives. Yes, I care how my patient feels, but it is not more “clinically relevant” than how they are actually doing physiologically. Both are important, but not equal. And the idea that comparing active treatment to placebo is not ideal is not new to researchers. It’s simply that following the natural history of the disease as a “control” is not usually appropriate (cf. Tuskegee syphilis experiment).
No good clinician would consider treating an asthmatic with placebo. Improper treatment of asthma leads to debility and death. This study chose mild asthmatics, but I still feel very uncomfortable with the ethics of the study design. Rather than using a disease we know how to treat to study placebo, we should be finding ways to get treatment to the millions of people who aren’t getting it.
References
Wechsler ME, Kelley JM, Boyd IO, Dutile S, Marigowda G, Kirsch I, Israel E, & Kaptchuk TJ (2011). Active albuterol or placebo, sham acupuncture, or no intervention in asthma. The New England journal of medicine, 365 (2), 119-26 PMID: 21751905

   Revisiting Daniel Moerman and “placebo effects”
David Gorski 
Link
About three weeks ago, ironically enough, right around the time of TAM 9, the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) inadvertently provided us in the form of a new study on asthma and placebo effects not only material for our discussion panel on placebo effects but material for multiple posts, including one by me, one by Kimball Atwood, and one by Peter Lipson, the latter two of whom tried to point out that the sorts of uses of these results could result in patients dying. Meanwhile, Mark Crislip, in his ever-inimitable fashion, discussed the study as well, using it to liken complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) as the “beer goggles of medicine,” a line I totally plan on stealing. The study itself, we all agreed, was actually pretty well done. What it showed is that in asthma a patient’s subjective assessment of how well he’s doing is a poor guide to how well his lungs are actually doing from an objective, functional standpoint. For the most part, the authors came to this conclusion as well, although their hedging and hawing over their results made almost palpable their disappointment that their chosen placebos utterly failed to produce anything resembling an objective response improving lung function as measured by changes (or lack thereof) in FEV1.
In actuality, where most of our criticism landed, and landed hard—deservedly, in my opinion—was on the accompanying editorial, written by Dr. Daniel Moerman, an emeritus professor of anthropology at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. There was a time when I thought that anthropologists might have a lot to tell us about how we practice medicine, and maybe they actually do. Unfortunately, my opinion in this matter has been considerably soured by much of what I’ve read when anthropologists try to dabble in medicine. Recently, I became aware that Moerman appeared on the Clinical Conversations podcast around the time his editorial was published, and, even though the podcast is less than 18 minutes long, Moerman’s appearance in the podcast provides a rich vein of material to mine regarding what, exactly, placebo effects are or are not, not to mention evidence that Dr. Moerman appears to like to make like Humpty-Dumpty in this passage:
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less.’
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master — that’s all.’
Let’s dig in, shall we?
The interviewer, Joe Elia, begins by framing the question of the significance of the NEJM placebo/asthma study as asking what matters more, subjective responses of patients or objective responses? Right off the bat, this is a problem for several reasons, the most glaring of which is that it’s a false dichotomy. Both matter, but for different diseases and conditions one can matter more than the other. For example, in the asthma study, as all the SBM bloggers who wrote about it pointed out, objective measures matter a lot. If, for example, a patient with asthma has a very low FEV1, he might still feel OK or have only mild shortness of breath and yet still be just a tiny push away from total respiratory collapse. Another example that comes to mind is diabetes, particularly type I diabetes. Before we had an effective treatment in the form of injected insulin to restore blood glucose levels to something resembling normal, many diabetics, other than symptoms such as thirst and frequent urination, felt more or less fine. Yet they could easily be just a piece a cake away from diabetic ketoacidosis. In such conditions, objective improvement matters, and it matters a lot—far more than subjective symptoms. That doesn’t mean that subjective symptoms aren’t important, but concentrating on the subjective and dismissing the objective can be dangerous. Moerman, not being a physician, seems not to recognize this and doesn’t even address the issue. Indeed, he seems blithely unaware that relying on placebo responses in diseases that produce a real, life-threatening physiological derangement is the way to kill at least a few patients. But they’ll feel great—until right before they crump.
Elia asks Moerman right off the bat what he sees in medical studies such as the NEJM placebo study that’s common to other human situations. Moerman responds:
…I see actors and responders. I see uniforms. I see symbols of power. I see authoritarian and all sorts of other kinds of interactions between people. I see lots of interactions between people. I see lots and lots and lots of meaning.
And I see dead people. (Sorry, couldn’t resist.)
Time and time again, Moerman returns to this word, “meaning.” But what does he—if you’ll excuse the awkward sentence construction—mean when he uses the word “meaning”? Elia asks him just that question, pointing out that the word featured prominently in the title of his book Medicine, Meaning and the “Placebo Effect”. Moerman responds with a bit of a waffle dance before he tries to actually answer the question:
…given that we’re talking to a bunch of physicians, let me start by saying why it is I put “placebo effect” in quotation marks. What we mean ordinarily by “placebo effect” is unproblematic. It’s an inert substance designed to mimic a medical procedure. The key thing is that it’s inert. If it’s inert, what that means is, it can’t do anything. That’s what “inert” means. But there simply can’t be such a thing as a placebo effect. It’s a contradiction in terms, sort of like “king of America.” So, I think that “placebo effect” is like “king of America.” It doesn’t exist. Now, at the same time we all know that if you give people inert medications they often respond dramatically, and they get a lot better. So, the only thing that we know for sure is that it’s not the placebo that did it. So what did do it? And what I argue is that what did it is all of the other meaningful stuff that’s associated with medicine, starting with the behavior of the parking lot attendant, going through the receptionist, to what’s hanging on the walls to the art in hospital. I said in the article, our hospital has two helipads.
When you walk into a place like that you know you’re in a place of great overweaning power. It’s incredibly meaningful. And I would argue that that meaning, that and all sorts of other kinds of meaning—the stethoscope around the neck, the uniforms, the funny white shoes, you know, on and on and on—all of that stuff goes together to create a generic system of meaning which is then sort of instantiated by the specific red or orange or blue pills that the doctor gives you and tells you when to take it this way and that way and to drink lots of water, which is a healing substance all of its own. And the meaning that’s attached to all of that stuff can be at least as powerful as whatever is in the pill, whether it’s inert or not.
Alright, I’ll give Moerman credit for a bit of a sense of humor. That line about his hospital having two helipads wasn’t half-bad. Of course, back when I was doing residency in Cleveland, our county hospital had three helipads. So there. (Actually, the reason it had three helipads is because it was the main base for Metro LifeFlight, where I actually moonlighted as a flight physician for nearly three years while I was in graduate school.) In any event, Moerman seems to miss a huge point. He seems to be arguing that placebo effects come from the atmosphere of medicine; i.e., the lab coats, the halls of “power,” the helipads, the medical jargon, the mysterious language that only medical personnel (the high priests or shamans of whom are, presumably, the doctors) can understand. Here’s the problem. In the NEJM article, the patients in the no-treatment, “watchful waiting” group in the asthma/placebo study experienced all of that medical awesomeness, yet they didn’t feel better. They only felt better after they got either active treatment or placebo treatment. In fact, all that medical awesomeness didn’t affect them very much at all. True, even some of those who received no treatment at all reported feeling better, but that’s not uncommon in a clinical trial, and it was a far fewer number who spontaneously felt better than those who were treated with an albuterol inhaler or placebo treatments. In this study at least, the aura of medicine didn’t do much compared to the actual placebo intervention. Moerman completely missed the point here.
He does a bit better, although not a lot, in one of his articles from 2002 to which he refers in his interview entitled Deconstructing the Placebo Effect and Finding the Meaning Response. After listing studies in which, for example, medical students reported feeling a stimulant response after taking a red placebo and a sedative response after taking a blue placebo; people with headache reported more pain relief after taking a branded aspirin as compared to aspirin in a plain bottle and after placebo aspirin in the same branded bottle compared to placebo in a plain bottle; and it was found that people who were told that exercise would improve their psychological—surprise! surprise!—reported that exercise improved their psychological well-being. In the article, he also tries to have it both ways. While arguing time and time again that placebos, because they are inert, can’t do anything, he takes pains to point out that placebo responses leading to pain relief can be blocked by an opiate antagonist, naloxone, concluding, rather disingenuously in my opinion, “To say that a treatment such as acupuncture ‘isn’t better than placebo’ does not mean that it does nothing.” This is, of course, a massive straw man. If, as Mark Crislip jokes, placebo effects due to CAM are the “beer goggles of medicine,” altering perceived pain and symptoms without actually affecting the underlying physiology, it is not surprising that the brain function might—oh, you know—actually change in response to placebo.
In the podcast, Moerman chooses two more recent studies to try to make his point—and misinterprets them both. First, he cites a famous article from 2009 in which patients were randomized to individualized acupuncture, standardized acupuncture, simulated acupuncture (twirling a toothpick against the skin), and usual care and makes exactly the same mistake interpreting it that CAM practitioners made in trying to promote the study. In essence, he concluded that because sham acupuncture (the toothpicks) did as well as “real acupuncture” and that both did better than usual care that acupuncture “works.” Wrong, wrong, wrong. Moerman then cites a famous German acupuncture study (the GERAC study, published in 2007) as evidence that acupuncture “works” as a “meaningful” intervention. Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong as well. This latter study preselected patients with a long history of back pain whose pain didn’t respond well to standard treatment but who were naive to acupuncture. In other words, these studies do not show that “acupuncture works very well for low back pain, much better than standard care” (Moerman’s exact words). In actuality, they showed the exact opposite.
He then mentions a study on depression in which St. John’s wort, sertraline, and placebo all had similar results in depression and asks:
What do you conclude from that study? That nothing has any effect against depression because a placebo was involved. That doesn’t follow.
Actually, yes it does. It does indeed follow. Well, it doesn’t follow that nothing has any effect against depression; rather, it follows that in this study apparently neither sertraline nor St. John’s wort had any effect. This, by the way, appears to be the study to which Moerman referred. If this is the study, then it’s not entirely true that sertraline had no effect different from placebo; it only affected one of three measures of depression, but it demonstrated “much improvement” in that measure. Disappointing, but not “no effect,” and there were a number of potential explanations. The authors note that “Failure of established antidepressants to show such superiority occurs in up to 35% of trials, which illustrates the difficulties plaguing randomized placebo-controlled trials in this population.” They also noted that only 36% of the sertraline group had their dose maximized, pointing out that “if any protocol bias existed at all, it would favor hypericum [St. John's wort], which could be dosed to the maximum of its permissible range, whereas the maximum permitted dose of sertraline was only 50% of its highest recommended amount.” So, in this study, it is reasonable to conclude that neither sertraline nor St. John’s wort “worked” in this population at this time at the doses used, but when the totality of evidence and the shortcomings of this trial are taken into account, sertraline does have an effect.
Another issue that Moerman completely ignores is that placebo responses might very well also be largely influenced by artifacts inherent in the structure of clinical trials. It’s not as though these issues haven’t been heavily studied, including expectancy effects (people are suggestible), observer effects (people often report improvement just from the process of being observed, also known as the Hawthorne effect), observer bias, training effects from repeated testing, and cheerleader effects from being encouraged. One wonders what Moerman would say about recent research, including an (in)famous NEJM meta-analysis and a recently updated Cochrane review, that suggest strongly that, when all these nonspecific effects and experimental biases are controlled for adequately, the placebo effect disappears. I think it’s worth quoting each briefly.
First, the NEJM:
…we found little evidence that placebos in general have powerful clinical effects. Placebos had no significant pooled effect on subjective or objective binary or continuous objective outcomes. We found significant effects of placebo on continuous subjective outcomes and for the treatment of pain but also bias related to larger effects in small trials. The use of placebo outside the aegis of a controlled, properly designed clinical trial cannot be recommended.
Then the Cochrane review:
We did not find that placebo interventions have important clinical effects in general. However, in certain settings placebo interventions can influence patient-reported outcomes, especially pain and nausea, though it is difficult to distinguish patient-reported effects of placebo from biased reporting. The effect on pain varied, even among trials with low risk of bias, from negligible to clinically important. Variations in the effect of placebo were partly explained by variations in how trials were conducted and how patients were informed.
Be that as it may, in a way Moerman (sort of) agrees with Crislip, just not in a way that supports his argument that the “meaning” behind placebos is this wonderful, powerful thing. Crislip makes a strong argument dismissing placebo effects as a myth. Moerman is dismissing placebo effects in a different manner, but in a way infused with his background as an anthropologist. He’s denying placebo effects by renaming them. In a way, they are (again, sort of) arguing the same thing. Crislip argues that placebo effects are an example of mild cognitive therapy in which the pain stays the same but it’s the perception of pain that changes. Moerman argues something similar, ascribing changes in pain perception to all trappings of “power” and interactions with health care providers in medical settings and the “meaning” that patients find in them. None of this is inconsistent with placebo responses being in actuality altered perceptions of symptoms. It’s just that Moerman seems to think that the “meaning” that alters these perceptions is far more powerful than it is. Unfortunately, while Crislip is rooted in hard-nosed “materialistic” science, Moerman seems more rooted in postmodern, relativistic thinking:
Practitioners can benefit clinically by conceptualizing this issue in terms of the meaning response rather than the placebo effect. Placebos are inert. You can’t do anything about them. For human beings, meaning is everything that placebos are not, richly alive and powerful. However, we know little of this power, although all clinicians have experienced it. One reason we are so ignorant is that, by focusing on placebos, we constantly have to address the moral and ethical issues of prescribing inert treatments (73, 74), of lying (75), and the like. It seems possible to evade the entire issue by simply avoiding placebos. One cannot, however, avoid meaning while engaging human beings. Even the most distant objects—the planet Venus, the stars in the constellation Orion—are meaningful to us, as well as to others (76).
One notes that reference #76 is a book by Timothy P. McCleary entitled, The Stars We Know: Crow Indian Astronomy and Lifeways. Perusing the information about the book, I see that the author states very early on that the purpose of his book was to “provide insight into a little known aspect of Crow culture—Crow ethnoastronomy. Ethnoastronomy, a fairly recent development in human sciences, attempts to elicit how non-Western peoples’ perceptions of cosmic phenomena are utilized in structuring behaviors, values, and mores.” All of this might be fascinating reading as far as learning about the history and culture of various peoples, but it would appear to stretch the bounds of what is a science and what it has to do with medicine I’m having a hard time grasping. It must be that reductionistic “Western” scientist in me. Is Moerman trying to say that because humans find “meaning” (whatever that means) in stars and constellations that placebos work? How would understanding “meaning” improve medicine above and beyond what we currently do to understand the effect of patient-provider interactions on health care delivery. Moerman either can’t or doesn’t specify, nor does he provide concrete examples of how his ideas would improve medicine. Maybe he does so in his book, but given that his article to which he referred is billed as the “abstract” or a “synopsis” of his book, somehow I doubt it. Worse, Moerman adds nothing new to the conversation, nor does he provide any testable hypotheses that would allow us to use his concept of “meaning” to better medical care by maximizing nonspecific effects as we use effective medicines.
The lack of specific examples aside, the problem remains for diseases for which there is a real derangement in physiology, such as asthma, diabetes, and the like. If placebo responses make the patient perceive his symptoms as being less severe, that doesn’t help the underlying pathophysiology or work to prevent the very real, very dangerous complications that can result from that pathophysiology. Again, nowhere in Moerman’s editorial or podcast do I see a recognition of that. What I do see is Moerman trying to make like Humpty-Dumpty and make the word “meaning” mean just what he chooses it to mean—neither more nor less, except that, now having read his NEJM editorial and his earlier paper and listened to his podcast interview, I’m still not sure he even knows what it’s supposed to mean.
The bottom line is that we as physicians are indeed called upon to relieve patients’ symptoms, but our obligation goes far beyond that. As physicians, we understand the pathophysiology of disease; we know the consequences of leaving a disease untreated. It is not enough for us to make the patient feel better. If that were the case, then there would be no reason not to give patients sedatives or stimulants for almost everything. Those certainly “make patients feel better”! But there are a lot of conditions where physiology trumps subjective complaints, or at least threatens to. Asthma, the topic of the NEJM placebo study from last month, is, of course, a classic example. A patient can be feeling fine (or at least not too bad) but be perilously close to a respiratory arrest. The same is true of diabetes, where a more or less asymptomatic patient can be on the verge of diabetic ketoacidosis. In these cases, our obligation as physicians is not just to make the patient feel better, but to make the patient better.

A Different Perspective: Placebo, SCAM, and Advertising
Mark Crislip on August 9, 2013
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Summertime, time, time
Child, the living’s easy.
Fish are jumping out
And the handicap, Lord
Handicaps high, Lord so high
~ Janis Joplin
It is summer. Time for the kids and the outside, not the computer. What follows is a summertime blog entry, for which I admit to feeling guilty for the comparatively little time I have spent on it, but as I have said before, no dying patient has ever told me “Doc, I wish I had spent more time at work.”
Mt. Hood has been a constant feature to the east my entire life. The mountain, on a clear day at least, is Portland’s most impressive geologic feature. If you are in the right part of the city, you may see Mt. St. Helens or the tips of Jefferson, Adams and even Rainier, but Mt. Hood dominates. It is solitary mass of rock, (diminishing) ice and snow only 50 miles from where I live. I have spent uncountable hours hiking in the Mt. Hood wilderness. When I think of Mt. Hood, in my mind’s eye it is from the perspective of west Portland looking east.
Last week was our yearly summer vacation in Sunriver, just south of Bend Oregon on the eastern side of the cascades in the Oregon High Desert. Driving north/south on highway 97 puts Mt. Hood in a different perspective. From the high desert you can see the huge swaths of the Cascades: calderas, mountains, lava fields and cinder cones. You see Mt. Hood differently. Not a single mountain to the east, but part of a chain of recent and distant historical volcanic activity along the Rim of Fire. Photographs do not do the view of the Cascades justice from this vantage point.
The eastern view puts Mt. Hood in a broader geologic and time perspective. It is still the same Mt. Hood, but in a different context. Like running into a nurse outside of the hospital, you have to recalibrate the context in which you understand and know the person.
I have written on placebo, the placebo effect, and its relationship to SCAM. To my understanding the preponderance of literature indicates there is no placebo effect upon any objective medical problem, only a change in the patients perspective of the problem.
The placebo effect is, as I have mentioned before, the Beer Goggles of Medicine. I look a lot better and am infinitely more amusing if you have consumed a pint or two of Mirror Pond, but really, I remain the same. Of course, for treating pain a change in perspective can be of benefit. Depending on whether you are an ends-justifies-the-means kind of guy, placebo outside the context of a clinical trial is not ethical as it requires lying to the patient.
SCAMs are usually no better than placebo in well-performed trials and have no efficacy in the treatment of disease. There has been a tendency to suggest that when a SCAM has the same outcome as placebo, but is better than doing nothing, that the effect of the SCAM is due to powerful placebo effect. I have this long standing rant in my infectious disease lectures that the only thing in medicine that has 100% sensitivity and specificity is when a health care provider uses the terms “big-gun”, “strong” or “powerful” in relationship to antibiotics they know nothing, zip, zero, zilch about the treatment of infectious diseases. It is always the mark if profound ID ignorance. Similarly if someone refers to the placebo effect as “powerful” they are equally guilty of imitating Jon Snow, at least when it comes to altering physiology.
I would be the last to argue that interaction between patient and physician is not important. What is said and how it is said is very important in numerous ways, as long it says within the bounds of honesty. Part of my job is to ‘sell’ a particular course of action to a patient. I do not want to leave anyone nonplussed as to my use of the word sell. I am not talking monetary exchange. I am using it with the definition “To persuade (another) to recognize the worth or desirability of something.”
I need to convince people that I know what needs to be done diagnostically and therapeutically, interventions that can he painful, expensive and prolonged. Telling someone we need to take out their artificial hip, get a 6 week course of IV antibiotics at a nursing home, wait another few months and only then get another hip is no small undertaking. Part of the placebo effect, of changing the patient perspective, is, I suppose, part of the cheerleading and encouragement you need to do to coax people through very difficult times.
Although I have not considered placebo with this term before, my interventions with patients are a form of advertisement where I choose my words that help convince patients that their therapies are working and effective. I am trying to generate a positive placebo effect. Antibiotic goggles anyone?
What started me thinking about placebo and advertising was a curious reference “Advertisements impact the physiological efficacy of a branded drug” sent by a colleague.
The study is curious and I think the results are spurious, mostly noise of questionable significance rather than a manifestation of a real effect. The big cut and paste:
A subject was given a skin allergy test for common allergens. A research technician administered a histamine challenge on the subject’s forearm, and a baseline measurement of the wheal reaction was taken. The wheal reaction is the slightly reddened, elevated area at the site of the challenge and is a well-established measure of histamine response (2). All normal individuals, whether they have allergies or not, develop a wheal reaction to a histamine challenge. The subject reported her belief about the efficacy of Claritin. She was given 10 mg Claritin and was made aware that it was Claritin. She was shown a movie spliced with naturally timed advertisement breaks. In one condition (Claritin advertisements), one advertisement in each break was an advertisement for Claritin. In the other condition (Zyrtec advertisements), one advertisement in each break was an advertisement for Zyrtec. The Zyrtec advertisement stated that Zyrtec “starts working two hours faster than Claritin.” The histamine challenge and wheal measurement were repeated during the movie, 60 and 120 min after Claritin was administered. At the end of the experiment, the subject was again asked her belief about the efficacy of Claritin. We define the efficacy of Claritin (at 60 and 120 min) as the percentage decrease in the size of the wheal reaction relative to the baseline. We thus have a subject-specific measure of efficacy. By comparing the efficacy across the subjects in the two advertisement conditions, we identify the impact of advertisements on the efficacy of Claritin. In the subpopulation without allergies, we find that the efficacy of Claritin at 120 min is substantially higher for subjects who were exposed to Claritin advertisements. Claritin advertisements have no significant impact on efficacy 60 min after the drug is taken. This pattern is consistent with the observed changes in the subjects’ beliefs. Exposure to Claritin advertisements in this sub- population greatly increases the belief in the efficacy of Claritin. At the same time, the realized efficacy of Claritin at 120 min (but not at 60 min) is strongly correlated with the change in beliefs. In the subpopulation with allergies, we find no relationship between exposure to Claritin advertisements and the change in beliefs. Moreover, the advertisements have no impact on the efficacy of Claritin at 120 min. We do find a curious negative impact of Claritin advertisements on Claritin’s efficacy at 60 min in this subpopulation, but this effect cannot be mediated by the (nonexistent) impact of advertisements on beliefs.
After reading the study, the effect is barely statistically significant but clinically irrelevant results from the noise of clinical studies.
But it does bring up the issue of the importance of advertising in promoting efficacy of placebo effects. As they note in the paper,
A small existing literature examines the impact of commercial features of drugs on their efficacy. Previous experiments show that the color, the packaging, and the price of drugs affect their perceived efficacy.
What are most SCAMs but advertising an unneeded and useless product to people who do not need it?
My perspective of most SCAM has been focused on the truth and reality of their claims, but truth and reality have little to do with advertising. I have been shaving for 40 plus years and never, not once, has a female rubbed my cheek with the back of her hand after a shave. Never, even though that appears to be a common effect of shaving in most advertising see on TV.
The tools of rational thought and science may not be the best approach for an industry, SCAM, that is based on advertising. I need a different perspective to analyze SCAM, that of the psychology of desire. Not why people believe weird things, but why they buy weird things. I ran across an enormous number of books and journals, all behind paywalls, on the techniques used by advertisers to entice people to part with their money for sugared water.
That may be the paradigm, the perspective, to understand SCAM, but that will have to wait for a rainy winter’s day. I have a tee time with my kids and a mere two weeks before they disappear into school. Gotta run.

   CAM: The Beer Goggles of Medicine
Mark Crislip 
Link
It is summer, the kids are off, and time to write dwindles in the face of sun and golf. Nonsense knows no season, and in my readings this week I came across the phrase “the undeniable power of the placebo.” I will do my best to deny that power at least three times before the I crow my conclusion.
One of my first entries for SBM, back in the mists of time, was the Placebo Myth [0], where I argued that the placebo has no clinical effects, has clinically irrelevant alleged physiology and at most leads to a slight change in perception on the part of the patient that they have less pain. Essentially placebo does nothing. It has no power.
Two studies this month continue that argument: demonstrating that placebo has no practical benefit and the crowing in the media mistakenly trumpets that it does. The headline on Medscape [1] reads “Placebo Effects Modest in Treating the Common Cold.” How modest?
719 patients with new-onset common cold were randomly assigned to no pills, placebo, blinded to echinacea, and open-label echinacea. Illness duration and severity were the main study endpoints, and neutrophil count and interleukin 8 levels from nasal wash at enrollment and 2 days later were secondary endpoints.
No surprise that for the hard endpoint, WBC and interleukin levels, the sciencey part of the study, there was no difference. Placebo and echinacea (as if there were a difference) had no effect on measurable reality.
There was no difference in the severity scores in any of the groups as well.
Those who thought they received echinacea thought they were better faster (2.58 days, not statistically significant) than those who did not know they were getting echinacea. As is usual with CAM studies, only when the patient believed they were getting a potentially effective treatment did the subjective aspects of their illness improve.
The authors said “Participants randomized to the no-pill group tended to have longer and more severe illnesses than those who received pills.” What was the difference between 3 placebos and no treatment over an illness that lasted a week?
The difference was 0.16 days. Two decimal points. That’s accurate. That would be 3 hours, 50 minutes, and 24 seconds faster improvement. Seriously. That is a clinically relevant number? Is there anyone who can mark both the onset and end of a cold with that kind of precision? Over a week they improved 2.2% faster. That is modest. Is such an ‘improvement’ likely to be a real effect or part of random clustering seen in all studies?
So another study that demonstrates that the only effect of placebo is to change the perceptions of illness, not the illness itself. Placebos of all kinds, and all CAM is placebo, do nothing for objective findings, only change the perception of diseases. It is a curious phenomenon. If someone’s perceptions convince them that they were abducted by aliens, or see ghosts, or witnessed a UFO, or psychic phenomena, many would say, and rightly so, that perceptions are unreliable and that they are being misled and misinterpreting what has occurred. If the same thing happens with SCAM, we fund studies by the NCCAM.
The second study was the NEJM asthma report, already discussed at length at this blog. Patients with mild asthma had no objective changes in their lung function, but were subjectively better if they had a placebo inhaler or sham acupuncture when compared to no treatment. Again, no objective change, only subjective change.
If a patient says they are subjectively better, then they are better even if they are objectively unchanged, right?
It is an interesting question, almost a Zen kōan, like the sound of one hand clapping, or if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound? [2] If there was an overarching theme to TAM 9, it was that humans have an amazing ability to convince themselves that phenomena that have no basis whatsoever in reality are in fact real. It may be UFO’s, or ghosts, or psychic abilities or libertarianism [3]; people believe these phenomena are real but they are only fooling themselves. The placebo effect is not an effect, but only a change in perception.
Illness appears better through the beer goggles of placebo and CAM. But in the morning, when you wake up, the disease is uchanged.
Virtually all SCAMs have no effect beyond that of placebo. So I hereby declare a new law: Since SCAM effect = placebo and placebo effect = nothing, therefore the SCAM effect = nothing. Lets call it Crislip’s Law of the CAM Transitive Relationship ™, as I do so want something named after me, and, as homeopathy founder Samuel Hahnemann demonstrated, by declaring a random concept a Law, it imbues it with a fundamental validity. Get it on the Wikipedia this week, OK?
Both the AFP and NEJM have the same duh moment: these studies “support the general idea that beliefs and feelings about treatments may be important and perhaps should be taken into consideration when making medical decisions.”
Of course it is important to take into consideration the patient’s beliefs and feelings when treating them. The more involved the patient is with their treatment plan, the better the outcome. A huge part of the practice of medicine is just that interaction. After 25 years, most of the time my practice is not that difficult. Most consults would take at most 15 minutes from start to finish if only my clinical needs were the issue: Me find bug, me kill bug, me go home. It is really not that hard anymore. The time in a consult is not in making the diagnosis and starting the treatment plan, it is talking with the patient and their family about all the ramifications of their diseases.
The NEJM article, however, bordered on the ludicrous. Most busy clinicians do not have the time or inclinations to read most articles critically. We rely on a hierarchy of trust, and know from prior experience that some journals are more trusted than others. The Annals of Internal Medicine lost my trust years ago, and I always read their articles with a grain of salt substitute, knowing that they can publish gullible nonsense. First the acupuncture article, now the current asthma article, and the NEJM has fallen from trusted journal to one I must read with suspicion. I long ago was taught that you judge a person by the company they keep, and the NEJM has now been frequently spotted in the company of nonsense.
Look at the abstract, which is all most people will read:
Although albuterol, but not the two placebo interventions, improved FEV1 in these patients with asthma, albuterol provided no incremental benefit with respect to the self-reported outcomes. Placebo effects can be clinically meaningful and can rival the effects of active medication in patients with asthma. However, from a clinical- management and research-design perspective, patient self-reports can be unreliable. An assessment of untreated responses in asthma may be essential in evaluating patient-reported outcomes. (Funded by the National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine.)
Placebo effects can be clinically meaningful. You are receiving a SCAM based/placebo based therapy. You think you are better. Your tumor, your HIV, your rheumatoid arthritis, your asthma is unchanged and the basic pathophysiology, with its physiological consequences, metastasis, immune destruction, joint damage, lung inflammation, continues unabated and unchecked. That is good?
The accompanying editorial has what has to be the most dumbass straw man in the history of the NEJM:
What is the more important outcome in medicine: the objective or the subjective, the doctor’s or the patient’s perception? This distinction is important, since it should direct us as to when patient-centered versus doctor-directed care should take place.
I am rarely insulted by the SCAM world; mostly I roll my eyes and give a snort of laughter. However, this is the NEJM, an allegedly respected journal.
The goal of medicine always has been and always will be about both. The heart of patient care is establishing a therapeutic relationship, and everything that is the placebo ‘effect’ is part of the interaction between patient and health care worker. To suggest otherwise is both disingenuous and insulting. The issue for as long as I have been in medicine is the best way, within time and financial constraints, to apply and nurture the non-objective parts of medicine. What is not needed is to wrap up the patient-physician interaction in pseudo mystical nonsense, lies or non reality based therapies that are SCAM.
Maybe it is sufficient simply to show that a treatment yields significant improvement for the patients, has reasonable cost, and has no negative effects over the short or long term. This is, after all, the first tenet of medicine: “Do no harm.”
They are advocating for a form of Fernando medicine: it is better to feel improved than to be improved.
I suppose not being effective is not considered a ‘negative effect over the short term or long term.’ And I always though the first tenet of medicine was “Heal the patient.” If you can to that without harm, so much the better.
A positive subjective response plus no objective response yields nothing.
A negative subjective response plus a positive objective response yields a suboptimal clinical outcome.
A positive subjective response plus a positive objective response yields the best of clinical outcomes. It is what we, in real medicine, strive for.
SBM at its best offers the last, SCAM at its best offers only the first. It offers nothing but beer goggles.
Footnotes
     1.  Have I really been writing for this blog for over three years? Where does the time go?
     2.  I am a paid Infectious Disease blogger for Medscape, and I realized during an interview with Rachael Dunlop that since Medscape is supported by pharmaceutical advertising, and I am paid by Medscape, I am, in fact, a paid Big Pharma Shill once removed.
     3.  We know from the work of Elliot and Goulding that in fact it does not.
     4.  The last is a joke. Please, do not send me copies of the Watchtower in an attempt to convince me of the righteousness of your cause.

Placebo Speculations
Mark Crislip on October 17, 2014
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I have a new term to add to the English language, ebolasmacked, a derivative of the British term gobsmacked. Ebolasmacked defines my life the last few weeks since Ebola, or at last preparations for Ebola, have taken a huge bite out of my time with many interesting twists and turns. I think this is maybe the 9th outbreak (HIV, MERS, SARS, Legionella, H1N1, Avian flu, West Nile, MRSA) of my career and it has certainly generated more hysteria relative to the risk than any to date. Many of my usual pastimes, like SBM (as this essay will no doubt demonstrate), have had to take a back seat to preparing for what should be a very unlikely, but very disruptive, event. We do not want to get caught with our hazmats down should a case of Ebola come through the door.
What makes life interesting, among other things, is the constant realization that the more you know the more there is to know. I like Richard Dawkins’ metaphor in Climbing Mount Improbable where he pictures scientific progress as a series of false summits extending into infinity. It sure seems that way. Every time I think I understand a topic, I find there is still more to learn.
My Dad told me when I graduated from medical school that half of everything I had just learned was probably not true, the only problem is that you didn’t know which half. It was partially true. There have been ideas that have been abandoned since I was an intern, the most famous being that ulcers were due to stress and diet. But a new paradigm has been the exception, not the rule.
The last thirty years have been more about refining knowledge about the complexity of disease and its treatment and, perhaps equally importantly, having a better understanding of the all slings and arrows of outrageous fortune that can make the results of a clinical trial suspect.
There are a series of false summits in medicine, but each is only a foot above the preceding summit, more a series of very long, never-ending steps in an ever-more refined and sophisticated understanding of disease. Recently, as an example, my gaster was flabbered to discover there are now 36 interleukins. Where did all those come from? There were, like, six last time I looked. As the national ID meetings last week demonstrated, yet again there are a never-ending series of fine points for processes about which I thought I had a good understanding.
It is one of the characteristics of pseudo-medicine of which I am jealous. Each practitioner sits at the summit of a perfect mountain, albeit one make of made of fog, delusion, and unicorn tears, with a perfect and never-changing concept of disease and its treatment.
I think I have a good understanding of the placebo effect, although perhaps I should say I have my understanding of the placebo effect. The comments will no doubt suggest mine is not a universal interpretation, but given the enormity of my ego, I think it is the correct one in clinical medicine.
I have multiple posts on the topic, so rather than repeat myself, although I do love to quote me, the one liner is: there is no placebo effect. Placebo (I know, I have gone beyond one line) are beer goggles, improving subjective end points with no change in objective endpoints. My archetype is from Penn and Teller’s BS episode where a lady reports her pain is better after treatment with a giant magnet that is actually a painted gutter downspout.
But why are some people prone to having a placebo effect, a subjective improvement, to a worthless intervention like homeopathy or acupuncture? Or a ‘real’ placebo as is used in a clinical trial?
Genes and placebo
I recently came across “Outsmarting the Placebo Effect” in Science, a short review of the genetic underpinnings of the placebo response. It is interesting, although early work.
The point of the article was to review the attempts to identify people who were prone to the placebo effect. There are compelling economic reasons to do this. If you are designing a clinical trial you want to know if your therapy is better than placebo. The greater the placebo effect in an intervention, the larger the number of patients need to be enrolled to demonstrate efficacy and the bigger the trial the more it will cost. If you can minimize the placebo response, you can move to smaller, less expensive and faster trials to show a new therapy is effective.
Dr. Kathryn Hall has found a relationship between the enzyme catechol-O-methyltrasferase (COMT) and a placebo response. The COMT enzyme breaks down catecholamines, which are neurotransmitters.
The COMT gene comes in two polymorphisms, with either a valine (val) or a methionine (met) amino acid at position 158. Since genes come in pairs, people can be val/val, val-met, or met/met. The met/met form of the enzyme has less activity, leads to more dopamine and:
has been correlated with variations in memory function, cognition, attentional processing, affect , confirmation bias , pain processing and sensitivity. Met/met individuals have higher levels of performance in cognitive tests, which measure executive function as well as increased sensitivity to experimental and chronic pain relative to val/met and val/val individuals.
Which combination of the genes is present is associated with perception of pain as people with met/met sense pain more acutely than those with the val/val form of the gene. But even more curious for this blog, met/met carriers also respond more to placebo.
They had patients from a previous study of irritable bowel syndrome who were treated with waitlist, sham acupuncture offered in a no frills businesslike way (a limited placebo), and a:
limited placebo arm augmented with a supportive warm provider who expressed confidence in the effectiveness of the treatment (‘‘augmented placebo’’).
In the original study, the more placebo offered, the better the response in the IBS-SSS score:
IBS-SSS includes abdominal pain severity, abdominal pain frequency, abdominal distention severity, dissatisfaction with bowel habits, and disruption of quality of life.
So they went back and genotyped everyone and looked at their response and their genotype. It was a nice, linear relationship: met/met with the most response on the IBS-SSS, the val/val had the least and the val-met right in the middle.
And there is more:
Significantly more drug-specific as well as general side effects were reported from homozygous carriers of the Val158 variant during medication as well as placebo treatment compared to the other genotype groups. Val158/Val158 carriers also had significantly higher scores in the somatosensory amplification scale (SSAS) and the BMQ (beliefs about medicine questionnaire). Together these data demonstrate potential genetic and psychological variables predicting nocebo responses after drug and placebo intake, which might be utilized to minimize nocebo effects in clinical trials and medical practice.
And met carriers are impaired on emotional processing tasks compared with val carriers with met-hetero- and homozygotes experience larger subjective stress responses than Val-homozygotes.
I recognize that genes are not destiny and that the final understanding will be far more complicated, especially in an organ as complex as the brain. Well, some brains. The ID literature is growing with reports of various polymophisms in Toll-like receptors and other proteins and the resultant increase or decrease in the risk of infections. My personal favorite is:
Gene polymorphism resulting in the substitution of glutamine with lysine at residue 223 in the carbohydrate recognition domain of SP-A2 increases susceptibility to meningococcal disease, as well as the risk of death.
Translation: have the wrong snot, increase your risk of meningitis and death. And this is but one among hundreds of subtle variations in genes that alter our risk for disease. As Willie said “The fault lies not in the stars, but in ourselves.”
This leads to an alternative, and a testable, partial explanation for the continued popularity and loyalty to what should be worthless pseudo-medical interventions. It is not the innumerable flaws of the modern medicine or the wonderful bedside manner of pseudo-medical providers. It could be that there is a subset of the population that is predisposed to the perceived benefit of a pseudo-medicine and are receiving continuous positive reinforcement every time they get, say, an acupuncture treatment. It could also explain why so many different forms of acupuncture all have the same effects. It is not the beloved endorphins in the spinal fluid, instead acupuncturists are all stimulating the placebo centers in the predisposed. It would be interesting to know the COMT composition of regulars in a chiropractic or acupuncture clinic. Perhaps there is a preponderance of met/met polymorphisms in these practices.
And it would be interesting to know how the val/val patients respond to standard therapy as well since:
Despite their best efforts, many a warm and caring physician has had patients that seemed to derive minimum benefit from their empathic attentions. Our findings that val/val patients are less influenced by the placebo treatment, regardless of whether it is delivered in an augmented or limited context, potentially shed some light on this clinical challenge.
What is the distribution in somatosizers? Chronic pain patients? Or the distribution in TAM attendees or the commenters to this blog. I would love to know my own genotype, as well as how much Neanderthal DNA I have and where my genes come from. When asked my ethnic background, a popular question in Minnesota (Crislip. Where’s that name from?) I like to say my ancestors came from Hadar.
As I think I have mentioned in the past I am sometimes skeptical of free will and consciousness, suspicious that both are an illusion. So I am biased in favor of studies like this that point to variations in the meat machine that could alter its function. It is interesting to think about, and great grist for beer-fueled late night discussions.
Of Mice and Pain
The May 2nd Science had an article called “Male Scent May Compromise Biomedical Studies” and reviews how mice respond to pain.
Dr. Jeffrey Mogil studies pain in mice. Mice exhibit less pain response if there is someone in the room, even if that someone is a cutout of Paris Hilton. But even more curious, animals demonstrate even less pain response if there is a male in the room. Then they refined that response even more. It is the smell of the male that the mice were responding to:
So he told the people in his lab to place their worn T-shirts near injected animals and then leave the room. Even when the humans weren’t present, the results were the same. Rats and mice showed about a 36% lower score on the grimace scale when exposed to male versus female T-shirts, the team reported online this week in Nature Methods. (Female mice were slightly more sensitive to the effect). Placing a woman’s T-shirt next to a man’s T-shirt negated the impact. Bedding material from unfamiliar male mice and guinea pigs, as well as pet beds slept in by unsterilized male cats and dogs, produced the same response: Male odors seemed to act like painkillers.
He hypothesized that it is an evolved response to being potentially hunted. To show pain is to show weakness and make it more likely you will be attacked.
Does this apply to humans? Interesting question. Humans are not mice although it is estimated we can detect a trillion (not a typo) smells and those of you with teenaged boys know that is not an underestimate.
I think back to acupuncture pain studies and wonder what the gender of the acupuncturists was and if the gender of the therapist could have made a difference in pain. It is an interesting potential confounding variable, and would make for an interesting review of the acupuncture literature. Does the published literature demonstrate better results from male vs. female acupuncturists?
I remember one pain study, and I can’t locate it on the web or my drive (so many references to find that particular needle in the pdf stack), where several acupuncturists were used in a trial and only one had a consistent positive improvement on patient pain scores. I wish I could find the study as I wonder about the gender of the acupuncturists and perhaps the one with the better results was a more manly man, a user, perhaps, of Old Spice.
Acupuncture could be an excellent modality to tease out any effects on pain due to the gender of the provider. A researcher would not have worry about any real physiologic effects. It is reasonably clear that the features most associated with responding to acupuncture are knowing you are receiving acupuncture and believing or being told that acupuncture works.
Have male and female acupuncturists apply real and sham acupuncture (as if there is a difference) in a neutral manner and double blind methodology. If there is a gender difference due the provider and patients’ pain it would be very interesting.
Another step up.
Now back to Ebola preparations.

   Placebo Prescriptions
Scott Gavura
Link
Whether it’s acupuncture, homeopathy or the latest supplement, placebo effects can be difficult to distinguish from real effects. Today’s post sets aside the challenge of identifying placebo effects and look at how placebos are used in routine medical practice. I’ve been a pharmacist for almost 20 years, and have never seen a placebo in practice, where the patient was actively deceived by the physician and the pharmacist. So I was quite surprised to see some placebo usage figures cited by Tom Blackwell, writing in the National Post last week:
The practice is discouraged by major medical groups, considered unethical by many doctors and with uncertain benefit, but one in five Canadian physicians prescribes or hands out some kind of placebo to their often-unknowing patients, a new study suggests.
The article references a paper in the Canadian Journal of Psychiatry which, sadly, does not have much of a web presence. The article continues:
McGill’s Prof. Raz and his team conducted a survey of specialists throughout Canada, receiving responses from 606 doctors, 257 of them psychiatrists. About 20% of both psychiatrists and non-psychiatrists said they had used placebos in treating patients. The specific treatments they confirmed using included actual placebo tablets, sugar pills and saline injections. Some — including 35% of psychiatrists — said they also used “sub-therapeutic” doses of real drugs, amounts too small to have any chemical effect on the patient.
One in five physicians actively using placebos? Even if they’re being used sporadically, that’s a lot more use than I would have expected, and what my own practice would suggest. Is my experience typical? I put a short post on my own blog and on Twitter, and I was surprised by the responses. While use seems to be uncommon, it’s definitely still happening, and some pharmacists participate in the charade. I was surprised to see that there are even some impressive-looking commercially-manufactured placebo capsules out there, too. (I wonder if they’re covered by insurance plans?)
I was able to obtain a full copy of the article, and it provided some context to the prevalence numbers. The web-based survey (still online) was sent to 7600 academic physicians, plus an undisclosed number of psychiatrists. Given the response rate was so low (though perhaps not unexpected for a survey), there is no information to suggest that the sample that responded is representative of the broader physician population. Given the subject matter, I’d expect that supporters of placebo use might be more inclined to respond. All of this leads me to conclude that, yes, it is happening, but no, it’s probably not one in five physicians.
The usage of placebos in active practice is one that David Gorski has discussed before, and he had some serious ethical problems with their use. Gorski reviewed a paper by Tiburt et al, which was a survey of 1,200 internists and rheumatologists, and noted that among the 57% that responded, about half reported prescribing placebo treatments on a regular basis. Big numbers, and a much better response rate. But it also could have been skewed towards placebo prescribers.
I turned to the biomedical literature for some prevalence information. PubMed looked kindly upon my request: A 2010 paper entitled Frequency and circumstances of placebo use in clinical practice – a systematic review of empirical studies. In their study, Fässler and colleagues searched the literature with a wide net, looking for articles on the frequency of placebo use and attitudes among health professionals, students or patients.
Before we dive into the results, it must be noted that not all placebos are the same. And this might explain the disconnect between the surveys, and my pharmacy observations. “Pure” placebos are truly inert: they contain no active ingredients. These are the sugar/lactose pills, saline injections, and most homeopathy (products diluted beyond 12C, at least). “Impure” placebos, on the other hand, actually contain active ingredients, but are ineffective for the condition being treated. This could be because of a sub-therapeutic dose, or the active ingredient has no effectiveness against the condition being treated (e.g., antibiotics for viral infections, or the less-dilute homeopathic products). So perhaps those prevalence numbers may not be so wrong – subtherapeutic doses or antibiotics are less obviously detectable as being prescribed with placebo effect intent.
The review identified 22 studies of relevance, some dating back as far as 1973. (The Tiburt paper referenced above was among them.) Most were quantitative studies, based on interviews or questionnaires. Studies were conducted in a range of countries, with North America being reasonably well represented. The data quality was not impressive. Most of the sampling was non-random, none of these surveys used consistent questions, and response rates were all over the map. Even the definition of placebo varied between studies.
All of the studies that looked at frequency of placebo prescribing reported some use: 17-80% for pure placebos, and 41-99% for impure placebos. Pure placebos seemed to be more commonly used in hospital settings, and impure placebos were reported more in the primary care setting. The frequency of use of both pure and impure placebos was low: less than once per month in most studies. So overall, it seems consistent with the Canadian data reported last week.
Under what circumstances would deceiving a patient be felt to be acceptable? Without a systematic survey, it’s impossible to quantify the conditions and reasons for use. But some of the themes identified include:
Pure Placebos
    • pain, insomnia, anxiety, risk of substance abuse
    • difficult/demanding patients
Impure Placebos
    • desire of patients to receive a prescription
    • take advantage of placebo effects
    • avoid conflicts with patients
    • as a supplemental treatment for non-specific symptoms
Respondents in the different studies generally believed that placebo could be effective in a subset of patients, ranging from 5% to 42%. Among physicians and medical students, up to a third believed that placebos can induce objective, physiological changes. The overall appropriateness of placebo use led to some divergent opinions. From an ethical perspective, very few thought the use of placebos should be prohibited, though many considered the use problematic. A surprising number considered the use of placebos acceptable if used for patient benefit.
Another interesting paper, not included in the Fässler review, was published in 2010 in the journal Family Medicine. Kerman et al reported on a survey of 412 physicians in the paper Family physicians believe the placebo effect is therapeutic but often use real drugs as placebos [PDF]. Again, the response rate (43%) was poor, but among responders, 56% reported using a placebo in active practice, with 19% doing so more than 10 times per year. The most common placebo cited was the use of antibiotics (43%) followed by vitamins (23%) and herbal supplements (12%). Pure placebos were infrequently used.
Survey responders had very positive opinions of placebo use, with 85% believing that placebos have psychological and physical benefits. Remarkably, 92% supported placebo use in clinical practice. Only 8% felt placebo use should be prohibited. The most common reasons for placebo use were “unjustified” demand for medication (32%) followed by the desire to calm the patient (20%) and after therapeutic options were exhausted (20%).
It’s the impure placebos that concern me the most. The popularity of antibiotics as placebo treatments is alarming. While generally well tolerated, they’ve got a long list of side effects, which can be serious in rare cases. And antibiotic resistance, driven by misuse, has public health consequences. The use of vitamins and herbal supplements is also troubling: it’s increasingly clear that these products can cause harms, too. And it leaves me wondering what proportion of physician-recommended use of vitamins and supplements that I see is just a deliberate attempt to harness placebo effects.
The literature can tell us much about the placebo, but much less about how these products are actively used in the practice of medicine. The data are poor, but there’s enough to suggest that deliberate placebo prescribing is taking place, albeit with some ethical discomfort for many prescribers. Outside of perhaps a hospital setting where a “pure” placebo could be evaluated somewhat more objectively, I can’t imagine any situation where their provision would be ethically acceptable. As a pharmacist, my responsibility is to the patient, not the physician, and in a community pharmacy setting, I’d refuse to provide any treatment that would require me to deceive the patient about true nature of prescription. The idea of placebo effects may be tantalizing, but not at the cost of patient autonomy, or inappropriate prescribing.
References
Fässler, M., Meissner, K., Schneider, A., & Linde, K. (2010). Frequency and circumstances of placebo use in clinical practice – a systematic review of empirical studies BMC Medicine, 8 (1) DOI: 10.1186/1741-7015-8-15
Kermen R, Hickner J, Brody H, & Hasham I (2010). Family physicians believe the placebo effect is therapeutic but often use real drugs as placebos. Family medicine, 42 (9), 636-42 PMID: 20927672

   Homeopathy and the Selling of Nonspecific Effects
Steven Novella
Link
One of the core features of science (and therefore science-based medicine) is to precisely identify and control for variables, so that we know what, exactly, is exerting an effect. The classic example of this principle at work is the Hawthorne effect. The term refers to a series of studies performed between 1924 and 1932 at the Hawthorne Works. The studies examined whether or not workers would be more productive in different lighting conditions. So they increased the light levels, observed the workers, and found that their productivity increased. Then they lowered the light levels, observed the workers, and found that their productivity increased. No matter what they did, the workers improved their productivity relative to baseline. Eventually it was figured out that observing the workers caused them to work harder, no matter what was done to the lighting.
This “observer effect” – an artifact of the process of observation – is now part of standard study design (at least well-designed studies). In medical studies it is one of the many placebo effects that need to be controlled for, in order to properly isolate the variable of interest.
There are many non-specific effects – effects that result from the act of treating or evaluating patients rather than a physiological response to a specific treatment. In addition to observer effects, for example, there is also the “chearleader” effect from encouraging patients to perform better. There are training effects from retesting. And there are long-recognized non-specific therapeutic effects just from getting compassionate attention from a practitioner. It is a standard part of medical scientific reasoning that before we ascribe a specific effect to a particular intervention, that all non-specific effects are controlled for and eliminated.
Within the world of so-called “complementary and alternative medicine” (CAM), however, standard scientific reasoning it turned on its head. After failing to find specific physiological benefits for many treatments under the CAM umbrella, proponents are desperately trying to sell non-specific effects as if they are specific to their preferred modalities. In other contexts this might be considered fraud. It is certainly scientifically dubious to the point of dishonesty, in my opinion.
The latest example of this is a study published in the journal Rheumatology: Homeopathy has clinical benefits in rheumatoid arthritis patients that are attributable to the consultation process but not the homeopathic remedy: a randomized controlled clinical trial. The study compared 5 groups: the first three received a homeopathic consultation and either individualized, complex (meaning a standard preparation), or placebo treatment for rheumatoid arthritis; the last two received no consultation and either complex homeopathic treatment or placebo. The study was double-blind with respect to the treatments, but not blinded with respect to whether or not a subject received a homeopathic consultation.
The results:
Fifty-six completed treatment phase. No significant differences were observed for either primary outcome. There was no clear effect due to remedy type. Receiving a homeopathic consultation significantly improved DAS-28 [mean difference 0.623; 95% CI 0.1860, 1.060; P = 0.005; effect size (ES) 0.70], swollen joint count (mean difference 3.04; 95% CI 1.055, 5.030; P = 0.003; ES 0.83), current pain (mean difference 9.12; 95% CI 0.521, 17.718; P = 0.038; ES 0.48), weekly pain (mean difference 6.017; 95% CI 0.140, 11.894; P = 0.045; ES 0.30), weekly patient GA (mean difference 6.260; 95% CI 0.411, 12.169; P = 0.036; ES 0.31) and negative mood (mean difference − 4.497; 95% CI −8.071, −0.923; P = 0.015; ES 0.90).
In other words – there was no difference in any outcome measure among individualized homeopathic treatments, complex (standardized) treatment, or placebo. According to this study – homeopathy does not work for rheumatoid arthritis. That is really the only thing we can conclude from this study.
However, the authors spend a great deal of time trying to argue that the study supports the conclusion that, even though homeopathic products have zero effect, the homeopathic consultation process does have a beneficial effect. This is a flawed conclusion on several levels.
First, the study was not blinded for consultation vs no-consultation. Any comparison of this variable, therefore, is highly unreliable. It is likely no coincidence that the blinded comparisons were all negative, while some of the unblinded comparisons were positive. Also, even there the results are weak. The primary outcome measure was negative. Only the secondary outcome measures, which are mostly subjective, were positive.
And, perhaps most significantly, the study was not even designed to test the efficacy of the homeopathic consultation itself because it was compared essentially to no intervention (and in an unblinded fashion). There is therefore every reason to conclude that any perceived benefit from the consultation process is due to the nonspecific effects of the clinical interaction – attention from a practitioner, expectation of benefit, chearleader effect, etc.
If the authors wished to test whether there is something special about the homeopathic consultation then they should have compared it to attention from a health care provider that was controlled for time and personal attention, but did not contain elements specific to the homeopathic consultation. This study did not do that.
Conclusion
The study itself was reasonably well designed. It is a bit small, especially for the number of comparison groups, and so was underpowered. But it did make a reasonable and blinded comparison between homeopathic preparations and placebo and found no difference. This is in line with research into homeopathy in general - it is no different from placebo, which means homeopathy does not work.
It is worth pointing out that homeopaths have complained in the past that comparing standardized homeopathic complex to placebo is not fair, because homeopathy requires and individualized treatment. This, of course, contradicts the claims for any homeopathic product on the shelves. But that point aside, in this study individualized treatments performed no better, contradicting that complaint.
The authors, however, are presenting the study as evidence that the homeopathic consultation works, when this study was not designed to test that variable. The effects can easily be explained as the non-specific effects of therapeutic attention. The study provides no basis upon which to conclude that there is any value to a homeopathic consultation beyond the raw benefit of time and attention.
The study does reinforce what previous studies have shown – attention from a provider does have measurable benefits to quality of life and subjective symptoms (even if not disease-altering). This should prompt a re-evaluation of the priorities given to reimbursing for provider time. It should be noted that homeopaths generally charge directly for their time, and are not typically contracted to accept an insurance-based fee schedule. So comparing a typical homeopathic consultation to a busy physician’s office is not fair.
Further – if we are going to advocate for increased money for provider time and attention, such resources should go to providers who are science-based and use modalities that have efficacy on their own. It is highly misguided, wasteful, and potentially dangerous to rely upon practitioners who utilize an unscientific philosophy and treatments that are admittedly worthless, just because there are non-specific subjective benefits from the attention given.
Edzard Ernst makes the same points in an editorial that the journal Rheumatology ran in the same issue. While I question the decision to publish this study with the conclusion as written (peer-reviewers and editors should have been much harsher on the hype and spin of the authors), at least they had the courage to include Ernst’s comments as well.

A Credible Placebo Control for Chiropractic Research
Harriet Hall on October 11, 2016
Link


The research on chiropractic has been far from rigorous. One of the problems is that studies of spinal manipulation therapy (SMT) can’t be double blinded, and it is very difficult to even do single blinding. So most studies resort to non-manipulation control groups like “usual care” or “wait list” or “pain medication.” Those studies are practically guaranteed to lead to false positive conclusions: they make SMT look more effective than it would look if you could provide a control that patients couldn’t distinguish from real SMT.
In a study just published in the European Journal of Neurology, Chaibi et al. successfully used a credible placebo manipulation on patients with migraine. It showed that SMT doesn’t work for migraine, but that’s not news. The news is that it showed how to improve the methodology of SMT studies to get more reliable results.
The study design
It was a prospective three-armed, single-blinded randomized controlled trial (RCT) conducted at a university hospital in Norway. 104 patients who had at least one migraine attack per month were studied over a period of 17 months. The control group continued with their usual pharmacological management, the active treatment group got SMT, and the placebo group got “a sham push maneuver of the lateral edge of the scapula and/or the gluteal region.” I would have thought patients could tell the difference, but they couldn’t. The blinding was successful. They did an “exit poll” after each intervention session, and more than 80% of subjects in both the active treatment and the placebo treatment groups believed they had received SMT.
The results
The number of days with migraine were significantly reduced in all three groups. This is not surprising, because doing anything, even just enrolling patients in a study, usually results in improvement; that’s why we have to use control groups. Initially there was no difference between the three groups. The effect continued in the SMT and placebo groups during follow-up, while it returned to baseline in the usual-care control group. They looked at several secondary outcomes and found some small differences, but they didn’t draw any conclusions from that data. They concluded that the effects in both the SMT and the placebo manipulation groups were “probably a placebo response.”
Adverse effects
Adverse effects were significantly more frequent in the SMT group than in the placebo manipulation group. The most commonly reported ones were local tenderness and tiredness. Fewer than 1% of patients reported other effects including lower back pain, face numbness, nausea, provoked migraine attack, and fatigue in arms. No severe or serious adverse effects were reported. If the patients got neck manipulations, face numbness and nausea might have been worrisome red flags indicating possible vertebral artery dissection and impending stroke.
Why the Gonstead method?
The SMT group was treated with the Gonstead method, with high-velocity, low-amplitude thrusts “directed to spinal biomechanical dysfunction (full spine approach) as diagnosed by standard chiropractic tests at each individual treatment session.” They did not say what those standard chiropractic tests were. According to skeptical chiropractor Sam Homola, those “standard chiropractic tests” are not reliable, and they are meant to diagnose mythical “subluxations.” Why Gonstead? Homola commented, “I cannot imagine why a scientific study would rely upon an entrepreneurial chiropractic treatment method rather than upon generic spinal manipulation.”
The authors did not reveal what parts of the spine were manipulated. Gonstead includes adjustments of the cervical spine, and any benefits of neck manipulation (placebo or otherwise) must be balanced against possible risk of a rare but catastrophic complication: stroke or death.
Can chiropractors relieve migraine?
The authors of this study call it “chiropractic” spinal manipulation therapy (CSMT), and Gonstead is indeed a chiropractic technique. But generic spinal manipulation is not specifically chiropractic; it is also used by DOs and physical therapists. The evidence for the effectiveness of “chiropractic” or SMT for migraine is mixed. Considering the flaws of the positive studies (notably the absence of a credible placebo control group) and the results of this new study, I think it is reasonable to conclude that chiropractic and/or SMT have little or no role to play in the treatment of migraine.
I asked Sam Homola, and here’s what he said:
In my own experience as a chiropractor, I felt that a patient in the throes of a migraine headache got more immediate relief from medication than from any kind of physical treatment. Although spinal manipulation can have some neurophysiological effects, I was never able to determine that manipulating the spine or correcting a subluxation was an effective treatment for a migraine that might be caused by an imbalance in brain chemicals.
Conclusion: a valuable study with two lessons
Lessons learned: (1) don’t use SMT for migraine (2) do use proper placebo controls for research.
The authors state that to their knowledge, this is the first manual-therapy RCT with a documented successful blinding. It’s about time! Any future research on manual therapies should incorporate the kind of sham manipulations, blinding, and verification of successful blinding that these researchers used.
The chiropractic subluxation is a myth. It’s appalling that many chiropractors still endorse D. D. Palmer’s obsolete belief system in the 21st century.

   Is There a Placebo Effect for Animals?
David Ramey 
Link
One of the occasional arguments used in support of “alternative” approaches to human medicine is the observation that since “alternative” medicine is used (with anecdotal success) in animals, and animals don’t know anything about the treatment that they’re getting, then they must work a priori. Of course, the fallacy of such an observation is pretty obvious to anyone with a logical/skeptical frame of mind, because it assumes that the therapies do work (even though there’s little evidence of that).
Clearly, however, some people perceive that the therapies work, including veterinarians – there are veterinary acupuncturists, chiropractors, homeopaths, etc., etc. Since there’s very little scientific support for the idea that the therapies actually have any clinically significant effect on biological processes, including the processes that result in disease, questions arise as to whether there are other effects of “alternative” treatments on animals. Specifically, people may wonder whether or not animals can benefit from placebo effects.
Fully discussing placebo effects is a topic for another blog (or several other blogs). Regardless, whether or not placebo effects exist in human medicine, there is little evidence that they exist in animals. (1) In general, for a placebo response to occur, it would seen require that the patient being treated recognize that there is an intentional effort to treat. Animals would appear to lack the ability to comprehend such intentions (other than they may not like a particular intervention). As such, animals would not be able to participate in placebo-generating experiences. So, for example, one couldn’t rationally suggest to a dog that a particular therapy might help it get better, or that it was beneficial because it was “natural;” one presumably wouldn’t wax eloquent to a horse that a particular therapy might give it a window of hope for recovery. They just wouldn’t understand.
Still, there are many explanations for how a placebo-like effect might be explained in animals. Take conditioning. Conditioning theory proposes that bodily changes result following exposure to a stimulus that previously produced that change. This is perhaps the most intuitively acceptable explanation for any placebo effects in animals. Indeed, animal studies support such a model for placebo effects, starting with the first descriptions on salivating dogs by Pavlov. (2) Both human and animal studies support the idea that conditioning forms some basis for placebo responses. (3) Since conditioning requires learning, it would be expected that repeated visits to a practitioner (of any particular persuasion) might increase the strength of the association between a learned stimuli and response in animals, good or bad. There are numerous examples of dogs shaking in fear when being taken into a veterinary clinic; on the other hand, a dog that enjoyed being handled in a soothing environment might appear to receive some relief from a chronic condition; as it learned to associate its visits with the comforting handling, conditioning effects could occur. This could certainly serve as reasonable explanations for purported placebo effects in animals. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that a healing or therapeutic effect can be dependably provoked as a result of conditioning cannot be supported at this time by any evidence.
Expectancy theory proposes that bodily changes may occur to the extent that the person receiving the therapy expects them to. There is considerable overlap between expectancy and conditioning, because learning is one of the major ways that expectancies are formed. To the extent that therapies are expected to provide relief from disease, or at least provide the client and/or veterinarian with a feeling of control over the disease process, they may alleviate adverse mental states (in the humans). Certainly, in humans, therapies that help restore patient control may evoke therapeutic effects, at least short term, but studies that investigate the expectancy model in animals have so far not been performed. Still, if animals were able to form an association between treatment-related signals (the attention and handling received, the way that the owner behaves towards the animal when it is receiving treatment) and the relief of its distress, expectancies of treatment effects might develop (on the part of both animal and owner).
There is a good body of research that demonstrates that human contact has measurable effects on animals. For example, petting by humans reduces heart rates in dogs (4) and horses (5) and causes major vascular changes in dogs. (6) Gentle handling increases productivity in dairy heifers (7) and increases reproductive efficiency in sows. (8) Thus, it is plausible that human-animal contact might play an important role in the observed responses to therapeutic interventions. To take an “alternative” example, it has been shown that a single acupuncture treatment is as effective as petting a horse, when it comes to relief of signs of chronic airway disease; that is, there’s no demonstrable effect of acupuncture beyond simple handling. (9) On the other hand, handling may also be stressful to animals, so responses to handling may not necessarily be beneficial. Still, there’s no question that human contact can invoke responses from animals and animals may behave quite differently when they are not being observed; those shouldn’t be confused with placebo-effects, however.
Can Therapies Induce Placebo Effects in Owners?
The reported intensity of subjective symptoms such as pain, fatigue, and depressed mood in an animal may vary over time for all sorts of reasons, not all of which have to do with actual changes in symptom severity. Further complicating such analyses are treatment effects that might exist on the part of both the animal owner, as well as the veterinarian with a personal investment in an “alternative” approach.
Client expectations can be very powerful motivators. Having participated in a therapeutic transaction, clients generally expect to see some results. Optimistic owners may be more likely to diligently pursue treatments. Even failing obvious results, normal reciprocal responses often result in clients reporting improvement, at least initially, even when no improvement has occurred. At the very least, veterinarians can help clients understand what problems are occurring in the animal – such comfort and reassurance may make a problem easier for the client to deal with. That’s a good thing, mostly, unless the veterinarian steers the client into areas that are unsupported by evidence.
Good veterinary care should include a healthy dose of understanding and compassion, and veterinarians should be interested in proven effective care. However, there’s no evidence whatsoever that animals can benefit from, or even experience, placebo effects. Indeed, when doctors claim effectiveness for a treatment beyond the evidence in the belief that they are doing the patient a favor by inducing a “placebo effect” to the animal’s supposed benefit, they are abusing three trusted roles: expert, authority figure, and comforter. Animals deserve better.
REFERENCES
McMillan, FD. The Placebo Effect in Animals. J Am Vet Med Assoc 1999; 215(7): 992-9.
Pavlov, IP. Conditioned Reflexes. London: Oxford Press, 1927. 23–78.
Voudouris, NJ, Peck, CL, Coleman, G. Conditioned placebo responses. J Pers Soc Psychol 1985; 48: 47-53.
Gantt, WH, Newton, JO, Royer, FL, et al. Effect of person. Conditional Reflex 1966; 1: 18-35.
Lynch, B. Heart rate changes in the horse to human contact. Psychophysiology 1974; 11: 472-478.
Newton, JF, Ehrlich, WW. Coronary blood flow in dogs: effect of person. Conditional Reflex 1966; 1: 81.
Gross, WB. The benefits of tender loving care. Int J Stud Anim Prob 1980; 1: 147-149.
Heinsworth, PH, Brand, A, Willems, PJ. The behavioral response of sows to the presence of human beings and their productivity. Livestock Prod Sci 1981; 8: 67-74.
Wilson, DV, Berney, CE, Peroni, DL, et al. The effects of a single acupuncture treatment in horses with severe recurrent airway obstruction. Equine Vet J 2004; 36(6): 489-94.

Adjectives
When a placebo is called ‘powerful’, what is meant? Nothing.
Mark Crislip on November 21, 2023
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Adjectives are important. Adjectives, of course, describe nouns, and adjectives can bias how you think about the world. In politics, well, you can come up with your own examples. In our skeptical world of science-based medicine, there are the adjectives ‘complementary’ and ‘alternative’ that when applied to the noun medicine, add nothing. Those modalities that like to describe themselves with those adjectives are deluding themselves, given that, as so often noted at this blog, they are neither complementary nor alternative to reality-based medicine. But I would suspect that the adjectives help give SCAM practitioners a feeling that they are actually involved with something positive and worthwhile. Nope.
Reality-based medicine can suffer from the same issues.
For years, I said, there were only two rules in medicine that were true 100% of the time. The first was that infections went to the disc space and then to the vertebral bodies but tumor went to the bone, sparing the disc. That fact was 100% reliable. And then it wasn’t. At the end of my long and storied career, I had a case where the infection went to the vertebral body, avoiding the disc space, a Brodies abscess of the spine. I found there were few other cases in the Pubmeds. So 99.99999999999999999% reliable.
The other rule, however, has remained true to this day. Anyone who uses the adjectives ‘strong,’ ‘powerful’ or ‘big gun’ to modify the noun ‘antibiotic’ is an idjit who knows nothing about the treatment of infectious diseases. I have never witnessed a black swan to disprove the rule. There is nothing intrinsically strong, powerful or big gun about any antibiotic. Like applying honesty and integrity to, well, take your pick, they are adjectives that do not belong. Ciprofloxicin, an antibiotic I have often heard described with those adjectives, is a useless antibiotic if I were treating my central nervous system syphilis. Not that I have CNS syphilis, mind you, but as an example.
Vancomycin, another antibiotic that is often described as strong or powerful, stinks on ice: expensive (well it was), toxic, lousy pharmacokinetics and barely able to kill. In the scheme of antibiotics, it is suboptimal, but sometimes the only choice.
‘Strong,’ ‘powerful’ and ‘big gun’ likely give the prescribing physician the (false) sense they know that they are doing and the receiving patient the (false) confidence that something extraordinary is being done. It ain’t. But saying I am prescribing expensive, toxic, broad-spectrum antibiotics with increased side effects would not be as well received.
What you want, for antibiotics, and for any intervention, is a treatment that is reliably effective for a given medical problem. Two adjectives, reliable and effective, that never apply to SCAMs.
Which brings us to placebo. I have written about placebo before. Actually, much of my SCAM writings are about placebo. For those who do not want to search the site, try here, here and here.
I suspect the most common adjective found in front of placebo is powerful. Powerful shows up in book titles, journal articles, and New York Times editorials
In research settings, placebo responses are powerful but a nuisance, as they make detecting a drug’s superiority over a placebo difficult. And in clinical practice they are powerful, but they often require deception, making them unethical.
There is open label placebo (OLP), where the patient is knowing told they are being treated with placebo.
The OLP approach verbally fosters a positive expectancy, typically by conveying some variation of the following discussion points: (a) placebos are powerful (b) the body automatically responds to placebos compliance is important, and (d) positive attitudes help but are not necessary.
Since the effects of the fantasy-based therapies often discussed here at SBM (acupuncture, homeopathy, etc) are all due to the ‘powerful’ placebo, just what does that mean? What is powerful? Is the placebo able to leap over tall buildings in a single bound?
I don’t know. Powerful is an adjective that isn’t ever strictly defined in reference to placebo that I can find. It appears to be an intrinsic but unmeasured and unmeasurable property of the placebo. Powerful is chi. Powerful is innate intelligence. Powerful is the dilution and succussion. Powerful is all sound and fury, signifying nothing. Powerful is an axiom.
Placebos are not going to have any effect on any of the processes I saw in my career: placebo will not cure pneumonia, send lymphoma into remission or modify a heart attack. If there is an objective medical issue, expect no benefit from placebo. In comparison to placebo, even vancomycin would be powerful. But placebo would be not be reliably effective against any process that would send you the ER. So not powerful for most medical problems.
What the placebo does help is patient reported symptoms, usually pain. It does nothing for the underlying problem, but does change the perception of the problem.
Take, as one of many examples, osteoarthritis and placebo.
Pain and stiffness are improved with a placebo intervention. Walking time, strength, and range of motion are not.
This is a common effect from these ‘powerful’ placebos. Improvements of the subjective but not the objective. Which is nice if you are the patient. But a modest decrease in subjective discomfort does not powerful make.
Placebo interventions are certainly not reliably effective. It perhaps depends on the patient:
Certain personality-types, participants suggested, might be better suited to benefit from OLPs. Some suggested that only open-minded participants would experience improvement.
Open-minded? Lol. Or maybe it is the gullible or fantasy-prone, who come under the power of placebo.
And placebos may cost money
“Please God, tell me it would be dirt cheap.” (Participant # 2)
“On some level, I find it offensive that I would have to pay for a sugar pill.” (Participant # 5)
If you have limited income, having to pay for a sugar pill would be powerfully annoying.
I can’t see how the term powerful can be applied to placebos except as a marketing ploy. It is PR.
I still think the best descriptor for placebo effects is beer goggles.
I look better and am a lot funnier if you have had two pints of IPA. Or maybe three. Let’s make it four. But I haven’t changed. And you are out 10 bucks (it’s happy hour) and your liver has taken another hit.
Same with placebos.
When I was a kid and did a suboptimal job on some assigned chore, my Dad would call the result “half-assed.” Now there is an adjective that can be applied to all placebos.
Next time you see an article promoting the powerful placebo, just substitute half-assed for powerful. It is a better fit.

The Magic Feather Effect: Placebos and the Power of Belief in Alternative Medicine
In her book The Magic Feather Effect, journalist Melanie Warner covers placebo research, shows that alternative medicine is placebo medicine, takes a “try it yourself” approach, and gives belief and anecdotes more credit than they deserve.
Harriet Hall on February 19, 2019
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In the movie Dumbo, a little elephant with large ears can fly by flapping them like wings, but he refuses to believe he can. A mouse uses a psychological trick to persuade him, telling him that holding a “magic feather” will enable him to fly. He gives Dumbo an ordinary crow feather and Dumbo uses it to fly in a circus act. When he accidentally drops the feather, the mouse tells him it wasn’t magic but only worked as a confidence-builder, and Dumbo continues to fly without it.
A new book, The Magic Feather Effect: The Science of Alternative Medicine and the Surprising Power of Belief, by the journalist Melanie Warner, sees Dumbo’s feather as an analogy for alternative medicine. The analogy is imperfect, but the idea is that alternative medicine providers persuade patients to accept a non-reality-based belief, and believing has a powerful placebo effect that allows the mind to heal the body. Unlike Dumbo’s feather, a patient who improves with alternative medicine is never told the treatment was imaginary. There is no “science of alternative medicine”. If it were based on science, it would not be “alternative”, but would simply be part of medicine. Alternative medicine is placebo medicine. Science has not shown it to be “powerful” in the accepted sense. She portrays it as powerful based largely on anecdotal evidence of seemingly miraculous healings.
One-sided anecdotal reporting
Her reporting is one-sided. She emphasizes failed back surgeries and other failures of medicine, and she interviews people who believe alternative medicine has cured them; but she doesn’t make any attempt to balance their accounts with interviews of people who alternative medicine harmed or failed to help. She doesn’t even mention the What’s the Harm website, which collects reports of people who were harmed or died because they put their trust in the fantasies of alternative medicine.
She devotes several pages to a seemingly miraculous recovery from quadriplegia attributed to unconventional treatments.
She visits a patient who was allegedly cured of pheochromocytoma at Lourdes, and learns that the diagnosis may have been incorrect. She hypothesizes that the patient’s symptoms may have been psychological distress that triggered physical symptoms, claiming that relief of psychological distress counts as a miracle cure. A doctor tells her “Our belief in miracles has a fantastic placebo effect.” She does not reveal that out of 200 million patients who have visited Lourdes, only 67 were validated by the Catholic church as having experienced a “medically inexplicable” cure; and most of those actually were medically explicable as conditions that were susceptible to psychosomatic influences or known to show spontaneous remissions. Not so fantastic. Those statistics are a powerful argument against her “magic feather” thesis.
She questions the concept that treatments should be proven more effective than placebo in randomized, blinded, placebo-controlled trials. For her, it is enough for patients to report feeling better. “Effective” is subjective, anecdotal, not objectively measurable improvement. She assumes placebos work and jumps the gun to investigate how they work.
Good reporting of placebo research
Her investigation of the scientific research on placebos is the best part of the book. She cites many studies and the criticisms of the studies. She explains the role of conditioning and suggestion.
The brain can produce its own pain-killing chemicals. Experiments have shown that the opioid antagonist naloxone reverses the pain-killing effect of placebos. In Parkinson’s disease, the brain released dopamine when told a saline injection was a Parkinson’s drug. Patients believe that surgery will be effective, and in several studies fake surgeries have worked just as well as real surgeries.
Kaptchuk’s acupuncture research has shown that interactions with warm, empathetic providers got better results than impersonal, perfunctory interactions; and patients on a no-acupuncture waiting list got far worse results.
Warner’s reporting of the research does suffer one flaw: her unquestioning acceptance of useless studies that compare alternative treatments to a waiting list and studies that add an alternative treatment to the usual care. She seems not to realize that such studies are a waste, because the outcome can be predicted. They will always show that the alternative treatment “works”, because doing anything new is always better than doing nothing. As Edzard Ernst has shown, these trial designs cannot generate a negative result.
Fabrizio Benedetti is a meticulous and prolific placebo researcher. She attends his lectures and interviews him. He is trying to understand the biological basis of placebo responses, but he doesn’t think his laboratory studies have practical clinical applications. Placebo responses are short-lived, and they can produce nocebo effects. He stresses that they are only effective for certain subjective symptoms, that there is a difference between care and cure, and that there are serious ethical concerns.
Warner also interviews Benedetti’s protégé Luana Colloca, who endorses the “better than usual care” criterion for effectiveness rather than “better than placebo”. She believes her allergic asthma was cured by a single acupuncture treatment. When she told Benedetti, his interpretation was that she was a very good placebo responder.
She covers chronic pain, the research into how it develops, and the fact that altering mindsets is a major goal of pain clinics. She tells an anecdote about a patient who was resistant to all treatments until a clairvoyant told her there was nothing wrong with her back. This was a “shock to her mind”, a kind of miracle that enabled her brain to eliminate the perception of pain overnight.
She covers research on stress, meditation, inflammation, biophotons, hallucinations, synesthesia, and Tai Chi. Tai Chi was thought to influence the immune system and have other benefits. But a study showed otherwise. It compared tai chi to cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) for patients with rheumatoid arthritis. CBT had a modest effect on pain, inflammation, and immune markers; but in the Tai Chi group there was nothing – not even a reduction in pain. The study was never published “because the lead author didn’t know how to explain the results.” That’s irresponsible: science advances by studying unexplained results.
The value of alternative medicine
The value of alternative medicine lies in the lengthy encounters with providers who make patients feel supported and listened to, who give them confident explanations (usually false) of exactly what is wrong, and who confidently promise to fix the problem.
She interviews a “healer” who seems to have the whole package of everything placebo researchers say makes for an effective therapeutic encounter: meaningful attention, expression of empathy, listening skills, earnest eye contact, steady projection of confidence, and an office adorned with a suggestive assembly of symbols.
On a visit to a Psychosomatic Medicine clinic in Germany, she finds that patients are seldom “cured” but they develop a sense of control, empowerment, improved self-esteem, and more self-confidence.
If alternative medicine lies are able to evoke a placebo response that produces healing, exposing the truth should allow the healing to continue just as the mouse’s revelation to Dumbo allowed him to keep flying. But that’s not the way it works. Placebos are not powerful, and the myths that alternative medicine practitioners feed patients are more acceptable to them than a truth that will require them to reject strongly held beliefs. Desperate patients seek out confident, empathetic practitioners, even if the treatments they offer are based on total nonsense.
Unfair criticism of skeptics
She criticizes skeptics for having too little interest in the mind’s role in health and healing. I think skeptics are very interested in the mind’s role, but they are not credulous: they insist on good evidence. One book reviewer said, “For all the value the skeptics provide in finding objective truth, sometimes in their need for academic certainty they lose sight of what matters to their patients.” The reviewer goes on to ask, “But in the end, if your life is measurably better, does it matter?” Yes, it matters! And skeptics have explained why (ethics, failure to get lifesaving treatment, undermining critical thinking, etc.) I am convinced that truth matters. For my column in Skeptical Inquirer, I chose the title “Reality Is the Best Medicine.” The Journal of the American Medical Association used to have a series with facing pages: on the left, a patient declared his cancer cured by an unconventional treatment, and on the right they posted his death certificate showing that he died of that cancer shortly after his testimonial.
She singles out Steven Novella and David Gorski for discouraging further acupuncture research; but she doesn’t fully explain their reasoning, which I think is eminently valid.
Try it for yourself
She tries everything for herself, experiencing energy medicine, acupuncture, bathing at Lourdes, even letting a chiropractor pop her neck despite understanding that there is a small risk of complications such as stroke and death. Personal experimentation may be persuasive journalism, but it is not good science. If she improves, she can’t know if it was because of the treatment; and if she doesn’t improve, that is not evidence that it is ineffective for others. Controlled scientific studies are the only valid way to determine the truth.
She tried craniosacral therapy and despite knowing that the bones of the skull don’t move, she is “taken aback that the right side of my head does seem decidedly higher.” She didn’t try to find any objective evidence. Her subjective impression was enough for her.
With regard to energy medicine, she reveals her bias by saying, “I yearned to have a reason to believe…The possibility of phenomena that science has failed to detect has a tantalizing thrill. Throughout history, many ideas have been unreasonable and preposterous until they weren’t… In the absence of hard evidence, it seems what I may need to have is a personal encounter with the anomalous force so many others say they have experienced.” She took classes but was unable to learn to see auras or have the experiences others had.
In the first chapter she undergoes muscle testing (applied kinesiology) before and after an intervention by an energy medicine practitioner. She experiences unexplained arm weakness and is impressed, but in a later chapter she reports a simple explanation: a chiropractor who used to be an enthusiastic muscle tester eventually realized he was unconsciously pushing in a different way when he expected the patient to be strong, appearing to use the same force but actually using less force than when he wanted their arm to give way.
Illness vs. disease; what does “healing” mean?
She points out that illness and disease are not the same thing. Disease is objective pathology; illness is the lived experience of the patient.
Autonomic systems like the immune system and the neuroendocrine system can be modified by learning and conditioning. Pain perception and other symptoms are conscious events that can be modulated by expectations and patient-doctor communication.
She says peace and acceptance can be its own kind of profound healing.
She says, “I try not to harden around my skepticism.” This strikes me as an admission that she rejects scientific rigor in favor of gee-whiz anecdotal evidence. There is nothing hardened about skepticism. It is not dogma or systematic disbelief; it is a process that evaluates claims and only accepts beliefs that are based on good evidence: the essence of what good scientists do.
She protests that she will always side with science and couldn’t possibly defend the flood of nonsense, but she insists she has seen alternative medicine therapies help people and the stories they weave provide meaning and comfort. She says that until more doctors learn to offer the things alternative medicine offers, to evoke the power of belief and hope, and to treat the patient rather than the disease, alternative medicine isn’t going away.
Conclusion: Lessons to be learned
Warner makes the case that alternative medicine offers something of value to some patients, although it involves persuading the patient to believe in fantasies like acupuncture points, undetectable energies, chiropractic subluxations, and other magic feathers. As Mark Crislip said, “While changing the perception of disease for the better is of benefit, it is just not ethical to base treatment on a lie.” What if understanding the science behind the placebo/contextual effect of the provider/patient encounter could enable them to provide the value without the deception? I question whether that is possible for alternative medicine, which relies so heavily on confident explanations that have no basis in reality.
But I think it is an achievable goal for science-based providers. Clinical medicine is not just science; it’s applied science. Its goal is:
To cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always.
It’s easy to get fixated on scientific trials and lose sight of the need to comfort the patient. Surely we can do better. I wouldn’t call it “healing”, but comforting another human being is important too.

The “It Worked for Me” Gambit
Steven Novella on April 20, 2016
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It is almost inevitable that whenever we post an article critical of the claims being made for a particular treatment, alternative philosophy, or alternative profession, someone in the comments will counter a careful examination of published scientific evidence with an anecdote. Their arguments boils down to, “It worked for me, so all of your scientific evidence and plausibility is irrelevant.”
Both components of this argument are invalid. Even if we grant that a treatment worked for one individual, that does not counter the (carefully observed) experience of all the subjects in the clinical trials. They count too – I would argue they count more because we can verify all the important aspects of their story.
I want to focus, however, on the first part of that statement, the claim that a treatment “worked” for a particular individual. Most people operationally define “worked” as, they took a treatment and then they improved in some way. This, however, is a problematic definition on many levels.
Placebo effects
Much of the disagreement about how to define “works” comes down to placebo effects. The generally-accepted scientific approach is to conclude that an intervention works when the desired effect is greater than a placebo. When all other variables are controlled for, the intervention as an isolated variable is associated with an improved outcome. That is the basic logic of a double-blind placebo controlled trial.
Proponents of “alternative” treatments that tend to fail such trials have turned to the argument that placebo effects should count also, not just effects in excess of placebo. They essentially argue, who cares if something works through placebo, as long as it works.
One problem is in the assumption that because one is feeling better, the treatment therefore worked. This is the post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. We do not know what the subject’s outcome would have been like had they not received the treatment, or if they received a different treatment.
In this way many placebo effects are just an illusion, not a real benefit.
Simple regression to the mean explains why this is likely. People will tend to seek treatment when their symptoms are at their worst, which means they are likely, by chance alone, to regress to the mean of the distribution of symptoms – or return to a less severe state, which will be interpreted as improvement.
This is further compounded by confirmation bias. Symptoms are often highly complex, variable, and subjective. What counts as “better” can be determined post hoc by whatever happens. For headaches, for example, there are many variables to consider – frequency, duration, severity, response to pain medication, the need for pain medication, level of disability, and a host of associated symptoms such as nausea, blurry vision, or mental fog.
All of these features of a headache can change, providing ample opportunity to cherry pick which outcome to consider. That is exactly why in a clinical trial the primary outcome measure has to be chosen prior to collecting data. This is also why we are suspicious of clinical trials that use multiple secondary outcome measures, and claim a positive study when one of those secondary measures is improved.
In other words – the natural course of a symptom or illness provides very noisy data. It does not make scientific sense to pick out only the positive effects from this distribution of data and declare that the treatment “worked” in those instances.
This is exactly like having an alleged psychic guess cards, and perform no better than chance but declare that for those random hits they did make their psychic power was working. You have to look at all the data to see if there was an effect.
This principle applies to medical interventions as well – you have to look systematically at all the data to see if there is an effect. Saying “well it worked for me” is exactly like saying that the psychic powers worked whenever they randomly hit, even though the overall pattern was negative (consistent with random guessing).
Another layer of randomness to the data which is then ripe for cherry picking and confirmation bias is trying multiple therapies for the same problem (in addition to the same therapy for multiple problems). For example, someone might take medication, acupuncture, chiropractic, and homeopathic remedies at the same time for their headaches, and if they improve credit one or more of the alternative treatments. Or they may try them in sequence, and whichever one they took when their symptoms improved on their own gets the credit due to the post hoc fallacy.
We intuitively ignore the failed treatments – the misses – and commit the lottery fallacy by asking the wrong question: what are the odds of my headache getting better shortly after taking treatment X. But the real question is – what are the odds of my headache getting better at any time, and that I would have recently tried some treatment.
There are also psychological factors in play. When people try an unconventional treatment, perhaps out of desperation or just the hope for relief, they may feel vulnerable to criticism or a bit defensive for trying something unorthodox and even a bit bizarre. There is therefore a huge incentive to justify their decision by concluding that the treatment worked – to show all the skeptics that they were right all along.
Then, mixed in with all of this, is a genuine improvement in mood, and therefore symptoms, from the positive attention of the practitioner (if there is one – i.e. you’re not taking an over-the-counter remedy), or just from the hope that relief is on the way and the feeling that you are doing something about your health and your symptoms. This is a genuine, but non-specific, psychological effect of receiving treatment and taking steps to have some control over your situation.
What is distressing to those of us who are trying to promote science-based medicine is that this latter factor is often treated as if it is the entire placebo effect, or at least a majority. The evidence, however, suggests that it is an extreme minority of the effect.
A recent study with asthma, for example, shows that the placebo effect for objective measurements of asthma severity was essentially zero. There was a substantial effect for subjective outcomes. So subjects reported feeling better even when objective measures showed they were no better. This sounds an awful lot like confirmation bias and other psychological factors, like expense/risk justification and the optimism bias.
Conclusion: Stories often triumph over statistics
Placebo effects are largely an illusion of various well-known psychological factors and errors in perception, memory, and cognition – confirmation bias, regression to the mean, post-hoc fallacy, optimism bias, risk justification, suggestibility, expectation bias, and failure to account for multiple variables. There are also variable (depending on the symptoms being treated) and subjective effects from improved mood and outlook.
Concluding from all of this that a treatment “worked”, when a treatment appears to be followed by improved symptoms, is like concluding that an alleged psychic’s power “worked” whenever their random guessing hits. This is why anecdotal experience is as worthless in determining if a treatment works as is taking the subjective experience of a target of a cold reading in determining if a psychic’s power is genuine.
Yet, even for many skeptics, the latter is more intuitive than the former. It is hard to shake the sense that if someone feels better than the treatment must have “worked” in some way.
The, “It worked for me,” gambit will likely always be with us, however. Stories are compelling, and none more than our own. It is just how our brains work. If we eat something and get nauseated, we will avoid that food in the future. If we take a treatment and feel better, the feeling that the treatment was the cause can be profound and hard to dismiss with dry data.
This is true even with treatments that have been proven effective. We cannot know in any individual case whether or not an intervention worked, because we cannot know what would have happened without the treatment. We can only make statistical statements based on clinical data.
Thinking statistically rather than anecdotally is not in the human comfort zone, however.

ORBITA: Another clinical trial demonstrating the need for sham controls in surgical trials
Last week, the results of ORBITA were published. This clinical trial tested coronary angioplasty and stenting versus optimal medical management in patients with single-vessel coronary artery disease. It was a resoundingly negative trial, meaning that adding stenting to drug management didn’t result in detectable clinical improvement. What was distinctive about this trial is that it used a sham procedure (i.e., placebo) control, which few trials testing surgery or a procedure use. The results of ORBITA emphasize how important sham procedure controls are, whenever they can be ethically used, and how resistant physicians can be to change.
David Gorski on November 6, 2017
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We here at SBM devote a lot of discussion to unscientific and pseudoscientific treatment modalities, the vast majority of which can be best described as quackery. Sometimes, though, what’s even more interesting are controversies in “conventional” science-based medicine. In particular, I’m a sucker for clinical trials that have the potential to upend what we think about a disease and how it’s treated, particularly when the results seem to go against what we understand about the pathophysiology of a disease.
So it was that I started seeing news reports last week about ORBITA (Objective Randomised Blinded Investigation With Optimal Medical Therapy of Angioplasty in Stable Angina). Basically, ORBITA is a double-blind, randomized controlled trial comparing percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI, or, as it’s more commonly referred to colloquially, coronary angioplasty and/or stenting) versus a placebo procedure in patients with coronary artery disease. Indeed, the sham procedure is what makes this trial interesting and compelling, although the devil is in the details. What this trial and its results say about coronary artery angioplasty and stenting, placebo effects, and clinical trial ethics are worth exploring. Basically, ORBITA calls into doubt the efficacy and usefulness of PCI in a large subset of patients with stable angina (chest pain or discomfort due to constriction of one or more coronary arteries that most often occurs with fairly predictably with activity or emotional stress—that is, exertion).
Before I dig in, I can’t resist mentioning that cardiac surgery was one of the very earliest forms of treatment in which the importance of a sham surgery control was shown to be very important. In 1939, an Italian surgeon named David Fieschi developed a technique in which he tied off (ligated) both internal mammary arteries through two small incisions, one on each side of the sternum. The idea was to “redirect” blood flow to the heart in order to overcome ischemic heart disease, in which the patient suffers pain, heart failure, or even death due to insufficient blood flow to the heart muscle caused by atherosclerotic narrowing of one or more of the coronary arteries. The results were striking, as three quarters of all patients on whom Dr. Fieschi did his procedure improved and as many as one third appeared to be cured. The procedure became very popular and appeared to work.
Nearly two decades later, in the late 1950s, the NIH funded a cardiologist in Seattle named Dr. Leonard Cobb to do a randomized controlled clinical trial of the Fieschi technique. He operated on 17 patients, of whom eight underwent the true Fieschi procedure, with both internal mammary arteries tied off, and nine underwent skin incisions in the appropriate location. In 1959, Dr. Cobb’s results were published in the New England Journal of Medicine, where he reported that the results were the same for patients who underwent the “real” Fieschi operation or the sham procedure. This was the beginning of the end of internal mammary ligation as a treatment for angina and a landmark in the history of surgery. After this trial, understanding of the ethics of human subjects research changed, and including sham surgical procedures in clinical trial design became increasingly frowned upon.
ORBITA is one of several recent trials that use sham interventions that have been reported in recent years as that ethical understanding has shifted again in the face of increasing evidence that surgery can produce the most powerful placebo effects of all interventions. Another example is trials of vertebroplasty for vertebral fractures due to osteoporosis, which showed that vertebroplasty in this setting produced results indistinguishable from the sham procedure. Increasingly, it has been argued that more surgical trials should include a sham procedure group.
PCI: A brief history
Publication of the results of ORBITA were timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the development of PCI. Basically, coronary angioplasty was developed 40 years ago as a less invasive treatment than coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) for coronary artery disease. In brief, in PCI a cardiologist will thread a catheter up a major blood vessel in the groin to the heart and into the coronary artery (or arteries) with blockages. At the end of the catheter is a balloon. The idea is to thread the end of the catheter under fluoroscopic guidance (fluoroscopy is a form of X-ray imaging with video) into the coronary artery and past the blockage, such that the balloon aligns with the atherosclerotic blockage. The balloon is then inflated to open up the blockage. That’s the basic idea, although the methods have evolved markedly over the last forty years.
At this point I can’t help but mention a bit of a personal note, as it involves the research I did as part of my PhD thesis, lo these many years ago. One of the huge problems with angioplasty early on was the high rate of restenosis (recurrent narrowing) of the blood vessel treated. The reason for this was that balloon angioplasty involved, in essence, injuring the vessel. As with any injury, there was an inflammatory reaction, and one consequence of the inflammatory reaction due to angioplasty is that the vascular smooth muscle cells in the media (the middle layer of the blood vessel) would be stimulated to proliferate and restenose the vessel. As part of my PhD thesis, I cloned and characterized a homeobox gene (yes, a homeobox gene, for you geeks out there) that inhibited the proliferation of vascular smooth muscle cells. The idea was to treat the area at the time of the procedure with this gene as a form of gene therapy to prevent restenosis.
I realize that those of you out there who might be cardiologists and who weren’t practicing back in the 1990s probably think this was an insane idea, but here’s why it wasn’t so insane back then. In those days, coronary stents hadn’t been perfected, much less the drug-eluting coronary stents that are commonly used now to prevent restenosis. Basically, after most angioplasty procedures now, cardiologists place a stent in the area of former blockage. To prevent cellular ingrowth into the holes of the stent and subsequent restenosis, the stent slowly elutes a drug that prevents the proliferation of vascular smooth muscle cells. (As an aside, one of the things about these stents that frequently causes problems to surgeons like me is that the patient needs to be on powerful anti-platelet drugs like Plavix for up to a year after stenting). In any case, with the development of drug-eluting stents, the idea of gene therapy to prevent restenosis disappeared into the dustbin of scientific history, for the most part.
Back when PCI was new and young, its indications were a lot more limited, but as time went on and cardiologists’ confidence grew indications expanded to multivessel disease and other indications that used to mandate CABG, to the point that PCI for acute coronary syndromes has grown to predominate. As MedPageToday describes:
In the early years of PCI it was widely believed that PCI to open a severely blocked artery would have long term cardiovascular benefits, even in stable patients. Angina patients, the thinking went, were at higher risk for CV events and death, and PCI or CABG lowered that risk by restoring flow through the blocked vessel and preventing a future MI. But doubts grew over time, as it became increasingly clear that MIs were more likely to occur at other, less obvious blockages. Coronary artery disease began to be seen more as a systemic condition and less as a focal plumbing problem. The positive role of medical therapy, including statins and aspirin, became increasingly recognized.
Finally, a decade ago the COURAGE trial, despite widespread and fierce initial resistance in the interventional cardiology community, led to widespread agreement that in fact PCI in stable lesions did not produce long-term improvements in outcome when compared to optimal medical therapy (OMT).
But PCI for stable angina maintained a strong clinical presence as a new consensus emerged in the cardiology community that PCI was superior to OMT in the relief of symptoms. The mantra was that patients would need a stent eventually so they might as well get it upfront. It is this reduction in symptoms that the ORBITA trial sought to test.
And it is this assumption or belief that ORBITA called into doubt, at least for one large subset of patients.
ORBITA
ORBIT has been published in the online first section of The Lancet; so let’s dig in. The introduction tells the tale, and you don’t even have to leave the abstract:
Symptomatic relief is the primary goal of percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) in stable angina and is commonly observed clinically. However, there is no evidence from blinded, placebo-controlled randomised trials to show its efficacy.
Or, in more detail in the introduction:
Percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI) was originally introduced to treat stable angina.1 More than 500 000 PCI procedures are done annually worldwide for stable angina. The Clinical Outcomes Utilizing Revascularization and Aggressive Drug Evaluation (COURAGE) trial showed no difference in myocardial infarction and death rates between patients with stable coronary artery disease who underwent PCI and controls.2 Meta-analyses have shown similar results.3
Angina relief remains the primary reason for PCI in stable coronary artery disease.4 Guidelines recommend antianginal medication as rst line therapy, with PCI reserved for the many patients who remain symptomatic.5
Data from unblinded randomised trials have shown significant exercise time improvement, angina relief, and quality of life improvement from PCI.6–8 However, symptomatic responses are subjective and include both a true therapeutic effect and a placebo effect.9 Moreover, in an open trial, if patients randomised to no PCI have an expectation that PCI is advantageous, this might affect their reporting (and their physician’s interpretation) of symptoms, artifactually increasing the rate of unplanned revascularisation in the control group.4,10
So the investigators who designed ORBITA sought to do a rigorous randomized, double-blind, sham-controlled clinical trial of PCI for patients in stable angina. One can argue that such a trial should have been done a long time ago, before PCI became such a popular procedure for stable angina, and you would be correct. However, it’s been done now; so let’s look at the design. First, the inclusion criteria:
    • Age 18-85 years
    • Stable angina/angina equivalent
    • At least one angiographically significant lesion (≥70%) in a single vessel that was clinically appropriate for PCI
Exclusion criteria:
    • Angiographic stenosis ≥50% in a nontarget vessel
    • Acute coronary syndrome
    • Previous coronary artery bypass graft surgery
    • Left main stem coronary disease
    • Contraindications to DES
    • Chronic total coronary occlusion
    • Severe valvular disease
    • Severe left ventricular systolic impairment
    • Moderate-to-severe pulmonary hypertension
    • Life expectancy <2 years
    • Inability to give consent
Other features of the patient population studied:
    • Previous PCI: 13%
    • Left ventricular ejection fraction normal: 92%
    • Canadian Cardiovascular Society angina severity grading class: I (3%), II (59%), III (39%)
    • Angina duration: 9 months
    • Vessel involved: left anterior descending (69%)
    • Median area stenosis by quantitative coronary angiography: 85%
    • Median baseline FFR value: 0.72; median post-PCI FFR value: 0.9
The primary endpoint to be assessed was improvement in exercise time. Patients with stable angina and evidence of severe single-vessel stenosis were randomized 1:1 to either PCI or a sham procedure. After enrollment, patients in both groups underwent six weeks of medical optimization. After that, they underwent either PCI or sham procedure with auditory isolation in which the subjects all wore headphones playing music throughout the procedure. During the procedure, patients’ heart function (measurements known as fractional flow reserve (FFR) and instantaneous wave-free ratio (iFR)) was monitored using a research method, but operators were blinded to the physiology values and did not use them to guide treatment. Randomization occurred after this physiological assessment. For patients undergoing PCI, the operator used drug-eluting stents according to standard clinical guidelines with a mandate to achieve complete revascularization as determined by angiography. In the sham procedure group, subjects were kept sedated in the cath lab for at least 15 minutes, with the coronary catheters withdrawn with no intervention having been done. Here’s the summary of the timeline and allocation of the trial:
Here’s the trial outline:
Overall, there were 230 patients enrolled, of which after the medical optimization phase 200 were randomized, with 105 patients assigned to PCI and 95 assigned to sham procedure. And the results? They were what we call in the business a big nothingburger. The change in exercise time from baseline for PCI vs. sham, was 28.4 vs. 11.8 seconds, p = 0.2. Secondary outcomes were no better:
    • Change in Seattle Angina Questionnaire (SAQ)-physical limitation from baseline: 7.4 vs. 5.0, p = 0.42
    • Change in SAQ-angina frequency from baseline: 14.0 vs. 9.6, p = 0.26
    • Change in Duke treadmill score from baseline: 1.22 vs. 0.1, p = 0.10
Also, at followup six weeks later, patients in both groups were receiving a mean of 2·9 medications; so PCI didn’t decrease the need for cardiac medications. In other words, there was no statistically significant change in either the primary or secondary outcomes in patients with stable angina. The authors noted:
In ORBITA, the first blinded, placebo-controlled trial of PCI for stable angina, PCI did not improve exercise time beyond the effect of the placebo. This was despite the patients having ischaemic symptoms, severe coronary stenosis both anatomically (84·4% area reduction) and haemodynamically (on-treatment FFR 0·69 and iFR 0·76), and objective relief of anatomical stenosis, invasive pressure, and non-invasive perfusion indices (FFR p<0·0001, iFR p<0·0001, stress wall motion score index p=0·0011). There was also no improvement beyond placebo in the other exercise and patient-centered effects with placebo effects. Forgetting this point, or denying it, causes overestimation of the physical effect.
In an accompanying editorial, David L. Brown and Rita F. Redberg commended the ORBITA investigators for “challenging the existing dogma around a procedure that has become routine, ingrained, and profitable,” noting that ORBITA shows “(once again) why regulatory agencies, the medical profession, and the public must demand high-quality studies before the approval and adoption of new therapies” and characterizing PCI for stable angina as putting “PCI in the category of other abandoned therapies for cardiovascular disease, including percutaneous trans-myocardial laser revascularisation10 and catheter-based radiofrequency renal artery sympathetic denervation11—procedures for which the initial apparent benefit was later shown in sham-controlled blinded studies to actually be due to the placebo effect.” Noting that the short duration of followup actually would favor PCI because “any haemodynamic benefit from PCI occurs early and the benefits of medical therapy continue to accrue over years,” Brown and Redberg conclude:
The implications of ORBITA are profound and far-reaching. First and foremost, the results of ORBITA show unequivocally that there are no benefits for PCI compared with medical therapy for stable angina, even when angina is refractory to medical therapy. Based on these data, all cardiology guidelines should be revised to downgrade the recommendation for PCI in patients with angina despite use of medical therapy. ORBITA highlights the importance of including sham controls and double blinding in a trial to avoid being fooled by illusory improvements due to the powerful placebo effect of procedures such as PCI. Although sham-control procedures are associated with some adverse outcomes, those complications are dwarfed in magnitude by the rate of adverse events in the approximately 500 000 patients who undergo PCI for symptomatic relief of stable angina in the USA and Europe each year. These adverse events include death (0·65%), myocardial infarction (15%), renal injury (13%), stroke (0·2%), and vascular complications (2–6%).12 Health-care providers should focus their attention on treating patients with stable coronary artery disease with optimal medical therapy, which is very effective, and on improving the lifestyle choices that represent a large proportion of modifiable cardiovascular risk, including heart-healthy diets, regular physical activity, and abstention from smoking.
Based on the results of this trial, one can easily argue that PCI should rarely—if ever—be performed in patients with single vessel disease and stable angina.
The backlash
Not surprisingly, there was pushback. Cardiologists were not pleased by this result, even though it has been well known for a long time that in patients like those studied in ORBITA, PCI at least doesn’t improve survival or decrease progression to need revascularization more than OMT. For instance, in a comment on the study various cardiologists were quick to make excuses:
Panelist Dr Martin Leon (Columbia University Medical Center, New York City) applauded the investigators efforts for a “remarkable study” but said it’s a much, much higher bar to achieve when the end points are differences from baseline between two groups.
“Baseline data demonstrating that these patients had very good functional capacity, had infrequent angina, had very little ischemia, means that regardless of what you did to the coronary artery there was going to be very little you could demonstrate in terms of clinical therapeutic benefit. So I’m really glad that PCI had a statistically significant benefit in both echos and the stress tests,” Leon said.
“The concern here is the results will be distorted and sensationalized to apply to other patient populations where this kind of outcome very likely would not occur,” he added.
My counter to the argument that the patients included in this trial were not that sick is: Yes! That’s the point. These are exactly the sorts of patients who too frequently are subjected to PCI for in essence no benefit over that which can be achieved by medical management.
Next up:
Commenting for theheart.org | Medscape Cardiology, Dr Roxana Mehran (Ichan [sic] School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York City) said, “To me actually this study shows angioplasty is quite effective in reducing ischemia, improving [fractional flow reserve] FFR, and in fact I’m actually very pleased with this. It’s exactly what I want to do for my patients—improve their blood supply.”
Asked whether this isn’t just a positive spin on a negative study, Mehran quickly responded, “No,” adding that whenever a primary end point is a change in a value, showing an important difference is very hard to do when baseline values are so good, especially with only 200 patients.
“I promise you, had she studied 400 patients this would be positive because everything was in the right direction,” she said.
Actually, that’s exactly what she’s doing, trying to put a positive spin on a negative study. It’s so blatantly obvious that that’s what Dr. Mehran is doing that she should really be embarrassed to have said something like this to be published for the public to read. In fairness, she does have a germ of a point in that the study was relatively small and potentially underpowered to detect some differences. On the other hand, it’s rather interesting to note how some cardiologists totally twist the usual rationale and methodology used to determine if a therapy works. Here’s what I mean.
Normally, when a new intervention is first tested, it’s tested in small pilot trials. If a positive result is observed, that result justifies a larger trial to confirm efficacy and safety. If a positive result is not observed, then the treatment is generally abandoned or modified before being tested again. Now, get a load this:
During the press briefing Dr Robert Yeh (Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, MA) congratulated the authors on a courageous, bold, and well-executed trial but said the results reaffirm in many ways those from COURAGE.
“To extrapolate that this means that elective PCI is not an indicated procedure is the furthest overreach that I can possibly imagine from a very small and I think hypothesis-generating trial with an interesting result,” he said.
Let’s grant Dr. Yeh his characterization of this study as “hypothesis-generating.” When hypothesis-generating studies are negative, the hypothesis is usually considered to be not worth testing further, barring serious methodologic or design issues in the hypothesis-generating study. To demand another, much larger, much more expensive study to follow up on a result that, even if Dr. Yeh is correct, would likely be a very modest difference in an increase in exercise tolerance. Basically, much, although in fairness not all, of what these cardiologists are doing is to make excuses.
None of this is to say that ORBITA is bulletproof. It is, compared to other trials of PCI, relatively small. There was a trend towards improved exercise tolerance in the PCI group compared to the sham group that might have been significant with more patients. The question, of course, is whether it would be worth it to do another larger trial. After all, interventional cardiologists are utterly convinced that PCI is more effective than OMT and are unlikely to change practice (much) based on this trial:
How will the results of ORBITA be viewed? It will be a combination of love and hate. ORBITA was rigorously designed and undertaken with great care and painstaking attention to detail using objective exercise and physiologic outcome measures before and after stabilization on OMT, combined with the use of well-validated quality of life metrics before and after randomization. Overall, the results were stunningly negative, which ORBITA supporters will cite. By contrast, it is very likely that many in the interventional community will be ready to pounce on and discredit this study — there certainly hasn’t been an opportunity since COURAGE was published 10 years ago in 2007 to potentially discredit a trial that now confronts the sacred cow of PCI benefit for angina relief as the sole basis to justify PCI in stable CAD patients. They will likely cite the limitations of small numbers (only 200 patients), that the study was woefully underpowered, the potential ethical conundrum of subjecting subjects with significant flow-limiting CAD to a sham procedure (or deferred PCI for clinical need), that 28%-32% of randomized subjects had either normal FFR or IFR (and therefore didn’t have a “physiologically significant,” or flow-limiting stenosis, that PCI would otherwise benefit), that there was a low frequency of multivessel CAD, that the short duration of follow-up (only 6 weeks) was too brief to assess potential benefit (though this actually favored the PCI group) and, of course, who would have the time or patience to call patients three times/week to assess their response to intensifying medical therapy — “not real-world,” just like the OMT used in COURAGE wasn’t achievable in the real-world.
Despite these reactions, I do have some optimism. Interventional radiologists reacted very negatively to the trials showing that vertebroplasty for osteoporotic spinal fractures doesn’t work. Eventually, they started to come around, and usage of vertebroplasty for this indication is declining, albeit not as fast as it should. Science- and evidence-based medicine is messy, and there is some truth to the old adage that old treatments don’t ever quite disappear until the generation that learned them retires or dies off. But change does come in response to clinical trials.
In the meantime, whatever effect ORBITA has on clinical practice, it should serve as a wakeup call that in clinical trials of surgical or procedural interventions examining endpoints with a degree of subjectivity (unlike, for instance, death or time to cancer recurrence), whenever possible, new interventions should be compared to sham procedures. Of course, this isn’t always possible, either for ethical or practical reasons, but when it is practical sham procedures are just as essential as placebo controls in drug trials.

Psychological Placebos
New research shows the importance of carefully separating real therapeutic effects from psychological placebos.
Steven Novella on February 6, 2019
Link

A thorough understanding of placebo effects is critical to the science of medicine, and to understanding how objectively worthless interventions can become so popular. A recent article in Nature: Scientific Reports presents a series of experiments that take a look at psychological placebos, where the intervention is not medical, but purely psychological. The results are not surprising, but they are instructive for both practitioners and researchers.
I have been writing about placebo effects since this blog began, because it is perhaps the most misunderstood and abused concept in medicine. Further, it lies at the heart of a deliberate campaign to weaken scientific standards in medicine and confuse the public in order to promote fanciful and ineffective treatments. Essentially, the public is being sold a misconception – that placebo effects are real biological effects that can be exploited to produce real healing. However, decades of actual research tell a very different story.
Placebo effects are a combination of non-specific effects of the therapeutic interaction, and an illusion of biased perception. Measured placebo effects are generally subjective and short-lived. They result from things like having an improved mood at the expectation of being treated, a positive therapeutic interaction, getting medical attention, and being compliant with treatment. These are non-specific effects, meaning that they derive from the medical interaction, not from any real physiological effect of the treatment itself. The illusory effects include subjective validation, regression to the mean, and confirmation bias. We tend to seek treatment when our symptoms are at their worst, so they are bound to improve. Many illnesses are self-limiting – they will get better on their own, no matter what we do. And we will tend to subjectively interpret our symptoms in line with our expectations and desires, perhaps out of a motivation to justify the decision to seek a specific treatment.
This is why placebo-controlled double-blind assessments are critical in clinical trials. Without them, we can’t really be sure of the results.
This is the point at which many people ask, “What’s the difference?” What does is matter if someone feels better because of a physiological effect or placebo effect, as long as they feel better? It matters a great deal. First, the person may not actually feel better, but has convinced themselves that they do in order to justify the treatment. This could be dangerous, if the illness being treated is something like asthma. This could delay presentation for medical care, increasing the risk of death.
Further, placebo effects are powerful at convincing people that a treatment works when in fact it doesn’t. This leads to numerous harms – seeking ineffective treatments at considerable cost and lost opportunity, delaying or replacing effective treatment, and leading people to unscientific and even bizarre beliefs about health and disease. This also makes them vulnerable to charlatans, whether knowing or themselves deceived.
Scientifically the harm is also great. Without properly accounting for placebo effects, science cannot progress. If researchers cannot distinguish between a real physiological treatment and non-specific treatment effects, they will not know which medical theories are more correct, and which are blind alleys. Medical research will then chase its tail, and not make any real progress. We don’t have to assume this will happen – we historically saw this happen, for literally thousands of years. Bizarre notions of health and disease flourished in every culture prior to scientific medicine, largely driven by placebo effects. Real progress was stymied. Understanding and controlling for placebo effects is largely responsible for the progress medicine has made in the last century.
Psychological placebo
All of the above also applies to psychological interventions, which can be even more challenging to tease apart genuine effects from placebo effects. There are a few reasons for this. First, many outcomes in psychological treatment are inherently subjective – how do patients feel? We can find objective markers in some cases, like lost days of work, use of symptomatic medication, or observed behavior, but there is still a huge subjective component.
But also – the non-specific therapeutic interventions are actually a large part of the point of treatment. Clients are supposed to form a positive therapeutic relationship with their therapist, and this alone can have a positive impact. It is still, however, critically important to tease apart specific from non-specific therapeutic effects, because otherwise the science of therapy will not advance, and patients and practitioners will waste a lot of time engaging in theatrical placebos without any inherent benefit.
This brings us to the current study, which is actually a good example of the kind of treatments that tend to thrive in the world of mental health because of the challenge of detecting placebo effects. The researchers did a series of three experiments on a total of 421 subjects. Subjects were exposed to green images on a computer screen, either a dot, a flux (a moving combination of green, white, and yellow colors), or a morph (pulsating green and yellow circles). In each of the studies there was a control condition in which subjects were exposed to the green video and were told only that they were a control, with an emotionally neutral technician. In the placebo condition the subjects were given a rationale for why the green video should improve their mood. In the placebo-plus condition, the technician was also instructed to be friendly, empathic, and positive. In the third study only, the green morph, there was a fourth group with a friendly technician, but without the therapeutic rationale.
So all the interventions were just placebos, and the researchers just made up the alleged rationale for why looking at a video of green color for six minutes should improve their mood. The results in all cases showed no effect on mood, alertness, or calmness for the control condition. The placebo condition showed a positive effect only for calmness. The placebo plus condition showed a positive effect for mood and calmness (but not alertness). In the third experiment, the positive interaction without the rationale showed no benefit. All results were greatest in the short term, but still present (although diminished) at 7 days. They were not measured beyond 7 days.
These results mostly confirm conventional wisdom and prior research – that when you combine an explanation for why an intervention should help, with a positive caring therapist, people feel less stressed and have a positive mood, at least in the short term. I was a little surprised that the positive interaction alone did not have any significant effect, but that was looked at in only on group and so there is limited data.
Taken at face value, this research suggests that a therapist can essentially make up whatever bull they want, and as long as they are friendly and positive, their clients will feel better in the short term. The implication of this is that any intervention will seem to work in these conditions.
Again, the problem with this is that then practitioners assume the underlying theory must be correct, when we know that this is not true. Let’s take EMDR, for example, the idea that having a patient move their eyes back and forth has a specific therapeutic benefit. Unless we control properly for the clear nonspecific effects of doing any intervention, we cannot know if the underlying theory of EMDR has any merit. It probably doesn’t, in my opinion, and the neurological explanations are contrived and unconvincing. The clinical research so far is not able to exclude non-specific effects as the sole cause.
There are also non-benign interventions that are based on pure magical thinking, or result in interventions that are inherently abusive or dangerous, like attachment therapy. Also, people seeking psychological treatments are an especially vulnerable population, and therapists are in an especially powerful position. It is unfortunately easy, for example, in this context to convince clients that they were abused when they were younger, when it never happened. This lead to an entire industry of what we now know is false memory syndrome.
The subjective nature of psychological symptoms and therefore interventions means that researchers need to be more careful in designing studies, and to carefully, even obsessively, control for nonspecific placebo effects. Otherwise what they are doing is the very definition of pseudoscience – it has all the trappings of science and may seem superficially convincing, but is not actually advancing our understanding of human psychology and treatment.
